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In  the  Introduction  I  briefly  lay  out  the  history  of  the  value  terms  that  I  will  be 
considering  in  my  thesis  and  consider  the  philosophical  relevance  of  the  development  of 
such  values  in  the  5t'  century.  The  infiltration  of  modern  ideas  of  morality  into  what  was 
considered  to  be  good  to  the  Greeks  has  a  great  influence  on  the  literature  and  philosophy 
of  this  period.  Plato  prioritises  these  quiet  moral  virtues,  but  also  tries  to  hang  on  to  some 
of  what  had  come  before,  and  thus  faces  difficulties  with  his  moral  theory.  I  will  show 
that  courage  presents  Plato  with  an  acute  difficulty  when  attempting  to  develop  a 
consistent  ethical  theory. 
In  Chapter  2I  look  at  the  Protagoras  where  the  main  issues  about  courage  that  Plato  will 
continue  to  discuss  throughout  his  life  are  introduced.  The  questions  of  the  extent  to 
which  the  virtues  can  be  taught  and  the  unity  of  the  virtues  are  introduced  early  on.  What 
follows  is  an  attempt  to  explain  and  justify  the  Socratic  idea  that  the  virtues  are  co- 
dependent  and  that  they  all  in  some  way  boil  down  to  knowledge.  In  Chapter  3  on  the 
Laches  I  will  show  that  the  discussion  focuses  more  particularly  on  the  virtue  of  courage 
and  is  mostly  a  more  sophisticated  attempt  to  understand  courage  than  the  one  presented 
in  the  Protagoras.  The  early  dialogues  are  chiefly  concerned  with  the  Socratic  idea  that 
virtue  is  knowledge  and  my  discussion  in  those  chapters  considers  how  well  this  theory 
works  when  related  to  courage.  The  role  of  fear  in  a  definition  of  courage  is  not  explicitly 
considered  in  these  early  works  but  it  is  clearly  a  fundamental  part  of  any  explanation  of 
courage.  The  position  Plato  takes  on  fear  in  the  early  dialogues  is  not  altered  in  any 
significant  way  until  we  get  to  the  Laws  -and  even  then  not  substantially  enough  -  and  so 
the  inherent  problems  in  this  approach  are  continued  into  the  middle  period. 
In  the  following  three  chapters  (4-6)  1  examine  the  position  taken  in  the  Republic  in 
detail,  which  I  take  to  be  more  representative  of  the  Platonic  rather  than  Socratic  position. 
Plato's  psychological  model  -  which  includes  direct  influence  from  the  lower  soul  -  is  a more  reasonable  interpretation  of  the  internal  workings  of  the  agent  than  the  simpler 
model  in  the  early  dialogues  of  the  only  direct  motivator  being  beliefs  or  knowledge.  This 
model  supports  the  definitions  given  of  the  virtues  in  the  Republic  and  thus  Plato's  ethical 
theory  is  presented  more  clearly  than  perhaps  anywhere  else  in  his  corpus.  The  same 
problems  face  Plato  in  explaining  courage  though,  in  spite  of  his  meticulous  thesis,  he 
still  must  explain  how  fear  operates  within  his  definition  and  I  look  at  this  in  detail  in 
Chapter  6  on  the  emotions. 
The  chapter  on  the  Laws  considers  the  idea  that  some  of  the  apparent  differences  between 
the  Republic  and  the  Laws  are  due  to  Plato's  growing  realisation  that  courage  will  not  be 
assimilated  into  a  unified  ethical  theory  of  the  type  that  he  wishes  to  propose.  Plato  takes 
the  dramatic  step  of  referring  to  the  acts  of  mercenary  soldiers  as  courageous  and  thus  the 
issue  of  whether  courage  should  always  be  considered  a  virtue  arises.  I  consider  what 
Christopher  Bobonich  has  called  the  Dependency  Thesis  as  an  attempt  to  understand  the 
relationship  between  these  two  apparently  different  types  of  courage.  At  the  end  of  the 
Laws  Plato  seems  more  unsure  about  the  position  he  should  take  on  the  unity  of  the 
virtues  and  how  to  explain  the  virtue  of  courage.  As  I  will  show  over  the  next  six 
chapters,  courage  presents  a  challenge  that  Plato  is  never  quite  able  to  meet,  but  the  ways 
in  which  he  fails  to  incorporate  it  into  his  ethical  position  provides  illuminating 
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In  his  influential  book  Merit  and  Responsibility  A.  W.  H  Adkins  puts  forward  the  thesis 
that  the  important  value  terms  in  Greek  times  -  those  such  as  agathos,  arete,  kalos,  kakos 
and  aischron  -  were  heavily  influenced  by  the  needs  of  the  society.  When  the  most 
important  quality  in  a  man  was  that  he  could  protect  his  dependents  from  the  threat  of 
death  or  servitude  through  warfare  the  agathoi  were  those  who  were  able  to  do  this.  Thus 
the  people  depicted  in  Homer  who  are  given  the  highest  honours  are  the  strong  and 
powerful  who  are  able  to  protect  the  weaker  who  depend  on  them.  Adkins  calls  the 
virtues  that  were  commended  in  heroes  such  as  Achilles  and  Agamemnon  competitive 
virtues.  Adkins  also  says: 
Being  the  most  powerful  words  of  commendation  used  of  a  man,  they  [courage, 
successful  leadership  etc.  ]  imply  the  possession  by  anyone  to  whom  they  are  applied 
of  all  the  qualities  most  highly  valued  at  any  time  by  Greek  society. 
In  the  5`h  century  the  meaning  behind  such  value  terms  becomes  much  more  muddled, 
perhaps  due  to  the  need  for  internal  civic  concord  which  relies  more  on  justice  and 
temperance  than  courage  and  skill  in  warfare.  We  start  to  see  value  terms  occasionally 
being  connected  with  characteristics  that  were  not  previously  recognised  as  important. 
What  Adkins  calls  the  quiet  virtues  -  as  opposed  to  the  competitive  virtues  of  the 
Homeric  world  -  start  to  seep  into  the  works  of  dramatists  such  as  Euripides,  Sophocles 
and  Aeschylus.  For  example  in  the  Suppliants  by  Aeschylus  we  find  him  praising  justice: 
Zeus 
...  watches  over  these  things,  and  holds  the  balance,  assigning  to  the  kakoi  their 
unjust  deeds,  to  the  law  abiding,  their  righteous  deeds. 
And  in  the  Ajax  by  Sophocles  we  find  him  commending  temperance: 
'  A.  W.  H.  Adkins,  Merit  and  Responsibility,  p.  31. 
2  Aeschylus,  Suppliants,  402,  from  Adkins'  own  translation  in  Merit  and  Responsibility. The  gods  love  men  who  are  temperate  and  hate  those  who  are  kakoi.  3 
I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  there  are  not  examples  of  Homer  or  Hesiod  praising  justice 
or  temperance,  but  that  the  occurrence  is  so  infrequent  as  to  be  noticeable.  Also  the 
references  to  the  warrior  or  king  being  agathos  because  they  are  brave  and  powerful  are 
plentiful  in  those  works.  So  when  the  writers  of  the  5th  century  start  to  praise  these  quiet 
virtues  it  is  not  that  they  have  never  been  spoken  of  well  before  but  that  they  are  now 
given  a  stronger  position  in  what  makes  a  man  agathos. 
This  development  towards  the  inclusion  of  quiet  virtues  into  the  concept  of  what  makes  a 
man  good  can  be  seen  more  explicitly  in  the  works  of  Plato.  In  the  Apology  Socrates  acts 
in  a  way  that  will  have  surprised  his  audience,  and  gives  the  first  sign  that  in  the  work  of 
Plato  we  will  appreciate  a  more  structured  and  analytical  approach  to  this  change  in 
attitude.  Socrates  does  not  present  himself  to  the  court  in  the  usual  manner;  he  does  not 
parade  his  friends  and  children  around  the  court  and  make  emotional  appeals  to  the  jury. 
In  this  way  his  approach  to  his  defence  would  have  been  in  contrast  to  the  norm  of  the 
day.  In  another  way,  what  Socrates  does  in  court  would  not  have  seemed  out  of  place  to 
his  audience  even  if  what  he  said  would  have.  It  was  common  practice  in  Greece  at  this 
time  to  appeal  for  leniency  on  the  grounds  that  you  have  been  a  valued  citizen  who  has 
contributed  to  the  life  of  the  state.  Socrates  does  make  reference  to  what  he  has  done  for 
Athens,  but  does  not  do  so  as  an  emotional  appeal  but  as  an  attempt  to  explain  his 
lifestyle,  and  his  value  to  his  homeland.  After  the  verdict  of  guilty  is  given  Socrates  says: 
I  did  not  follow  that  path  that  would  have  made  me  of  no  use  either  to  you  or  to 
myself,  but  I  went  to  each  of  you  privately  and  conferred  upon  him  what  I  say  is  the 
greatest  benefit,  by  trying  to  persuade  him  not  to  care  for  any  of  his  belongings  before 
caring  that  he  himself  should  be  as  good  and  as  wise  as  possible,  not  to  care  for  the 
city's  possessions  more  than  for  the  city  itself,  and  to  care  for  other  things  in  the  same 
way.  4 
3  Sophocles,  Ajax,  132,  from  Adkins  own  translation  in  Merit  and  Responsibility. 
4  Apology  36c1-dl. 
2 Socrates  believed  that  he  had  provided  a  valuable  service  to  the  men  of  Athens.  What  is 
surprising  about  Socrates'  speech  in  the  Apology  is  that  he  frequently  links  the  value  of 
justice  with  arete.  He  does  this  both  implicitly  -  by  his  claims  that  the  only  thing  that 
matters  is  that  he  has  behaved  justly  -  and  explicitly: 
Do  you  think  I  would  have  survived  all  these  years  if  I  were  engaged  in  public  affairs 
and,  acting  as  a  good  man  must,  came  to  the  help  of  justice  and  considered  this  the 
most  important  thing.  5 
By  claiming  that  a  good  man,  an  agathos,  would  come  to  the  help  of  justice  Plato  is 
making  an  explicit  claim  about  what  kind  of  person  a  good  man  is.  To  attempt  to  clarify 
the  meaning  of  a  term  such  as  agathos  at  that  point  in  the  5  `h  century  was  a  particularly 
challenging  exercise,  but  one  which  Plato  took  on: 
Plato's  chief  problem  in  ethics  is  the  problem  which  has  existed  in  Greek  values  from 
Homer  onwards:  namely,  that  of  affixing  dikaiosune,  and  the  quiet  virtues  generally, 
to  the  group  of  values  based  on  arete  so  firmly  as  to  make  future  severance 
impossible.  6 
As  well  as  establishing  Plato's  position  on  the  importance  of  the  quiet  virtues,  the 
Apology  establishes  Socrates  as  the  heroic  figure  of  Plato's  work.  By  having  respect  for 
the  old  values  -  such  as  courage,  and  the  new  ones  -  such  as  justice,  Socrates  himself 
represents  the  ethical  position  Plato  will  take  in  most  of  his  works.  When  Socrates  puts 
the  question  he  expects  from  others  -'are  you  not  ashamed,  Socrates,  to  have  followed 
the  kind  of  occupation  that  has  led  to  your  being  now  in  danger  of  death?  '7  -  he  replies 
by  comparing  his  behaviour  with  that  of  Achilles: 
According  to  your  view,  all  the  heroes  who  died  at  Troy  were  inferior  people, 
especially  the  son  of  Thetis  who  was  so  contemptuous  of  danger  compared  with 
disgrace.. 
. 
he  despised  death  and  danger  and  was  much  more  afraid  to  live  a  coward 
who  did  not  avenge  his  friends.  "Let  me  die  at  once,  "  he  said,  "when  once  I  have 
'  Apology  32e3-5. 
6  Adkins  p.  259-260. 
7  Apology  28b3-4. 
3 given  the  wrongdoer  his  deserts,  rather  than  remain  here,  a  laughingstock  by  the 
curved  ships,  a  burden  upon  the  earth.  "8 
Socrates  is  like  Achilles  in  his  lack  of  interest  in  death;  the  continuity  between  their 
positions  is  that  only  what  makes  one  good  should  be  considered  -  even  if  that  would 
have  meant  different  things  to  these  two  men  -  and  that  the  threat  of  death  itself  should 
not  sway  you.  Achilles  is  also  said  to  be  afraid  of  living  like  a  coward  and  doing  what  he 
believed  to  be  shameful.  The  idea  that  the  brave  man  should  feel  fear  of  doing  the  wrong 
things  is  a  central  part  of  Plato's  definition  of  courage  in  his  dialogues. 
The  clash  between  the  traditional  values  of  the  Homeric  period  and  the  new  set  of  values 
can  be  seen  perhaps  more  clearly  in  the  Gorgias  than  the  Apology  in  an  impassioned 
speech  by  Callicles: 
What  nature  approves  and  sanctions..  . 
is  to  do  nothing  to  hinder  or  restrain  the 
expansion  of  one's  desires.. 
. 
Now,  I  don't  think  most  people  can  do  this,  and  that's 
why  they  condemn  those  that  can;  they're  ashamed,  and  they  try  to  disguise  their 
failings  by  claiming  that  self-indulgence  is  contemptible..  . 
And  why  do  they  praise 
self-discipline  and  justice?  Because  their  own  timidity  makes  them  incapable  of 
winning  satisfaction  for  their  pleasures.  9 
Callicles  rejects  the  redefinition  of  arete  so  as  to  predominately  include  the  quiet  virtues 
that  Plato  is  attempting,  he  explicitly  holds  to  the  traditional  interpretation  of  what  makes 
a  man  good. 
The  virtue  of  courage  spans  both  the  traditional  definition  of  what  makes  a  man  agathos 
and  the  new  interpretation.  The  Homeric  heroes  were  expected  to  be  brave  almost  above 
all  else,  but  it  is  also  one  of  the  four  central  virtues  that  Plato  includes  in  his  theory  about 
virtue.  As  the  Homeric  system  of  values  was  not  analysed  to  the  extent  that  Plato 
examined  the  virtues  in  his  work  it  was  traditionally  an  acceptable  part  of  a  slightly 
8  Apology  28c2-d4. 
9  Gorgias  491  e9-492b  1. 
4 muddled  conception  of  virtue.  However,  including  courage  in  the  transition  to  a  generally 
more  quiet  conception  of  virtue  creates  considerable  problems  for  Plato;  this  is  because 
our  common  conception  of  courage  can  be  exhibited  by  people  who  are  certainly  not  just, 
moderate  and  wise.  We  will  see  in  the  following  chapters  that  Plato's  attempt  to  include 
courage  in  a  unified  theory  of  virtue  in  the  Protagoras,  Laches,  Republic  and  the  Laws 
presents  him  with  considerable  difficulty.  At  each  stage  of  his  career  courage  challenges 
the  consistency  of  Plato's  view;  by  the  time  of  the  Laws,  Plato  appears  to  be  aware  of  the 
difficulty  courage  presents  to  his  thesis  and  quite  radically  alters  his  interpretation  of  the 
virtue  -  in  that  it  is  no  longer  necessarily  a  virtue  at  all. 
On  a  different  note,  there  is  an  important  difficulty  when  trying  to  analyse  the  views  of 
Plato.  His  choice  to  use  the  dialogue  form,  in  which  he  never  appears,  means  that  in  the 
early  dialogues  at  least,  his  own  ideas  are  never  explicit.  Due  to  this  difficulty  there  has 
been  much  discussion  of  whether  the  dialogues  can  be  considered  to  reflect  the  views  of 
the  historical  Socrates  or  those  of  Plato.  There  are  two  main  schools  of  thought 
concerning  this  issue  -  the  Unitarian  view  and  the  developmental.  The  Unitarian 
tradition,  supported  by  Shorey,  Friedlander  and  to  some  extent  Kahn,  subscribes  to  the 
view  that  all  Plato's  dialogues  were  written  from  a  single  unchanging  point  of  view.  In 
contrast,  developmentalists,  such  as  Guthrie  and  Vlastos,  believe  that  Plato  started  from 
the  position  of  the  historical  Socrates  and  gradually  developed  his  own  views,  which 
grew  and  changed  throughout  his  life. 
The  most  common  developmentalist  position  is  that  which  supports  the  idea  that  the 
`early'  dialogues  are  Socratic  and  the  `middle'  and  `late'  dialogues  are  Platonic.  Thus 
Guthrie  said  the  early  dialogues  are  where  Plato  `is  imaginatively  recalling,  in  form  and 
substance  the  conversations  of  his  master  without  as  yet  adding  to  them  any  distinctive 
doctrine  of  his  own"0.1  reject  the  Unitarian  view  and  some  versions  of  the 
developmental  view  of  the  Socratic  or  Platonic  content  of  the  dialogues.  The  main 
10  Guthrie,  A  History  of  Greek  Philosophy,  Vol.  IV,  p.  345. 
5 difficulties  with  the  Unitarian  position  are  that  there  are  inconsistencies  between  the  early 
dialogues,  and  that  most  thinkers  do  develop  and  change  their  views  throughout  their 
lifetime,  and  it  is  natural  to  assume  that  Plato  would  have.  I  will,  for  example,  argue  in 
the  following  chapter  that  the  hedonism  Socrates  espouses  in  the  Protagoras  is  not 
consistent  with  his  position  in  the  Gorgias  or  other  early  dialogues. 
What  I  intend  to  argue  is  that  the  picture  is  more  complex  than  Unitarians  and  some 
Developmentalists  allow  for,  and  that  the  `early'  dialogues  do  contain  the  ideas  that  Plato 
learned  from  conversations  with  Socrates,  but  not  just  those.  I  do  not  agree  that  the 
division  between  the  early  and  middle  dialogues  is  based  on  the  idea  that  Plato  started 
introducing  his  own  theories  only  in  the  middle  dialogues,  or  that  the  Socratic  influence 
over  Plato  disappeared  at  this  time.  I  think  that  there  is  evidence  that  Plato  was  already 
testing  out  his  own  views,  and  seeing  how  they  fared  against  the  Socratic  ones  in  some  of 
the  dialogues  that  are  certainly  considered  to  be  `early'.  If  this  were  the  case  it  may  mean 
either  that  the  generally  accepted  chronology  is  incorrect,  or  that  the  chronology  cannot 
be  organized  into  neat  compartments  the  first  of  which  is  labelled  `Socratic'  and  the 
second  `Platonic'.  I  am  not  sure  whether  the  question  of  chronology  is  one  that  can  be 
conclusively  answered  with  the  information  we  have,  and  I  will  not  attempt  to  answer  it 
here.  I  will  discuss  the  various  reasons  I  have  for  believing  that  there  was  more  of  Plato 
in  the  early  dialogues  than  has  been  accepted  in  the  developmental  tradition  in  the 
following  two  chapters  on  the  Protagoras  and  the  Laches.  It  is  enough  at  this  point  to  say 
that  the  picture  I  favour  is  one  where  we  do  see  the  Socratic  ideas  in  the  early  dialogues, 
but  that  it  is  not  Plato's  intention  to  simply  immortalize  them  in  his  writing.  It  is  more 
correct  to  see  the  early  dialogues  as  Platonic  exercises,  which  enabled  him  to  come  to  the 
philosophical  conclusions  that  he  espoused  later.  To  some  extent  then  he  did  begin  from 
the  Socratic  position,  but  he  did  not  do  so  uncritically. 
6 Chapter  2:  Courage  and  Hedonism  in  the  Protazoras 
Contents 
1.  Introduction  (p.  8) 
2.  Courage  (p.  9) 
3.  Hedonism  (p.  15) 
i.  The  Protagoras  and  the  Gorgias 
ii.  Gosling  and  Taylor 
iii.  Rudebusch 
iv.  An  alternative  interpretation 
4.  The  Commensurable  Scale  (p.  25) 
i.  Can  we  have  commensurability  such  that  we  can  judge  all  options  open  to  us 
on  the  amount  of  pleasure  contained? 
ii.  Is  commensurability  necessary  for  Socrates'  denial  of  akrasia? 
5.  Courage  (p.  31) 
6.  The  Development  from  the  Protagoras  and  the  Laches  to  the  Republic  (p.  35) 
7.  Conclusion  (p.  38) 
7 1.  Introduction 
The  Protagoras  is  the  first  of  the  early  dialogues  to  put  courage  centre  stage'.  In  this 
dialogue  Socrates  argues  for  the  thesis  that  virtue  is  in  some  way  reducible  to 
knowledge.  It  is  in  this  dialogue  that  the  problems  associated  with  applying  such  a 
theory  to  courage  start  to  take  shape.  We  will  see  that  Plato  has  great  difficulty  in 
explaining  courage  in  the  light  of  the  position  he  takes  on  hedonism  in  the 
Protagoras,  the  role  of  which  in  this  dialogue  is  to  bolster  his  anti-akractic, 
intellectualist  stance.  Given  that  the  thesis  that  virtue  is  knowledge  is  subsequently 
built  on  hedonism  it  is  clear  from  the  outset  that  courage  is  going  to  be  problematic. 
We  may  be  able  to  accept  that  being  a  good  person  is  the  best  kind  of  life,  but  that 
doesn't  mean  we  can  also  accept  that  it  will  be  the  most  pleasurable,  or  that  it  should 
be.  Wouldn't  a  man  who  took  pleasure  in  the  slaughter  of  battle  be  a  monster  rather 
than  an  example  of  virtuous  behaviour?  Ultimately,  Socrates'  support  of  hedonism 
creates  more  problems  for  a  coherent  definition  of  courage  than  it  solves.  I  will  also 
argue  in  this  chapter  that  the  Protagoras,  like  the  Laches,  provides  Plato  with  a  forum 
to  examine  the  ideas  of  his  teacher  and  other  ideas  of  the  time  before  he  took  the  step 
of  writing  a  more  assertive  dialogue  like  the  Republic. 
11  will  argue  this  in  this  and  the  following  chapter. 2.  Courage 
The  dialogue  begins  with  the  question  whether  virtue  can  be  taught.  Protagoras 
believes  that  it  can  be  and  defends  his  position  in  his  great  speech2.  The  point  of  this 
is  that  even  though  there  are  no  recognised  teachers  of  virtue,  the  Athenians  make 
every  effort  to  teach  virtue  to  the  young.  The  education  they  receive  (especially  the 
musical  elements)  is  designed  for  this  purpose  and  so  are  the  laws  of  the  city.  But 
instead  of  replying  directly  to  these  claims  Socrates  raises  the  question  of  the  unity  of 
virtue.  The  discussion  of  unity  is  perhaps  intended  to  illuminate  the  question  of  the 
teachability  of  virtue  and  in  the  end  place  both  Socrates  and  Protagoras  in  difficult 
philosophical  positions.  Their  contrasted  positions  in  the  final  pages  -  that  Socrates 
thinks  virtue  is  knowledge  but  cannot  be  taught  and  Protagoras  thinks  virtue  is  not 
knowledge  but  can  be  taught  -  confirms  that  something  is  awry  in  the  discussion  -  or 
their  initial  statements  concerning  teachability. 
After  the  introductory  discussion  and  Protagoras'  first  speech  the  conversation  turns  to 
the  question  of  the  unity  of  the  virtues.  Protagoras  has  spoken  in  his  speech  about  the 
virtues  as  if  they  were  `collectively  one  thing'3.  In  response  to  this  Socrates  asks: 
Is  virtue  a  single  thing,  with  justice  and  temperance  and  piety  its  parts,  or  are  the 
things  I  have  just  listed  all  names  for  a  single  entity?  4 
To  this  question  Protagoras  responds  by  claiming  that  `virtue  is  a  single  entity,  and  the 
things  you  are  asking  about  are  its  parts'5.  Socrates  wants  to  know  whether  Protagoras 
thinks  the  individual  virtues  are  `heterogeneous  in  the  way  that  eyes,  ears  and  nose  are 
parts  of  a  face,  or  are  they  homogeneous  like  the  parts  of  a  lump  of  gold?  '6  Protagoras 
responds  that  they  are  like  the  parts  of  a  face,  whereas  Socrates'  aim  in  the  Protagoras 
is  to  try  and  argue  that  they  have  a  stronger  connection,  perhaps  that  they  are  more 
akin  to  parts  of  a  lump  of  gold  -  all  reducible  to  knowledge.  Protagoras  rejects  both 
2  Protagoras  320d  1-328d3. 
3  Prot.  329c5. 
4  Prot.  329d  1-3. 
s  Prot.  329d4-5. 
6  Hobbs,  Angela,  Plato  and  the  Hero,  p.  113. the  stronger  and  the  weaker  versions  of  the  unity  of  the  virtues.  The  stronger  thesis  is 
that  the  virtues  alI  amount  to  the  same  thing;  that  `bravery',  `wisdom',  `temperance', 
`justice',  and  `piety'  are  all  words  that  refer  to  the  same  thing.  The  weaker  thesis  is 
that  the  virtues  are  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  of  each  other,  in  that  people  are 
brave  if  and  only  if  they  are  wise,  temperate,  just  and  pious.  As  Terry  Penner 
explained,  the  former  thesis  is  called  the  stronger  because  it  entails  but  is  not  entailed 
by  the  latter  -  the  weaker  thesis7.  Protagoras  makes  it  clear  that  he  rejects  both  theses 
of  the  unity  of  the  virtues  when  he  claims  that  the  virtues  are  not  even  necessarily 
found  together:  `many  are  courageous  but  unjust,  and  many  again  are  just  but  not 
wise'8. 
To  challenge  the  claims  made  by  Protagoras  that  the  virtues  are  distinct  and  separable 
Socrates  gives  three  arguments.  Each  of  the  arguments  is  intended  to  show  that  two  of 
the  virtues  that  Protagoras  believes  can  be  found  separately  are  in  fact  intrinsically 
linked.  The  first  argument9  is  designed  to  show  that  justice  and  piety  are  the  same 
kind  of  thing,  but  it  is  not  successful.  Protagoras  says  concerning  the  virtues  that  `they 
are  not  like  each  other  in  power  or  function  or  in  any  other  way"°.  Protagoras  believes 
that  the  virtues  can  be  found  separately,  therefore  that  we  cannot  assume  that  if  a 
person  is  just  then  they  will  be  pious.  Socrates  then  asks  him: 
Isn't  piety  the  sort  of  thing  that  is  just,  and  isn't  justice  the  sort  of  thing  that  is 
pious?  Or  is  it  the  sort  of  thing  that  is  not  pious?  Is  piety  the  sort  of  thing  to  be  not 
just,  and  therefore  unjust,  and  justice  impious?  '1 
Socrates  is  asking  Protagoras  to  say  whether  he  thinks  that  piety  is  either  just  or 
unjust,  but  this  is  not  an  appropriate  question  given  what  Protagoras  has  said. 
Protagoras  is  clearly  committed  to  the  idea  that  it  is  not  the  case  that  piety  is  just, 
whereas  Socrates  has  asked  him  whether  piety  is  just  or  unjust.  Socrates  is  guilty  of  a 
switching  the  scope  of  the  negation  such  that  Protagoras  must  respond  by  either 
7  Penner,  T.,  'The  Unity  of  Virtue',  Plato  2:  Ethics,  Politics,  Religion  and  the  Soul. 
8  Prot.  329e5-6. 
9  Prot.  331a7-332a3. 
10  Prot.  330a6-7. 
10 agreeing  that  piety  is  just  or  not.  Protagoras  rightly  does  not  agree  to  respond  to 
Socrates'  conclusions  and  it  is  clear  that  as  he  hasn't  agreed  with  these  initial  points 
there  is  no  point  in  Socrates'  taking  the  argument  further.  Socrates  appears  to  mask 
the  failure  of  this  argument  with  insincere  magnanimity  when  he  says  that  he  has 
irritated  Protagoras  and  that  they  should  move  on  for  that  reason. 
The  second  argument12  is  designed  to  show  the  connection  between  temperance  and 
wisdom.  Socrates  has  more  success  with  this  attempt  even  thought  he  perhaps  should 
not  have  had.  After  establishing  the  idea  that  each  thing  can  only  have  one  opposite, 
Socrates  goes  on  to  argue  that  folly  is  the  opposite  of  both  temperance  and  wisdom, 
and  therefore  temperance  and  wisdom  must  be  the  same  thing.  Protagoras  could  have 
argued  that  folly  is  not  the  opposite  of  temperance  even  though  it  may  be  the  opposite 
of  wisdom,  but  instead  he  grudgingly  agrees  with  the  conclusion  even  though  he  is  not 
happy  about  it. 
The  third  argument13  sets  out  to  establish  a  connection  between  justice  and  wisdom 
but  Socrates  and  Protagoras  are  at  loggerheads  from  the  start.  Protagoras  claims  that 
one  can  show  good  judgement  whilst  acting  unjustly  -a  particularly  un-Socratic  claim 
-  but  that  this  is  only  the  case  if  the  end  result  is  good.  Protagoras  is  then  committed 
to  the  idea  that  we  only  show  good  judgement  when  we  do  something  if  the  end  result 
is  good  14.  This  idea  rules  out  the  possibility  that  someone  could  act  unjustly  and 
cleverly  and  according  to  all  possible  information  but  be  foiled  at  the  last  moment  by 
an  act  of  god  that  no  one  could  possibly  have  foretold.  In  this  situation  it  seems 
somewhat  unfair  to  say  that  they  did  not  show  good  judgement  if  without  the  act  of 
god  everything  would  have  turned  out  as  they  intended  and  to  their  advantage. 
Protagoras  is  thus  committed  to  the  claim  that  those  who  may  be  said  to  think  wisely 
while  behaving  unjustly  must  actually  bring  about  some  good  consequences.  What  is 
"Prot.  331a8-bl.  This  is  the  first  argument  Socrates  gives  to  challenge  Protagoras'  claim  that  the 
virtues  are  distinct. 
12  Prot.  332a3-333b3. 
1'  Prot.  333d3-c4. 
14  Prot.  333d8-12. 
11 not  clear  is  who  the  consequences  should  be  good  for.  One  would  guess  that 
Protagoras  thinks  of  them  as  being  advantageous  to  the  agent,  but  Socrates'  question 
of  whether  these  `goods  things  constitute  what  is  advantageous  to  people?  "5  muddies 
the  waters  and  enables  Protagoras  to  get  out  of  the  argument  by  going  on  to  a 
digression  about  the  relativity  of  good.  We  might  think  that  a  distinction  needs  to  be 
made  between  moral  and  non-moral  good  or  between  what  is  good  for  the  agent  and 
what  is  good  for  the  community.  It  is  possible  that  Protagoras  has  the  latter  in  mind, 
but  of  course  Socrates  needs  to  avoid  such  a  distinction. 
Socrates'  choice  of  arguments  in  response  to  Protagoras'  belief  that  the  virtues  are  not 
unified  is  interesting.  Protagoras'  specific  claim  is  that  'many  are  courageous  but 
unjust,  and  many  again  are  just  but  not  wise'  16.  Socrates  has  attempted  to  respond  to 
the  claim  that  many  are  just  but  not  wise  with  his  third  argument,  but  has  not 
addressed  the  idea  that  people  can  be  courageous  but  unjust.  As  I  have  argued  in 
Chapter  1,  courage  presents  a  particularly  acute  problem  for  Plato  because,  more  than 
any  of  the  other  cardinal  virtues,  it  does  not  easily  fit  into  the  conception  of  being 
wholly  good.  This  may  be  why  Plato  does  not  include  courage  in  these  arguments;  he 
might  recognise  that  courage  presents  a  difficulty  for  the  unity  of  the  virtues  and  thus 
have  Protagoras  more  explicitly  single  out  courage  so  that  Socrates  has  no  choice  but 
to  confront  this  problem.  After  an  interlude  and  the  discussion  about  poetry  Protagoras 
makes  his  position  clear: 
What  I  am  saying  to  you,  Socrates,  is  that  all  these  are  parts  of  virtue,  and  that 
while  four  of  them  are  reasonably  close  to  each  other,  courage  is  completely 
different  from  all  the  rest.  The  proof  that  what  I  am  saying  is  true  is  that  you  will 
find  many  people  who  are  extremely  unjust,  impious,  intemperate,  and  ignorant, 
and  yet  exceptionally  courageous'? 
Socrates  responds  to  this  bold  claim  with  the  following  argument: 
(i.  )  `courageous  men  are  confident'.  18 
15  Prot.  333d8-el. 
16  Prot.  329e5-6. 
17  Prot.  349d4-8. 
18  Prot.  349e2. 
12 (ii.  )  `virtue  is  something  fine'.  19 
(iii.  )  `Those  with  the  right  kind  of  knowledge  are  always  more  confident  than  those 
without  it,  and  a  given  individual  is  more  confident  after  he  acquires  it  than  he  was 
before'.  0 
(iv.  )  However,  `men  lacking  in  knowledge  of  all  these  occupations...  [can]  be 
confident  in  each  of  them'?  ' 
(v.  )  The  men  who  are  ignorant  and  `are  so  confident  turn  out  to  be  not  courageous 
but  mad'22,  because  otherwise  courage  would  be  contemptible. 
(vi.  )  `And,  on  the  other  side,  the  wisest  are  the  most  confident  and  the  most 
confident  are  the  most  courageous... 
(vii.  )...  And  the  logical  conclusion  would  be  that  wisdom  is  courage'23 
This  argument  given  by  Socrates  is  particularly  unsuccessful;  it  convinces  neither 
Protagoras  nor  the  modern  reader  that  courage  and  wisdom  are  the  same.  I  will  discuss 
point  (iii.  )  below  in  section  3,  but  for  the  moment  I  wish  to  concentrate  on  the  other 
issues  involved  in  this  argument.  Working  our  way  through  the  argument  we  already 
face  a  questionable  premise  at  (ii.  ).  Why  should  we  agree  with  Plato  both  that  courage 
is  one  of  the  virtues,  and  that  a  virtue  is  `something  fine'?  Plato  has  to  make  these 
assumptions  in  order  to  incorporate  courage  into  his  concept  of  virtue,  but  many  of  the 
problems  Plato  faces  in  his  ethical  theory  are  created  by  these  inconvenient  but 
perhaps  unavoidable24  assumptions.  Protagoras  of  course  accepts  this  premise  without 
blinking  an  eyelid,  as  it  would  have  been  a  familiar  idea  to  him  as  well.  I  will  address 
the  issue  of  courage  being  something  other  than  a  virtue  in  greater  depth  in  a  later 
chapter.  For  the  time  being  it  suffices  to  say  that  this  statement  alone  (and  the  claim 
derived  from  it  in  (v.  ))  does  not  itself  invalidate  the  argument,  and  that  they  are 
necessary  for  the  conclusions  Socrates  wishes  to  draw. 
One  of  the  logical  flaws  committed  by  Plato  in  this  argument  is  in  his  conclusion  in 
(vi.  ).  In  (vi.  )  Plato  claims  that  the  wisest  people  are  the  most  confident  and  that  the 
most  confident  people  are  the  most  courageous.  What  Plato  appears  to  be  arguing  here 
"  Prot.  349e4. 
20  Prot.  350a10-12. 
21  Prot.  350b  1  -2.  22  Prot.  350c2-3. 
23  Prot.  350c3-5. 
24  By  `unavoidable'  here  I  mean  that  given  the  ethical  tradition  it  was  unlikely  that  Plato  would  initially 
challenge  the  idea  that  courage  is  always  good.  We  shall  see  that  in  the  Laws  he  resigns  himself  to 
13 is  that  the  groups  of  people  we  would  call  `wisest,  `most  confident'  and  `most 
courageous'  are  co-extensive,  by  which  I  mean  that  the  same  people  would  be  found 
in  each  group.  Plato  has  gained  Protagoras'  acceptance  of  the  idea  that  the  wisest 
people  are  the  most  confident  in  (iii.  ),  but  Protagoras  has  at  no  point  accepted  that  the 
most  confident  are  the  most  courageous.  Protagoras  responds  with  the  statement  that: 
When  I  was  asked  if  the  courageous  are  confident,  I  agreed.  I  was  not  asked  if  the 
confident  are  courageous.  If  you  had  asked  me  that,  I  would  have  said,  `Not  all  of 
them'.  You  have  nowhere  shown  that  my  assent  to  the  proposition  that  the 
courageous  are  confident  was  in  error.  What  you  did  show  next  was  that 
knowledge  increases  one's  confidence  and  makes  one  more  confident  than  those 
without  knowledge.  25 
Protagoras  has  spotted  one  thing  that  is  amiss  in  Socrates'  argument  -  if  the  argument 
is  to  be  successful  Socrates  needs  to  establish  that  the  confident  are  courageous  but 
Protagoras  has  agreed  only  to  the  claim  that  the  courageous  are  confident.  In  fact  he 
thinks  that  some  confident  people  are  not  courageous  but  mad.  However  Protagoras 
does  not  draw  attention  to  a  second  flaw  in  Socrates'  argument.  If  (vi.  )  were  true  it 
would  imply  that  the  wisest  are  the  most  courageous,  but  to  say  this  is  not  the  same  as 
to  say  that  wisdom  and  courage  are  the  same.  The  claim  that  the  wisest  are  the  most 
courageous  would  be  compatible  with  the  claim  that  the  moderately  wise  are  not 
courageous  at  all.  But  if  that  were  the  case  then  wisdom  and  courage  could  not  be  the 
same  property.  Socrates  might  have  established  that  wisdom  and  courage  converge  at 
the  limit  but  that  would  not  entitle  him  to  claim  as  he  does  in  350c  that  his  argument 
shows  that  wisdom  is  courage. 
having  to  change  this  part  of  his  theory  presumably  due  to  the  fact  that  cannot  deal  with  the  problems 
encountered  in  previous  works. 
25  Prot.  350c7-d4. 
14 3.  Hedonism 
After  Protagoras'  speech  explaining  why  he  rejects  the  argument  set  out  to  prove  that 
wisdom  is  courage  Plato  suddenly  introduces  a  new  theme.  Socrates  asks  Protagoras 
whether  `some  people  live  well  and  others  live  badly?  26'  To  this  question  Protagoras 
replies  in  the  affirmative.  However  when  asked  if  he  is  willing  to  connect  pleasure  and 
the  good  in  such  a  way  that  `to  live  pleasantly  is  good,  and  unpleasantly,  bad'Z7,  he 
declines.  The  hedonistic  view  which  is  apparently  introduced  at  this  point  has  perhaps 
been  the  most  discussed  of  the  themes  in  this  dialogue,  and  the  most  challenging  part 
of  the  dialogue  to  explain.  Plato  appears  to  be  arguing  for  an  idea  that  is  inconsistent 
with  the  rest  of  his  work,  which  raises  the  question  to  what  extent  he  genuinely 
supported  the  arguments  presented  in  this  dialogue.  I  will  argue  that  the  version  of 
hedonism  that  Socrates  argues  for  in  the  Protagoras  does  present  us  with  a  serious 
interpretative  problem  as  long  as  we  wish  to  believe  that  the  (early)  dialogues  are 
genuine  accounts  of  either  Socrates'  or  Plato's  views.  The  views  expressed  in  the 
Protagoras  do  conflict  with  those  expressed  in  the  Gorgias  and  other  `early'  works.  I 
will  show  that  two  attempts  to  interpret  these  two  works  consistently  -  Gosling  and 
Taylor,  and  Rudebusch  -  ultimately  fail.  I  do  not  think  it  is  likely  that  the  answer  to 
this  inconsistency  is  that  either  Socrates  or  Plato  simply  changed  his  mind.  Although 
that  is  a  possible  explanation,  it  is  not  the  most  likely  as  it  would  mean  that  either 
Socrates  or  Plato  were  committed  to  a  theory  for  a  short  space  of  time  that  the 
dialogues  that  came  before  and  after  were  implicitly  critical  of.  Such  a  change  of  heart 
would  also  have  to  have  involved  extensive  revision  of  the  early  Platonic  position.  If 
it  is  then  the  case  that  Plato  is  advocating  a  theory  that  not  only  does  not  appear  in  the 
other  dialogues  but  also  is  actually  explicitly  argued  against  in  other  works  then  other 
kinds  of  explanations  must  be  sought.  If  Plato  could  not  consistently  believe  in  all  the 
theories  that  Socrates  argues  for  in  the  early  dialogues  (without  regularly,  and  rather 
drastically,  changing  his  mind),  then  these  dialogues  were  most  probably  not 
functioning  as  records  of  Socrates'  actual  beliefs.  If  this  is  the  case  then  in  what  other 
way  could  they  have  been  functioning? 
26  Prot.  351  b  1-2. 
27  Prot.  35  1c1. 
15 i.  The  Protagoras  and  the  Gorgias 
The  main  problem  with  the  hedonism  in  the  Protagoras  is  that  Socrates'  position  in 
other  dialogues  does  not  seem  to  support  such  a  view.  This  is  particularly  the  case  in 
the  Gorgias,  and  so  interpreting  these  two  dialogues  in  such  a  way  that  they  are  not 
openly  contradictory  has  been  rather  a  challenge.  As  Rudebusch  says  in  his  book 
Socrates,  Pleasure,  and  Value  a  straightforward  `reading  causes  an  interpretive 
dilemma  for  those  who  seek  to  ascribe  a  coherent  ethical  theory  to  Socrates  that 
underlies  his  argumentation  in  both  dialogues'28  .  In  the  Gorgias  Socrates  argues 
explicitly  against  Callicles  that  pleasure  and  goodness  are  two  different  things.  Near 
the  beginning  of  the  discussion  Socrates  and  Callicles  say: 
[Socrates]:  All  right,  let's  have  it  on  record  that  Callicles  of  Acharnae  claims  that 
`pleasant'  and  `good'  are  identical 
... 
[Callicles]:  And  what  shall  we  say  about 
Socrates  of  Alopece?  Does  he  or  does  he  not  agree  with  Callicles?  [Socrates]:  He 
does  not.  9 
Whereas  there  is  much  support  for  the  view  that  Socrates  is  advocating  some  kind  of 
identification  of  `pleasure'  and  `goodness'  in  the  Protagoras.  For  example: 
What's  this,  Protagoras?  Surely  you  don't  follow  the  common  opinion  that  some 
pleasures  are  bad  and  some  pains  good?  I  mean  to  say,  in  so  far  as  they  are 
pleasant,  are  they  not  also  good,  leaving  aside  any  consequence  that  they  may 
entail?  And  in  the  same  way  pains,  in  so  far  as  they  are  painful,  are  bad.  30 
ii.  Gosling  and  Taylor 
Gosling  and  Taylor3'  offer  an  explanation  of  the  apparent  inconsistency  between  the 
Gorgias  and  the  Protagoras  by  drawing  a  distinction  between  two  types  of  hedonism 
-  one  they  think  is  argued  against  in  the  Gorgias,  the  other  supported  in  the 
Protagoras.  Their  position  is  that  in  the  Gorgias  Socrates  argues  against  Callicles' 
version  of  hedonism  that  states  that  any  pleasure  is  the  good,  whether  that  be  the 
pleasure  of  immediate  gratification  or  the  pleasure  of  long-desired  and  worked  for 
Z$  Rudebusch,  George,  Socrates,  Pleasure,  and  Value,  p.  19. 
29  Gorgias  495d5-el. 
30  Prot.  351  c3-8. 
16 ambitions.  In  the  Protagoras  they  think  that  Socrates  is  arguing  for  an  enlightened 
hedonism  that  is  only  committed  to  the  idea  that  goodness  can  be  found  in  long-term 
pleasure.  Gosling  and  Taylor  work  through  the  arguments  in  the  Gorgias  and  show 
that  the  hedonism  of  the  Protagoras  is  not  a  target,  and  that  what  Socrates  is  doing  in 
his  discussion  with  Callicles  is  demonstrating  that  the  good  is  not  the  satisfaction  of 
all  and  any  desires  that  come  along32.  Thus  they  conclude  that: 
It  appears  that  the  alleged  inconsistency  between  the  Protagoras  and  the  Gorgias  is 
illusory.  What  is  maintained  in  the  former  is  not  what  is  attacked  in  the  latter,  nor 
is  Socrates'  position  on  pleasure  in  the  former  inconsistent  with  the  stance  which 
he  adopts  in  the  latter33 
The  argument  provided  by  Gosling  and  Taylor  allows  us  to  interpret  these  two 
dialogues  in  a  way  that  does  not  cause  conflict.  By  arguing  that  Socrates'  arguments 
against  Callicles  show  only  that  one  must  distinguish  goodness  from  immediate 
pleasantness  the  hedonism  in  the  Protagoras  that  allows  for  the  Socratic  rechne  of 
measurement  is  left  untouched. 
The  account  given  by  Gosling  and  Taylor  does  therefore  avoid  certain  difficulties, 
however  it  encounters  a  different  one  by  drawing  a  distinction  between  long-term  and 
short-term  pleasures.  Rudebusch  argues  that  the  distinction  that  Gosling  and  Taylor 
draw  between  long-term  and  short-term  pleasures  creates  the  loss  of  the 
commensurability  that  is  so  important  for  the  identification  of  virtue  with  knowledge 
and  the  unity  of  the  virtues  -  and  there  is  much  evidence  for  such  ideas  being 
genuinely  Socratic.  The  reason  why  the  commensurability  is  so  important  is  explained 
well  by  Terence  Irwin.  Irwin  describes  Socrates'  position  in  the  Protagoras  as 
epistemological  hedonism;  we  need  to  be  able  to  assess  which  options  will  provide  the 
most  overall  pleasure  in  order  to  pursue  what  is  pleasurable  (or  good)34.  He  argues 
that  hedonism  in  the  Protagoras  is  essential  for  Socrates  if  he  is  to  defend  the  truth  of 
31  Gosling  &  Taylor,  The  Greeks  on  Pleasure. 
32  For  more  detail  of  this  point  see  Gosling  &  Taylor,  The  Greeks  on  Pleasure. 
33  Gosling  &  Taylor,  The  Greeks  on  Pleasure,  p.  76-77. 
34  Irwin,  T.,  Plato's  Moral  Theory,  chapter  IV. 
17 the  unity  of  the  virtues  (UV)  and  the  idea  that  knowledge  is  sufficient  for  virtue 
(KSV).  He  says  that: 
If  the  many  were  not  hedonists,  their  initial  objection  to  KSV  would  not  be  refuted. 
For  they  suggested  that  some  of  man's  desires  -  for  food,  sex,  revenge,  and  so  on  - 
might  move  him  apart  from  his  beliefs  about  the  ýood;  and  only  HP  showed  that 
they  could  not  recognise  such  incontinent  desires  5 
His  claim  is  that  without  a  general  and  inclusive  hedonism,  which  provides  a 
commensurable  scale  on  which  to  compare  our  options,  knowledge  could  not  be  the 
determining  factor  of  virtue.  Knowledge  after  all  needs  a  subject  area  to  work  on,  and 
with  the  acceptance  of  the  idea  that  what  contains  the  most  pleasure  is  the  good,  it 
would  just  need  to  assess  which  options  contain  the  most  pleasure.  And  the  fact  that 
value  is  to  be  understood  in  terms  of  pleasure  makes  the  connection  between 
knowledge  and  action  so  acceptable,  as: 
Then  if  the  pleasant  is  the  good,  no  one  who  either  knows  or  believes  that  there  is 
another  possible  course  of  action,  better  than  the  one  he  is  following,  will  ever 
continue  on  his  present  course  when  he  might  choose  the  better.  36 
And  if  knowledge  is  sufficient  for  virtue  then  it  is  sufficient  for  all  virtue  and  the 
virtues  then  become  one;  they  are  all  essentially  knowledge  of  what  the  right  thing  to 
do  is.  As  Irwin  says: 
Socrates  defends  hedonism  only  by  showing  that  the  many  implicitly  accept  it  in 
their  choices.  But  to  defend  the  truth  of  KSV  and  UV,  hedonism  must  be  true,  and 
not  only  the  many's  belief.  37 
Irwin's  argument  that  Socrates  relies  on  this  belief  in  hedonism  in  order  to  argue  for 
other  theses  seems  plausible.  Therefore  if  the  point  of  including  hedonism  is  to  give 
support  for  these  other  more  important  theses,  this  role  that  hedonism  is  playing  must 
not  be  undermined  by  an  attempt  to  interpret  the  Protagoras  and  Gorgias  consistently. 
35  ibid,  p.  106.  'HP'  stands  for  the  Hedonism  Principle. 
36  Prot.  358b10-c4. 
18 However,  the  implausibility  of  Gosling  and  Taylor's  interpretation  is  not  simply  that  it 
would  negate  the  value  of  the  hedonism  for  Socrates,  but  that  there  is  textual  evidence 
that  he  did  not  support  such  a  position.  To  draw  any  distinction  between  different 
types  of  pleasures,  whether  it  is  between  long-term  and  short-term  pleasures,  or  high 
or  low  pleasures,  implies  that  not  all  pleasures  can  be  quantified  on  the  same 
commensurable  scale.  And  as  Socrates  says  in  the  Protagoras: 
For  if  someone  were  to  say:  `But  Socrates,  the  immediate  pleasure  is  very  much 
different  from  the  pleasant  and  the  painful  at  a  later  time,  '  I  would  reply,  `They  are 
not  different  in  any  other  way  than  by  pleasure  and  pain,  for  there  is  no  other  way 
that  they  could  differ.  Weighing  is  a  good  analogy;  you  put  the  pleasures  together 
and  the  pains  together,  both  the  near  and  the  remote,  on  the  balance  scale,  and  then 
say  which  of  the  two  is  more.  For  if  you  weigh  pleasant  things  against  pleasant,  the 
greater  and  the  more  must  always  be  taken.  8 
This  statement  makes  it  clear  that  Socrates  is  not  advocating  an  enlightened  version  of 
hedonism  that  prioritises  long-term  pleasures  over  short-term  ones,  but  that  the  fact 
that  some  pleasures  are  in  the  future  should  mean  that  they  often  carry  less  weight 
than  they  should  in  the  decision-making  process.  It  is  clear  then  that  Gosling  and 
Taylor's  distinction  between  different  kinds  of  pleasures  mistakenly  interprets  the 
thesis  argued  for,  and  invalidates  the  relevance  of  hedonism  in  the  Protagoras. 
iii.  Rudebusch 
Rudebusch's  theory  is  subtly,  but  importantly,  different  from  Gosling  and  Taylor.  His 
theory  also  relies  on  a  distinction  between  types  of  pleasures,  that  of  real  and 
apparent  pleasures.  He  also  believes  that  his  distinction  reconciles  the  Protagoras  and 
the  Gorgias  because  Socrates  is  only  attacking  apparent  pleasures  in  the  Gorgias, 
whereas  he  is  advocating  a  scale  of  real  pleasures  in  the  Protagoras.  This  distinction 
does  not  face  the  same  problems  as  the  Gosling  and  Taylor  distinction  as  it  is 
plausible  that  Socrates  is  discussing  what  is  genuinely  pleasurable  in  the  Protagoras, 
and  that  his  attack  on  Polus'  and  Callicles'  position  in  the  Gorgias  is  on  mistaking 
what  is  only  apparently  pleasurable  for  what  is  genuinely  pleasurable.  Socrates 
37  Irwin,  T.,  Plato's  Moral  Theory,  p.  108. 
38  Prof.  356a6-b6. 
19 attempts  to  persuade  his  interlocutors  that  by  doing  what  they  desire  they  may  not  be 
doing  what  they  will,  or  what  they  genuinely  desire.  Socrates  first  gets  Polus'  assent 
that  what  we  do  we  do  for  the  sake  of  the  good39.  He  then  states  that: 
We  don't,  then,  in  an  unqualified  sense,  want  to  slaughter  people  or  exile  them 
from  their  communities  or  confiscate  their  property.  We  want  to  do  these  things 
only  if  they're  in  our  interest,  but  if  they're  not  we  don't  want  to  do  them  because, 
as  you  admit,  we  want  good  things,  but  don't  want  things  that  are  either  indifferent 
or  bad  40 
Socrates'  theory  can  be  stated  in  the  form  of  the  biconditional:  `I  desire  to  murder  if 
and  only  if  the  murder  is in  fact  an  extrinsic  good  for  mei41  (where  an  extrinsic  good 
is  one  which  is  not  a  good  in  itself  but  is  good  or  bad  contingent  on  a  further 
criterion).  Therefore  if  the  murder  is  in  fact  not  in  the  person's  interest  Socrates  would 
claim  that  the  person  did  not  genuinely  desire  it,  and  it  would  be  only  an  apparent 
desire.  The  distinction  between  apparent  and  genuine  desires  does  then  appear  in  the 
Gorgias,  and  could  therefore  be  the  target  of  Socrates'  argument.  However,  I  shall 
show  that  there  are  two  problems  with  this  theory  that  Rudebusch  does  not  seem  to 
appreciate.  The  first  is  that  the  Protagoras  is  discussing  pleasure  not  desire  -  two 
different  states  -  and  when  the  discussion  in  the  Gorgias  turns  to  pleasure  when 
Socrates  is  talking  to  Callicles  the  theory  is  no  longer  so  credible.  The  second  is  that 
by  making  the  Protagoras  consistent  with  the  Gorgias  in  such  a  way,  he  is in  danger 
of  alienating  it  from  many  of  the  other  early  dialogues.  I  will  discuss  each  of  these 
problems  in  turn  next. 
The  theory  set  forward  by  Rudebusch  is  interesting  and  quite  plausible  when 
considering  the  views  of  Polus  in  the  Gorgias.  However,  if  we  look  at  Socrates' 
discussion  with  Callicles  his  position  becomes  less  convincing.  Socrates  articulates 
Callicles'  position  in  the  Gorgias: 
79  Gorgias  468b-c. 
40  Gorgias  468c3-9. 
"  Idea  found  in  Rudebusch's  Socrates,  Pleasure,  and  Value. 
20 All  right,  let's  have  it  on  record  that  Callicles  of  Acharnae  claims  that  `pleasant' 
and  `good'  are  identical,  but  that  knowledge  and  courage  are  different  from  each 
other  and  from  goodness  42 
Socrates,  on  the  other  hand,  claims  not  to  be  a  supporter  of  such  a  view.  It  is  clear  at 
this  point  that  Callicles'  position  is  not  that  the  good  and  apparent  pleasure  are  the 
same,  but  that  the  good  is  the  same  as  genuine  pleasure.  When  Socrates  paraphrases 
Callicles'  position  it  is  the  identification  of  goodness  with  actual  pleasure  that  he 
means,  and  the  argument  that  follows  shows  that  Socrates  is  arguing  against  this 
position  and  not  one  that  assimilates  goodness  to  apparent  pleasure.  The  argument 
falls  into  two  parts.  In  the  first  part  Socrates  gains  Callicles'  acquiescence  to  the  idea 
that  as  good  and  evil  fortune  are  opposed  to  one  another  they  are  therefore  mutually 
exclusive.  He  provides  examples  such  as  if  you  had  ophthalmia  in  both  eyes,  your 
eyes  cannot  at  the  same  time  be  healthy  -  in  other  words,  what  is  good  for  the  eyes 
and  what  is  bad  are  mutually  exclusive.  He  concludes  this  part  with  the  statement  that: 
Whenever  we  find  a  person  losing  and  keeping  things  at  the  same  time,  then,  we'll 
know  that  we're  not  faced  with  the  good  and  the  bad.  Do  you  agree  with  me  about 
this?  a3 
This  is  a  statement  to  which  Callicles  agrees.  In  the  second  part  of  the  argument 
Socrates  begins  by  saying  that  thirst  and  hunger  are  painful  and  the  satisfaction  of 
such  desire  is  pleasurable.  So  Callicles  has  admitted  that  by  drinking  and  satisfying 
your  thirst  you  are  both  in  pain  (because  you  are  thirsty)  and  enjoying  the  pleasure  of 
drinking  by  satisfying  your  thirst.  Socrates  then  reminds  Callicles  that  he  earlier 
agreed  to  the  claim  that  what  is  good  and  evil  cannot  be  experienced  at  the  same  time, 
and  therefore  concludes  that  pleasure  is  not  the  same  as  the  good,  and  pain  is  not  the 
same  as  the  bad.  I  am  not  concerned  with  the  possible  flaws  in  this  argument  but 
simply  that  Socrates'  attack  is  not  levelled  at  apparent  pleasure.  The  argument 
certainly  could  be  used  to  show  that  apparent  pleasures  and  pains  are  not  the  same  as 
good  and  evil  respectively,  but  it  can  -  and  appears  to  be  -  levelled  at  genuine 
pleasures.  Rudebusch's  argument  is  that  Socrates'  arguments  in  the  Gorgias  are  not 
attacking  the  genuine  pleasures  that  are  used  so  effectively  in  the  Protagoras,  but  as 
42  Gorgias  495d5-8. 
41  Gorgias  496c1-4. 
21 this  argument  with  Callicles  does  target  the  identification  of  pleasure  with  the  good 
regardless  of  the  distinction  between  genuine  and  apparent  pleasures  his  argument 
does  not  hold  water. 
The  struggle  with  the  Protagoras  and  the  Gorgias  is  not  simply  a  matter  of  finding  a 
reading  of  them  both  so  that  they  do  not  contradict  one  another,  but  a  matter  of  finding 
a  reading  of  the  early  dialogues  that  includes  both  the  Protagoras  and  the  Gorgias. 
Otherwise  the  ongoing  efforts  to  align  the  arguments  of  the  Protagoras  with  those  of 
the  Gorgias  would  be  only  an  academic  exercise,  and  would  not  necessarily  tell  us 
anything  interesting  about  the  early  work  of  Plato.  Rudebusch's  interesting  reading  of 
the  Protagoras  accepts  that  Socrates  was  actually  arguing  for  a  version  of  hedonism. 
What  all  cases  of  hedonism  have  in  common  is  described  very  well  by  J.  C.  B.  Gosling 
in  his  book,  `Pleasure  and  Desire:  the  case  for  hedonism  reviewed'.  He  says  that  what 
is  common  to  all  cases  of  hedonism  is  that: 
Pleasure  is  set  up  as  the  criterion  and/or  motive  of  (good)  action,  principles  or  way 
of  life.  There  are  many  other  ethical  views  which  make  out,  for  instance,  that  the 
life  of  virtue  must  at  least  be  pleasant,  or  contain  some  pleasures,  which,  however 
admirable  or  interesting  they  may  be  in  themselves,  fail  to  qualify  as  hedonistic 
because  they  explicitly,  and  not  just  by  unacknowledged  implication,  introduce 
some  other  criterion  than  pleasure  for  deciding  between  the  good  or  the  bad  life  or 
action  44 
For  Socrates'  theory  to  be  a  version  of  hedonism  it  must  be  committed  to  the  idea  that 
what  is  good  can  only  be  defined  as  such  by  considering  the  amount  of  pleasure  it 
produces  or  contains.  There  can  be  no  other  criterion  included  in  the  evaluation  that 
determines  the  ethical  value  of  an  action,  principle  or  way  of  life. 
The  difficulty  in  attributing  a  consistent  hedonism  to  the  Socrates  of  the  early 
dialogues  can  be  seen  in  the  Crito.  There  Socrates  says: 
44  Gosling,  J.  C.  B.,  Pleasure  and  Desire:  the  case  for  hedonism  reviewed,  pp.  25-26. 
22 Since  our  argument  leads  to  this,  the  only  valid  consideration,  as  we  were  saying 
just  now,  is  whether  we  should  be  acting  justly  in  giving  money  and  gratitude  to 
those  who  will  lead  me  out  of  here,  and  ourselves  helping  with  the  escape,  or 
whether  in  truth  we  shall  act  unjustly  in  doing  all  this  45 
Socrates  is  saying  that  the  only  relevant  question  is  whether  running  away  would  be 
the  right  thing  to  do.  The  things  that  Crito  wishes  him  to  consider  -  his  family,  friends 
and  himself-  he  does  not  believe  should  be  taken  into  account.  Strictly  speaking  this 
would  be  consistent  with  hedonism  but  only  if  Socrates  believed  that  it  is  always 
pleasanter  or  less  painful  to  do  what  is  just  than  to  behave  unjustly  and  in  particular 
that  in  his  case  being  put  to  death  was  pleasanter  or  less  painful  than  running  away. 
On  the  face  of  it  these  claims  look  obviously  false  and  Socrates  does  nothing  to 
suggest  that  he  accepts  them.  So  if  the  Socrates  of  the  early  dialogues  is  supposed  to 
be  a  hedonist  we  have  to  accept  that  in  the  Crito  he  is  concealing  his  true  views. 
However,  the  lack  of  support  for  a  hedonistic  Socrates  in  the  Crito  coupled  with  a 
possible  misunderstanding  of  the  arguments  of  the  Crito  will  not  suffice  to  show  that 
the  Protagoras  is  at  odds  with  this  dialogue.  Even  though  the  hedonistic  theory  is  not 
explicit  in  the  Crito  it  does  not  mean  that  Socrates  was  not  at  this  point  an  advocate  of 
such  a  theory.  Also,  Socrates  may  have  believed  that  a  life  in  exile  without  the 
company  of  his  friends  away  from  the  city  he  loved  -  and  the  knowledge  that  he  did 
not  live  by  his  beliefs  -  would  have  been  the  more  painful  option.  The  reason  that  the 
Crito  contradicts  the  Protagoras  is  the  primacy  of  goodness  in  the  above  statement. 
He  says  that  `the  only  question  which  remains  to  be  considered  is,  whether  we  shall  do 
rightly',  if  that  is  the  only  question  which  should  be  considered  then  even  if  the  right 
option  is  the  most  pleasurable  Socrates  cannot  be  a  supporter  of  hedonism  here  as  he 
introduces  `some  other  criterion  than  pleasure  for  deciding'46  what  he  should  do,  that 
of  rightness  itself. 
iv.  An  alternative  interpretation 
If  there  is  no  successful  argument  that  can  explain  the  hedonism  of  the  Protagoras  in 
such  a  way  that  produces  consistency  with  the  Gorgias  and  the  other  early  dialogues 
45  Crilo  48c7-d3. 
46  See  footnote  16. 
23 then  a  different  kind  of  explanation  must  be  sought.  Socrates  is  arguing  for  a  theory  he 
does  not  support  elsewhere,  and  in  the  Gorgias  openly  criticises.  Once  we  accept  this 
fact  the  kinds  of  explanations  we  must  turn  to  in  order  to  understand  the  Protagoras 
become  clearer.  There  are  two  routes  open  to  us  at  this  point.  The  first  may  be  the 
route  of  the  `ad  hominem'  argument.  This  theory  claims  that  Socrates  is  concerned 
only  with  the  person  he  is  arguing  with,  and  therefore  tailors  his  arguments  to  suit  the 
situation.  This  implies  that  the  positions  Socrates  takes  in  the  early  dialogues  are  not 
necessarily  his  own  (they  could  be  of  course  in  situations  where  it  is  the  argument  that 
his  interlocutor  needs  to  hear).  The  second  is  the  one  I  have  already  proposed  above  - 
that  the  most  plausible  explanation  of  the  Protagoras  problem  is  that  it  does  not 
represent  Socrates'  own  view,  but  that  it  allows  Plato  to  challenge  and  consider 
certain  theories.  The  problems  encountered  in  the  Protagoras  were  obviously 
considerable  enough  for  Plato  to  reject  hedonism  as  a  basis  for  action,  and  it  is  these 
problems  that  I  will  consider  in  the  section  on  courage.  The  reason  I  think  the  second 
theory  is  preferable  is  that  the  `ad  hominem'  idea  is  an  implausible  interpretation  of 
the  arguments  in  some  of  the  early  dialogues  given  the  amount  of  cross  textual 
support  from  other  writers47.  It  cannot,  of  course,  apply  to  a  middle  period  dialogue 
such  as  the  Republic  -  for  the  Republic  seems  to  be  far  too  genuinely  argued  for  and 
discussed  to  simply  be  an  ad  hominem  argument  for  the  good  of  Glaucon  and 
Adeimantus.  The  second  theory  calls  on  evidence  in  the  Republic  which  shows  how 
the  ideas  and  problems  of  the  early  dialogues  directly  impact  of  the  ideas  of  the 
middle  period. 
47  Notably  Aristotle  and  Xenophon. 
24 4.  The  Commensurable  Scale 
It  may  seem  that  the  hedonism  Socrates  proposes  in  the  Protagoras  relies  on  a  scale  of 
commensurable  values,  in  other  words,  that  every  action  can  be  reduced  to  the  amount 
of  pleasure  it  contains  and  that  these  pleasures  can  be  quantified  and  compared.  This 
reliance  on  a  commensurable  scale  means  that  the  pleasure  involved  is  essentially  the 
same  stuff  that  exists  to  a  greater  or  lesser  degree  in  certain  activities.  The 
commensurability  of  values  is  used  by  Socrates  to  show  that  akrasia  is  not  possible  -a 
claim  that  has  been  challenged  by  Michael  Stocker  -  and  that  when  we  behave  in  a 
way  that  is  commonly  described  as  weakness  of  will  we  are  simply  in  ignorance  of 
what  we  actually  value  as  best48.  What  I  will  consider  in  this  section  are  the  following 
issues:  i.  Whether  we  can  have  commensurability  such  that  we  can  judge  all  options 
open  to  us  on  the  amount  of  pleasure  contained;  ii.  Whether  incommensurability  is 
necessary  for  Socrates'  denial  of  akrasia. 
i.  Can  we  have  commensurability  such  that  we  can  jud  eg  all  options  open  to  us  on  the 
amount  of  pleasure  contained? 
Much  has  been  written  on  the  claims  made  in  the  Protagoras  concerning  the 
commensurable  scale  of  pleasure.  Can  every  option  available  to  us  be  assessed  and 
compared  by  how  much  pleasure  each  contains?  Zeckhauser  and  Schaefer,  in  their 
article  `Public  policy  and  normative  economic  theory'  use  the  following  gruesome 
example:  `[a]  man  would  not  agree  to  have  his  arms  and  legs  cut  off  in  exchange  for 
any  number  of  desserts'  49.  This  claim  is  surely  true,  and  a  difficult  case  for  a  supporter 
of  commensurability.  According  to  the  commensurability  claim  it  would  be  the  case 
that  we  could  work  out  how  much  pleasure  there  is  in  each  of  the  desserts  on  offer, 
and  how  much  displeasure  there  is in  having  one's  legs  and  arms  cut  off,  and  then 
could  in  principle  find  an  amount  of  desserts  that  matched  or  exceeded  in  pleasure  the 
amount  of  displeasure  felt  at  the  alternative.  One  may  be  prevented  from  enjoying  all 
the  desserts  by  premature  death  or  some  other  reason,  but  that  does  not  interfere  with 
48  Stocker,  Michael,  Plural  and  Conflicting  Values. 
49  Zeckhauser  &  Schaefer,  `Public  policy  and  normative  economic  theory',  p.  52. 
25 the  conclusion  that  there  is  an  amount  of  desserts  that  balances  out  the  pain  of 
amputation.  This  doesn't  seem  to  be  a  plausible  explanation. 
This  may  appear  to  be  an  incontrovertible  case  against  commensurability,  but  as  I  will 
show  the  above  statement  from  Zeckhauser  and  Schaefer  is  not  necessarily 
inconsistent  with  a  commensurable  scale.  As  described  by  James  Griffin,  the  pleasure 
contained  in  the  puddings  would  decrease  over  time,  particularly  if  we  needed  to  eat  a 
lot  every  day  in  order  to  have  any  hope  of  eating  the  required  amount  over  our 
lifetime.  If  each  dessert  was  less  enjoyable  than  the  previous  one,  say  4  pleasure 
points,  then  2,  then  1,  the  total  amount  of  pleasure  would  end  up  approximating  a 
natural  number,  in  this  case  8,  as  the  amount  added  on  would  never  be  enough  to  take 
the  total  significantly  further.  In  which  case  it  would  presumably  never  be  possible  to 
have  enough  desserts  to  balance  out  the  amount  of  displeasure  experienced.  Therefore 
the  claims  that  `[a]  man  would  not  agree  to  have  his  arms  and  legs  cut  off  in  exchange 
for  any  number  of  desserts',  could  be  accepted  as  true  as  well  as  a  commensurable 
scale  of  pleasure.  A  similar  argument  could  be  given  from  the  method  of  decision- 
making  Socrates  proposes  in  the  Protagoras.  The  loss  of  the  arms  and  legs  would  not 
only  score  badly  on  the  pleasure  scale  (into  negative  amounts  which  I  am  assuming 
will  amount  to  pain),  but  will  also  prevent  future  pleasure  which  could  have  been 
obtained  by  someone  with  a  full  set  of  limbs.  Given  that  the  negative  pleasure  points 
will  continue  to  be  accrued  after  the  operation  it  is  clear  that  the  amount  of  desserts 
will  never  make  up  for  it. 
What  then  will  count,  if  anything,  against  a  commensurable  scale  of  pleasures?  We  do 
appear  to  value  things  in  different  ways;  we  may  value  doing  our  duty  as  well  as  the 
pleasure  in  eating  chocolate  cake.  Are  we  involved  in  the  same  process  when  we 
evaluate  both  of  these  options?  Stocker  discusses  the  distinction  between  cognitive 
and  affective  evaluation: 
26 The  distinction  between  the  cognitive  and  the  affective  turns  on  how  the  relevant 
object  is  taken  up.  It  might  be,  so  to  speak,  seen  or  appreciated  through  reason, 
even  if  this  is  a  thoroughly  evaluative  reason.  Or  it  might  be  felt  5° 
He  says  that  the  fact  that  we  can  value  things  in  different  ways  explains  how  akrasia 
can  be  possible.  If  the  way  that  we  value  different  options  can  fragment  we  can  see 
how  a  situation  could  arise  in  which  we  think  one  option  is  the  best  course  of  action 
but  are  more  attracted  to  the  alternative  and  therefore  we  do  not  act  on  our  judgment 
of  what  is  best51. 
So  are  pleasures  the  kinds  of  things  that  can  always  be  compared  with  one  another 
quantitatively?  There  are  such  a  variety  of  different  pleasures  to  be  found,  the  claim 
that  all  pleasures  are  essentially  the  same,  just  caused  by  different  objects,  is 
intuitively  unappealing.  David  Wiggins  says: 
It  seems  that  in  the  sphere  of  the  practical  we  may  know  for  certain  that  there  exist 
absolutely  undecidable  questions  -  e.  g.  cases  where  the  situation  is  so  appalling  or 
the  choices  are  so  gruesome  that  nothing  could  count  as  the  reasonable  practical 
answer.  52 
Unlike  the  case  above  where  the  choice  is  easy  between  having  one's  arms  and  legs 
chopped  off  and  having  many  desserts,  Wiggins  is  claiming  that  there  are  cases  where 
there  is  no  right  thing  to  do.  Philippa  Foot  warns  against  concluding  that  there  are 
undecidable  cases  because  of  the  fact  that  the  choices  are  ghastly  and  she  is  right  to  do 
so53.  How  would  we  rationally  make  a  decision  between  two  such  different  things  as 
losing  our  sight,  and  a  never  being  with  a  loved  one  again?  There  do  appear  to  be 
cases  where  it  is  not  possible,  even  in  principle,  to  make  a  decision  based  on  pleasures 
and  pains.  We  may  indeed  be  able  to  actually  make  a  choice  if  forced,  but  that  does 
not  mean  that  our  decision  is  based  on  any  rational  criterion.  If  all  options  can  be 
assessed  in  terms  of  pleasures  and  pains,  as  Socrates  contends  in  the  Protagoras,  this 
so  Stocker,  Michael,  Plural  and  Conflicting  Values,  p.  216. 
51  I  will  discuss  below  Stocker's  reasons  for  saying  that  this  fragmentation  can  also  occur  with  a 
commensurable  scale  of  values. 
52  Wiggins,  David,  `Truth,  Invention  and  The  Meaning  of  Life',  p.  371. 
53  Foot,  Philippa,  Moral  Dilemmas. 
27 is  a  relevant  case,  and  one  that  Socrates,  or  a  supporter  of  this  theory,  does  not  have  a 
reasonable  answer  to  54 
However,  we  must  guard  against  assuming  that  commensurability  and  comparability 
are  the  same  thing.  I  will  discuss  the  difference  between  these  two  ideas  in  the  next 
section  and  consider  whether  commensurability  is  indeed  necessary  for  Socrates  or 
whether  he  can  get  away  with  using  the  less  disagreeable  concept  of  comparability. 
ii.  Is  commensurability  necessary  for  Socrates'  denial  of  akrasia 
Socrates  is  relying  implicitly  on  two  ideas  in  the  Protagoras;  that  the  value  of  all 
actions  can  be  reduced  to  the  amount  of  pleasure  they  contain,  and  that  all  types  of 
pleasure  are  commensurable.  Much  has  been  made  of  the  claim  that  commensurability 
is  necessary  for  Socrates'  argument,  and  the  argument  has  been  attacked  because  of 
the  difficulty  of  such  a  claim.  However,  could  Socrates  argument  work  with  the  less 
controversial  claim  that  pleasures  are  comparable  rather  than  commensurable? 
These  two  terms  -  commensurability  and  comparability  -  denote  similar  ideas. 
Comparability  is  the  claim  that  we  can  compare  pleasures  and  rank  them  according  to 
how  much  we  value  them,  in  other  words  the  idea  that  we  can  make  sense  of  the  claim 
that  one  pleasure  is  better  than  another  pleasure.  Commensurability  is  a  stronger  claim 
than  this,  as  it  is  the  idea  that  not  only  can  we  compare  pleasures,  but  that  they  are 
essentially  the  same  stuff  but  found  in  greater  or  lesser  amounts.  Therefore  one  could 
coherently  claim  that  pleasures  are  incommensurable  but  comparable.  Some  people, 
such  as  Joseph  Raz  hold  that  drawing  this  distinction  is  not  a  meaningful  one55.  As  T. 
K.  Seung  and  Daniel  Bonevac  explain  in  their  article  `Plural  Values  and  Indeterminate 
Rankings': 
sa  A  hedonist  could  recognise  some  undecidable  cases,  such  as  (a)  if  we  knew  that  the  pleasures  and 
pains  involved  in  each  of  the  available  courses  of  action  to  be  absolutely  equal,  or  (b)  if  we  could  not 
tell  which  action  would  produce  more  pleasure  or pain.  A  hedonist  cannot  recognise  cases  which  are 
undecidable  because  the  pleasures  and  pains  are  incommensurable  in  some  way,  which  is  what  I  am 
arguing  for  here. 
28 For  Raz,  the  idea  of  incommensurability  entails  the  idea  of  incomparability.  When 
two  things  are  incommensurable  (there  is  no  common  measure  for  their  respective 
56  values),  he  holds,  they  cannot  be  meaningfully  compared. 
The  idea  supported  by  Raz  that  if  values  are  not  commensurable  then  we  are  unable  to 
compare  and  rank  them  seems  contrary  to  experience.  Putting  aside  the  argument  that 
pleasures  are  incommensurable,  if  we  consider  two  possible  options  such  as  the 
ethical  choice  and  the  pleasurable  option,  it  seems  that  we  are  able  to  choose  between 
them.  In  this  sense  then  we  can  rank  them  in  such  a  way  that  allows  us  to  choose 
between  them.  As  Griffin  explains: 
Some  judgments  of  the  form  "A  is  preferable  to  B"  do  not  rest  upon  other 
judgments  about  the  quantity  of  something  found  in  A  and  the  quantity  of  it  found 
in  B.  When,  in  employing  the  principle  of  utility,  one  talks  about  A's  yielding 
greater  satisfaction  than  B,  this  should  be  understood  as  saying  that  having  A  is  the 
satisfaction  of  a  greater  desire  than  having  B  would  be.  One  wants  A  more  than  B. 
But  one's  desires  are  not  ranked  by  quantities  of  satisfaction  57. 
We  may  be  able  to  recognise  that  A  is  preferable  to  B  without  it  being  the  case  that  A 
contains  more  of  some  specific  quality  than  B.  Kant  may  believe  that  `there  is  no 
common  measure  for  the  value  (dignity)  of  human  beings  and  that  (price)  of  material 
things'58,  but  he  also  ranks  the  dignity  of  human  beings  as  higher.  He  is  not  being 
inconsistent  here,  just  simply  recognising  the  fact  that  even  if  two  things  are 
incommensurable  that  doesn't  mean  that  we  are  unable  to  compare  and  rank  them. 
To  return  to  the  above  heading,  there  is  evidence  in  the  Protagoras  that  Socrates  did 
indeed  support  a  form  of  commensurability  of  pleasures,  and  that  he  did  require  a 
stronger  sense  of  similarity  than  comparability.  The  analogies  he  uses  when  he  is 
trying  to  persuade  his  interlocutor  that  salvation  lies  in  this  art  of  measurement 
suggest  a  quantitative  commensurability  that  could  not  be  replaced  with  the  ability  to 
rank  one's  options.  Socrates  says: 
ss  Raz,  Joseph,  The  Morality  of  Freedom. 
56  Seung,  T.  K.,  &  Bonevac,  D.,  `Plural Values  and  Indeterminate  Rankings',  p.  800. 
37  Griffin,  James,  `Are  there  incommensurable  values?  ',  pp.  48-9. 
58  See  20 
29 Weighing  is  a  good  analogy;  you  put  the  pleasures  together  and  the  pains  together, 
both  the  near  and  the  remote,  on  the  balance  scale,  and  then  say  which  of  the  two  is 
more  59 
And: 
If  then  our  well-being  depended  on  this,  doing  and  choosing  large  measures, 
avoiding  and  not  doing  the  small  ones,  what  would  we  see  as  our  salvation  in  life? 
Would  it  be  the  art  of  measurement  or  the  power  of  appearance?  60 
Socrates  also  refers  to  knowing  the  greater  number,  and  his  art  of  measurement  as  a 
science.  The  language  used  gives  us  clear  indications  of  the  quantitative  nature  of 
Socrates'  skill  of  measurement.  The  complexity  of  such  a  skill  suggests  that  the  theory 
that  pleasures  are  comparable  rather  than  incommensurable  would  not  be  sufficient, 
and  also  supports  Socrates'  use  of  commensurability.  Comparability  may  be  enough  to 
support  us  making  a  decision  between  two  options,  but  when  we  have  to  take  into 
account  all  the  possible  pleasures  and  pains  of  each  option  facing  us,  comparability 
will  not  give  us  the  necessary  clarity  to  make  such  complex  choices. 
The  fact  that  Socrates  is  advocating  a  commensurable  scale  rather  than  a  comparative 
one  makes  the  hedonism  of  the  Protagoras  problematic.  If  Plato  is  indeed  using 
hedonism  to  support  the  unity  of  the  virtues  and  the  thesis  that  knowledge  is  sufficient 
for  virtue  then  the  foundation  is  weak.  As  well  as  these  inherent  problems  with 
hedonism,  Socrates'  commitment  to  such  an  idea  intensifies  the  difficulty  of  including 
courage  in  his  general  theory. 
59  Prot.  356b2-5. 
60  Prot.  356d  1-5. 
30 5.  Courage 
Once  Socrates  has  developed  the  relationship  between  pleasure  and  the  good,  and  the 
idea  that  people  always  go  for  what  they  believe  to  be  best,  he  continues: 
Then  if  the  pleasant  is  the  good,  no  one  who  knows  or  believes  there  is  something 
else  better  than  what  he  is  doing,  something  possible,  will  go  on  doing  what  he  had 
been  doing  when  he  could  be  doing  what  is  better.  To  give  in  to  oneself  is  nothing 
other  than  ignorance,  and  to  control  oneself  is  nothing  other  than  wisdom.  1 
And  he  goes  on  to  say: 
[Socrates]:  `Now,  no  one  goes  willingly  towards  the  bad  or  what  he  believes  to  be 
bad;  neither  is  it  in  human  nature,  so  it  seems,  to  want  to  go  toward  what  one 
believes  to  be  bad  instead  of  to  the  good.  And  when  he  is  forced  to  choose  between 
one  of  two  bad  things,  no  one  will  choose  the  greater  if  he  is  able  to  choose  the 
lesser.  ' 
They  agreed  with  all  of  that  too. 
[Socrates]:  `Well,  then,  is  there  something  you  call  dread  or  fear? 
... 
I  say  that 
whether  you  call  it  fear  or  dread,  it  is  an  expectation  of  something  bad...  If  what  I 
have  said  up  to  now  is  true,  then  would  anyone  be  willing  to  go  toward  what  he 
dreads,  when  he  can  go  toward  what  he  does  not?  Or  is  this  impossible  from  what 
we  have  agreed?  For  it  was  agreed  that  what  one  fears  one  holds  to  be  bad;  no  one 
goes  willingly  toward  those  things  which  he  holds  to  be  bad,  or  chooses  those 
things  willingly'.  62 
Socrates  is  claiming  that  because  we  go  towards  what  we  believe  to  be  the  best  option, 
the  courageous  do  not  go  towards  what  is  frightening  to  them  because  one  would  only 
fear  the  worse  option.  Once  Protagoras  has  agreed  with  the  hedonistic  position  as 
described  by  Socrates  he  appears  to  think  that  he  has  no  choice  but  to  acquiesce  in  the 
continuing  discussion.  However  this  is  a  controversial  step  for  Socrates  to  make. 
Plato's  claim  that  `what  one  fears  one  holds  to  be  bad;  no  one  goes  willingly  toward 
those  things  which  he  holds  to  be  bad,  or  chooses  those  things  willingly'  is  surely  an 
oversimplification  of  the  matter.  The  idea  that  no-one  ever  does  anything  that 
frightens  them  is  troubling;  why  should  it  be  the  case  that  the  someone  cannot  go 
towards  something  they  feel  fear  about,  just  as  long  as  they  believe  it  to  contain  the 
greater  overall  pleasure?  One  might  think  that  this  is  what  the  courageous  typically  do. 
61  Prot.  358c1-c5. 
31 It  may  be  true  that  people  fear  what  they  consider  to  be  bad,  but  you  may  feel  fear 
about  a  particular  action  because  of  one  element  involved(such  as  the  possibility  of 
death)  but  not  think  that  the  action  overall  is  bad.  Socrates  appears  to  be  forgetting 
about  his  theory  of  maximising  pleasure  at  this  point  and  ends  up  oversimplifying  the 
argument.  The  Socratic  belief  that  we  always  choose  to  do  what  we  believe  to  be  the 
best  thing  for  us  could  have  allowed  for  the  feeling  element  of  fear  towards  what  we 
actually  do63,  as  long  as  we  think  that  it  is  the  best  thing  overall,  and  provided  that 
Socrates  distinguishes  the  feeling  of  fear  from  the  judgement  that  motivates  us. 
Socrates'  previous  argument  allows  him  to  claim  that: 
But  all  people,  both  the  courageous  and  the  cowardly,  go  toward  that  about  which 
they  are  confident;  both  the  cowardly  and  the  courageous  go  toward  the  same 
64  thing 
And, 
[Protagoras]:  But,  Socrates,  what  the  cowardly  go  toward  is  completely  opposite  to 
what  the  courageous  go  toward.  For  example,  the  courageous  are  willing  to  go  to 
war,  but  the  cowardly  are  not.  [Socrates]:  Is  going  to  war  honourable  or  is  it 
disgraceful?  [Protagoras]:  Honourable  [Socrates]:  Then,  if  it  is  honourable,  we 
have  agreed  before,  it  is  also  good,  for  we  agreed  that  all  honourable  actions  were 
good  65 
This  idea  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  brave  man  also  having  feelings  of  fear  of  what 
inspires  confidence  in  him.  Fortunately  Socrates'  definition  of  courage  in  the 
Protagoras  does  not  need  to  depend  on  the  idea  that  the  courageous  do  not  feel  fearful 
of  what  they  do.  He  could  have  said  that  the  courageous  go  towards  what  gives  them 
most  confidence  but  that  they  can  also  feel  fear  of  it.  Perhaps  he  believed  that  by 
accepting  the  idea  that  courage  may  involve  acting  in  spite  of  feelings  of  fear'  he 
would  have  to  allow  for  akrasia,  but  this  is  not  the  case.  By  oversimplifying  the 
argument  at  this  point  it  loses  the  logical  connection  with  the  previous  points  in  the 
dialogue  and  becomes  much  more  open  to  criticisms  such  as  the  one  above. 
62  Prot.  358d1-e8. 
63  As  long  as  the  feeling  element  of  fear  is  different  from  the  judgement  that  something  is  bad. 
64  Prot.  359e1-3. 
65  Prot.  359e4-10. 
32 The  claim  that  the  courageous  option  is  also  the  more  pleasurable  is  a  rather 
problematic  one.  There  is  something  odd  about  claiming  that  the  courageous  option 
would  also  be  the  pleasantest.  We  commonly  consider  courageous  actions  to  be  the 
kind  of  actions  that  are  difficult  or  painful  -  pleasure  is  a  term  rarely  applied  to 
courageous  deeds.  Whether  we  believe  that  courageous  deeds  are  done  in  spite  of  fear, 
or  because  of  fear  of  what  ought  to  be  feared  as  Plato  does,  the  courageous  deed  is  an 
act  done  for  a  reason.  Courageous  acts  are  not  done  thoughtlessly  or  because  someone 
felt  like  it,  and  if  an  act  is  done  in  these  manners  we  would  not  consider  them  to  be 
courageous.  This  also  counts  for  someone  motivated  by  pleasure.  If  a  woman  runs  into 
a  burning  building  and  saves  a  child  we  would  think  of  her  as  courageous,  however  if 
someone  rushed  into  a  burning  building  simply  for  the  thrill  we  would  not  regard 
them  as  brave.  It  looks  as  though  a  courageous  act  must  serve  some  point  beyond  the 
immediate  pleasure  of  the  act. 
Socrates'  positive  thesis  about  courage  is  thus: 
Cowardice  is ignorance  of  what  is  and  is  not  to  be  feared...  courage  is  the  opposite 
of  cowardice..  . 
So  then,  wisdom  about  what  is  and  is  not  to  be  feared  is  the 
opposite  of  this  ignorance.. 
. 
So  the  wisdom  about  what  is  and  is  not  to  be  feared  is 
courage  and  is  the  opposite  of  ignorance66 
As  we  can  see  from  this  definition,  Socrates  argues  that  courage  is  knowledge  of  what 
should  really  be  feared  and  cowardice  is  ignorance  of  this.  Presumably  then,  the 
courageous  person  is  also  the  person  who  knows  what  will  bring  most  pleasure,  which 
is  the  opposite  of  what  should  truly  be  feared.  The  brave  person  is  thus  motivated  to 
do  the  courageous  act  by  the  desire  to  move  away  from  what  is  most  fearful  and  move 
towards  what  brings  most  pleasure.  The  idea  that  the  courageous  person  is  motivated 
by  moving  away  from  what  is  most  fearful  is  incorporated  in  Plato's  definition  of 
courage  beyond  the  Protagoras,  and  I  will  discuss  it  in  later  chapters.  The  idea  that  we 
move  towards  what  brings  pleasure  when  we  act  courageously  is  unique  to  the 
Protagoras,  and  the  main  problem  with  the  definition  offered  in  this  dialogue. 
66  Prot.  360c12-d9. 
33 So  how  could  Plato  justify  the  claim  that  by  choosing  to  act  courageously  you  make 
the  correct  choice  for  his  hedonistic  calculus?  He  could  mean  one  of  two  things:  either 
that  the  actual  act  of  bravery  brings  pleasure,  or  that  the  rewards  of  being  a  brave 
person  bring  more  pleasure  than  any  other  option.  If  the  former  is  to  stand  a  chance  as 
the  correct  interpretation  then  Plato  must  mean  to  include  cerebral  pleasures  -  even  if 
he  cannot  draw  a  distinction  between  cerebral  and  physical  pleasures  that  elevates  the 
importance  of  one  or  the  other  without  damaging  his  thesis.  So  assuming  that  Plato  is 
not  claiming  that  going  into  battle,  for  example,  is  physically  pleasurable,  he  could  be 
claiming  that  there  are  cerebral  pleasures  associated  with  it  that  outweigh  the 
pleasures  of  running  away.  But  what  could  these  cerebral  pleasures  be  without 
recourse  to  the  idea  that  pleasure  comes  from  doing  the  morally  right  thing?  The 
theory  that  whether  one  is  courageous  or  not  depends  on  whether  one  gets  pleasures 
from  the  act  of  battle  is  clearly  unacceptable. 
Perhaps  Plato  meant  the  latter  -  that  the  rewards  of  being  a  brave  person  bring  more 
pleasure  than  any  other  option.  This  interpretation  also  leads  to  insuperable 
difficulties.  The  thesis  could  only  be  plausible  if  the  person  were  to  survive  the 
courageous  act  otherwise  they  would  not  accrue  the  long-term  benefits.  If  that  were 
the  case  then  either  we  must  return  to  the  above  problematic  interpretation  that  one 
gets  pleasure  from  the  act  of  battle,  or  deny  that  anyone  who  dies  is  courageous. 
Neither  of  these  options  are  appealing. 
34 6.  The  Develonment  from  the  Protanoras  and  the  Laches  to  the  Republic 
There  is  evidence  in  this  dialogue  that  in  writing  the  Protagoras  Plato  was  not  only 
motivated  by  immortalising  the  thought  of  his  teacher,  but  that  it  provided  him  with  a 
means  of  working  out  his  own  view.  Protagoras  is  portrayed  as  a  much  worthier 
opponent  than  most  of  the  other  interlocutors  Socrates  talks  with;  he  is  articulate, 
thoughtful  and  competitive.  The  dialogue  ends  with  Protagoras  being  forced  into  a 
contradiction,  as  with  so  many  of  the  dialogues,  but  it  is  clear  that  he  thinks  he  has 
somehow  been  tricked  by  Socrates  and  is  not  convinced  by  the  arguments.  At  the  end 
of  the  dialogue  both  Socrates  and  Protagoras  are  apparently  in  difficult  positions. 
Socrates  seems  to  believe  that  virtue  is  knowledge  but  that  it  cannot  be  taught, 
whereas  Protagoras  believes  that  virtue  is  not  knowledge  but  that  it  can  be  taught.  In 
his  great  speech  Protagoras  says: 
Starting  when  they  are  little  children  and  continuing  as  long  as  they  live,  they  teach 
them  and  correct  them.  As  soon  as  a  child  understands  what  is  said  to  him,  the 
nurse,  mother,  tutor,  and  the  father  himself  fight  for  him  to  be  as  good  as  he 
possibly  can,  seizing  on  every  action  and  word  to  teach  him  and  show  him  that  this 
is  just,  that  is  unjust,  this  is  noble,  that  is  ugly,  this  is  pious,  that  is impious,  he 
should  do  this,  he  should  not  do  that.  7 
Plato  later  argues  for  a  similar  system  himself.  In  the  Republic  Plato  makes  a  strong 
case  for  the  importance  of  education  in  the  moral  development  of  the  individual, 
where  he  stresses  the  roles  of  physical  and  mental  training  for  children.  He  claims 
that: 
And  the  first  step,  as  you  know,  is  always  what  matters  most,  particularly  when 
dealing  with  those  who  are  young  and  tender.  That  is  the  time  when  they  are  easily 
moulded  and  when  any  impression  we  choose  to  make  leaves  a  permanent  mark.  68 
He  starts  by  discussing  music  and  poetry,  and  of  them  what  kinds  will  be  appropriate 
for  young  minds.  He  says  that: 
67  Prot.  325c6-d6. 
6'  Rep.  377a11-b2. 
35 Then  it  seems  that  our  first  business  is  to  supervise  the  production  of  stories,  and 
choose  only  those  we  think  suitable,  and  reject  the  rest.  We  shall  persuade  mothers 
and  nurses  to  tell  our  chosen  stories  to  their  children,  and  by  means  of  them  to 
mould  their  minds  and  characters  which  are  more  important  than  their  bodies.  9 
By  the  time  of  Republic  Book  III  Plato  is  explicit  that  education,  as  Protagoras 
maintained,  does  have  an  impact  on  virtue.  However,  he  is  also  to  some  extent  in 
agreement  with  what  Socrates  argues  in  the  Protagoras,  as  he  does  continue  to  stress 
the  importance  of  knowledge  for  virtue.  So  it  looks  as  though  Plato  has  found  some 
compromise  between  the  two  contradictory  and  inconsistent  views  espoused  by 
Protagoras  and  Socrates  in  the  Protagoras,  by  selecting  a  piece  from  each  theory  that 
are  not  inconsistent  with  one  another.  So,  by  putting  the  theories  of  these  two  great 
thinkers  against  one  another  in  this  imaginary  conversation  Plato  was  able  to  see 
which  part  of  each  of  their  views  he  should  pick  up  and  carry  forward. 
A  further  point  of  interest  in  the  Protagoras  regarding  how  these  early  dialogues 
should  be  read  is  the  treatment  of  courage  in  this  dialogue.  As  stated  above, 
Protagoras  claimed  that  regarding  the  virtues,  `four  of  them  resemble  each  other  fairly 
closely,  but  courage  is  very  different  from  all  the  rest'70.  When  reading  the  Protagoras 
it  is  natural  to  agree  with  Protagoras  when  he  claims  that  each  of  the  virtues  are 
different  from  the  others,  but  that  they  are  connected,  like  the  parts  of  a  face.  When 
Protagoras  claims  that  courage  seems  to  be  a  special  case  he  is  keying  into  a  common 
assumption  that  the  other  virtues,  such  as  justice  and  temperance,  are  necessarily 
required  of  a  good  person  but  that  courage  is  possibly  something  beyond  that71,  or  that 
someone  could  be  courageous  without  having  the  other  virtues.  Socrates  argues 
against  the  separation  of  courage  from  the  other  virtues  by  trying  to  prove  in  argument 
that  the  virtues  can  be  shown  to  be  the  same.  However,  Plato  seems  more  convinced 
by  the  Protagorean  view  in  the  Republic.  When  he  discusses  the  virtues  in  that  later 
work  courage  is  the  only  virtue  not  said  to  primarily  reside  in  the  rational  part  of  the 
tripartite  soul.  All  the  other  virtues  are  said  to  primarily  rely  on  the  reasoning  part  of 
69  Rep.  377b9-c4. 
70  Prot.  349d3-4. 
7'  By  which  I  mean  that  in  some  cases  it  is  commonly  thought  to  be  supererogatory  to  be  courageous 
but  that  this  is  not  always  the  case. 
36 the  soul,  and  that  this  part  needs  to  be  developed  in  order  to  have  these  virtues. 
Genuine  courage72  does  also  rely  on  having  a  developed  reason  of  course,  but  the  fact 
that  it  also  relies  on  the  development  -  rather  than  suppression  -  of  another  part  of  the 
soul  is  interesting.  Only  Courage  is  explained  by  the  inclusion  of  the  thumos,  the 
spirited  part.  This  division  between  courage  and  the  other  virtues  again  shows  that  the 
early  dialogues  were  not  just  about  the  views  of  Socrates,  but  were  exercises  used  to 
discover  his  own  more  workable  view. 
72  Courage  of  the  Philosopher  Kings. 
37 7.  Cnndusinn 
The  Protagoras  ends  in  a  paradoxical  position.  At  the  beginning  of  the  discussion 
Socrates  claimed  that  he  didn't  think  that  virtue  could  be  taught,  but  has  gone  on  to 
argue  that  virtue  is  knowledge.  Protagoras,  on  the  other  hand,  expressed  the  view  that 
virtue  could  be  taught,  but  rejected  the  idea  that  it  is  some  sort  of  knowledge.  The 
implication  of  the  dialogue  ending  on  such  a  note  is  that  neither  Socrates'  nor 
Protagoras'  viewpoint  is  wholly  acceptable.  It  perhaps  also  implies  that  a  satisfactory 
account  of  virtue  and  whether  it  can  be  taught  will  draw  on  both  positions  and  make  a 
more  consistent  whole.  The  fact  that  the  end  of  the  dialogue  suggests  we  need  a  new 
account  of  virtue  and  its  teachability  applies  to  courage  in  particular  since  that  virtue 
has  proved  the  most  difficult  to  fit  in  with  Socrates'  view.  The  temporary  commitment 
to  hedonism  doesn't  help  Socrates  produce  a  workable  theory  -  in  fact  it  creates  more 
problems.  I  will  show  in  the  following  chapters  how  Plato  attempts  to  deal  with  these 
problems. 
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39 1.  Nicias  and  Laches  on  military  training 
The  Laches  is  an  early  dialogue  that  discusses  some  of  the  main  `Socratic'  issues,  such  as 
whether  virtue  is  knowledge  and  consequently  whether  it  can  be  taught,  with  reference  to 
the  specific  case  of  courage.  It  begins  with  Lysimachus  and  Melesias  looking  for  advice 
on  how  to  best  bring  up  their  sons  `in  order  to  make  first-rate  men  of  them".  They  have 
asked  Nicias  and  Laches,  two  famous  Athenian  generals,  to  join  them  in  the  hope  that 
they  might  be  able  to  tell  them  whether  military  training  will  help  in  this  aim.  Laches 
encourages  Lysimachus  and  Melesias  to  bring  Socrates  into  the  discussion,  as  he  believes 
him  to  have  some  experience  in  these  matters.  In  his  usual  fashion,  Socrates  asks  Laches 
and  Nicias  to  give  their  opinion  on  military  training  first,  as  he  is  `younger  than  these 
gentlemen  and  rather  inexperienced  in  the  field'2. 
Nicias  speaks  first,  and  says  that  he  believes  that  this  kind  of  training  gives  men  many 
advantages,  among  them  that  it  will  make  them  `fit  and  healthy'3,  `trained  in  the  use  of 
military  equipment'4,  and  it  will  encourage  an  interest  in  military  technique.  He  makes 
one  particularly  interesting  additional  point  concerning  training  which  is  that  `the 
possession  of  this  same  knowledge  will  make  any  individual  a  great  deal  braver  and  more 
daring  in  battle  than  he  would  otherwise  be'5.  Why  would  Nicias  make  such  a  claim? 
Presumably  the  point  is  that  military  laymen  dropped  into  a  war  zone  may  not  be  as 
inclined  to  act  courageously  because  they  do  not  have  experience  of  such  situations.  The 
knowledge  the  trained  soldier  possesses  may  at  times  enable  him  to  perform  courageous 
acts  that  the  layman  would  not  even  consider. 
It  is  then  Laches'  turn  to  state  his  position  on  the  matter  of  military  training.  Contrary  to 
Nicias,  he  claims  that  military  training  does  not  increase  bravery  in  the  individual.  He 
Laches  179b3. 
2  Laches  181  d2-3. 
3  Laches  181  e4. 
4  Laches  182a5. 
5  Laches  182c4-6. 
40 gives  various  points  in  support  of  this  view.  The  first  is  that  if  it  did  increase  bravery  then 
the  Spartans,  the  most  militarily  respected  of  the  Greeks,  would  practise  it.  lain  Lane 
claims  in  the  footnotes  of  his  translation  of  the  Laches  that  the  first  of  these  is  simply 
wrong,  `The  Spartan  Army,  known  and  feared  as  the  finest  in  Greece,  was  the  product  of 
a  ruthless  regime  of  training  which  began  for  all  male  citizens  at  the  age  of  seven'6.  This 
view  has  been  criticised  as  it  has  been  claimed  that  it  does  not  appreciate  the  nature  of  the 
kind  of  training  being  discussed.  If  the  nature  of  the  exercise  was  to  demonstrate  the 
beauty  of  military  technique  then  Laches'  claim  that  the  Spartans  have  not  practised  it 
would  not  necessarily  seem  so  ridiculous.  In  this  case  he  would  be  claiming  that  the 
Spartans  are  so  well  versed  in  military  matters  that  if  this  kind  of  training  benefited 
soldiers  in  any  way,  they  would  be  practicing  it.  However,  Laches'  point  is  only  correct  if 
they  really  were  only  discussing  a  particular  kind  of  military  training,  and  one  which  the 
Spartans  did  not  practise.  If  the  discussion  is  meant  to  be  a  more  general  one  which  is  to 
include  the  benefits  of  all  kinds  of  military  training,  then  Laches  has  missed  the  point  of 
the  conversation. 
Secondly,  Laches  claims  that  the  instructors  themselves  are  not  noted  for  their  bravery, 
and  so  a  connection  between  this  military  training  and  bravery  cannot  be  established: 
I've  come  across  quite  a  number  of  these  instructors  when  they've  been  faced  with  the 
real  thing,  and  I  know  the  stuff  they're  made  of.  We  can  see  right  away  how  the  land 
lies:  not  one  man  who  has  done  this  military  training  has  ever  made  a  name  for 
himself  on  active  service...  And  yet  in  every  other  subject  the  men  with  high 
reputations  come  from  the  ranks  of  those  who  have  gone  through  the  appropriate 
training.  7 
This  claim  is  based  on  Laches'  personal  experience  of  the  men  that  practise  this  skill.  It 
seems  to  be  an  early  example  of  the  adage  `those  who  can,  do,  those  who  can't,  teach'. 
As  a  military  man  himself,  it  is  interesting  that  Laches  has  not  seen  someone  be  brave  in 
battle  who  is  well  known  for  using  such  methods.  However,  this  point  is  perhaps  more 
6  lain  Lane,  Early  Socratic  Dialogues,  p.  87. 
7  Laches  183c1-7. 
41 instructive  about  Laches'  approach  to  the  argument.  He  is  thinking  about  the  issue  they 
are  discussing  in  a  much  more  practical  sense:  have  I  seen  anyone  who  uses  such  methods 
show  bravery  in  war?  This  point  also  suggests  that  what  Laches  is  thinking  of  is  a  special 
kind  of  artistic  military  training  designed  to  be  put  on  show  for  its  aesthetic  value,  rather 
than  a  more  general  military  training.  This  reading  would  support  his  point  above  that  the 
8  Spartans  do  not  train  their  soldiers  in  this  way. 
Laches'  third  reason  for  thinking  that  this  kind  of  military  training  does  not  make  soldiers 
braver  is  that  he  thinks  it  only  succeeds  in  making  cowards  take  foolish  risks,  and  the 
brave  the  focus  of  attention  and  criticism.  This  claim  is  of  more  interest  and  is  worth 
quoting  in  full: 
And  it  would  be  true  to  say,  I  think,  that  if  someone  who  was  a  coward  were 
to  imagine  that  he  knew  all  about  it,  he  would  become  over-confident  and 
then  make  it  all  the  more  obvious  what  his  true  colours  were.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  he  were  a  brave  man,  people  would  watch  his  every  move,  and  if  he 
made  even  the  slightest  mistake,  he  would  have  to  put  up  with  a  great  deal  of 
abuse.  People  have  a  grudge  against  men  who  profess  to  know  such  things,  so 
unless  a  man  is  strikingly  braver  than  the  rest,  there's  no  way  he  can  avoid 
becoming  a  laughing  stock  if  he  claims  this  kind  of  knowledge.  9 
There  are  many  ambiguous  translations  in  this  paragraph  that  create  a  difficulty  in 
interpretation.  Firstly,  the  word  `thrasus'  is  here  being  translated  as  `over-confident'. 
Does  this  translation  adequately  exhibit  what  Plato  was  originally  trying  to  say?  Given 
this  translation  I  assume  Laches  means  that  the  coward  would  over-estimate  his  ability, 
which  is  actually  not  as  effective  as  he  thinks.  So  why  would  he  then  make  his  `true 
colours',  or  elsewhere  translated  `true  nature',  more  obvious?  I  can  only  imagine  that  this 
statement  might  be  describing  a  situation  where  the  coward  would  put  himself  into  a 
a  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Laches'  arguments  against  military  training  do  follow  a  logical  structure.  He 
first  argues  that  military  training  is  not  necessary  for  courage,  as  the  Spartans  are  well-known  for  being 
courageous  and  they  don't  do  it.  He  then  argues  that  it  is  not  sufficient  for  courage  as  those  who  do  practise 
it  are  not  brave.  This  pattern  is  then  inverted  later  when  Socrates  points  out  that  the  first  two  definitions 
Laches  gives  for  courage  are  merely  sufficient  (standing  one's  ground)  and  then  merely  necessary 
(endurance)  but  that  the  does  not  give  one  that  is both  necessary  and  sufficient,  which  is  what  Socrates  is 
searching  for. 
9LachesI84b4-c4. 
42 dangerous  situation,  for  example  into  battle,  because  he  considers  himself  to  be  less 
threatened  by  it  than  he  previously  thought  because  of  his  new  found  skill  in  fighting. 
However,  because  he  is  by  nature  a  coward,  he  runs  away  at  the  last  minute,  revealing  his 
true  colours.  However,  this  reading  seems  to  create  a  problem  when  we  look  at  it  in 
relation  to  the  brave  man.  The  passage  appears  to  be  saying  that  the  brave  man  would  put 
himself  in  situations  of  danger  where  his  ability  could  be  assessed.  And  if  he  has  claimed 
to  have  superior  skills  in  fighting  the  criticism  will  be  harsh  if  he  fails  to  live  up  to  these 
claims.  The  claim  that  a  man  can  only  avoid  this  if  he  is  `strikingly  braver'  however  does 
not  seem  to  make  sense.  Why  would  a  braver  man  be  less  likely  to  make  a  technical 
mistake  in  fighting?  I  think  that  this  examination  shows  that  the  above  translation  is  not 
sufficient  to  explain  what  Plato  was  saying  in  the  Laches. 
Hobbs  offers  an  alternative  reading  of  this  passage.  She  says  that  deilos  and  andreios, 
above  translated  as  coward  and  brave  man,  could  also  be  translated  as  good  or  bad  at 
fighting.  In  this  case  Laches  could  be  referring  to  a  situation  where  `the  poor  fighter  is 
lured  by  his  overreaching  confidence  into  situations  which  he  is  in  fact  ill-equipped  to 
handle,  thus  exposing  his  woeful  lack  of  prowess'  10.  Under  this  interpretation,  with 
andreios  being  translated  as  a  man  good  at  fighting,  184b7-cl  would  again  refer  to  the 
jealous  scrutiny  of  observers  wanting  to  find  a  flaw.  184c1-4  would  now  more  coherently 
refer  to  the  `andreios',  or  man  skilled  at  fighting,  who  is  so  skilled  that  mistakes  never 
occurred,  and  therefore  he  cannot  be  mocked  by  those  who  are  jealous  of  him.  This 
alternative  reading  does  avoid  the  problem  of  how  to  understand  Laches  claim  that 
`unless  a  man  is  strikingly  braver  than  the  rest,  there's  no  way  he  can  avoid  becoming  a 
laughing  stock  if  he  claims  this  kind  of  knowledge',  but  also  requires  an  implausible 
translation  of  `andreios'  and  `deilos'.  What  this  passage  perhaps  suggests  is  that  Laches 
does  not  have  a  firm  grip  on  the  notion  of  courage  and  on  the  difference  between  courage 
and  some  kind  of  skill  in  battle. 
10  Hobbs,  A.,  Plato  and  the  Hero,  p.  82. 
43 This  final  point  by  Laches  does  have  further  implications.  Nicias  supports  the  view  that 
knowledge  of  this  area  makes  you  braver,  probably  because  he  is  supposed  to  be  familiar 
with  the  Socratic  tenet  that  virtue  is  knowledge  and  is  the  tool  by  which  Plato  will  allow 
Socrates  to  challenge  such  a  view.  Laches,  on  the  other  hand,  thinks  that  knowledge  of 
fighting  will  not  make  you  braver,  which  for  the  Greeks  necessarily  had  only  positive 
connotations,  but  it  makes  you  rasher.  Laches  rejects  knowledge  as  a  component  of  what 
makes  one  braver,  and  we  see  later  that  he  does  not  believe  it  to  be  a  virtue  that  is 
dependent  on  intellectual  qualities.  Socrates  later  uses  this  distinction  between  courage 
and  rashness  to  support  the  idea  that  it  is  knowledge  (the  kind  of  moral  knowledge 
Socrates  requires)  that  is  what  distinguishes  the  two  -  it  being  a  part  of  courage  but  not  of 
rashness. 
This  discussion  is  used  to  introduce  the  main  themes  of  this  dialogue.  Laches  and  Nicias 
show  what  their  later  position  will  be  through  what  they  say  about  the  matter  of  military 
training  -  Nicias  in  favour  and  Laches  against.  Nicias  supports  the  view  that  some  kind  of 
fighting  skill  will  increase  bravery.  This  may  be  because  he  is  attracted  to  the  Socratic 
view  that  virtue  is  knowledge  but  has  not  appreciated  the  difference  between  the  kind  of 
knowledge  Socrates  has  in  mind  and  the  kind  conveyed  by  the  sophists  and  teachers  of 
fighting  skill.  Laches'  early  conversation  with  Socrates  shows  that  he  is  not  a  particularly 
philosophically-minded  man,  and  that  he  is  not  familiar  with  the  Socratic  position,  and 
we  can  see  early  on  that  he  will  probably  not  be  very  sympathetic  to  it.  Apart  from 
establishing  the  characters  of  the  two  men  this  discussion  also  shows  the  reader  that  there 
is  a  problem  that  needs  to  be  addressed.  The  contrast  in  the  positions  of  Nicias  and 
Laches  demonstrates  that  the  issue  at  hand  is  the  role  of  knowledge  in  virtue.  Nicias  is 
established  as  the  representative  of  the  Socratic  view  that  virtue  is  knowledge  and  Laches 
as  the  opponent  to  this  view.  Plato  is  then  free  to  use  Socrates  as  a  more  neutral  figure  in 
order  to  examine  the  cogency  of  the  two  positions.  This  part  of  the  dialogue  also  brings 
up  the  question  of  what  kind  of  knowledge  is  relevant  for  virtue,  for  Laches  has  ruled  out 
the  idea  that  it  is  any  type  of  knowledge  when  he  said  that  those  with  some  form  of 
military  knowledge  are  not  necessarily  courageous  people.  Socrates  then  redirects  the 
44 conversation  away  from  the  case  of  military  training,  and  onto  the  far  more  interesting 
question  of  what  courage  itself  is. 
45 2.  Laches'  first  definition  of  courage 
Laches'  first  attempt  at  a  definition  of  `andreios'  is: 
If  a  man  is  prepared  to  stand  in  the  ranks,  face  up  to  the  enemy  and  not  run  away,  you 
can  be  sure  that  he's  brave.  '  1 
This  definition  incorporates  all  the  complexity  Laches  sees  in  the  word  and  uses  what  he 
probably  considers  to  be  its  paradigmatic  context,  that  of  war.  As  we  can  see  from  above, 
`andreios'  can  be  used  to  represent  courage  and  can  also  be  used  to  connote  manliness  in 
this  and  previous  periods.  Laches  may  have  intended  to  convey  something  of  these 
different  translations,  combining  the  ideas  of  courage  and  manliness.  How  can  we  expect 
Laches  to  make  a  clear  statement  about  what  is  essential  to  courage  when  the  vocabulary 
open  to  him  was  used  to  distinguish  a  more  general  idea?  Socrates  wanted  Laches  to  say 
what  the  defining  quality  of  all  the  cases  of  courage  was  -  the  element  by  virtue  of  which 
they  were  cases  of  courage.  The  term  `andreios'  may  appear  to  us  to  be  a  confused  term 
with  various  meanings,  but  Laches  was  working  with  one  word  with  a  deep  and  complex 
history.  This  fact  makes  it  all  the  more  understandable  when  he  does  not  initially 
understand  what  Socrates  is  looking  for  when  he  is  asked  what  courage  is.  Even  though 
Socrates  must  also  have  been  able  to  appreciate  the  breadth  of  the  word  Laches  was 
trying  to  contain  in  one  sentence,  this  was  clearly  not  the  kind  of  answer  he  wanted  from 
him. 
It  is  interesting  to  note,  as  Charles  Kahn  did,  that 
Plato  never  uses  Aristotle's  word  for  definition  (horismos);  and  the  term  he  does 
occasionally  employ  for  this  notion,  horos,  preserves  the  flavour  of  its  literal  meaning, 
"boundary  mark.  "  What  we  call  "defining"  is  for  Plato  "marking  the  boundaries".  12 
Laches  190e2-4. 
12  Kahn,  C.,  Plato  and  the  Socratic  dialogue,  p.  171. 
46 Evidently  in  the  Laches  Socrates  wanted  to  limit  the  boundaries  of  `andreia'  to  cases 
where  this  specific  element  was  exhibited,  and  not  include  all  cases  that  might  have  been 
thought  to  demonstrate  that  a  person  was  manly  or  courageous.  Plato  wanted  it  to  define  a 
specific  quality,  not  be  a  term  that  denotes  a  family  resemblance. 
Plato  also  wished  to  extend  the  boundaries  of  `andreia'  to  cover  all  kinds  of  people.  He 
tries  to  explain  this  to  Laches  when  he  explains  what  he  wants  from  him: 
I  wanted  to  find  out  not  just  what  it  is  to  be  brave  as  an  infantryman,  but  also 
as  a  cavalry  man,  and  as  any  kind  of  member  of  the  forces;  and  not  just  what 
it  is  to  be  brave  during  a  war,  but  to  be  brave  in  the  face  of  danger  at  sea;  and 
I  wanted  to  find  out  what  it  is  to  be  brave  in  the  face  of  an  illness,  in  the  face 
of  poverty,  and  in  public  life;  and  what's  more  not  just  what  it  is  to  be  brave 
in  resisting  pain  or  fear,  but  also  putting  up  stem  opposition  to  temptation  and 
indulgence  -  because  I'm  assuming,  Laches,  that  there  are  people  who  are 
brave  in  all  these  situations.  13 
Laches  responds  by  saying  `Very  much  so,  Socrates'  14.  It  is  perhaps  surprising  that 
Laches  does  not  challenge  what  must  have  been  to  him  a  radical  change  of  interpretation. 
Not  only  did  he  have  to  see  `andreios'  as  not  only  military,  but  also  not  as  the  province  of 
men  alone. 
1'  Laches  191  c9-e3. 
14Laches  191e4. 
47 3.  Laches'  second  definition  of  courage 
Laches'  second  definition  is: 
I  take  it,  in  that  case,  to  be  a  certain  endurance  of  the  soul,  if  I  have  to  mention  the 
element  essentially  present  in  all  cases.  '5 
It  is  at  this  point  that  Socrates  takes  for  granted  a  fact  about  courage  which  is  one  of  the 
major  sources  of  disagreement  about  it: 
Now,  this  is  how  it  appears  to  me:  by  no  means  every  kind  of  endurance,  I  think,  can 
appear  to  you  to  be  bravery.  I  make  that  surmise  because  I'm  almost  certain,  Laches, 
that  you  think  of  bravery  as  one  of  the  finer  things.  16 
This  statement  raises  the  question  of  why  Socrates  dismisses  the  possibility  of  the 
courageous  fool  so  readily;  the  idea  of  the  person  who  intends  to  do  good  and  faces 
terrifying  danger  in  the  attempt,  but  unfortunately  is  seriously  misguided  and  ends  up 
doing  harm.  Hobbs  explains  that:  `there  are  serious  linguistic  barriers  preventing  such  an 
approach  being  readily  available  to  Greek  thinkers.  No  matter  how  conceived,  the  very 
term  andreia  connotes  an  ideal  of  male  character  and  behaviour  which  cannot  be  value- 
neutral'17.  Here  Hobbs  is  saying  that  the  term  `andreia'  could  not  be  used  to  describe  a 
foolish  person  because  it  had  only  positive  associations,  and  would  not  have  been  used 
about  someone  who  failed  or  acted  foolishly.  This  is  an  important  issue  for  Plato's 
definition  of  courage,  and  one  that  I  will  discuss  further  in  the  conclusion  below. 
Laches  agrees  with  this  alteration  of  his  definition  to  wise  endurance.  Socrates  then 
provides  Laches  with  various  examples  where  he  believes  the  more  foolish  man  is  the 
more  courageous.  Laches  agrees  that  these  examples  cause  a  problem  for  his  theory  of 
courage  as  wise  endurance,  but  does  he  have  to?  One  of  the  cases  Socrates  gives  for  the 
fool  being  more  courageous  in  his  endurance  than  the  wise  man  is  as  follows: 
15  Laches  192b9-1  1. 
16  Laches  192c2-5. 
17  Hobbs,  A.,  Plato  and  the  Hero,  p.  89. 
48 Well  then,  suppose  during  a  war  a  man  showed  endurance  by  being  prepared 
to  fight:  he  has  calculated  his  chances  wisely  and  realized  that  others  will 
support  him,  that  he'll  be  fighting  an  enemy  outnumbered  and  outclassed  by 
his  own  side,  and  that  he  has  the  stronger  position  -  now,  which  would  you 
say  is  the  braver,  the  man  showing  endurance  with  the  benefit  of  this  kind  of 
wisdom  and  these  resources,  or  a  man  from  the  opposing  camp  willing  to 
show  endurance  in  standing  against  him.  18 
However,  is  the  endurance  of  the  outnumbered  man  necessarily  the  more  foolish?  If  he  is 
fighting  to  save  his  family  and  homeland  from  destruction,  then  the  fact  that  he  is 
`outnumbered  and  outclassed'  does  not  make  him  foolish'9.  In  that  case,  he  would  be 
taking  the  best  possible  action  in  a  difficult  situation.  This  example  seems  particularly 
strange  being  offered  by  Socrates,  considering  he  believes  that  whether  one  acts 
`foolishly'  or  `wisely'  is  not  just  a  matter  of  self-protection,  but  that  other  issues,  such  as 
what  the  right  thing  to  do  is,  should  be  taken  into  account.  Taylor,  Vlastos  and  Hobbs  all 
argue  that  Socrates  and  Laches  need  to  distinguish  between  `prudential  knowledge, 
narrowly  defined  in  terms  of  one's  physical  and  material  wellbeing,  and  knowledge  of 
overall  objectives  and  values'20.  So  in  the  case  of  courage,  prudential  knowledge  would 
cover  such  areas  as  whether  you  are  outnumbered  or  not,  better  trained,  or  even  who  is 
most  likely  to  win.  Knowledge  of  overall  objectives  and  values  on  the  other  hand  refers 
to  the  moral  element  in  the  beliefs  that  we  have,  for  example,  whether  it  is  morally  right 
to  stay  and  fight  or  run  away.  The  outnumbered  man  may  be  acting  foolishly  if  he  were 
only  armed  with  prudential  knowledge,  but  if  he  is  aware  of  his  overall  objects,  and  they 
are  worth  the  risk,  then  he  is  not  acting  foolishly. 
Socrates  also  refers  to  cases  of  men  involved  with  cavalry  attacks  and  diving  down  wells 
in  an  attempt  to  illustrate  the  point  that  those  with  less  knowledge  are  the  more 
18  Laches  193a2-9. 
19  It  is  not  necessarily  foolish  to  fight  when  `outnumbered  and  outclassed'  because  by  fighting  you  at  least 
have  a  chance  of  victory,  and  when  there  is  so  much  at  stake  it  probably  worth  taking  that  chance. 
20  Hobbs,  A.,  Plato  and  the  Hero,  p.  92. 
49 courageous.  Interestingly  the  same  examples  are  used  in  the  Protagoras  in  a  discussion 
concerning  courage.  It  is  generally  agreed  that  in  these  two  discussions  Plato  is  referring 
to  the  same  cases  to  illustrate  completely  opposite  points.  In  the  Protagoras  the 
conversation  goes: 
[Socrates]  Do  you  know  who  dives  confidently  into  wells?  [Protagoras]  Of  course, 
divers.  [Socrates]  Is  this  because  they  know  what  they  are  doing,  or  for  some  other 
reason?  [Protagoras]  Because  they  know  what  they  are  doing.  21 
And  in  the  Laches: 
Anyone  willing  to  go  down  into  a  well,  and  to  dive,  and  show  endurance  in  this  or  in 
some  similar  activity,  will  be  braver  than  the  experts,  although  not  an  expert  himself.  22 
In  the  Laches  he  is  assuming  that  those  who  do  such  things  as  dive  down  wells  without 
knowledge  are  braver  than  those  who  do  it  with  knowledge.  In  contrast,  in  the  Protagoras 
people  who  do  such  things  without  the  relevant  knowledge  Protagoras  classifies  as  `mad'. 
Socrates  appears  to  be  relying  on  his  interlocutors  having  different  intuitions  about  such 
cases  in  these  two  dialogues.  Vlastos,  as  well  as  others,  has  argued  that  the  fact  that  Plato 
used  the  same  examples  in  order  to  illustrate  a  contradictory  point  cannot  be  accidental: 
Plato  could  hardly  have  introduced  the  same  three  examples  in  the  Laches  unless  he 
were  deliberately  contrasting  the  position  he  gives  Socrates  here  with  the  one  allowed 
him  in  the  Protagoras.  I  submit  that  the  simplest  explanation  of  this  fact  is  an  advance 
in  moral  insight  in  Plato's  own  understanding  of  the  true  intent  of  the  Socratic 
conception  of  courage  as  wisdom:  when  Plato  has  come  to  write  the  Laches  he  has 
seen  clearly  what  he  not  yet  seen  when  he  wrote  the  Protagoras  -  that  the  wisdom  that 
accounts  for  the  brave  man's  courage  has  everything  to  do  with  moral  insight,  and 
nothing  to  do  with  technical  skill.  23 
I  agree  with  Vlastos  that  there  has  been  an  advance  in  moral  insight  between  writing  the 
Protagoras  and  then  writing  the  Laches.  In  the  Protagoras  Plato  tries  to  develop  a  simple 
21  Prot.  350a1-5. 
22  Laches  193c4-6. 
23  Vlastos,  G.,  Socratic  Studies,  p.  117. 
50 relationship  between  knowledge  and  virtue;  in  that  dialogue  he  claims  that  knowledge 
without  qualification  will  make  one  braver.  In  the  Laches  we  advance  beyond  the 
difficulties  of  the  Protagoras  and  it  becomes  clear  that  not  all  kinds  of  knowledge  count 
towards  courage.  For  instance,  the  knowledge  of  the  general  who  knows  he  is  in  a  far 
superior  position  to  his  adversary  on  the  battlefield  will  not  mean  that  he  is  the  braver,  in 
fact  the  contrary  is  probably  true.  This  change  from  the  Protagoras  to  the  Laches 
regarding  such  cases  coupled  with  his  desire  to  still  include  knowledge  in  a  definition  of 
courage  shows  that  Plato  is  now  explicitly  distinguishing  between  different  kinds  of 
knowledge  and  has  decided  what  kind  of  knowledge  is  important  for  his  theory.  He  is 
now  making  it  clear  that  it  cannot  be  any  kind  of  knowledge,  utilizing  the  distinction 
described  above  by  Hobbs  as  the  discussion  continues. 
51 4.  How  the  Laches  should  be  read 
This  part  of  the  dialogue  is  particularly  instructive  about  the  issue  of  whether  the 
Unitarian  or  Developmentalist  tradition24  can  provide  a  coherent  picture  of  the  early 
dialogues.  In  the  discussion  above  Plato  introduces  a  further  example  to  the  one  given  at 
193a2-9.  And  as  we  have  also  seen  above,  in  the  Laches  Plato  says: 
And  as  many  as  would  be  willing  to  endure  in  diving  down  into  wells  without  being 
skilled,  or  to  endure  in  any  other  similar  situation,  you  say  are  braver  than  those  who 
are  skilled  in  these  things.  25 
Plato  is  relying  on  the  intuition  that  anyone  would  believe  that  the  person  who  dived  into 
the  well  without  experience  or  training  would  be  braver  than  those  who  went  in  with  such 
expertise,  in  order  to  convince  Laches  that  his  definition  of  courage  as  wise  endurance  is 
not  satisfactory.  However,  in  the  Protagoras  Socrates  uses  the  same  example,  but  in  that 
case  wishes  us  to  have  the  contrary  intuition  -  that  those  who  dive  into  wells  with 
knowledge  are  courageous,  those  without  knowledge  are  fools26.  The  Unitarian 
interpretation  claims  that  Plato  wrote  the  dialogues  from  a  single  point  of  view,  and  so  we 
can  therefore  have  an  understanding  of  the  Platonic  view  of  the  dialogues  as  a  whole. 
However,  given  the  inconsistency  above,  this  theory  clearly  has  some  particularly 
difficult  textual  contradictions  to  explain  if  it  is  to  be  a  credible  interpretation.  This  may 
also  present  difficulties  to  the  proponent  of  some  versions  of  the  Developmentalist 
position  as  it  is  common  for  supporters  of  this  theory  to  claim  that  we  can  find  a  coherent 
Socratic  view  in  the  early  dialogues.  Thus  to  some  extent  both  of  these  popular  theories 
will  struggle  to  incorporate  such  a  discrepancy  between  two  early  dialogues. 
24  See  Chapter  1:  Introduction  for  a  discussion  of  the  difference  between  the  Unitarian  and 
Developmentalist  positions. 
23  Laches  193c4-6. 
26  Prot.  349e1-351. 
52 What  is  also  interesting  about  this  part  of  the  dialogue  is  that  Socrates  does  not  dismiss 
Laches'  view  and  move  on  to  the  one  suggested  by  Nicias,  but  rather  leaves  the  option 
open: 
If  you  don't  mind,  let's  stick  to  the  search  and  show  some  endurance,  in  case  Bravery 
herself  pokes  fun  at  us  for  not  bravely  searching  for  her,  when  perhaps  endurance 
actually  is  bravery  after  all.  27 
Socrates  was  obviously  not  satisfied  with  Laches'  definition  of  courage  as  endurance,  but 
was  also  unwilling  to  reject  it  completely.  The  concept  of  endurance  reappears  in  the 
Republic  firstly  when  discussing  education.  Socrates  claims  that  in  order  for  the 
Guardians  to  stimulate  their  `thumos'  they  must  endure  `strenuous  exercises  in  their 
physical  training'28.  It  is  the  thumos  -  the  seat  of  courage  in  the  Republic  -  that  will  be 
stimulated  by  endurance.  The  idea  is  included  again  when  Socrates  is  specifically 
discussing  courage.  In  Book  IV  of  the  Republic  Socrates  claims  that  in  order  to  be 
courageous  one  must  retain  in  all  circumstances  the  correct  beliefs  about  what  should  be 
feared.  The  courageous  person  must  not  be  overcome  by  `pleasure  or  pain,  desire  or 
fear'29.  In  other  words,  they  must  tolerate,  or  endure,  situations  where  they  are  tempted  to 
renege  on  their  beliefs  because  of  the  threat  of  pain  or  the  enticement  of  pleasure.  I  think 
that  the  statement  made  above  (Lathes  194a1-4),  even  though  it  is  in  the  form  of  a  joke, 
gives  us  a  nod  to  the  ideas  expressed  later  in  the  Republic.  In  this  point  I  am  partly  in 
agreement  with  Charles  Kahn  who  is  well  known  for  his  view  that  we  should  read  some 
of  the  early  dialogues  30 
proleptically,  looking  forward  rather  than  backward  for  their  meaning:  reading  them 
not  to  find  out  what  Socrates  said  so  long  ago  but  to  see  how  Plato  will  pursue  his 
paths  of  inquiry  from  one  dialogue  to  the  next,  and  ultimately  onto  the  doctrines  of  the 
middle  dialogues.  31 
27Laches  193e10-194a3. 
28  Rep.  410b6. 
29  Rep.  429d1-2. 
30  Laches,  Charmides,  Lysis,  Euthyphro  and  Protagoras. 
31  Kahn,  C.,  `Did  Plato  Write  Socratic  Dialogues?  ',  p.  39. 
53 It  may  be  true  that  the  Laches,  and  the  Protagoras  as  well,  show  us  the  views  of  the 
historical  Socrates  (in  the  Laches  through  Nicias)32,  but  they  are  more  informative  about 
the  development  of  Plato's  philosophical  beliefs.  Therefore  I  do  not  think  they  should 
only  be  read  proleptically,  but  that  that  is  a  particular  source  of  interest. 
32  Such  as  `we're  good  in  so  far  as  we're  clever,  but  in  so  far  as  we're  ignorant,  we're  bad',  Laches  194d1- 
2. 
54 5.  Nicias'  definition  of  courage 
Nicias  changes  the  type  of  definition  of  courage  to  one  much  more  fitting  to  the  views  of 
Socrates.  As  Hobbs  says,  he  changes  the  definition  under  discussion  from  a  non-cognitive 
psychological  quality  to  a  purely  cognitive  one.  Cognitive  theories  of  qualities,  in  this 
case  the  virtue  of  courage,  are  ones  where  the  central  tenet  is  that  the  relevant  quality  is 
identified  as  being  a  belief.  In  the  early  dialogues  we  get  the  cognitive  theory  that  the 
virtues  are  knowledge  of  different  areas,  so  the  idea  is  that  a  quality  can  be  defined  in 
reference  to  a  certain  kind  of  knowledge.  What  Nicias  says  of  courage  is: 
I've  often  heard  you  saying  that  we're  each  good  in  so  far  as  we're  clever,  but  in  so  far 
as  we're  ignorant,  we're  bad...  So  if  a  brave  man  is  a  good  man,  it's  obvious  that  he's 
clever.  33 
Laches  does  not  understand  what  kind  of  knowledge  Nicias  would  think  could  play  a  part 
in  courage,  so  Nicias  continues:  `This  is  the  knowledge  I  mean,  Laches:  knowledge  of 
what  is  fearful  and  what  is  encouraging,  both  in  wartime  and  in  all  other  situations'34 
Laches  still  cannot  understand  what  the  objects  of  this  kind  of  knowledge  would  be  and 
tries  to  prove  Nicias'  theory  wrong  with  unrelated  examples.  He  says:  `For  instance,  in 
the  case  of  ill  health,  doctors  are  the  ones  who  know  the  dangers,  aren't  they?  Or  do  you 
think  brave  men  are  the  ones  who  know?  Or  perhaps  you'd  call  doctors  brave?  '35  Laches 
is  clearly  still  stuck  on  the  distinction  between  knowledge  of  overall  ends  and  objectives 
and  knowledge  of  practical  matters  which  foiled  his  attempts  at  a  definition,  and  cannot 
see  that  Nicias  means  fear  of  doing  the  morally  wrong  thing.  Nicias  tries  to  explain  to 
Laches  that  it  is  not  prudential  knowledge  of  the  details  of  medicine  or  farming,  but 
knowledge  of  overall  objectives  and  what  is  genuinely  for  the  best,  a  distinction  Laches  is 
ultimately  unable  to  grasp  in  the  dialogue. 
33  Laches  194d1-4. 
34  Laches  194e12-195a2. 
35  Laches  195b2-5. 
55 Nicias'  general  picture  of  courage  is  thus:  imagine  a  man  standing  in  the  ranks  at  the 
beginning  of  a  battle.  He  has  the  choice  of  risking  life  and  limb  by  joining  his  fellow  men 
in  the  charge,  or  running  away.  He  feels  a  rational  fear  of  running  away  and  this  rational 
fear,  according  to  Nicias  in  the  Laches,  is  a  fear  of  what  is  genuinely  to  be  feared  -  fear 
of  the  morally  wrong  action.  We  can  see  in  the  other  dialogues  that  Plato  was  committed 
to  the  idea  that  it  is  the  morally  wrong  action  that  can  harm  you  the  most,  as  it  harms  your 
sou136.  The  virtue  of  courage  is  when  the  man  knows  that  running  away  from  the  battle  is 
what  is  to  be  feared,  as  it  is  the  option  that  is  most  dangerous  to  him. 
The  theory  presented  by  Nicias  asks  us  to  think  of  courage  in  a  different  way  to  the 
modern  conception.  Courage  is  often  conceived  to  be  an  overcoming  of  fear  rather  than 
acting  out  of  fear.  However,  there  is  analogous  evidence  that  Plato  was  aware  that  the 
idea  that  courage  was  acting  on  fear  of  doing  the  wrong  thing  would  have  seemed  strange 
to  his  readers.  His  subtle  response  to  this  comes  at  the  beginning  of  the  dialogue  when 
Nicias  and  Laches  are  trying  to  persuade  Lysimachus  and  Melesias  to  bring  Socrates  into 
the  discussion: 
[Laches]  What's  more,  Lysimachus,  you  mustn't  let  him  slip  away.  I've  seen  him  in  a 
quite  different  context  proving  a  credit  not  just  to  his  father,  but  also  to  his  country.  He 
marched  back  with  me  in  the  retreat  from  Delium  and,  I  assure  you,  had  the  rest  of  the 
troops  been  prepared  to  follow  his  example,  our  city  would  now  have  its  head  held 
high  and  would  never  have  taken  such  a  terrible  fall.  [Lysimachus]  When  your 
conduct  wins  the  praise  of  men  of  such  authority,  this  is  praise  indeed,  Socrates!  37 
And  also: 
But  what  about  another  man,  a  man  who  still  fights  the  enemy,  but  runs  away  and 
doesn't  make  a  stand?  ... 
I  suppose  just  like  the  Scythians  are  said  to  fight  every  bit  as 
much  in  retreat  as  in  pursuit,  and  perhaps  just  like  Homer  said  in  praise  of  Aeneas' 
horses  that  they  know  how  `quickly  to  cover  the  ground  in  flight  or  in  pursuit,  it  makes 
36  We  can  see  that  this  is  Plato's  view  in  the  Republic. 
37  Laches  18l  a7-b6. 
56 no  odds',  and  pays  `tribute  to  Aeneas  himself  for  his  knowledge  of  fear,  and  says  he's 
a  `contriver  of  fear'.  38 
In  both  of  these  sections  he  is  encouraging  us  to  believe  that  courageous  behaviour  can  be 
thought  of  as  a  moving  away  from  something  just  as  much  as  a  moving  towards.  These 
passages  are  not  evidence  in  favour  of  the  theory  of  courage  as  knowledge  of  what  should 
be  feared,  as  obviously  Plato  is  not  claiming  that  retreat  is  always  the  braver  thing  to  do. 
However,  he  is  trying  to  open  up  the  minds  of  his  listens  and  readers  to  thinking  about 
courage  in  a  new  way.  The  example  of  Socrates,  who  is  set  up  in  the  dialogue  as  an 
appropriate  person  to  discuss  the  education  of  Lysimachus'  and  Melesias'  sons,  is  seen  as 
the  archetypal  example  of  courageous  behaviour.  In  the  Crito  he  establishes  why  he 
believes  it  would  be  wrong  to  escape  from  captivity  before  his  death,  and  he  makes  his 
decision  based  on  reasoning: 
We  must  therefore  examine  whether  we  should  act  in  this  way  or  not,  as  not  only  now 
but  at  all  times  I  am  the  kind  of  man  who  listens  to  nothing  within  me  but  the 
argument  that  on  reflection  seems  best  to  me.  39 
Also,  at  the  end  of  the  Crito  Socrates  gives  a  speech  to  his  friend  explaining  why  he  will 
not  run  away,  drawing  together  all  of  the  points  he  has  made  throughout  the  dialogue 
concerning  his  reasons  for  staying  and  receiving  his  sentence.  We  see  Socrates' 
behaviour  as  courageous,  and  it  is  explained  by  Plato  as  being  due  to  his  belief  that  the 
alternative  will  be  worse  for  everyone  -  his  friends,  his  family,  and  perhaps  most 
importantly  himself.  There  is  no  mention  of  feeling  fearful  of  running  away,  he  is  simply 
calmly  explaining  his  reasons  for  staying  and  dealing  with  the  sentence  in  the  Crito  and 
Phaedo.  However,  if  Socrates  is  the  archetypal  courageous  man,  why  does  he  not  make 
mention,  or  indeed  at  any  point  appear  to  be,  afraid  of  the  immoral  alternative?  This  leads 
us  on  to  the  question  of  whether  or  not  Plato  expected  us  to  actually  have  the  feeling  of 
fear  of  doing  to  immoral  thing,  or  whether  fear  was  simply  the  ascription  of 
dangerousness. 
38  Laches  191  a5-b4. 
39  Crito  46b3-6. 
57 A  particular  difficulty  with  the  theory  as  presented  by  Nicias  is  the  question  of  why  we 
would  necessarily  feel  fear  of  the  option  we  know  to  be  the  worst  for  us.  As  Nicias  and 
Socrates  do  not  specify  the  nature  of  the  fear  in  the  morally  fearful  option  we  are  left  to 
consider  which  interpretation  of  the  role  of  fear  will  make  this  theory  of  courage  the  most 
plausible.  If  we  interpret  the  fear  as  a  felt  sensation,  then  the  theory  faces  this  problem  of 
why  we  would  necessarily  feel  fearful  of  the  option  we  identify  as  being  the  most 
dangerous.  The  student  going  into  final  exams  may  feel  frightened  and  need  courage,  but 
I  doubt  it  is  fear  of  the  alternative  at  that  moment  that  encourages  them.  If  they  were 
asked  to  think  about  why  they  decided  to  go  to  university  and  sit  exams  they  may  on 
reflection  say  that  they  felt  frightened  of  what  their  life  would  be  like  without 
qualifications,  but  that  does  not  mean  that  they  felt  that  kind  of  fear  on  the  day.  To  have 
fear  of  that  kind  you  need  time  to  reflect,  and  situations  requiring  courage  are  infamous  in 
not  allowing  that.  So  Plato  cannot  justifiably  expect  us  to  have  the  feeling  of  fear  of 
doing  the  immoral  alternative,  as  indeed  he  does  not  display  Socrates  doing  in  the 
Phaedo.  Therefore,  the  alternative  interpretation  of  the  theory  is  where  the  knowledge  of 
what  is  fearful  is  simply  knowledge  without  any  feeling  necessarily  associated  with  it. 
This  interpretation  -  that  no  feeling  element  was  necessary  to  the  Socratic  definition  of 
courage  -  seems  the  most  plausible  in  the  light  of  the  Socratic  position  that  we  are  only 
directly  motivated  by  our  beliefs.  It  could  also  be  argued  that  the  question  of  whether  the 
knowledge  of  the  truly  fearful  option  is  accompanied  by  the  feeling  of  fear  is  not  a 
relevant  one  to  the  theory.  If  the  rational  decisions  that  one  makes  are  the  all  important 
factor  for  Socrates,  then  whether  you  actually  have  the  feeling  of  fear  will  not  be  an  issue 
that  would  have  seemed  important  to  him. 
To  return  to  Nicias'  argument  with  Socrates,  once  Nicias  has  made  this  distinction 
Socrates  moves  onto  the  other  problems  he  perceives  in  Nicias'  theory.  Socrates  brings 
58 up  a  possible  problem  for  all  cognitive  definitions  of  courage  -  the  question  of  animals 
and  children: 
It's  obvious,  Nicias,  you  don't  believe  even  the  Crommyonian  pig  could  have  been 
brave.  I  don't  mean  to  be  flippant  by  that  remark;  I  think  that  if  one  puts  forward  this 
theory,  one  is  forced  either  to  deny  that  any  animal  whatsoever  is  brave,  or  else  to 
allow  that  an  animal  like  a  lion,  or  a  leopard,  or  even  a  wild  boar,  is  clever  enough  to 
know  things  which  all  but  a  few  human  beings  find  too  difficult  to  understand.  And  if 
one  has  the  same  concept  of  bravery  as  you,  one  is  bound  to  admit  that  as  far  as  being 
brave  is  concerned,  lions,  stags,  bulls  and  apes  are  all  in  this  same  position  40 
A  cognitive  definition  of  courage  relies  on  that  claim  that  virtues  such  as  courage  are 
dependent  on  beliefs  or  knowledge  -  in  Plato's  case,  knowledge  of  what  is  fearful.  Given 
that  animals  and  young  children  do  not  have  the  necessary  rationality  for  such  beliefs, 
they  cannot  therefore  be  courageous.  Nicias  accepts  the  outcome  of  the  first  argument  - 
that  animals  and  children  can't  be  brave.  He  states  that  what  people  have  commonly 
referred  to  as  courage  in  animals  and  children  is  what  he  would  call  fearlessness  and 
foolishness41: 
`Brave'  is  not  a  word  I  use  to  describe  animals,  or  anything  else  that's  not  afraid  of 
danger  because  of  its  own  lack  of  understanding;  I  prefer  `fearless'  or  foolish'.  Or  do 
you  suppose  I  call  every  little  child  brave  because  it  doesn't  understand,  and  so  is  not 
afraid  of  anything?  No,  I  think  to  be  unafraid  and  to  be  brave  are  two  quite  different 
things.  42 
There  is  no  response  given  to  Nicias'  position  on  this  matter,  and  the  discussion  changes 
to  set  up  the  final  problem  of  the  dialogue.  Nicias  has  defined  courage  as  knowledge  of 
future  evils,  but  Socrates  states  that  knowledge  is  not  something  that  can  be  separated 
into  past,  present  and  future  knowledge: 
It  seems  to  your  friend  and  me,  taking  account  of  all  objects  of  knowledge,  that  it's 
never  one  thing  to  know  how  a  past  event  took  place,  another  to  know  how  events  are 
40  Laches  196e4-12. 
41  Laches  197a7. 
42  Laches  197a5-b2. 
59 unfolding  in  the  present,  and  another  to  know  how  future  events  will  come  about  and 
what  the  best  course  for  them  would  be:  it's  the  same  knowledge  throughout  43 
However,  if  we  cannot  separate  knowledge  into  knowledge  of  the  past  or  the  future  then 
courage  cannot  be  knowledge  of  only  future  goods  and  evils  but  of  all  goods  and  evils; 
but  knowledge  of  goods  and  evils  must  be  the  whole  of  virtue  not  just  courage.  The 
discussion  thus  ends  negatively  with  the  intellectualist  position  that  virtue  is  knowledge 
again  being  shown  to  be  in  some  way  inadequate.  The  lesson  from  the  Protagoras  is  that 
we  need  to  give  more  consideration  to  what  kind  of  knowledge  virtue  could  be,  whereas 
the  Laches  identifies  the  kind  of  knowledge  needed  for  courage  but  this  knowledge  is 
then  indistinguishable  from  what  is  needed  for  virtue  as  a  whole.  It  seems  likely  that  at 
this  point  Plato  is  using  this  argument  about  courage  to  indicate  the  fundamental  nature  of 
the  unity  of  the  virtues,  and  the  difficulty  that  this  creates  when  trying  to  identify  the 
separate  natures  of  the  individual  virtues. 
43  Laches  198d1-5. 
60 6.  Further  sunnort  for  nart  4 
Nicias  argues  for  the  more  traditional  Socratic  theory  that  virtue  is  knowledge.  It  is 
interesting  to  note  that  here  Socrates  argues  against  the  idea  that  we  commonly  think  of 
him  supporting.  It  is  as  if  Plato  wants  to  have  Socrates  in  the  dominant  position  as  always 
but  wants  to  challenge  his  usual  ideas,  and  therefore  he  puts  Socrates'  actual  view  into 
the  mouth  of  Nicias.  This  shows  that  the  Socrates  in  the  dialogues  may  not  always  argue 
for  what  we  think  the  historical  man  thought,  and  that  Plato  was  not  always,  if  ever, 
interested  in  writing  in  order  to  exhibit  Socrates'  intellectual  prowess.  Socrates  criticizes 
Nicias'  view  by  arguing  that  his  definition  of  courage,  which  he  believes  is  a  part  of 
goodness,  could  also  be  the  definition  of  the  whole  of  goodness.  Nicias  is  clearly 
unhappy with  the  fact  that  he  would  either  have  to  reject  his  definition  or  accept  that 
courage  is  in  some  way  the  whole  of  virtue.  It  is  interesting  that  Plato  challenges  the  idea 
that  virtue  is  knowledge  by  discussing  courage,  as  it  is  singly  the  one  among  the  virtues 
which  would  have  the  greatest  claim  to  uniqueness.  This  point  is  brought  up  in  the 
Protagoras  when  Protagoras  himself  says  that  of  the  virtues  `four  of  them  resemble  each 
other  fairly  closely,  but  courage  is  very  different  from  all  the  rest'  44 
The  Laches  does  not  only  show  us  the  Socratic  view,  but  also  reveals  that  Plato's 
uncertainties  about  the  core  Socratic  ideas  are  showing  through  in  his  discussion  of  the 
issue  of  courage.  Firstly,  we  have  evidence  that  Socrates  was  committed  to  the  idea  that 
virtue  is  knowledge  -  the  view  supported  by  Nicias  in  the  dialogue  -  but  that  it  is  not  the 
surviving  view  at  the  end  of  the  dialogue  (That  such  views  as  `Virtue  is  Knowledge',  and 
`No  one  does  wrong  willingly'  are  Socratic  is  supported  by  cross-textual  analysis  with 
Xenophon  and  Aristotle).  By  making  Socrates  argue  against  his  own  view  Plato  is  able  to 
keep  Socrates  as  the  main  character  who  is  more  able  in  discussion  than  the  others,  whilst 
highlighting  the  problems  with  his  view.  The  early  dialogues  enabled  Plato  to  work 
through  Socrates'  ideas  and  establish  his  own  position.  Secondly,  the  two  main 
definitions  of  courage,  endurance  and  knowledge,  that  are  each  shown  to  be  inadequate 
44  Prot.  349d3-4. 
61 individually,  make  up  the  definition  Plato  gives  of  courage  in  the  Republic,  as  I  will 
demonstrate  in  Chapter  5. 
62 7.  Conclusion 
The  Laches  raises  some  interesting  and  meaty  issues  for  any  theory  of  courage.  Even 
though  it  is  in  a  sense  unsuccessful  in  that  the  definition  of  courage  offered  by  Nicias 
creates  problems  when  trying  to  successfully  distinguish  the  virtues  from  one  another,  it 
still  succeeds  in  drawing  out  what  are,  and  will  be  for  Plato  in  the  Republic,  key  points 
that  any  attempts  at  a  definition  of  courage  must  take  into  account.  It  is  a  key  step  in 
Plato's  long  and  difficult  relationship  with  the  virtue  he  will  in  the  end  rank  as  the  least 
important  of  the  four  main  virtues  45 
So  what  are  the  problems  encountered  in  this  dialogue?  The  main  issue  this  dialogue 
brings  up  is  the  role  of  knowledge  in  courage.  We  can  see  the  importance  Plato  places  on 
knowledge  by  the  fact  that  the  discussion  focuses  on  it  right  from  the  start.  The 
discussion  of  military  training  where  Nicias  and  Laches  present  their  opposing  views 
both  foreshadows  what  their  approach  will  be  in  the  second  half  of  the  dialogue,  and 
helps  us  to  'understand  that  the  question  of  what  role  knowledge  can  play  in  a  definition 
of  courage  is  not  an  easy  one  to  answer.  If  a  definition  of  courage  is  going  to  include 
knowledge  as  a  necessary  or  sufficient  part  we  need  to  first  clarify  what  kind  of 
knowledge  we  are  talking  about  -  which  is  where  the  Protagoras  fails  and  the  Laches 
succeeds.  In  response  to  Laches'  second  attempt  at  a  definition,  Socrates'  response 
demonstrates  that  if  wisdom  (or  knowledge)  is  to  be  included  it  cannot  be  a  prudential 
kind  of  knowledge;  knowledge  that  we  will  probably  be  victorious  and  are  therefore  not 
taking  too  much  of  a  risk  does  not  amount  to  courage.  I  do  not  mean  to  imply  that 
Socrates  and  Plato  were  necessarily  aware  of  the  distinction  between  prudential 
knowledge  and  knowledge  of  overall  ends  and  objectives,  but  that  it  is  likely  that  Plato 
may  have  been,  given  the  different  types  of  knowledge  that  are  being  referred  to  in 
Laches'  and  Nicias'  definitions,  and  that  it  is  one  that  the  dialogue  makes  the  modem 
reader  aware  of.  Nicias  certainly  seems  to  be  talking  about  a  different  kind  of  knowledge 
45  In  the  Laws,  see  chapter  7. 
63 to  Laches,  which  is  why  Laches  finds  it  so  difficult  to  fathom  what  Nicias  is  talking 
about. 
What  role  then  can  knowledge  of  overall  ends  and  objectives  have  in  a  definition  of 
courage?  If  we  are  to  accept  this  type  of  knowledge  as  the  whole,  or  a  part  of,  our 
definition  of  courage  we  will  also  have  to  accept  two  conclusions  that  arise  from  it.  The 
first  is  that  we  must  be  committed  to  the  idea  that  courage  is  necessarily  a  good  thing, 
which  we  can  see  that  Plato  and  his  contempories  all  accepted.  This  is  an  idea  that  Plato 
will  only  relinquish  when  he  writes  the  Laws  many  years  later,  and  only  then  in  part.  So 
if  we  need  knowledge  of  what  the  right  thing  to  do  is  in  our  definition  we  must  also  be 
committed  to  objective  moral  values  and  that  courageous  behaviour  will  always  adhere  to 
them.  Thus  the  misguided  suicide-bomber  who  goes  to  his  death  for  what  he  believes  will 
not  under  this  theory  be  acting  courageously.  This  does  not  necessarily  mean  the  theory  is 
wrong  of  course,  but  it  does  mean  it  excludes  cases  that  many  would  commonly  assume 
would  be  included  in  cases  of  courage.  Secondly,  as  stated  above,  any  cognitive  theory  of 
the  virtues  will  have  to  exclude  non-rational  beings,  such  as  animals,  as  well  as  pre- 
rational  ones,  such  as  children.  Children,  animals  and  suicide-bombers  will  then  be 
distinguished  from  cases  of  genuine  courage  because  of  their  lack  of  knowledge.  What 
will  we  then  call  this  kind  of  behaviour?  Would  it  simply  be  rashness  as  Nicias  says?  But 
the  difference  between  courage  and  rashness  is  surely  more  a  matter  of  the  amount  of  fear 
experienced  by  the  individual,  not  their  knowledge;  the  rash  man  doesn't  take  account  of 
the  dangers  involved  whereas  the  courageous  man  does  and  acts  anyway.  If  we  cannot 
adequately  account  for  the  apparently  brave-seeming  behaviour  of  animals,  children  and 
suicide-bombers  in  any  other  way,  then  maybe  we  should  accept  the  intuition  that  they 
are  exhibiting  bravery. 
I  would  also  like  to  say  something  in  favour  of  the  definition  presented  by  Nicias  in  this 
dialogue  that  I  am  taking  to  be  Socrates'  own.  If  we  think  of  courage  as  simply 
overcoming  fear  we  do  not  learn  anything  from  that  definition  about  what  makes  people 
64 be  courageous  and  why  some  people  are  and  some  people  aren't.  Nicias'  definition  is 
also  an  explanation  of  sorts  of  why  people  act  in  this  way.  The  idea  that  courage  is  the 
overcoming  of  fear  does  not  help  us  to  understand  why  some  people  are  courageous  and 
some  people  aren't.  It  also  does  not  rule  out  cases  of  overcoming  fear  that  we  would 
certainly  not  consider  to  be  courageous  -  such  as  the  man  who  overcomes  his  fear  of 
disgrace  in  order  to  commit  a  heinous  crime.  Whereas  the  idea  that  courage  is  knowledge 
of  what  should  be  feared  means  that  to  act  courageously  one  must  act  out  of  fear  rather 
than  in  spite  of  it  -a  motivation  that  is  particularly  understandable.  Thus  the  definition  of 
courage  as  knowledge  of  what  truly  should  be  feared  gives  a  plausible  definition  of  this 
character  trait  that  also  includes  an  explanation  as  to  why  someone  would  act 
courageously. 
We  shall  see  that  in  the  Republic  Plato  manages  to  retain  the  idea  of  courage  being 
knowledge  of  what  is  truly  fearful  or  encouraging  whilst  avoiding  the  outcome  that  it 
cannot  be  distinguished  from  virtue  itself  by  including  an  additional  element  -  enduring 
those  things  that  try  to  make  us  lose  our  beliefs.  So  the  Laches  points  us  towards  the 
theory  in  the  Republic  in  two  ways.  The  second  part  of  the  dialogue  provides  the  main 
thrust  of  the  theory  (that  virtue  is  knowledge),  whilst  the  first  part  works  out  what  must 
be  added  in  order  to  solve  the  problems  raised  in  this  dialogue  (some  kind  of  endurance). 
With  Nicias  expressing  the  Socratic  definition  of  courage  as  knowledge  the  character  of 
Socrates  can  bring  to  light  the  difficulties  of  defining  this  virtue  as  part  of  a  unified 
cognitive  theory.  Nicias  and  Socrates  seem  to  edge  around  the  important  point  that  Plato 
appears  aware  of  in  the  Republic:  that  courage  is  different  from  the  other  virtues  -  one 
could  know  what  is  right  without  being  brave  enough  to  do  it.  Laches'  definition  tries  to 
capture  the  distinctiveness  of  courage  but  it  fails  because  it  describes  a  kind  of  behaviour 
that  is  often  courageous  but  need  not  be.  By  combining  the  two  definitions  of  courage 
given  by  Nicias  and  Laches,  Plato  arrives  at  a  new  definition  in  the  Republic  that  is  able 
to  avoid  some  of  the  problems  encountered  in  this  dialogue.  The  view  in  the  Republic  is 
clearly  developed  as  a  result  of  working  through  these  issues  in  the  Laches. 
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66 1.  Introduction 
In  this  chapter  I  will  consider  the  dynamics  of  Plato's  tripartite  soul,  and  in  the  next 
the  impact  that  this  model  has  on  his  definition  of  courage.  I  will  start  by  considering 
the  argument  given  by  Plato  for  the  division  of  the  soul  -  often  called  the  argument 
from  opposites.  Various  interpretations  have  been  offered  of  how,  in  the  tripartite 
soul,  Reason,  Appetite  and  Spirit  interrelate.  I  will  consider  the  merits  of  two  main 
types  of  response  to  this  issue;  the  `strength  model'  and  the  `persuasion  model',  and 
consider  in  the  light  of  the  problems  of  these  models  whether  there  are  any  more 
acceptable  alternatives.  We  shall  see  that  an  alternative  interpretation  of  Plato's 
tripartite  soul  can  provide  insights  into  the  importance  of  courage  for  such  a  model, 
which  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  chapter.  Before  I  start,  however,  I  will 
provide  a  brief  description  of  Plato's  controversial  thesis. 
67 2.  The  Tripartite  Soul 
The  Platonic  theory  of  the  elements  or  parts  of  the  soul  is  presented  in  the  Republic, 
and  although  alluded  to  in  other  dialogues,  is  not  argued  for  directly  in  any  other 
work.  This  may  be  because  we  are  supposed  to  assume  the  theory  when  reading  his 
later  works,  or  that  he  recognised  some  serious  problems  inherent  in  the  view  that  he 
was  unable  to  rectify  without  abandoning  at  least  some  of  what  he  had  previously 
thought.  This  is  open  to  interpretation.  One  line  of  thought  is  that  with  awareness  `of 
its  problems,  we  are  tempted  to  suppose  it  still  alive  in  the  Phaedrus  and  Timaeus,  but 
dead  by  the  time  of  the  Laws".  However,  we  cannot  assume  that  absence  implies  a 
change  of  heart,  for  if  it  did  we  could  claim  that  Plato  was  incessantly  capricious  as 
his  dialogues  do  not  always  cover  old  ground.  I  will  return  to  this  question  in  the 
chapter  on  the  Laws  below. 
In  brief  then,  Plato  claims  that  the  soul  is  made  up  of  three  distinct  `parts'  or 
`elements'2.  Each  of  these  parts  has  different  functions  within  the  soul.  Reason  is  the 
part  that  will  dominate  a  just  soul,  is  rational  and  concerned  with  the  overall  good  of 
the  agent.  The  Spirit  is  the  part  that  is  the  seat  of  emotions  such  as  anger,  indignation 
and  is  the  driving  force  behind  courage,  and  is  generally  concerned  with  honour  and 
the  image  of  the  individual.  And  finally,  the  Appetite,  which  encompasses  the  desires 
usually  associated  with  the  body  -  hunger,  thirst,  sexual  desire  etc.  This  much  is  clear 
from  the  Republic.  However,  how  these  parts  relate  to  one  another  is  less  explicitly 
explained,  and  is  what  I  will  consider  next. 
1  Price,  A.  W.,  Mental  Conflict,  p.  93. 
2  It  is  a  controversial  matter  how  Plato  should  be  translated  when  he  discusses  the  parts  of  the  soul,  and 
whether  he  means  it  literally  or  symbolically. 
68 3.  The  Argument  for  the  Division  of  the  Soul 
i.  The  Argument 
The  argument  for  the  division  of  the  soul  is  given  in  Book  IV  of  the  Republic  at  435a- 
441c.  The  crux  of  Plato's  argument  rests  on  two  specific  ideas  and  the  examples  he 
gives  in  support  of  it.  The  first  I  will  call  the  Principle  of  Opposites3: 
Clearly  one  and  the  same  thing  cannot  act  or  be  affected  in  opposite  ways  at 
the  same  time  in  the  same  part  of  it  and  in  relation  to  the  same  object;  so  if 
we  find  these  [contradictions]  we  shall  know  we  are  dealing  with  more  than 
one  [faculty]. 
The  second  essential  part  of  Plato's  argument  is  that  human  beings  do  have  `opposite' 
feelings  towards  the  same  object.  Plato  is  relying  on  the  fact  that  most  of  us  are 
familiar  with  having  a  desire  for  another  piece  of  cake,  or  staying  in  bed  in  the 
morning,  but  also  having  the  `opposite'  feeling  that  we  shouldn't.  Due  to  the  fact  that 
we  do  have  these  `opposite'  emotions  about  the  same  object  at  the  same  time  Plato 
concludes  that  the  soul  is  not  one  thing,  but  has  different  parts  that  have  different 
attitudes  towards  the  same  object.  In  other  words,  if  a  man's  mind  tells  him  he  is 
thirsty  but  `there  is  something  in  it  that  resists  its  thirst,  it  must  be  something  in  it 
other  than  the  thirsty  impulse  which  is  dragging  it  like  a  wild  animal  to  drink's.  We 
can  imagine  Plato  could  be  referring  to  a  man  who  has  an  illness  that  means  he 
shouldn't  drink.  In  this  case  the  thirst  for  water  comes  from  the  appetitive  part,  the 
motivation  behind  not  drinking  comes  from  Reason,  and  Spirit  assists  Reason  in  the 
choice  to  not  drink.  I  will  address  the  role  played  by  Spirit  in  greater  detail  below,  as  it 
provides  insight  into  Plato's  model  of  the  soul  and  is  especially  relevant  to  his  concept 
of  courage. 
To  clarify,  the  argument  for  the  division  of  the  soul  is  thus: 
3I  will  use  this  name,  as  opposed  to  the  Principle  of  Non-contrariety  or  the  Argument  from 
Contradiction,  as  both  of  these  names  imply  a  certain  interpretation  of  the  passage. 
4  Republic.  436b9-cl. 
5  Rep.  439b4-6. 
69 Premise  (1):  'one  and  the  same  thing  cannot  act  or  be  affected  in  opposite  ways  at 
the  same  time  in  the  same  part  of  it  and  in  relation  to  the  same  object'. 
Premise  (2):  A  human  soul  can  experience  opposite  feelings  (to  experience  opposite 
feelings  is  to  be  affected  in  opposite  ways). 
Conclusion:  The  soul  is  not  one  and  the  same  thing. 
ii.  The  Contrary/Contradictory  Distinction 
The  first  problem  of  this  argument  to  note  is  that  Premise  (1)  contains  an  ambiguity 
that  needs  to  be  clarified  before  an  analysis  of  the  validity  of  this  argument  can  be 
attempted.  This  ambiguity  is  contained  in  the  translation  of  the  phrase  'ravavtta,  `in 
opposite  ways'.  There  are  two  possible  modern  interpretations  of  this  phrase  - 
contradictory  and  contrary  ways.  Propositions  are  contradictory  if  it  is  impossible  for 
both  to  be  true  or  both  to  be  false,  and  that  the  truth  of  one  implies  the  falsity  of  the 
other.  Propositions  are  contrary  if  only  one  can  be  true  but  they  can  both  be  false,  thus 
the  truth  of  one  implies  the  falsity  of  the  other  but  the  falsity  of  one  does  not  imply  to 
truth  of  the  other.  There  is  also  an  ambiguity  in  the  notion  of  acting  or  being  acted 
upon.  The  important  point  to  note  is  that  Plato  illustrates  his  principle  of  opposites 
where  there  is  some  kind  of  physical  activity,  but  he  applies  it  to  mental  activity.  The 
reason  why  this  creates  a  problem  can  be  seen  if  you  consider  two  different  kinds  of 
cases  in  which  the  contrary/contradictory  distinction  might  be  employed: 
External  acts: 
(A)  Moving/not  moving. 
(B)  Moving  towards  a  place/moving  away  from  a  place. 
(A)  is  a  clear  case  of  contradictories,  and  (B)  of  contraries. 
Mental  states: 
(C)  Wanting  to  move/  not  wanting  to  move. 
(D)  Wanting  to  move/  wanting  not  to  move. 
(C)  is  also  a  clear  case  of  contradictories,  whereas  with  (D)  it  is  not  so  clear.  It  is  not 
70 obvious  that  (D)  satisfies  the  definition  of  contraries  since  it  could  be  argued  that  one 
and  the  same  person  at  the  same  time  could  want  to  do  P  and  want  to  do  not-P. 
iii.  Evidence  for  Plato's  intended  meaning  of  `in  opposite  ways' 
The  evidence  does  show  us  that  Plato  applied  his  words  that  we  translate  as  opposite 
to  what  we  would  call  contradictory  and  contrary  predicates.  Meno,  in  the  dialogue  of 
the  same  name,  asks  Socrates  the  question:  `But  what  do  you  mean  when  you  say  that 
we  don't  learn  anything,  but  that  what  we  call  learning  is  recollection?  Can  you  teach 
me  that  it  is  so?  i6  To  this  question  Socrates  replies  to  Meno  that  `evidently  you  want 
to  catch  me  contradicting  myself'.  Here  Plato  appears  to  be  referring  to  a  genuine 
contradiction,  and  not  to  a  case  of  contraries.  Socrates  first  states  that  virtue  is  not 
teachable,  but  then  if  he  took  Meno  up  on  his  request  to  teach  him  he  would  be 
exhibiting  behaviour  that  supported  the  view  that  virtue  is  teachable  -a  clear  case  of 
applying  contradictory  predicates  to  the  same  object.  Interestingly,  Plato  uses  the  same 
word  in  the  Republic'  and  the  Meng  that  we  translate  as  `in  opposite  ways'  and  to 
`contradict  myself'(with  legon).  A  further  example  of  Plato  using  the  idea  of 
contradiction  appears  in  the  Euthydemus,  during  the  discussion  between  Euthydemus, 
Dionysodorus  and  Ctesippus  at  285d5-286c.  The  conversation  goes  as  follows: 
`Yes,  '  he  said,  `for  if  you  remember,  Ctesippus,  not  long  ago  we 
demonstrated  that  no  one  describes  things  as  they  are  not,  when  we  showed 
the  impossibility  of  speaking  non-facts.  ' 
`So  what?  '  said  Ctesippus.  `Does  that  alter  the  fact  that  you  and  I  can 
contradict  each  other?  T 
'If  we  were  both  describing  the  same  event,  '  he  asked,  'would  that  constitute 
contradiction?  Or  wouldn't  we  both,  surely,  just  be  saying  the  same 
thing?...  what  about  when  neither  of  us  describes  the  event?  '  he  asked. 
`Would  that  be  contradiction?  Or  would  that  rather  be  neither  of  us  having 
the  event  in  mind  at  all?  '10 
In  this  case  Plato  uses  the  verb  `äv'rtMyw'  meaning  `to  speak  against'  or  `to 
6  Meno  81  e3-5. 
7  Meno  82a1-2. 
e  Rep.  436b9-c1. 
9  Meno  82a2. 
10  Euthydemus  286a1-b2. 
71 contradict'.  Socrates  disputes  the  validity  of  this  argument  by  saying:  `I'll  have  you 
know  that  I've  heard  this  argument  plenty  of  times  from  plenty  of  people..  . 
it  means 
falsehood  is impossible,  doesn't  it  -  that  people  either  speak  the  truth  or  are  not 
speaking  at  all?  "'.  However,  he  does  not  dispute  the  point  that  we  would  need  to  be 
discussing  the  same  thing  in  order  to  disagree  with  one  another.  This  argument 
appears  to  foreshadow  the  argument  in  the  Republic,  when  Plato  includes  the  phrase 
67tp6;,  rai  tov'  to  show  that  he  is  conscious  of  a  common  object  being  necessary  for 
genuine  conflict.  While  I  think  that  these  examples  point  to  Plato  meaning 
contradiction,  not  contrary,  in  the  Republic,  Meno  and  Euthydemus,  there  are  also 
ones  where  he  seems  to  be  referring  to  the  use  of  contraries.  As  in  the  Republic  when 
Plato  says: 
Then  would  you  not  class  assent  and  dissent,  impulse  and  aversion  to 
something,  attraction  and  repulsion  and  the  like  as  opposite  actions  or 
states...  and  what  about  hunger  and  thirst  and  the  desires  generally...  or,  again, 
willing  and  wishing,  don't  they  all  fall  under  one  of  the  two  classes  of  opposites 
just  mentioned?...  And  what  about  disinclination,  unwillingness  and  dislike? 
Shouldn't  we  put  them  in  the  opposite  class,  with  repulsion  and  rejection?  12 
There  is  enough  evidence  to  show  that  Plato  was  aware  of  situations  where  both 
contradictory  and  contrary  predicates  could  apply,  even  if  he  is  unaware  of  the 
distinction  and  uses  one  word  to  describe  them  all. 
iv.  The  application  of  predicates  to  parts  and  wholes 
Before  discussing  the  cogency  of  either  position  I  wish  to  look  at  the  idea  of  how 
predicates  of  simple  parts  relate  to  the  predicates  of  complex  wholes.  In  this 
discussion  I  will  be  assuming  that  when  Plato  uses  the  phrase  `one  and  the  same 
thing'  at  436b9  he  is  referring  to  a  simple  thing;  in  other  words,  a  thing  without  parts. 
In  his  discussion  of  the  soul,  Plato  is  using  the  idea  that  opposite  predicates  cannot 
properly  be  applied  to  one  thing,  and  that  if  we  find  them  to  be  in  some  sense 
appropriate  we  must  reallocate  them  to  parts  of  the  thing. 
11  Euthydemus  286b9-c7. 
12  Rep.  437b2-c9. 
72 However,  can  the  soul  conceivably  work  in  such  a  way  that  we  cannot  say  things  of 
the  whole  that  we  can  of  the  parts?  To  what  extent  then  should  we  ascribe  predicates 
to  the  `parts'  that  we  cannot  ascribe  to  the  agent,  when  the  agent  simply  is  the  `parts' 
that  make  up  the  soul?  Given  that  Plato  does  not  posit  an  extra  part  of  the  non- 
physical  aspect  of  a  person  above  the  soul  (the  difficulties  with  this  possibility  are 
discussed  below),  then  we  are,  and  only  are,  our  soul  and  body.  Consider  the  example: 
3  is  odd  and  2  is  even  but  5(3+2)  is  not  both  odd  and  even.  In  this  case  we  cannot 
ascribe  the  predicates  of  the  parts  to  the  whole,  but  that  does  not  mean  that  we  cannot 
divide  5  into  3  and  2.  However,  5  is  not  just  the  total  of  3  and  2,  it  is  also  a  number  in 
its  own  right  and  we  don't  have  to  think  of  5  as  being  made  up  of  3  and  2.  Perhaps  a 
different  example  would  be  more  useful:  two  walls  and  the  ceiling  of  a  room  are  green 
and  the  other  two  walls  and  the  floor  are  red.  In  this  case  we  would  feel  comfortable 
applying  these  two  predicates  to  the  room  as  well  as  the  individual  parts,  but  does  this 
case  properly  support  Plato's  claim  that  opposite  predicates  can  be  applied  to  a 
complex  thing?  We  can  say  that  the  room  is  both  red  and  green,  and  by  saying  this  we 
surely  mean  that  there  are  parts  of  the  room  that  are  red  and  parts  of  the  room  that  are 
green.  The  fact  that  we  can  apply  both  of  these  predicates  to  the  same  room  means 
that  we  can  assume  that  we  can  divide  the  room  up  into  parts  and  that  the  predicate 
`red'  applies  to  one  part  (or  parts)  and  the  predicate  green  applies  to  another  part  (or 
parts).  Applying  this  example  to  Plato's  argument  would  support  the  idea  that  Plato 
meant  `in  opposite  ways'  to  refer  to  contraries  rather  than  contradictories  as  red  and 
green  are  contraries  and  not  contradictories. 
So  if  it  is  the  case  that  we  do  not  balk  at  the  ascription  of  contrary  predicates  to  the 
same  thing  -  as  in  the  red  and  green  room  -  is  it  the  case  that  they  can  actually  justify 
the  kind  of  division  that  Plato  is  after?  Given  that  the  awareness  of  having  contrary 
desires  (like  wanting  a  piece  of  chocolate  cake  and  wanting  not  to  have  a  piece  of 
chocolate  cake)  is  such  a  familiar  experience  should  we  necessarily  agree  with  Plato 
that  we  are  committing  an  error  of  judgement  when  we  ascribe  them  to  `one  and  the 
same  thing'?  I  will  look  at  the  issue  of  whether  contrary  predicates  properly  support 
73 Plato's  argument  below,  as  well  as  considering  which  reading  of  `in  opposite  ways'  is 
the  more  likely  given  what  he  says,  and  which  is  most  helpful  to  Plato's  cause. 
v.  Modem  and  Ancient  terminology 
I  will  now  consider  how  the  different  modem  interpretations  of  the  ambiguous  phrase 
`in  opposite  ways'  affects  the  argument  for  the  division  of  the  soul.  However,  it  is 
important  to  be  wary  when  using  a  modern  distinction  when  looking  at  an  ancient 
text.  It  is  likely  that  the  Greek  we  have  translated  as  `in  opposite  ways'  covered  the 
same  examples  as  our  phrase.  However,  the  distinction  we  draw  today  between  the 
two  interpretations  of  `in  opposite  ways'  would  not  necessarily  have  been  clear  to 
Plato.  The  language  may  have  simply  not  have  facilitated  the  philosopher  in  these 
cases.  So  Plato  may  have  used  `tiävavtta'  to  represent  what  we  call  contradictions  as 
illustrated  by  (A)  and  (C)  or  contraries  as  illustrated  in  (B)  or  something  rather  looser 
in  (D).  He  also  may  have  used  it  in  different  ways  in  different  places  in  the  dialogues. 
Even  if  we  accept  that  Plato  was  working  with  a  different  set  of  concepts  and  words  to 
describe  them  that  does  not  mean  that  his  work  will  not  stand  up  to  a  modern  analysis. 
It  seems  somewhat  condescending  to  let  Plato  off  the  hook  for  mistakes  or 
ambiguities  we  would  not  accept  today.  Also,  if  such  an  argument  is  to  convince  the 
modern  reader  then  it  needs  to  be  examined  by  modern  methods.  I  will  therefore  look 
at  the  principle  of  opposites  by  using  the  distinction  of  contradictory  and  contrary 
predicates  (and  some  looser  version  of  contrary  predicates),  to  decide  whether  Plato's 
theory  of  the  tripartite  soul  is  metaphysically  persuasive. 
vi.  436b9-cl:  (A)  and  (B) 
Firstly,  I  will  look  at  the  distinction  drawn  in  (A)  and  (B)  above,  in  the  phrase  `one 
and  the  same  thing  cannot  act...  in  opposite  ways'.  Plato  includes  the  phrase  `rpog 
iaüiov'  in  his  principle  of  opposites,  which  is  above  translated  as  `in  relation  to  the 
same  object'.  Plato  illustrates  this  principle  with  examples  of  movement  and  their 
opposites.  Moving  towards  a  place  and  moving  away  from  it  could  clearly  be 
construed  as  cases  where  something  is  acting  or  acted  upon  in  different  respects  or  in 
74 relation  to  a  different  object.  Cases  of  this  kind  could  not  therefore  furnish  counter- 
examples  to  the  principle  of  opposites.  Not  surprisingly  therefore  Plato  makes  it  clear 
that  he  is  referring  to  the  contradictories  -  moving  and  not  moving  as  in  (A)  -  rather 
than  to  say  supposed  contraries  as  in  (B).  If  he  means  to  use  `opposite'  in  this  way  then 
he  is  making  an  uncontroversial  point  when  he  says  that  `one  and  the  same  thing 
cannot  act...  in  opposite  ways'.  However,  this  interpretation  runs  into  trouble  when  we 
consider  the  final  statement  of  the  Principle  of  Opposites:  `so  if  we  find  these 
contradictions  we  shall  know  that  we  are  dealing  with  more  than  one  faculty'.  Plato 
cannot  here  be  envisaging  a  case  in  which  we  find  a  single  undivided  thing  actually  to 
have  opposite  properties  because  he  denies  the  possibility  of  such  cases.  He  must 
therefore  have  in  mind  cases  where  something  which  seems  to  be  single  is  found  to 
have  opposite  properties  and  is  thus  shown  to  be  complex.  But  if  `opposite'  means 
`contradictory'  it  is  impossible  to  describe  such  a  case. 
vii.  Plato's  three  examples 
The  examples  that  Plato  uses  to  support  the  Principle  are  cases  of  movement.  He 
believes  that  these  might  be  presented  to  him  as  proof  that  the  same  thing  can  bear 
opposite  predicates,  but  not  `at  the  same  time  in  the  same  part  of  it  and  in  relation  to 
the  same  thing'  13.  They  are: 
1.  If  we  were  told  that  a  man,  who  was  standing  still  but  moving  his  hands  and  his 
head,  was  simultaneously  both  at  rest  and  in  motion,  we  should  not  accept  that 
as  a  proper  statement  of  the  case,  but  say  that  part  of  him  was  standing  still  and 
part  of  him  in  motion.  " 
2.  It  might  be  argued  as  a  further  refinement  that  a  top,  spinning  around  a  fixed 
axis,  is  both  at  rest  and  in  motion  as  a  whole,  as  indeed  is  any  body  in 
circular  motion  on  the  same  spot.  We  should  not  agree,  but  argue  that  it  is 
not  the  same  parts  of  such  bodies  that  are  at  rest  and  in  motion;  they  have 
both  an  axis  and  a  circumference,  and  their  axis  as  it  has  no  inclination  in 
any  direction,  is  at  rest,  but  their  circumference  is  in  motion.  " 
3.  it  is  not  fair  to  say  that  an  archer's  hands  are  pulling  and  pushing  the  bow  at  the 
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75 same  time,  but  that  one  hand  is  pushing  it,  the  other  pulling.  " 
In  example  1  it  is  correct  to  say  that  he  is  moving  in  reference  to  his  hands  and  head, 
but  stationary  in  reference  to  his  trunk.  At  first  glance  this  appears  to  be  a  suitable 
example  to  illustrate  his  point  about  the  fact  that  contradictory  predicates  cannot  be 
applied  to  one  simple  thing,  and  if  this  appears  to  be  the  case  actually  there  is  a 
subject  confusion,  which  would  be  rectified  by  using  simple  parts  of  the  complex 
subject  in  question  instead  of  the  thing  as  a  whole.  It  appears  on  first  inspection  to  be 
difficult  not  to  agree  with  him  that  the  statement  that  a  man  is  both  in  rest  and  motion 
is  understandable  in  this  case  but  not  strictly  accurate  and  needs  qualification.  If  we 
were  faced  with  such  a  man  and  asked  whether  he  was  stationary  or  in  motion  we 
would  probably  go  for  one  or  the  other  with  the  justification  that  he  is  moving  because 
his  arms  are  moving,  or  he  is  stationary  because  he  is  staying  in  the  same  place.  If 
pushed  we  might  concede  that  his  arms  are  moving  and  his  legs  are  staying  still,  and 
we  might  qualify  it  in  the  same  way  as  Plato.  So  this  seems  to  be  a  case  of  finding 
contradictions  in  a  person  and  therefore  concluding  that  we  must  be  dealing  with  more 
than  one  part. 
How  does  this  example  look  in  the  light  of  the  previous  discussion?  I  established 
above  that  regarding  action,  as  we  need  a  specific  object  we  can  only  understand 
examples  like  these  as  cases  of  contradiction.  However,  the  difference  between 
example  1  and  the  Principle  of  Opposites  Plato  is  working  from  is  that  in  this  case 
there  does  not  at  first  glance  appear  to  be  a  single  specified  object.  So  in  order  for  the 
example  to  fit  with  the  Principle  I  will  conceive  of  it  as  including  the  following 
contradiction: 
(A')  The  man  moves  his  body/  The  man  doesn't  move  his  body 
The  problem  now  is  whether  we  can  `find  these  contradictions'.  Plato  is  relying  on  the 
fact  that  it  is  illogical  to  apply  opposite  predicates  to  one  simple  thing,  but  also  that  it 
is  possible  in  some  situations  to  apply  them  to  a  thing  with  parts,  even  if  we  don't 
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process  of  application  of  the  opposite  terms.  If  we  assume  that  Plato  is  taking  `at  rest' 
and  `in  motion'  to  be  contradictories,  in  the  sense  that  `not  at  rest'  would  mean  the 
same  as  `in  motion'  then  the  application  of  the  terms  to  the  man  is  not  just  an 
improper  statement  of  the  case,  it  is  illogical.  We  may  say  that  the  man  is  `in  motion' 
as  part  of  him  is  in  motion.  However,  it  is  not  legitimate  to  claim  that  the  man  is  `at 
rest'  if  part  of  him  isn't.  Plato  appears  to  be  relying  on  the  fact  that  when  appraising 
this  man,  people  would  allow  themselves  to  use  such  terms  because  they  had  already 
divided  him  in  their  mind.  And  given  that  this  is  an  argument  intended  to  establish  a 
partition  this  is  not  an  acceptable  element  of  Plato's  examples.  If  the  man  has  not 
already  been  divided  into  parts  then  if  we  find  this  contradiction  in  example  1  then 
either  we  are  using  the  terms  `in  motion'  and  'at  rest'  to  mean  `partly  in  motion'  and 
`partly  at  rest',  in  which  case  they  are  not  contradictions  and  not  in  conflict,  or  we  are 
committing  a  logical  error.  Either  way  it  is  not  a  sound  foundation  for  a  logical 
argument. 
The  second  example  does  not  work  for  Plato,  in  fact  he  appears  to  be  providing  us 
with  a  case  of  a  simple  thing  that  can  be  given  opposite  predicates.  Plato  wants  us  to 
agree  that  part  of  the  top  is in  motion  (the  circumference),  and  part  is  at  rest  (the  axis). 
Even  though  the  axis  and  the  circumference  are  different  properties  of  the  spinning 
top  that  does  not  mean  that  they  are  different  `parts',  and  that  one  can  move  while  the 
other  does  not.  If  the  top  is  spinning  then  the  whole  of  the  top  is  spinning,  whether  or 
not  it  stays  stationary  on  the  same  spot.  Even  though  the  axis  and  the  circumference  of 
the  spinning  top  are  different  that  does  not  mean  that  they  are  different  `parts'. 
Richard  Stalley  argues  that  this  is  only  a  genuine  counterexample  if  we  translate  the 
phrase  `xaTa  iabTov'  as  `in  the  same  part'  as  opposed  to  the  alternative  translation  `in 
the  same  respect',  or  `in  the  same  way"'.  I  think  that  Stalley  is  correct  when  he  states 
that  this  alternative  interpretation  will  rule  out  the  spinning  top  as  a  counterexample  of 
the  Principle,  his  explanation  being  that  `the  top  is  stationary  so  far  as  one  kind  of 
motion  is  concerned  and  moving  so  far  as  a  different  kind  of  motion  is  concerned'. 
"  Stalley,  Richard,  `Plato's  Argument  for  the  Division  of  the  Reasoning  and  Appetitive  Elements  within 
the  Soul,  p.  120. 
77 However,  we  accept  this  translation  at  a  cost  to  the  overall  argument.  It  is  clear  later 
that  Plato  does  wish  to  establish  the  existence  of  parts,  and  in  order  to  do  this  his 
argument  for  division  must  make  reference  to  them. 
The  third  example  unfortunately  faces  the  same  problems  as  the  first,  but  in  a  different 
way.  In  this  case  there  is  a  single  specified  object,  the  bow,  and  the  man  is  acting  `in 
opposite  ways'  in  relation  to  it:  pulling  and  pushing.  The  structure  of  this  example  is 
in  this  case  the  one  found  in  (B)  and  can  be  formalised  as  follows: 
(B')  The  man  pulls  the  bow  /  The  man  pushes  the  bow 
They  cannot  be  contradictory  predicates  because  they  can  both  be  false,  and  with 
contradictory  predicates  this  is  not  the  case.  However,  it  is  not  clear  in  this  case 
whether  they  are  contrary  predicates  either,  as  they  can  surely  both  be  true.  As  with 
example  1  it  is  the  application  of  these  predicates  to  the  man  that  is  problematic.  It 
seems  that  when  we  apply  either  or  both  of  these  predicates  to  someone  we  do  not 
mean  them  in  a  way  that  would  imply  conflict.  If  I  were  to  say  that  the  man  before  me 
is  pulling  a  bowstring,  I  do  not  mean  that  he  is  using  his  entire  body  and  all  of  his 
force  to  pull  the  bow,  I  mean  that  he  is  using  one  of  his  arms.  If  this  is  the  case  then 
what  I  really  mean  when  I  say  that  man  is  pulling  a  bow  is  that  man  is  in  part  pulling 
a  bow.  So  I  am  assuming  the  existence  of  parts  of  the  man  when  I  initially  apply  the 
predicate.  However,  if  the  predicates  are  to  be  in  conflict  in  the  way  Plato  needs  them 
to  be  to  justify  division,  then  they  would  have  to  mean: 
(B")  The  man  pulls  the  bow  with  all  his  strength  /  The  man  pushes  the  bow  with... 
If  this  is  the  case  then  these  two  predicates  can  in  no  way  be  found  to  relate  to  the 
same  man  at  the  same  time.  So  if  the  predicates  are  meant  to  be  opposites  applied  to 
the  same  man  we  simply  cannot  `find  these  contradictions',  and  if  they  are  not  then 
they  are  not  enough  for  Plato's  argument. 
78 As  the  argument  progresses  it  becomes  clear  that  Plato  is  mainly  interested  in  the  soul 
and  its  motivations,  even  though  he  continues  to  utilise  examples  of  action  to  support 
his  point.  Plato  obviously  felt  that  the  examples  above  concerning  external  action, 
being  explicitly  observable  would  be  of  assistance  in  determining  how  to  interpret  the 
less  explicit  ones  of  the  covert  workings  of  the  soul.  In  which  case  Plato  was 
presumably  unaware  of  the  problems  inherent  in  the  examples  he  gave  and  the 
difficulties  the  Principle  would  face  by  including  external  action  as  well  as  internal 
motivations. 
viii.  436b9-cl:  (C  and  (D) 
So  let's  now  turn  to  the  question  of  whether  Plato's  argument  can  still  stand  when  we 
utilise  the  different  ways  in  which  the  word  `opposites'  can  be  understood,  but  this 
time  in  relation  to  internal  motivation.  I  have  argued  above  that  in  regard  to  external 
actions  Plato  faces  problems  whether  the  examples  are  in  the  form  of  (A)  as  with 
example  1,  or  in  the  form  of  (B)  as  with  example  2.  Unfortunately,  the  Principle  also 
contains  minefields  when  looking  at  interpretations  of  (C)  and  (D)  as  well.  If  Plato 
were  relying  on  (C)  to  justify  the  partition  of  the  soul,  `wanting  to  move'  and  `not 
wanting  to  move'  would  be  sufficient  for  the  job  of  justifying  division;  as  it  is  an 
impossibility  that  `one  and  the  same  thing'  can  at  the  same  time  have  a  desire,  and 
also  have  an  absence  of  desire,  then  it  would  seem  to  be  correct  to  conclude  in  this 
case  that  we  are  in  fact  dealing  with  more  than  one  thing.  However,  the  problem  with 
the  interpretation  of  the  argument  in  the  form  of  (C)  is  the  same  as  the  problem 
encountered  when  looking  at  (A):  how  would  we  `find  these  contradictions'?  Surely 
not  from  introspection.  I  cannot  imagine  a  situation  where  I  would  claim  to  want 
something  but  also  to  experience  the  absence  of  wanting  it.  Does  Plato  then  mean  that 
we  can  find  these  contradictions  in  others?  This  cannot  be  the  case  either.  We  can 
observe  someone  else  having  a  desire,  through  the  way  they  behave  or  what  they  say, 
but  we  could  not  at  the  same  time  observe  the  absence  of  desire  in  them.  The  fact  is 
that  if  we  are  talking  about'one  and  the  same  thing',  we  cannot  accept  these 
contradictions  in  the  way  that  Plato  needs  us  to  in  his  argument  and  examples  to 
justify  the  division.  Given  the  above  discussion  I  think  it  unavoidable  to  conclude  that 
if  Plato  was  intending  to  use  interpretation  (C)  as  the  structure  of  a  valid  argument  he 
79 is  facing  the  same  overwhelming  problems  he  was  with  external  action.  So,  although 
(C)  may  imply  division,  Plato  cannot  use  it  to  justify  the  tripartite  soul.  It  is  perhaps 
advantageous  to  Plato  then  that  there  is  evidence  that  he  may  have  been  making  the 
statement  at  436b9-cl  with  reference  to  the  looser  distinction  described  in  (D). 
The  vocabulary  Plato  is  using  to  describe  the  opposite  affections  to  the  same  object 
imply  that  he  is  contrasting  wanting  something  ('assent',  `impulse',  `attraction'),  with 
an  active  feeling  of  wanting  not  to  have  it  ('dissent',  `aversion',  `repulsion'),  not,  as  in 
(C),  with  the  absence  of  feeling  about  the  relevant  object.  So,  if  Plato  is  referring  to 
situations  when  we  have  two  conflicting  feelings  about  the  same  object  then  it  looks 
like  he  cannot  be  referring  to  (C)  at  this  point,  which  is  characterised  by  the  contrast 
of  wanting  and  an  absence  of  wanting.  It  is  much  more  likely  that  at  437b1-c9  Plato  is 
actually  referring  to  the  structure  of  (D):  wanting  to  move  and  wanting  not  to  move.  If 
Plato  is  relying  on  a  weak  version  of  contrary  desires",  as  opposed  to  contradictory, 
then  his  position  relies  more  heavily  on  personal  experience;  whereas  (C)  cannot  be 
found  within  the  one  individual,  we  know  from  experience  that  (D)  is  perfectly 
conceivable,  and  an  everyday  occurrence. 
The  consequence  of  this  discussion  is  that  (D)  might  not  be  enough  for  Plato  to 
conclude  that  these  two  impulses  come  from  different  internal  sources.  If  Plato 
believes  that  he  is  presenting  the  reader  of  the  Republic  with  a  sound  argument  to 
persuade  us  of  his  division  then  he  is  facing  serious  problems.  Under  interpretation 
(C)  premise  1  was  perfectly  plausible,  but  premise  2  was  unacceptable.  However  with 
(D)  the  situation  is  more  complicated.  Wanting  to  move  and  wanting  not  to  move  are 
contrary  in  a  sense  but  it  is  not  clear  that  this  is  the  strict  logical  sense  in  which 
contrary  predicates  may  be  true  of  the  same  object.  As  we  have  seen,  one  might 
simply  insist  that  a  single  entity  can  desire  to  drink  and  desire  not  to  drink  at  the  same 
time.  But  premise  I  is  not  a  necessary  truth  unless  `contrary'  is  taken  in  the  strict 
logical  sense.  Thus,  on  this  interpretation,  it  is  not  clear  that  the  argument  is  valid. 
1e  We  would  commonly  think  of  wanting  to  do  something  and  wanting  not  to  do  it  as  being  contrary  in 
some  way  but  they  do  not  satisfy  the  definition  of  contrary  predicates. 
80 ix.  A  fourth  example 
I  would  like  to  introduce  a  fourth  example  to  be  used  to  help  understand  the  workings 
of  the  soul  which  goes  as  follows:  imagine  a  man  is  standing  still  and  is  having  both 
his  arms  pulled  in  opposite  directions.  In  this  case  we  could  say  that  the  man  is  being 
affected  or  acted  on  `in  opposite  ways  at  the  same  time',  in  the  sense  that  each 
movement  is  mutually  exclusive.  It  may  be  contested  that  the  idea  of  being  pulled  in 
two  different  directions  does  not  contain  contradictions  or  contraries  in  the  way  that 
Plato  means.  It  does  not  contain  contradictions,  as  it  does  not  claim  to  be  a  case  of 
Person  A  being  pulled  north  with  their  right  arm/Person  A  not  being  pulled  north 
with  their  right  arm.  It  is  a  case  of  contraries  where  Person  A  is  being  pulled  north 
and  not-north  (south)  at  the  same  time.  However,  it  is  clearly  an  appropriate  example 
as  the  argument  above  shows  that  Plato  is  relying  on  the  idea  of  exclusivity,  and  in 
this  case  the  body  of  the  man  cannot  move  both  in  one  direction  and  in  its  opposite. 
So,  given  the  idea  of  division  originating  from  plural  affects  I  imagine  that  Plato 
would  explain  this  situation  by  saying  that  the  man's  right  arm  is  being  pulled  in  one 
direction,  and  his  other  arm  is  being  pulled  in  the  other  direction.  However,  is  this 
really  what  the  man  experiences?  Surely  in  this  case  the  man  as  a  whole  is  both  being 
pulled  in  one  direction  and  being  pulled  in  the  opposite  direction  as  well.  To  explain 
the  situation  by  changing  the  subject  from  the  man  to  his  arms  ignores  the  fact  that  the 
man  is  also  a  unity,  and  that  being  acted  on  in  one  part  will  affect  the  rest. 
It  follows  from  Newton's  Laws  that  if  two  forces  act  upon  a  body  in  different 
directions  the  resultant  motion  will  be  in  a  third  direction  unless  the  original  forces  are 
opposite.  Even  in  this  case  the  body  will  still  be  affected  by  both  forces,  to  the  extent 
that  it  will  move  towards  the  stronger  force  at  a  speed  proportional  to  the  weaker 
force.  In  the  case  of  the  man  being  pulled  in  two  directions  it  is  the  whole  body  that  is 
being  affected  by  two  different  forces,  whereas  to  interpret  these  physical  analogies  in 
the  way  that  Plato  wants  to  we  would  have  to  deny  this.  This  case,  and  others  like  it, 
could  be  used  to  provide  a  different  understanding  of  the  soul  from  the  Principle  of 
Opposites  that  would  suggest  that  the  soul  is  not  divided  in  the  sense  that  parts  are 
81 affected  individually.  It  is  perhaps  a  more  appropriate  example  because  it  applies 
more  readily  to  cases  of  being  affected  psychologically  by  an  object;  this  case  and  the 
psychological  examples  are  to  do  with  being  acted  on. 
x.  Conclusion 
This  alternative  example  of  the  Principle  reveals  that  the  Principle  does  not  adequately 
support  the  idea  of  strict  division  in  the  soul  when  considering  cases  of  contrary 
predicates  acting  on  the  individual  either.  But  what  we  can  say  is  that  we  experience 
internal  conflict  in  such  a  way  that  speaking  of  parts,  as  we  so  often  do  (`part  of  me 
wants  t...  )  does  provide  us  with  a  way  to  interpret  our  experience.  I  will  not 
comment  on  whether  I  believe  Plato  was  relying  on  (A),  (B),  (C)  or  (D),  I  think  it  is 
extremely  likely  that  he  was  not  aware  of  the  distinction.  Particularly  as  there  is 
evidence  that  he  was  using  the  term  'opposite'  in  both  ways  at  different  times  as  if  they 
were  the  same.  What  I  think  I  have  shown  is  that  if  `opposite'  is  construed  as 
contradictory  as  in  (A)  and  (C)  the  claim  that  something  acted  or  was  acted  on  in 
opposite  ways  would  entail  that  it  contained  more  than  one  part.  However  there  is  no 
experience  that  could  count  as  `finding  these  contradictions'.  Thus  the  principle  of 
opposites  interpreted  in  this  way  could  not  provide  a  method  for  demonstrating  that 
something  which  appears  to  be  a  unity  is  in  fact  complex.  If  we  interpret  `opposite'  in 
the  loose  sense  of  contrary  suggested  by  (D)  we  can  imagine  finding  a  soul  to  be 
qualified  by  the  relevant  contraries  but  this  would  not  prove  that  the  soul  is  divided. 
82 4.  Models  of  Plato's  Tripartite  Soul 
i.  The  Strength  Model 
One  possible  view  is  that  when  the  individual  has  to  make  a  decision  it  is  the  strength 
of  the  feelings  in  the  parts  that  determines  which  gets  its  way.  If  the  desire  of  the 
appetitive  part  is  stronger  than  the  rationality  of  the  overall  good  of  Reason,  and 
stronger  than  the  pride  felt  by  the  spirited  part  for  not  being  the  kind  of  person  who 
gives  in  to  temptation,  then  the  desire  will  win  out.  There  is  much  evidence  that  Plato 
believed  that  the  parts  interact  in  such  a  way.  This  can  be  seen  particularly  clearly  in 
the  language  he  uses.  When  discussing  the  case  of  the  thirsty  man  who  shouldn't  drink 
he  says: 
How  are  we  to  describe  such  cases...  Must  we  not  say  that  there  is  one 
element  in  their  minds  which  bids  them  drink,  and  a  second  which  prevents 
them  and  masters  the  first?  " 
And  also,  when  discusses  the  phrase  `being  master  of  oneself'  lato  says: 
What  the  expression  is intended  to  mean,  I  think,  is  that  there  is  a  better  and  a 
worse  element  in  the  personality  of  each  individual,  and  that  when  the 
naturally  better  element  controls  the  worse  then  the  man  is  said  to  be  "master 
of  himself',  as  a  term  of  praise.  But  when  (as  a  result  of  bad  upbringing  or 
bad  company)  the  smaller  forces  of  one's  better  element  are  overpowered  by 
the  numerical  superiority  of  one's  worse,  then  one  is  adversely  criticised  and 
said  not  to  be  master  of  oneself  and  to  be  in  a  state  of  indiscipline  2° 
To  speak  of  one  part  mastering  the  other  certainly  sounds  like  Plato  believed  that  it  is 
a  contest  of  the  strength  of  feeling  of  the  three  parts.  So  the  agent  will  then  act 
according  to  the  strongest  desire,  may  it  be  the  desire  of  the  Appetite,  Spirit  or 
Reason  21.  So,  the  strength  of  the  drive  towards  the  object  of  the  part  is  causally  related 
to  the  feelings  of  attraction  and  repulsion  to  the  object.  In  other  words,  the  more  the 
agent  desires  the  drink  the  stronger  the  drive  will  be,  and  the  more  Reason  thinks  it  is 
not  for  the  good  of  the  agent  the  stronger  it  will  be  against  the  Appetite.  Christopher 
19  Rep.  439c5-8. 
20  Rep.  431  a4-b4. 
83 Bobonich  finds  fault  with  this  interpretation  because  if  `the  interaction  of  the  parts  is 
limited  to  a  competition  between  their  respective  desires  in  terms  of  strength'  then 
`the  conflicting  imperatives  seem  to  do  no  work  in  explaining  why  the  agent  acts  one 
way  rather  than  another'22  .  In  other  words,  if  the  Appetite  is  saying  `Drink!  '  and 
Reason  is  saying  `Don't  drink!  '  the  decision  is  made  on  the  strength  of  the  view  not 
on  the  actual  content  of  the  view.  In  this  case  the  model  would  appear  to  have  little 
explanatory  power  if  it  can  only  tell  us  that  if  we  drink,  then  there  was  a  greater  force 
in  us  towards  that  goal.  This  would  make  Plato's  soul  much  less  psychologically 
interesting  as  it  would  do  little  work  in  explaining  why  we  do  what  we  do. 
There  is  also  the  problem  that  if  we  allow  that  the  parts  operate  within  the  Strength 
Model  by  issuing  commands,  to  whom  are  the  imperatives  supposed  to  be  addressed? 
It  cannot  be  to  some  `whole  person'  over  and  above  the  three  parts  of  the  soul,  as  they 
are  what  constitutes  the  whole  soul.  The  parts  must  relate  to  each  other,  not  to  some 
extra  part  of  the  soul  to  which  they  are  instrumentally  inferior.  It  may  be  agreed  that 
Plato  does  not  argue  for  another  part  of  the  soul  to  control  the  main  three,  but  how  are 
we  to  understand  the  process  of  decision-making  between  the  parts  without  positing 
an  extra  part?  In  the  tripartite  soul,  there  is  no  adjudicator  to  decide  which  part  has  the 
stronger  feeling  towards  a  certain  object.  So  is  the  weaker  part  supposed  to 
acknowledge  its  weakness  and  back  down,  not  being  able  to  keep  up  the  fight  against 
a  more  powerful  opponent?  But  how  would  this  assessment  be  made?  Or  are  we  to  be 
left  only  with  the  idea  of  the  stronger  part  simply  overpowering  the  weaker,  but 
without  any  idea  how  this  is  to  be  understood?  But  perhaps  no  further  explanation  is 
needed.  Perhaps  we  can  only  understand  this  phenomenon  of  one  motivational  feeling 
overpowering  another  through  the  analogy  of  one  person  overpowering  another. 
Recourse  to  subjective  experience  may  help  us  to  understand  this  also.  In  the  case  of 
irrational  desires,  it  can  feel  as  if  the  strength  of  the  desire  blocks  out  the  motivational 
force  of  any  other  inclination.  The  best  example  of  this  might  be  when  we  make  a 
snap  decision  to  do  something  that  we  would  not  have  done  given  more  time  to  think. 
_1  By  'desire'  here  I  do  not  mean  to  attribute  desires  to  the  Spirit  and  Reason  in  the  same  way  as  the 
Appetite.  By  desire  I  mean  the  course  of  action  they  wish  to  follow  because  of  reasons  contained  in 
their  function. 
84 Even  if  we  accept  that  the  cogency  of  the  Strength  Model  provides  an  understanding 
of  the  mechanics  of  how  this  model  works,  does  this  mean  it  is  an  adequate 
explanation  of  the  tripartite  soul?  I  think  not.  I  want  to  argue  that  the  main  problem  is 
the  difficulty  of  relating  the  Strength  Model  to  both  the  just  and  unjust  soul.  The 
unjust  soul  is  characterised  by: 
some  kind  of  civil  war  between  these  same  three  elements,  when  they 
interfere  with  each  other  and  trespass  on  each  other's  functions,  or  when  one 
of  them  rebels  against  the  whole  to  get  control  when  it  has  no  business  to  do 
so,  because  its  natural  role  is  to  be  a  slave  to  the  rightfully  controlling 
element?  ' 
Also,  when  arguing  for  the  existence  of  the  spirited  part  of  the  soul,  Plato  says  that  in 
`a  man  whose  desires  are  forcing  him  to  do  things  his  reason  disapproves  of...  It's  like 
a  struggle  between  political  factions''.  In  the  case  of  `civil  war'  or  a  `struggle 
between  political  factions'  resolution  is  usually  reached  combatively,  where  the 
strength  of  the  sides  determines  the  outcome.  So  the  description  of  the  way  decisions 
are  made  in  the  case  of  the  unjust  soul,  if  we  are  to  follow  the  analogy  of  the  state, 
does  seem  to  be  through  some  kind  of  intellectual  arm-wrestling.  As  said  above,  this 
seems  to  fit  with  the  experience  of  being  overcome  by  our  desires.  Acting  on  our 
desires  often  appears  to  be  a  matter  of  rejecting  any  process  of  deliberation;  not 
wanting  any  other  feeling  to  have  the  chance  of  changing  one's  mind.  However,  are 
we  also  to  understand  the  just  soul  as  operating  in  the  same  way? 
Plato  tends  to  use  the  same  kind  of  language  to  describe  the  just  soul  that  he  uses  to 
describe  the  unjust  soul.  Life  often  refers  to  the  control  exhibited  by  Reason  when  it  is 
the  dominant  part  .  So  what  reason  is  there  to  think  that  the  just  soul  and  the  unjust  " 
soul  don't  both  operate  in  accordance  with  the  Strength  Model?  The  reason  is  this. 
22  ßobonich,  C.,  Akrasia  and  Agency  in  Plato's  Laws  and  Republic,  p.  11. 
23  Rep.  444b1-5. 
24  Rep.  440a10-b3. 
25  Rep.  444d7-9;  Rep.  443b1.3;  Rep.  442c5-8. 
85 The  just  soul  is  one  controlled  by  Reason  backed  up  by  Spirit.  A  soul  thus  constituted 
would  surely  have  Reason  in  the  prime  position  because  of  its  specific  advantage  -  the 
ability  to  think  rationally.  If  we  imagine  three  people,  who  are  each  characterised  by 
one  part  of  the  tripartite  soul,  trying  to  reach  agreement  about  what  they  should  all  do, 
we  would  not  expect  the  rational  man  to  try  and  get  his  way  through  force  against  two 
much  beefier  opponents  -  that  in  itself  would  not  be  rational.  I  would  assume  that  for 
the  physically  weaker  rational  man  to  be  in  change  it  would  have  to  be  done  through 
persuasion  and  argument.  It  is  the  unjust  soul,  then,  that  the  Strength  Model  explains 
adequately;  with  Desire  achieving  dominance  through  superior  `size',  but  a  sufficient 
explanation  of  the  operations  of  the  just  soul  seem  to  be  further  from  this  model's 
grasp.  This  intuition  suggests  that  a  different  interpretation  may  have  something  to 
contribute  to  the  understanding  of  Plato's  soul.  I  will  now  consider  the  Persuasion 
Model  to  see  if  it  offers  a  more  comprehensive  understanding,  and  if  not,  whether  it 
can  be  joined  to  the  Strength  Model  in  some  way  to  provide  for  a  more  intuitive  and 
comprehensive  understanding  of  Plato's  soul. 
ii.  The  Persuasion  Model 
The  image  of  the  parts  of  the  tripartite  soul  using  persuasion  and  reasoned  argument  to 
gain  influence  over  the  actions  of  the  person  does  seem  to  apply  more  satisfactorily  to 
the  just  soul.  As  said  above,  in  the  case  of  the  three  people  representing  the  parts  of 
the  soul,  it  would  not  be  rational  for  an  intellectually  superior  but  weaker  man  to  try  to 
use  his  physical  strength  over  a  physically  stronger  opponent.  However,  the  main 
argument  against  accepting  the  view  that  the  parts  of  the  soul  persuade  each  other  in 
the  course  of  reaching  a  decision  is  that  this  model  requires  that  all  parts  have  enough 
rationality  to  understand  the  arguments,  including  Desire.  This  doesn't  seem  to  fit 
with  Plato's  original  description  of  the  role  of  Desire.  lie  says  that: 
The  mind  of  the  thirsty  man,  therefore,  in  so  far  as  he  is  thirsty,  simply  wants 
to  drink,  and  it  is  to  that  end  that  its  energies  are  directed 
...  If  therefore  there 
is  something  in  it  that  resists  its  thirst,  it  must  be  something  in  it  other  than 
the  thirsty  impulse  which  is  dragging  it  like  a  wild  animal  to  drink.  " 
86 Using  the  analogy  of  Desire  being  like  a  `wild  animal'  may  fit  well  with  the  Strength 
Model  but  doesn't  seem  to  fit  well  with  it  also  having  a  rational  capacity  to  make 
decisions  about  the  soundness  of  arguments.  There  is  some  evidence  that  Plato  did 
conceive  of  Desire  having  a  rational  capacity.  When  he  speaks  of  self-discipline  being 
when  'all  these  three  elements  are  in  friendly  and  harmonious  agreement,  when  reason 
and  its  subordinates  are  all  agreed  that  reason  should  rule'27  it  suggests  that  Desire  can 
be  tamed  to  be  responsive  to  the  natural  superiority  of  Reason.  And  later,  in  Book  IX 
Plato  attributes  the  love  of  money  to  Desire,  because  `wealth  is  the  means  of 
satisfying  desires"'  of  the  kind  felt  by  Desire.  Julia  Annas  argues  that  this  means  that 
Desire  is  capable  of  `means-ends  reasoning'  and  that 
Most  significantly,  we  find  that  very  different  kinds  of  life  can  be  said  to  be 
dominated  by  this  part  of  the  soul.  Plato  describes  the  oligarchic  man, 
obsessively  subordinating  all  other  concerns  to  the  getting  and  keeping  of 
money;  the  democratic  man,  following  any  desire  that  happens  to  be 
uppermost  and  thus  dividing  his  time  between  worthy  and  trivial  pursuits; 
and  the  tyrannical  man,  dominated  by  unfulfilled  lust.  29 
For  these  lives  to  be  possible,  and  in  line  with  the  persuasion  model,  the  reasoning 
part  of  Desire  must  be  assisting  Desire  proper  in  obtaining  the  object  of  their  desire.  In 
this  case,  some  kind  of  rationality  of  Desire  is  essential  to  Plato  because  otherwise  the 
life  of  a  person  ruled  by  desire  would  be  so  disorganised  that  it  would  arguably  be 
impossible  for  it  to  attain  any  of  its  goals.  From  the  evidence  of  the  different  types  of 
character,  Plato  clearly  thinks  that  those  ruled  by  Desire  do  have  the  ability  to 
rationally  consider  how  to  get  what  they  want.  So  if  the  persuasion  model  is  to  offer 
us  an  accurate  theoretical  structure  of  the  tripartite  soul  there  must  be  a  convincing 
explanation  of  why  attributing  rationality  to  Desire  is  the  best  way  of  explaining  the 
organisation  of  the  unjust  life.  The  problem  for  this  model  is  that  it  cannot 
consistently  explain  the  description  given  of  Desire  in  Book  IV  (as  above  439a9-b6) 
and  the  unjust  lives  presented  in  Book  IX. 
26  Rep.  439a9-b6. 
27  Rep.  442c10-12. 
2$  Rep.  580c3-4. 
87 iii.  Problem  1 
If  Plato's  soul  is  interpreted  only  in  terms  of  the  Persuasion  Model  akrasia  would 
present  a  serious  problem.  When  we  say  that  someone  persuaded  us  of  something,  we 
think  of  them  making  us  change  our  minds  about  what  would  be  the  best  thing  to  do. 
For  Desire  to  be  persuaded  by  Reason,  it  must  be  persuaded  of  the  fact  that  Reason's 
choice  is  better.  So  after  being  persuaded  we  are  in  a  different  epistemic  state,  we 
have  different  beliefs,  for  if  we  didn't  we  would  not  agree  to  go  along  with  the  views 
of  the  other  person,  or  other  part  of  the  self.  If  we  are  to  agree  to  this  definition  of 
`persuade',  then  if  we  act  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  Desiring  part,  Reason 
must  have  agreed  that  this  was  in  some  sense  best.  This  interpretation  therefore  cannot 
account  for  the  existence  of  akrasia. 
Akrasia,  or  the  weakness  of  will,  is  commonly  seen  to  be  some  kind  of  inability  to 
stick  to  what  one  believes  to  be  the  best  thing  for  oneself.  For  a  proper  case  of  akrasia 
to  occur  the  agent  must  really  believe  that  what  they  are  doing  is  not  the  best  thing  for 
them,  and  do  it  anyway.  In  the  Protagoras,  Socrates  rejected  the  concept  of  akrasia 
and  claimed  that  no  one  does  wrong  willingly.  Bobonich  argues  that  Plato's  more 
complex  psychological  model  does  have  a  way  of  understanding  this  phenomenon: 
`Although  he  [Plato]  rejects  the  possibility  of  akratic  action  in  the  Protagoras,  he 
reworks  his  moral  psychology  in  the  Republic  to  accommodate  its  possibilityi30.  For 
Plato,  akrasia  is  when  the  actions  of  the  agent  are  not  dominated  by  Reason.  The 
reasoning  part  of  the  soul  is  the  part  that  considers  what  is  best  for  the  person  as  a 
whole,  and  not  just  in  the  short  term.  When  this  part  is  not  in  control  the  agent  will  act 
in  a  way  they  believe  not  to  be  the  best  thing  for  them,  in  spite  of  this  belief.  However, 
as  stated  above,  if  action  is  a  result  of  one  part  being  persuaded  by  another  of  what  is 
best,  then  akratic  action  becomes  impossible.  However,  if  Desire  takes  control  of 
action  by  force  and  not  by  persuasion  this  problem  is  avoided,  as  in  this  case  Reason 
is  still  aware  of  what  is  actually  the  best  thing  to  do,  but  the  actions  of  the  individual 
are  not  the  same  as  this  belief. 
29  Annas,  Julia,  An  Introduction  to  Plato's  Republic,  p.  130. 
30  Bobonich,  C.,  `Akrasia  and  Agency  in  Plato's  Laws  and  Republic',  p.  3. 
88 iv.  Problem  2 
Perhaps  a  combination  model  would  successfully  rule  out  certain  problems  associated 
with  both  models.  This  may  be  the  case  but  there  would  still  be  the  problem  of 
justifying  a  rational  part  of  Desire  which  is  necessary  if  Reason  rules  through 
persuasion.  The  reason  behind  the  division  of  the  soul  is  to  separate  it  into  parts  that 
have  different  capacities  which  represent  the  different  motivational  forces  that  we 
feel.  Won't  mixing  a  bit  of  Reason  in  with  Desire  affect  the  fundamental  argument 
given  for  the  division  of  the  soul  in  the  first  place?  And,  given  Plato's  argument  for 
dividing  the  soul,  would  he  not  consider  it  necessary  to  separate  Desire  into  two  parts, 
separating  its  rational  part  from  its  irrational  part?  Bobonich  says  that 
The  very  possibility  of  a  conflict  within  the  Desiring  part  between  its  desire 
for  what  is  best  for  itself  and  its  desires  for  food  and  drink  calls  its  unity  into 
question.  Does  not  such  a  conflict  within  the  Desiring  part  force  us  to  apply 
the  Principle  of  Opposites  to  the  Desiring  part  itself  and  thus  subdivide  it 
further?  3' 
These  problems  arise  I  think  from  the  different  ideas  expressed  in  Book  IV  and  IX.  In 
Book  IV  Plato  puts  the  original  case  for  the  division  of  the  parts  of  the  soul.  436b9-cl 
cited  above  expresses  the  view  of  Book  IV.  Under  this  view  Desire  could  not  possibly 
have  a  rational  element  that  could  understand  the  `persuasion'  of  Reason  because  if 
this  were  the  case  rational  Desire  would  at  times  `be  affected  in  opposite  ways  at  the 
same  time'  as  Desire  proper.  And  if  this  were  to  happen,  then,  following  the  argument 
presented  in  Book  IV,  Desire  would  have  to  be  split  again".  So,  as  far  as  Book  IV 
goes,  Reason,  Spirit  and  Desire  represent  three  very  different  parts  with  different 
motivational  forces.  Given  the  argument  for  the  division  of  the  soul  as  presented  in 
Book  IV,  this  part  of  the  Republic  would  appear  to  assume  the  truth  of  the  Strength 
Model.  It  is  the  examples  given  in  Book  IX  of  the  unjust  lives  and  societies  that 
suggests  a  different  picture. 
31  Christopher  Bobonich,  `Akrasis  and  Agency  in  Plato's  Laws  and  Republic',  p.  13. 
32  It  could  be  argued  that  Plato  might  not  object  to  the  desiring  part  having  contrary  desires,  and  that 
this  part  of  the  soul  may  even  be  partly  characterized  by  such  disunity.  This  may  be  true,  but  it  is  still  a 
logical  problem  for  the  tripartite  soul,  as  if  desire  has  its  own  reasoning  element  Plato  would  have  to 
distinguish  sub-parts  within  desire  and  this  might  have  to  go  on  ad  infinitum. 
89 Let's  remind  ourselves  of  the  evidence  provided  by  books  IV  and  IX,  to  see  whether 
some  of  the  problems  with  interpreting  Plato's  theory  are  due  to  inconsistencies  in  the 
text.  In  Book  IV  Plato  makes  the  statements  at  436b9-cl  and  439a9-b6,  which  clearly 
characterise  Desire  as  having  a  simple  impulse  towards  a  target  object.  These 
quotations  show  that  the  Desire  of  Book  IV  could  not  be  reasoned  with,  but  only 
controlled  or  obeyed.  Book  IX,  however,  presents  a  different  picture.  The  life  of  the 
tyrannical  man  is  ruled  by  Desire.  He  is  the  archetypal  akratic  personality  in  whose 
`life  its  always  been  the  later  pleasure  that  has  had  the  better  of  it  at  the  expense  of  the 
earlier"'.  Plato  describes  the  tyrannical  man  as  a  kind  of  criminal,  subject  to  the 
desires  he  cannot  control.  He  turns  to  `burgling  a  house  or  holding  someone  up  at 
night'  as  a  means  of  getting  money  to  fund  his  desires.  This  is  where  the  unjust  man 
of  Book  IX  differs  from  the  one  depicted  in  Book  IV.  The  criminal  in  Book  IX  also 
desires  money  as  a  means  to  his  desires;  as  Julia  Annas  said  above  he  is  capable  of 
`means-ends  reasoning'.  This  is  not  the  wild  irrational  Desire  presented,  and  justified, 
to  us  in  Book  IV.  So  there  appears  to  be  unreconcilable  differences  between  Plato's 
descriptions  in  the  Republic;  either  there  are  inconsistencies  between  Book  IV  and 
Book  IX,  or  he  has  unwittingly  presented  an  argument  for  a  soul  split  into  four  parts  - 
Reason,  Spirit,  Desire  proper  and  the  rational  element  of  Desire  -  not  three. 
33  Rep.  574a7-8. 
90 5.  An  Alternative  Model 
There  is  a  way  to  avoid  this  difficulty,  and  it  involves  a  new  model  of  Plato's  tripartite 
soul.  So  far  certain  conditions  for  a  satisfactory  model  have  been  established:  The  just 
soul,  ruled  by  Reason,  would  not  rule  with  strength  or  force,  but  with  its  essential 
characteristic  -  its  ability  to  reason;  however,  for  Reason  to  rule  through  rationality  we 
need  to  explain  how  Desire,  essentially  irrational,  is  to  respond  to  the  rationality  of 
Reason;  and  that  the  unjust  soul,  ruled  by  Desire,  will  use  strength  as  its  currency. 
And,  also,  what  is  the  role  of  Spirit  in  the  soul's  dynamics?  The  discussions  above  of 
the  Strength  and  Persuasion  Models  have  shown  that  they  are  each  able  to  explain  the 
workings  of  the  unjust  and  just  soul  respectively.  So  perhaps  the  best  interpretation  is 
to  combine  these  two  models.  In  this  interpretation,  Reason,  being  wholly  rational, 
would  not  communicate  with  Desire,  being  wholly  irrational  but  would  communicate 
with  Spirit  and  Spirit  would  then  restrict  the  power  of  Desire.  Spirit  of  course  is  not 
rational  either  but  given  the  right  education  -  which  Plato  places  great  importance  on 
in  the  Republic  -  it  can  be  appealed  to  through  the  beliefs  established  in  childhood.  If 
Spirit  has  not  been  given  the  right  moral  education  then  Reason  will  not  be  able  to 
appeal  to  these  stored  beliefs  and  Spirit  will  use  its  strength  against  Reason  itself.  This 
model  would  explain  why  Plato  dedicated  so  much  of  the  Republic  to  the  education 
programme  of  those  of  the  Auxiliary  and  Ruler  classes,  for  the  state  of  the  Spirit 
established  in  early  life  would  then  determine  the  character  of  the  person  in  later  life. 
One  possible  objection  to  this  theory  is  that  Plato  may  not  have  agreed  with  the  idea 
that  Reason's  job  is  not  to  rule  the  soul  as  a  whole  directly,  but  to  influence  Spirit  in 
such  a  way  as  to  overpower  Desire.  However,  I  think  that  this  objection  would  be 
spurious.  In  Plato's  analogy  with  the  state  he  believes  that  the  spirited  class  would 
`police'  the  city  and  keep  order:  `the  young  men  whom  we  have  been  describing  as 
Guardians  should  more  strictly  be  called  Auxiliaries,  their  function  being  to  assist  the 
Rulers  in  the  execution  of  their  decisions7'.  Cornford,  in  his  translation,  goes  even 
34  Rep.  414b4-6. 
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Reason  is  thus  still  ruling  the  soul,  but  with  the  help  of  the  Spirit. 
One  of  the  advantages  of  the  Combination  Model  is  that  it  offers  a  mode  of  operation 
that  does  not  assign  rationality  to  the  desiring  part.  However  it  needs  to  provide  an 
explanation  for  the  problem  of  how  the  irrational  but  ordered  lives  in  Books  VIII  and 
IX  are  possible.  One  possible  explanation  is  to  think  of  Desire  utilising  the  functional 
capacity36  of  Reason  to  fulfil  its  appetites  on  its  behalf.  In  this  case  Plato  would  not 
need  to  explain  the  inclusion  of  a  rational  element  in  Desire,  given  his  basis  for 
dividing  the  soul  into  parts.  As  Gerasimos  Santas  argues  in  Goodness  and  Justice, 
Plato's  `discussion  in  Book  VIII  of  the  Republic,  shows  clearly  enough  that  he  was 
aware  of  the  view  that  spirit  and  appetite  can  dominate  and  reason  be  used  purely 
instrumentally'  (evidence  that  Plato  conceives  of  the  Desire  and  Spirit  `using'  Reason 
in  an  unjust  soul  in  this  way  can  be  found  in  the  conclusion  to  Book  IX)".  When 
discussing  the  `composite'  beast,  comprised  of  the  many-headed  beast(Desire),  the 
lion(Spirit)  and  the  man(Reason),  Plato  illustrates  his  point  by  arguing  that: 
to  say  that  it  pays  him  to  give  the  many-headed  beast  a  good  time,  and  to 
strengthen  it  and  the  lion  and  all  its  qualities,  while  starving  the  man  till  he 
becomes  so  weak  that  the  other  two  can  do  what  they  like  with  him;  and  that  he 
should  make  no  attempt  to  reconcile  them  and  make  them  friends,  but  leave 
them  to  snarl  and  wrangle  and  devour  each  other.  " 
So  if  Desire  and  Spirit  `can  do  what  they  like  with'  Reason,  and  not  just  `do  what  they 
like',  then  Reason  must  be  performing  a  function  in  this  situation.  In  fact,  given  the 
characterisation  Plato  gives  of  desire,  it  seems  likely  that  in  all  organisations  of  the 
soul  Reason's  function  is  closely  intertwined  with  Desire.  Plato  argues  that  desire  is 
irrational  and  simple  drives  towards  certain  objects  -  drink  to  satisfy  thirst,  food  to 
satisfy  hunger: 
35  The  Republic  of  Plato,  trans.  Cornford,  F.  M.,  Clarendon,  London,  1941. 
36  By  `functional  capacity'  I  mean  its  ability  to  reason,  not  including  any  other  element  of  Reason. 
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92 Then  is  thirst,  in  so  far  as  it  is  thirst,  the  desire  in  the  mind  for  anything  more 
than  simply  drink?  Is  it  thirst  for  hot  drink  or  cold...  for  any  particular  kind  of 
drink  at  all?  Isn't  it  rather  that  if  heat  is  added  to  thirst  it  brings  with  it  the  desire 
for  cold...  Simple  thirst,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  desire  for  its  natural  object, 
drink...  and  any  qualification  is  an  addition.  "' 
Desire  can  motivate  the  soul  to  drink  or  eat,  but  cannot  qualify  the  thirst  or  hunger  in 
order  to  satisfy  anything  other  than  the  most  primal  needs  of  the  body.  Qualification 
will  come  from  Reason,  for  it  is  Reason  that  can  comprehend  the  connection  between 
the  heat  of  the  body  and  the  effect  of  a  cold  drink.  So  in  the  case  of  the  tyrannical  man 
who  has  a  'formidable  extra  crop  of  desires  growing  day  by  day  and  night  by  night 
and  needing  satisfaction"',  the  fact  that  he  needs  money  to  continue  his  lifestyle  of 
`drunkenness,  lust  and  madness"'  can  only  be  worked  out  by  the  means-ends  rational 
capacity  of  Reason. 
So  it  seems  reasonable  to  claim  that  in  Plato's  soul,  whatever  desires  we  have,  we 
need  more  than  just  the  desire  to  obtain  it.  Getting  from  the  internal  motivational  state 
of  desire  to  the  acquisition  of  the  desired  object  will  always  involve  reasoning  of  some 
kind,  even  for  a  much  less  extravagant  desire  than  the  lifestyle  of  the  tyrant.  In  any 
case,  why  should  Reason  be  dormant  in  an  unjust  soul,  when  desire  is  not  dormant 
when  the  soul  is  just?  In  any  formation  of  the  soul  each  element  will  play  some  part, 
but  the  part  played  depends  on  the  power  balance  within  the  soul. 
It  is  important  to  remember  not  to  infer  too  much  where  Plato  is  silent;  we  may  have 
to  accept  that  the  Republic  covered  much  ground  but  cannot  give  answers  to  all  our 
questions.  There  is  nothing  wrong  with  attempting  to  answer  them  ourselves,  of 
course,  as  long  as  we  remember  that  they  are  our  answers,  not  Plato's.  It  is  possible 
that  the  difficulties  in  finding  a  consistent  interpretation  of  Plato's  soul  are  due  to 
inconsistencies  in  Plato's  theory,  our  own  inability  to  properly  appreciate  the  text,  or 
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rather  than  further  Plato's  philosophical  argument.  This  may  be  shown  in  the  contrast 
between  Books  IV  and  VIII-IX:  Book  IV  explains  Plato's  psychological  theory  which 
provides  the  basis  for  his  argument  that  the  just  soul  is  happiest,  but  the  cases  of  the 
unjust  men  in  Books  VIII  and  IX  may  have  acted  as  more  persuasive  evidence  in 
favour  of  the  just  life.  It  is important  to  remember  that  a  primary  function  of  the 
Republic  was  to  demonstrate  that  it  really  is  to  our  advantage  to  be  just.  Plato  may 
have  been  more  concerned  with  that  in  all  possible  ways  open  to  him,  than  in  ensuring 
that  they  were  consistent. 
94 6.  The  Spirit 
I  have  up  to  this  point  neglected  the  unique  role  that  Spirit  plays  in  the  soul,  and  as  the 
Combination  Model  above  shows,  its  part  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  tripartite 
soul.  As  stated  above,  the  spirited  part  is  the  seat  of  emotions  such  as  anger, 
indignation  and  courage,  and  is  said  to  be  concerned  with  honour  and  the  image  of  the 
individual.  It  is  the  part  of  the  soul  that  benefits  from  the  comprehensive  educational 
programme  described  in  Book  III.  Spirit  does  not  recognise  and  desire  the  good  in  the 
same  way  as  Reason,  but  can  be  trained  to  aspire  to  the  good.  Plato  says  that  `it  is  the 
energy  and  initiative[thumos]  in  their  nature  that  may  make  them  uncivilised...  if  you 
treat  it  properly  it  should  make  them  brave,  but  if  you  overstrain  it,  it  turns  them  tough 
and  uncouth,  as  you  would  expect"'.  When  the  Spirit  is  exercised  and  develops  to  the 
right  degree  it  supports  the  rule  of  Reason  in  the  soul  and  the  soul  is  therefore  just. 
And  when  Spirit  supports  Desire  the  soul  is  unjust.  In  other  words,  a  `proper 
adjustment  produce[s]  a  character  that  is  self-controlled  and  brave...  and 
maladjustment  one  that  is  cowardly  and  crude"'.  So  when  Spirit  isn't  cultivated  by 
education  it  sides-with  Desire  and  rules  by  brute  force;  `he  becomes  an  unintelligent 
philistine,  with  no  use  for  reasoned  discussion,  and  an  animal  addiction  to  settle 
everything  by  brute  force'44.  So  when  Spirit  is  untrained  it  rules  by  force  with  Desire, 
and  when  it  is  trained  it  supports  the  conclusions  of  the  `reasoned  discussion'  of 
Reason  as  ruler.  Plato's  discussion  of  the  possible  outcomes  of  the  trained  or 
untrained  Spirit  also  supports  the  theory  that  the  just  and  unjust  souls  operate  in 
different  manners,  with  Reason  ruling  through  persuasion  and  Desire  through 
strength.  His  description  of  Spirit  also  shows  its  pivotal  role  in  the  soul.  If  it  is  the 
case  that  the  adjustment  of  Spirit  explains  the  nature  of  the  whole  soul  then  it  is 
clearly  Spirit  that  Reason  must  communicate  and  develop  a  just  soul  with. 
It  is  because  the  Spirit  is  so  important  that  Plato  devotes  so  much  space  to  the 
education  of  the  Spirit  in  Books  II  and  III.  He  does  not  explicitly  claim  that  early 
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95 education  is  for  the  thumos  alone,  but  he  does  make  statements  that  suggest  this. 
When  explaining  his  definition  of  courage  as  the  special  virtue  of  the  Auxiliary  class 
in  his  city-state  he  says: 
Our  city  is  therefore  brave  too  in  virtue  of  a  part  of  itself.  That  part  retains  in  all 
circumstances  the  power  to  judge,  on  the  basis  laid  down  by  our  lawgiver  in  its 
education,  what  and  what  sort  of  things  are  to  be  feared.  " 
I  will  discuss  this  definition  of  courage  in  the  following  chapter,  but  for  the  moment 
what  is  interesting  is  that  the  auxiliaries  are  able  to  be  courageous  because  of  the 
education  of  the  `lawgiver'.  This  education  of  the  spirited  part  is  also  attested  to  in 
Book  IV,  when  Plato  is  trying  to  distinguish  Spirit  from  Reason  in  the  soul.  Here  he 
claims  that  children  `are  full  of  spirit  as  soon  as  they're  born;  but  some  never  seem  to 
acquire  any  degree  of  reason  and  most  of  them  only  at  a  late  stage'46.  This  also  shows 
that,  as  the  reason  doesn't  develop  until  later,  the  educational  programme  discussed  in 
Books  II  and  III  are  designed  for  the  development  of  the  Spirit;  As  Angela  Hobbs 
says:  `the  fact  that  the  thumos  is  present  before  reason  has  fully  developed  makes  it  a 
key  player  in  early  emotional  trainingi47. 
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96 7.  The  Immortal  Soul 
The  greater  part  of  this  chapter  has  been  devoted  to  the  discussion  of  the  soul  in  Book 
IV  of  the  Republic.  However,  the  issue  of  the  soul's  immortality  is  not  broached  at 
this  point  but  in  Book  X.  Given  the  lengthy  arguments  in  Book  IV  to  convince  us  of 
the  tripartite  nature  of  the  soul,  it  is  somewhat  surprising  to  find  that  this  does  not 
describe  the  soul's  `true  nature"'.  The  soul's  'true  nature'  is in  fact  simpler  than  the 
discussion  of  the  tripartite  soul  would  have  us  believe;  the  soul  is  unitary  in  its 
genuine  form.  Is  Plato  changing  his  mind  about  the  theory  he  has  spent  so  much  time 
arguing  for?  It  is  perhaps  more  plausible  to  suggest  that  the  tripartite  soul  accurately 
depicts  what  he  believes  to  compose  the  mortal  soul,  whereas  what  will  live  on  is 
simply  the  rational  part.  This  leads  to  the  further  problem  of  how  this  change  occurs, 
and  in  what  way  the  appetitive  and  spirited  parts  of  the  soul  are  lost  on  death. 
So  why  have  these  two  sections  of  the  Republic  appeared  so  contradictory  to  one 
another?  Once  he  thinks  he  has  argued  for  the  immortality  of  the  soul  he  then  claims: 
Nor  should  we  believe,  either,  that  in  its  essential  nature  the  soul  is  diverse  and 
variable  and  full  of  internal  conflicts..  .  we  were  thinking  just  now  of  the  soul  as 
composed  of  a  number  of  parts  which  do  not  fit  perfectly  together.  In  that  case  it 
could  hardly  be  immortal.  49 
The  idea  here  is  that  anything  that  is  composite  can  in  principle  be  taken  apart, 
therefore  it  cannot  be  immortal  in  the  sense  of  being  indestructible.  So  it  appears  that 
the  tripartite  soul  that  the  psychological  and  political  structure  is  based  on  is  thus  only 
concerned  with  the  finite  mortal  life;  the  tripartite  structure  does  not  apply  to  the 
immortal  `real  self'.  Does  this  then  mean  that  the  virtues  as  described  in  relation  to  the 
parts  of  the  soul  do  not  exist  in  the  immortal  soul,  or  that  we  must  understand  them  in 
a  different  way?  For  the  greater  part  of  the  Republic  the  virtues  have  been  so  closely 
entwined  with  the  tripartite  model  that  it  difficult  to  appreciate  what  this  will  mean  for 
the  immortal  soul. 
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97 The  initial  problem  when  attempting  to  unravel  this  apparent  difficulty  is  how  we  are 
to  understand  the  change  that  the  soul  undergoes  on  the  death  on  the  individual.  I  will 
consider  two  possible  interpretations  that  have  at  least  some  support  in  the  Republic  or 
other  relevant  works.  Firstly  I  will  examine  the  idea  that  the  change  from  mortal  to 
immortal  requires  two  parts  of  the  soul  -  Desire  and  Spirit  -  to  somehow  disappear  on 
death.  In  this  case  the  tripartite  soul  could  then  be  considered  an  accurate  description 
of  the  mortal  soul,  but  the  immortal  soul  would  be  what  is  left  after  it  sheds  `all  the 
rocks  and  shells  which...  encrust  it  in  wild  and  earthly  profusion'.  The  relevant  section 
in  the  Republic  runs  from  611aIO-612a6,  the  most  relevant  passages  are: 
[1]  We  have  described  truly  enough  the  soul  as  we  at  present  see  it.  But  we  see  it  in 
a  state  like  that  of  Glaucus  the  sea-god,  and  its  original  nature  is  as  difficult  to  see 
as  his  was  after  long  immersion  had  broken  and  worn  away  and  deformed  his 
limbs,  and  covered  him  with  shells  and  seaweed  and  rock,  till  he  looked  more  like 
a  monster  than  what  he  really  was.  This  is  the  sort  of  state  we  see  the  soul  reduced 
to  by  countless  evils.  " 
And, 
[2]  Think  how  its[the  soul's]  kinship  with  the  divine  and  immortal  and  eternal 
makes  it  long  to  associate  with  them  and  apprehend  them;  think  what  it  might 
become  if  it  followed  this  impulse  whole-heartedly  and  was  lifted  by  it  out  of  the 
sea  in  which  it  is  now  submerged,  and  if  it  shed  all  the  rocks  and  shells  which, 
because  it  feeds  on  the  earthly  things  that  men  think  bring  happiness,  encrust  it  in 
wild  and  earthly  profusion.  " 
The  simplicity  of  this  interpretation  is  perhaps  what  gives  it  its  appeal.  If  the  soul  is 
complex  when  housed  in  a  living  mortal  but  simple  after  death  then  the  parts  which 
are  not  characterised  by  the  love  of  knowledge  that  we  can  see  in  [2]  characterises  the 
true  soul  will  somehow  disappear  on  death.  These  parts  are  of  course  Desire  and 
Spirit.  The  two  descriptions  of  the  soul  are  then  consistent  with  one  another  and  can 
be  examined  separately  for  what  we  can  learn  about  the  mortal  or  the  immortal  soul. 
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98 The  problem  with  this  interpretation  is  perhaps  just  as  simple.  Plato  persistently  says 
in  many  of  his  dialogues  that  the  soul  is  immortal,  and  more  importantly,  argues  for  it 
immediately  before  the  section  being  considered.  If  the  soul  is  immortal  then  in  what 
way  could  two  thirds  of  it  be  mortal?  Given  that  Plato  says  these  two  parts  are 
considerably  bigger  than  their  more  rational  companion  then  would  he  have  really 
argued  that  the  soul  is immortal  when  what  he  really  meant  was  a  small  part  of  it  is 
immortal?  As  T.  M.  Robinson  says  in  his  article  `Soul  and  Immortality  in  Republic  X' 
regarding  the  description  of  Glaucus  the  sea-god: 
to  call  these  unwelcome  accretion  the  two  `lower'  parts  of  the  soul,  however, 
seems  to  me  less  plausible  than  to  see  them  as  blemishes  necessarily  resulting  from 
any  association  with  the  body  and  the  bodily.  "Z 
Another  problem  with  the  idea  that  the  appetitive  and  spirited  parts  of  the  soul 
somehow  dissipate  on  death  is  that  there  would  be  no  point  in  punishment  after  death 
if  only  the  reasoning  part  of  the  soul  survived.  The  lower  parts  of  the  soul  would  have 
been  the  parts  that  motivated  immoral  behaviour  that  would  deserve  punishment  but  if 
they  no  longer  exist  then  to  what  extent  can  the  immortal  soul  be  considered 
responsible  for  the  mortal  soul's  actions?  These  problems  can  be  defused  with  a 
different  understanding  of  what  happens  when  a  person  dies  which  I  will  discuss  next. 
The  second  interpretation  I  will  consider  takes  into  account  this  point  made  by 
Robinson  that  we  can  gain  a  more  plausible  account  of  the  immortal  soul  by 
considering  how  it  is  affected  by  being  embodied.  This  is  the  idea  that  perhaps  Plato 
meant  that  the  whole  soul  somehow  persists  after  death.  This,  in  turn,  could  be 
understood  in  a  further  two  ways:  that  the  whole  soul  persists  in  the  sense  that  the 
Reason,  Spirit  and  Appetite  persist,  or  that  the  whole  soul  persists  but  as  it  is  no 
longer  embodied  it  is  not  complicated  (i.  e.  made  complex)  by  conflicting  desires.  The 
first  of  these  is  clear  enough  and  needs  no  further  explanation,  the  second  I  will 
explain  further  below.  The  evidence  for  such  a  view  is  unfortunately  not  found  in  the 
52  Robinson,  T.  M.,  `Soul  and  Immortality  in  Republic  X',  p.  147. 
99 Republic,  but  in  the  Phaedrus.  In  that  dialogue  Socrates  likens  the  soul  to  a  charioteer 
and  his  horses: 
To  begin  with,  our  driver  is in  charge  of  a  pair  of  horses;  second,  one  of  his  horses 
is  beautiful  and  good  and  from  stock  of  the  same  sort,  while  the  other  is  opposite 
and  has  the  opposite  sort  of  bloodlines' 
Later  he  informs  us  what  these  horses  and  the  charioteer  are  representing: 
The  horse  that  is  on  the  right...  is  a  lover  of  honour  with  modesty  and  self-control; 
companion  to  true  glory,  he  needs  no  whip,  and  is  guided  by  verbal  commands 
alone.  The  other  horse  is  a...  companion  to  wild  beasts  and  indecency,  he  is  shaggy 
around  the  ears  -  deaf  -  and  just  barely  yields  to  horsewhip  and  goad  combined.  "' 
This  description  of  the  soul  as  a  charioteer  and  horses  is  clearly  a  reference  to  the 
tripartite  soul  of  the  Republic,  with  the  charioteer  as  Reason,  and  the  horses  as  Spirit 
and  Desire.  While  the  ordinary  people  have  difficulty  controlling  their  horses,  at  least 
one  of  which  is  wild,  the  gods  have  no  difficulty  as  their  horses  and  charioteer  are 
themselves  all  good,  and  can  ascend  to  heaven  without  releasing  the  horses.  This 
seems  to  imply  that  the  soul  in  its  three  parts  can  potentially  ascend  to  heaven  as  long 
as  all  three  parts  are  `good'.  This  is  not  the  case  in  the  Phaedrus  however,  and  it  is 
unlikely  that  it  was  intended  to  be  in  the  Republic  either.  Even  those  of  a  philosophic 
nature  in  the  Phaedrus,  who  have  a  well-disciplined  Spirit  and  are  able  to  control  the 
horses  well  enough  to  experience  as  much  as  is  possible  of  the  truth,  cannot  actually 
gain  access  to  that  place  while  tied  to  the  wild  horse  of  desire.  This  evidence  is  not 
enough  therefore  to  distract  us  from  the  quite  explicit  claim  in  the  Republic  that  the 
immortal  soul  cannot  be  composed  of  parts.  If  the  whole  soul  cannot  persist  in  its 
tripartite  nature  then  in  what  other  way  can  the  whole  soul  live  on? 
This  interpretation  places  great  importance  on  the  effect  the  body  can  have  on  the 
nature  of  the  soul.  C.  D.  C.  Reeve  argues  that  any  interpretation  of  the  section  on  the 
5'  Phaedrus  246b  1-4. 
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100 immortality  of  the  soul  must  include  an  understanding  of  how  the  soul  is  affected  by 
its  integration  with  the  body.  He  says: 
appetitive  and  spirited  desires  are  the  result  of  embodiment  -  the  "maiming" 
referred  to  at  61  lcl-2.  A  disembodied  psyche  would  not  need  food,  drink,  sex, 
money,  or  the  approval  of  other.  " 
Glaucus  the  sea-god  has  been  `broken  and  worn  away  and  deformed'  by  mortal 
desires.  This  deformation  is  a  consequence  of  having  desires  within  the  soul  that  are 
focussed  on  the  transitory  realm  that  the  body  inhabits  rather  than  the  reality  of  the 
forms.  These  desires  for  things  concerned  with  the  body  or  with  the  approval  of  others 
can  conflict  with  the  proper  desire  for  knowledge  which  is  the  basis  for  the  argument 
for  the  division  of  the  soul  in  Book  IV.  Thus  the  existence  of  the,  to  some  extent, 
unavoidable  mortal  desires  leads  to  us  not  seeing  its  true  nature,  and  as  Plato  says  in 
[2]  above,  the  soul  being  separated  from  these  `earthly  things'  means  that  its 
appearance  is  no  longer  deformed  by  association.  Plato  does  use  the  fact  that  we  can 
have  conflicting  desires  to  argue  for  the  tripartite  soul,  so  if  we  no  longer  had  the  kind 
of  desires  that  would  conflict  (i.  e.  appetitive  vs.  rational)  there  would  be  no  reason  to 
think  that  the  soul  was  anything  other  than  unitary. 
If  it  is  the  case  that  the  soul  has  appetitive  and  spirited  parts  in  virtue  of  having 
appetitive  and  spirited  desires,  parts  which  somehow  merge  into  the  rest  of  the  soul 
when  those  desires  disappear,  then  the  soul  could  be  understood  as  unitary  during  life 
but  with  desires  that  can  be  grouped  together.  This  gives  a  different  light  to  the  idea  of 
the  soul  having  parts;  the  parts  in  this  case  would  not  literally  exist,  but  would  be  a 
convenient  way  of  describing  how  the  soul  has  inclination  that  can  be  generalised 
about.  Although  this  would  give  Plato's  tripartite  and  immortal  soul  a  more  modern 
explanation,  and  provide  a  good  explanation  of  how  the  soul  can  be  complex  during 
life  and  unitary  after  death,  it  does  not  seem  to  fit  wholeheartedly  with  the  character  of 
Plato's  theory.  When  discussing  the  tripartite  soul  he  does  appear  to  genuinely  mean 
`parts'  and  not  simply  be  using  the  term  to  simplify  his  theory.  However,  I  find  it 
ss  Reeve,  C.  D.  C.,  Philosopher-Kings:  The  Argument  of  Plato's  Republic,  p.  161. 
101 difficult  to  dismiss  this  interpretation  altogether  as  it  does  provide  us  with  a  more 
plausible  understanding  of  the  tripartite  soul. 
Plato  himself  does  not  appear  to  be  always  confident  about  the  tripartite  theory  or  the 
idea  that  the  soul  will  be  unitary  after  death.  At  the  end  of  the  section  devoted  to  the 
immortal  soul  Plato  says  that  after  death  `one  really  could  see  its  [the  soul's]  true 
nature,  composite  or  single  or  whatever  it  may  bef56.  And  in  the  Phaedrus  he  says: 
To  describe  what  the  soul  actually  is  would  require  a  very  long  account,  altogether 
a  task  for  a  god  in  every  way;  but  to  say  what  it  is like  is  humanly  possible  and 
takes  less  time.  So  let  us  do  the  second  in  our  speech.  " 
Perhaps  then  we  should  take  these  descriptions  of  the  soul  with  a  pinch  of  salt.  If  the 
descriptions  we  find  of  the  soul  in  the  Republic,  both  mortal  and  immortal,  are  views 
that  Plato  was  not  completely  sure  of  that  might  mean  that  he  was  aware  of  the 
inconsistencies  but  not  sure  of  which  theory  was  wrong.  It  could  also  mean  he  was 
using  the  theory  of  the  tripartite  soul  in  order  to  explain  and  argue  for  certain  other 
opinions,  such  as  the  possibility  of  akrasia  and  the  foundations  of  his  Republic. 
56  Rep.  612a3-4. 
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The  arguments  given  for  the  tripartition  of  the  soul  in  Book  IV  are  interesting  and 
challenging  but  are,  I  think,  flawed.  However,  the  theory  that  the  soul  has  three  parts 
is  still  a  very  psychologically  appealing  one.  Positing  this  theory  has  provided  Plato 
with  a  means  to  express  the  more  complex  psychological  activities  that  the  early 
dialogues  do  not  accept,  such  as  the  direct  influence  of  our  irrational  desires  or 
emotional  feelings  on  our  behaviour.  The  spirited  part  of  the  soul  has  been  shown  to 
have  a  pivotal  role  in  this  new  soul,  a  role  that  will  help  us  to  understand  Plato's  ideas 
about  courage  and  fear  in  the  following  two  chapters. 
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104 1.  Introduction 
In  this  chapter  I  will  look  at  courage  in  the  Republic.  Plato's  interpretation  of  courage 
in  the  Republic  is importantly  different  from  those  discussed  in  the  Laches  and  the 
Protagoras,  and  the  difference  between  them  is  informative  to  the  debate  concerning 
the  development  of  Platonic  thought.  In  the  Laches  and  the  Protagoras  we  see 
definitions  of  courage  such  as  courage  as  knowledge  and  courage  as  endurance,  in  the 
Republic  Plato  offers  us  a  combination  of  these  two  ideas.  In  the  Republic  courage 
becomes  knowledge  of  what  should  be  feared  and  the  ability  to  stick  to  that 
knowledge  and  act  in  accordance  with  it;  knowledge  mixed  with  a  kind  of  endurance. 
However,  Plato  does  not  simply  provide  us  with  one  definition  of  courage  in  the 
Republic.  The  Auxiliaries  and  the  Guardians  exhibit  a  different  virtue  due  to  the 
difference  in  their  souls  and  therefore  provide  two  conceptions  of  the  virtue  of 
courage.  The  courage  of  the  Guardians  is  closer  to  the  virtue  as  understood  in  the 
early  dialogues,  or  what  could  be  referred  to  as  the  Socratic  idea  of  the  virtues  as 
knowledge  without  emotion.  In  this  chapter  I  will  look  at  the  role  of  education  in  the 
development  of  courage;  the  issue  of  having  two  definitions  of  courage  -  how  they 
relate  and  to  what  extent  they  help  us  to  answer  a  familiar  problem  for  courage; 
introduce  the  idea  that  for  Plato  the  virtues  are  beneficial  to  the  agent;  and,  consider 
why  Plato  believed  at  this  stage  that  courageous  behaviour  is  always  good  and  finally 
examine  whether  this  is  a  plausible  view. 
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The  main  definition  of  courage  in  the  Republic  is  given  in  Book  four: 
We  call  an  individual  brave  because  of  this  part  of  him,  I  think,  when  he  has  a 
spirit  which  holds  fast  to  the  orders  of  reason  about  what  he  ought  or  ought  not  to 
fear,  in  spite  of  pleasure  and  pain.  ' 
What  is  initially  striking  about  such  a  definition  is  the  absence  of  knowledge  as  a  key 
element.  The  picture  we  are  given  of  the  virtues  in  the  Laches  and  Protagoras  is  what 
has  been  called  an  intellectual  view  of  virtue.  The  definition  given  by  Nicias  in  the 
Laches  and  by  Socrates  in  the  Protagoras  is  one  which  considers  courage  to  be  a  kind 
of  knowledge  -  in  that  case,  knowledge  of  what  should  be  feared.  As  we  shall  see  in 
the  section  below,  knowledge  is  still  the  important  element  in  the  courage  of  the 
philosopher-kings  but  the  demotic  virtue  of  the  Auxiliaries  does  not  require  it. 
How  character  develops  is  an  important  element  in  the  Republic,  and  one  that  Plato 
gives  much  emphasis.  In  Book  III  Plato  discusses  the  role  of  early  education  in  the 
ethical  development  of  people's  personalities.  It  is  this  early  education  that  is  so 
influential  on  the  development  of  courage  in  the  Auxiliary  class.  The  latter  stages  of 
education  outlined  in  the  Republic  are  only  for  those  who  are  preparing  to  be 
Guardians  and  so  will  not  be  experienced  by  the  class  that  is  supposed  to  be  the  guard 
dogs  of  the  state.  In  order  to  understand  the  courage  of  the  Auxiliary  further,  I  will 
next  look  at  the  comprehensive  system  of  education  set  up  to  prepare  them  for  their 
role  in  the  state. 
1  Republic.  442b  11-c3. 
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It  is  to  Plato's  credit  that  he  was  the  first  to  appreciate  the  influence  of  early  education 
on  the  future  adult  within  a  psychological  and  philosophical  theory.  At  the  beginning 
of  his  discussion  of  this  issue  he  says  that: 
the  first  step,  as  you  know,  is  always  what  matters  most,  particularly  when  we 
are  dealing  with  those  who  are  young  and  tender.  That  is  the  time  when  they  are 
easily  moulded  and  when  any  impression  we  choose  to  make  leaves  a 
permanent  mark.  ' 
It  is  due  to  the  strength  of  this  belief  that  Plato  sets  forward  such  stringent  proposals 
for  education  in  his  Republic.  He  strongly  believed  that  children  should  not  be 
subjected  to  images  of  vicious  or  disgraceful  behaviour  for  fear  that  they  will  emulate 
it.  It  could  be  argued  that  in  this  he  goes  far  too  far,  and  that  what  matters  to  the 
development  of  the  individual  is  that  the  people  closest  to  them  provide  them  with 
positive  models  to  imitate.  However,  his  discussion  of  this  topic,  particularly  his 
various  references  to  Achilles,  help  to  illuminate  his  concept  of  the  spirit,  his 
definition  of  courage,  and  also  his  metaphysical  and  moral  theory  as  a  whole. 
To  Plato,  Achilles  is  the  embodiment  of  the  Spirit  out  of  control.  The  fighting  men  of 
his  Republic  will  be  resolute  and  courageous,  but  subservient  to  the  rulers,  who  have 
more  wisdom  than  them,  and  always  do  what  they  have  been  taught  is  right.  Achilles 
is  insolent,  wilful,  self-obsessed  and  proud,  more  concerned  with  his  `honour'  than 
with  the  good  of  the  army  and  generals  for  which  he  fights: 
the  message  is  plain:  Achilles'  thumos  is  in  a  state  of  complete  insubordination 
to  reason  and  in  consequence  he  displays  nothing  but  arrogance  towards  his 
rightful  masters,  whether  mortal  or  divine? 
2  Rep.  377a11-b2. 
3  Hobbs,  A.,  Plato  and  the  Hero,  p.  202.  This  seems  to  be  how  Plato  interprets  Achilles'  behaviour.  It  is 
a  different  question  whether  Plato's  interpretation  of  the  character  as  depicted  in  the  Iliad  is  correct.  For 
a  discussion  of  the  Homeric  Achilles  see  A.  Maclntyre,  `After  Virtue',  London,  Duckworth,  1981, 
p.  121-30. 
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certainly  the  lives  of  many  men.  It  is  understandable,  then,  why  Plato  chooses 
Achilles  as  an  example  of  how  a  military  man  ought  not  to  behave.  His  attitude  and 
behaviour  show  how  an  unruly  thumos  can  be  damaging  to  the  mental  state  of  the 
individual  and  the  people  that  rely  on  them.  Plato  may  at  times  misrepresent  Achilles' 
actions  to  enforce  his  point,  but  given  his  status  in  the  Greek  World,  Plato's  criticisms 
of  him  articulately  show  what  attitudes  would  need  to  be  changed  to  achieve  Plato's 
Republic. 
The  warrior  Achilles  provides  the  perfect  example  of  how  children  should  not 
develop,  and  Plato's  choice  of  example  reinforces  the  idea  that  this  early  stage  of 
education  is  predominantly  important  for  the  thumos,  as  it  is  the  seat  of  warrior-like 
qualities.  Plato's  summation  of  successful  early  education  is  given  at  401d5-402a5: 
For  rhythm  and  harmony  penetrate  deeply  into  the  mind  and  take  a  most  powerful 
hold  on  it,  and,  if  education  is  good,  bring  and  impart  grace  and  beauty,  if  it  is  bad, 
the  reverse.  And  moreover  the  proper  training  we  propose  to  give  will  make  a  man 
quick  to  perceive  the  shortcomings  of  works  of  art  or  nature,  whose  ugliness  he 
will  rightly  dislike;  anything  beautiful  he  will  welcome  gladly,  will  make  it  his 
own  and  so  grow  in  true  goodness  of  character;  anything  ugly  he  will  rightly 
condemn  and  dislike.  Even  when  he  is  still  young  and  cannot  understand  the 
reason  for  so  doing,  while  when  reason  comes  he  will  recognise  and  welcome  her 
as  a  familiar  friend  because  of  his  upbringing! 
Christopher  Gill  has  described  this  kind  of  early  education  as  the  development  of  pre- 
reflective  understanding  which  relies  on  a  pre-rational  harmonization  of  the  psyche 
that  is  reliant  on  the  surrounding  community  to  properly  enforces.  This  harmonization 
of  the  soul  of  the  Auxiliaries  and  future  Guardians  does  not  depend  on  rational 
appreciation  of  the  beautiful  and  the  ugly,  but  is  geared  towards  training  the  young  to 
accept  certain  beliefs  and  to  have  the  parallel  feelings.  So  the  courageous  Auxiliaries 
will  be  trained  to  have  correct  beliefs  about  what  should  be  feared,  and  therefore  how 
they  should  behave,  which  should  be  backed  up  by  the  right  emotional  response  to 
fear-inducing  situations. 
4  Rep.  40  1  d5-402a5. 
5  Gill,  Christopher,  'Ethical  Reflection  and  the  Shaping  of  Character:  Plato's  Republic  and  Stoicism'. 
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education  discussed  in  Book  III.  The  Guardians  are  trained  to  witness  the  reality  of 
how  things  really  are.  The  similes  of  the  sun  and  the  cave,  and  the  analogy  of  the 
divided  line  describe  the  truths  that  the  philosopher  will  be  able  to  comprehend  and 
how  they  will  grow  to  know  such  truths.  Having  such  knowledge  of  how  things  really 
are  will  mean  that  they  will  never  err  in  their  assessment  of  what  is  the  good,  and 
therefore  of  what  is  best  for  them.  I  will  consider  the  ethical  difference  between  the 
Guardians  and  the  Auxiliaries  below,  and  the  emotional  difference  between  them  in 
the  following  chapter. 
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To  return  to  Achilles,  we  may  feel  more  sympathetic  towards  him  than  Plato  does; 
considering  his  importance  to  the  Greeks,  Agamemnon  is  perhaps  unwise  in  treating 
him  so  badly.  Nevertheless,  Achilles  does  appear  to  behave  recklessly  in  a  time  of 
war,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  he  is  labouring  under  the  pressure  of  a  destiny  he 
is  unable  to  avoid,  that  promises  his  early  death.  So  Achilles  does  not  only  exemplify 
the  case  of  the  Spirit  running  amok,  but  he  also  exhibits  the  tragic  nature  of  the 
Homeric  world,  a  nature  that  is  essentially  anti-Platonic.  For  Homer,  and  for  Achilles, 
what  is  noble,  what  brings  one  arete,  is  not  always  beneficial  to  the  individual; 
Achilles  may  fight  and  win  honour  in  battle,  but  he  will  die  young  and  live  in  the 
`hateful  chambers  of  decay  that  fill  the  gods  themselves  with  horror".  This  distinction 
between  what  action  is  in  the  best  interest  of  the  character  personally  and  what  is 
morally  the  right  thing  to  do  can  be  seen  as  characteristic  of  Homer  and  the 
tragedians.  We  may  not  understand  Agamemnon's  actions  when  he  sacrifices 
Iphigenia  for  a  fair  wind  but  the  Greeks  at  the  time  would  have  appreciated  the  idea 
that  this  is  what  he  should  have  done  for  the  sake  of  the  city.  It  is,  however,  clearly 
not  in  his  own  interests  to  sacrifice  the  life  of  his  beloved  daughter.  For  Plato's  ethics 
and  the  conception  of  the  just  soul,  and  for  courage  in  particular,  this  cannot  be  the 
case,  he  must  deny  the  possibility  of  the  tragic;  in  other  words  he  must  deny  that  it  is 
possible  to  do  what  is  morally  best  and  suffer  for  it  as  a  personal  loss'. 
Plato  clearly  cannot  accept  the  tragic  point  of  view.  The  whole  message  of  the 
Republic  is  that  it  is in  our  interest  to  be  virtuous.  The  good  man  therefore  cannot 
meet  with  real  disaster.  Plato's  grand  metaphysical  thesis  of  the  permanence  of  the 
Forms  and  the  transience  of  the  physical  world  supports  his  stance  against  the  tragic, 
and  gives  fluency  to  his  psychological  and  ethical  theories.  Plato  leaves  his 
metaphysical  foundations  to  the  second  half  of  the  Republic,  but  it  is  really  this 
section  that  forms  the  foundation  for  the  entire  work.  When  Plato  is  asked  if  those 
6  Ilomer,  Iliad,  Book  XX,  64.  - 
7  It  could  be  argued  that  the  death  of  Socrates  exhibits  both  these  things,  but  Socrates  says  that  he  does 
not  think  that  death  is  harmful  to  him,  see  Phaedo  62+. 
110 who  `love  looking  and  listening"  can  be  distinguished  from  `philosophers  in  the  true 
sensei9  as  described  by  Plato,  he  replies: 
Then  what  about  the  man  who  recognises  the  existence  of  beautiful  things,  but 
does  not  believe  in  beauty  itself,  and  is  incapable  of  following  anyone  who 
wants  to  lead  him  to  a  knowledge  of  it?  Is  he  awake,  or  merely  dreaming?  Look; 
isn't  the  dreaming  simply  the  confusion  between  a  resemblance  and  the  reality 
which  it  resembles,  whether  the  dreamer  be  asleep  or  awake?...  Then  what  about 
the  man  who,  contrariwise,  believes  in  beauty  itself  and  can  see  both  it  and  the 
particular  things  and  that  in  which  they  share...  we  can  rightly  call  his  state  of 
mind  one  of  knowledge;  and  that  of  the  other  man,  who  holds  opinions  only, 
opinions.  '0 
So  the  thing  itself,  in  other  words  the  Form,  is  distinguished  from  the  particular  things 
that  we  perceive,  and  being  able  to  distinguish  between  them  is  the  difference 
between  having  knowledge  and  opinion.  I  will  not  discuss  the  argument  presented  at 
477-479  and  the  connection  Plato  makes  between  his  epistemology  and  his 
metaphysics,  but  rather,  as  stated  above,  the  connection  between  the  latter  and  his 
ethical  theory. 
It  is  the  Form  of  the  Good  that  provides  Plato  with  his  explanation  of  why  the  tragic 
view  in  Homer  is  not  correct,  as: 
the  good  therefore  may  be  said  to  be  the  source  not  only  of  the  intelligibility  of 
the  objects  of  knowledge,  but  also  of  their  being  and  reality,  but  is  beyond  it, 
and  superior  to  it  in  dignity  and  power.  " 
So  the  ultimate  cause  of  all  particular  good  things  and  all  particular  beautiful  or  noble 
things  is  the  Form  of  the  Good.  An  act  could  not  partake  of  what  is  noble  without  also 
partaking  of  what  is  good.  Plato  gives  further  support  for  this  idea  at  505b1-4: 
do  you  think  there's  any  point  in  possessing  anything  if  it's  no  good?  Is  there 
any  point  in  having  all  other  forms  of  knowledge  without  that  of  the  good,  and 
so  lacking  knowledge  about  what  is  good  and  valuable.  " 
a  Rep.  476b5. 
9  Rep.  476b2. 
1°  Rep.  476c2-d8. 
Rep.  509b6-9. 
12  Rep.  505b1-4. 
111 Desmond  Lee's  translation  here  translates  `kalos'  as  `valuable',  but  the  meaning  is 
clear;  the  Form  of  the  Good  enables  us  to  have  knowledge  of  what  is  both  `good'  and 
`valuable',  or  noble.  However,  perhaps  more  conclusive  evidence  comes  earlier,  in 
Book  V,  when  Plato  is  dismissing  the  notion  that  women  exercising  naked  will  be 
ridiculous  when  he  says  that  `it  is  and  will  always  be  the  best  of  sayings  that  what 
benefits  us  is  fair,  what  harms  us  shameful"'. 
It  is  this  denial  of  the  tragic  act  that  provides  Plato  with  support  for  his  concept  of 
virtue  in  the  Republic  and  in  particular  for  his  conception  of  courage  as  doing  what 
you  know  should  not  be  feared.  This  is  because  if  doing  what  is  courageous  is  both 
the  right  thing  to  do  and  beneficial  to  the  agent  then  why  should  it  be  feared?  But  is 
Plato  correct  in  his  belief  that  doing  the  right  things  is  always  beneficial  to  the  agent, 
particularly  when  we  are  discussing  a  virtue  such  as  courage?  Courage  is  typically 
exemplified  in  situations  where  there  could  be  loss  of  life,  and  how  could  someone 
who  dies  doing  a  courageous  act  be  benefited?  Given  Plato's  psychological  model 
discussed  in  the  previous  chapter  it  is  clear  why  courage  would  be  good  for  someone. 
To  briefly  summarise,  the  preferred  model  of  the  tripartite  soul  discussed  above 
shows  that  the  spirited  part  of  the  soul,  and  courage  as  its  primary  characteristic,  is 
very  important  for  having  a  unified  soul;  it  is  the  spirited  part  of  the  soul  that  acts  as  a 
kind  of  intermediary  between  the  reasoning  and  desiring  parts  and  determines  which 
part  rules  by  lending  its  substantial  power  to  either  of  the  two  other  parts.  If  the 
spirited  part  is  properly  trained  then  it  will  side  with  the  rational  part  and  the  soul  as  a 
whole  will  be  courageous,  if  on  the  other  hand  it  has  been  given  poor  training  and 
example  it  will  side  with  desire  and  the  soul  will  be  weak-willed  and  insatiable.  We 
can  see  then  that  the  state  of  the  spirited  part  is  of  primary  importance  to  the  state  of 
the  entire  soul. 
An  understanding  of  this  centrally  important  role  of  courage  also  enables  us  to 
appreciate  the  relevance  of  having  a  unified  soul.  A  particularly  Socratic  element  in 
13  Rep.  457b4-5. 
112 the  Republic  is  the  idea  that  our  true  selves  are  represented  by  our  rational  part,  as  we 
see  when  Plato  discusses  the  separation  of  the  soul  with  the  body  after  death".  If  our 
rational  parts  are  our  true  selves  then  it  is  only  by  acting  in  accordance  with  our 
rational  element  that  we  are  able  to  really  be  ourselves.  If  we  are  only  ourselves  when 
we  are  able  to  act  in  accordance  with  what  we  believe  then  courage  is  relevant  to  our 
welfare  in  a  special  way  -  it  is  only  by  being  courageous  that  we  can  unify  our  souls 
and  be  who  we  really  are,  or  act  in  accordance  with  how  we  genuinely  think  about 
things.  My  analysis  in  the  previous  chapter  shows  how  important  courage  is  to  the 
psychological  health  of  the  individual,  and  that  Plato  had  an  appreciation  of  the 
relevance  of  the  virtue  of  courage. 
In  the  Republic  Plato  divides  things  that  are  good  into  three  categories.  The  three 
categories  are: 
(i).  Do  you  agree  that  there  is  one  kind  of  good  which  we  want  to  have  not  with  a 
view  to  its  consequences  but  because  we  welcome  it  for  its  own  sake?  For 
example,  enjoyment  or  pleasure,  so  long  as  pleasure  brings  no  harm  and  its  only 
result  is  the  enjoyment  it  brings.  " 
(ii).  And  is  there  not  another  kind  of  good  which  we  desire,  both  for  itself  and  its 
consequences?  Wisdom  and  sight  and  health,  for  example,  we  welcome  on  both 
grounds.  16 
(iii).  And  there  is  a  third  category  of  good,  which  includes  exercise  and  medical 
treatment  and  earning  one's  living  as  a  doctor  or  otherwise.  All  these  we  should 
regard  as  painful  but  beneficial;  we  should  not  choose  them  for  their  own  sake  but 
for  the  wages  and  other  benefits  we  get  from  them.  " 
(i)  is  the  category  of  things  that  are  good  in  themselves  but  not  as  a  means  to  anything 
else;  (ii)  is  the  category  of  things  that  are  both  good  in  themselves  are  for  their 
consequences;  (iii)  is  the  category  of  things  that  are  only  good  for  their  consequences. 
Courage  to  Plato,  like  the  specified  virtue  of  wisdom,  would  be  included  in  category 
14  See  Chapter  4,  Section  7. 
1S  Rep.  357b7-1  1. 
16  Rep.  357c1-3. 
17  Rep  357c5-dl. 
113 ii)  -  what  is  good  for  us  in  itself  and  also  for  its  consequences".  But  maybe  courage 
isn't  something  that  will  always  be  a  good  for  us  in  either  the  short-term  or  the  long- 
term.  Unlike  Plato,  many  would  think  that  courage  is  not  something  which  is 
necessarily  beneficial  to  us  in  some  way  (either  in  itself  or  for  its  consequences)  but 
that  it  is  a  quality  that  is  usually  useful  to  us  and  often  beneficial  but  not  necessarily 
so.  It  may  be  useful  to  us  in  the  sense  that  sometimes  we  need  to  show  courage  in 
order  to  get  what  we  want,  as  being  courageous  may  be  a  useful  trait  when  we  need  to 
stand  up  for  ourselves  to  our  Boss  or  even  the  schoolyard  bully.  However  it  is 
something  that  may  also  get  us  into  more  serious  trouble.  A  courageous  person  may 
sometimes  find  themselves  in  dangerous  or  even  life  threatening  situations  as  a  result 
of  their  courage,  which  will  not  be  of  benefit  to  them. 
18  Plato's  explanation  of  why  we  should  want  courage  for  its  own  sake  is  provided  by  the  fundamental 
importance  of  the  virtues  to  a  healthy  soul. 
114 5.  The  Virtue  of  the  Philosopher-Kings 
In  Book  IV  we  get  the  argument  for  the  division  of  the  soul  into  three  parts,  and  the 
ideal  dynamic  between  these  parts: 
The  reason  ought  to  rule,  having  the  wisdom  and  foresight  to  act  for  the  whole,  and 
the  spirit  ought  to  obey  and  support  it...  when  these  two  elements  have  been  so 
brought  up,  and  trained  and  educated  to  their  proper  function,  they  must  be  put  in 
charge  of  appetite,  which  forms  the  greater  part  of  each  man's  make-up  and  is 
naturally  insatiable.  19 
However,  it  is  to  Book  IX  that  we  must  look  to  discover  how  the  different  parts  relate 
to  different  personality  types.  Each  part  is  said  to  have  its  own  particular  pleasure, 
`and  similarly  its  own  desires  and  its  own  governing  principles"'.  The  soul  is 
therefore  dominated  by  one  of  the  three  parts  and  is  motivated  by  the  particular 
pleasure  of  that  part: 
That  is  why  we  divide  men  into  three  basic  types,  according  to  whether  their 
motive  is  knowledge,  success  or  gain  2' 
As  a  result  of  these  ideas  we  come  to  a  familiar  problem  in  Plato.  If  the  virtuous  soul 
is,  as  described  above,  one  where  Reason  rules,  why  is  anyone  other  than  those  ruled 
by  Reason  able  to  be  virtuous,  as  they  do  seem  to  be?  This  is  a  particularly  pertinent 
question  for  the  virtue  of  courage  as  it  is  the  only  one  of  the  virtues  originally  said  to 
reside  in  a  single  part  and  a  part  of  the  soul  other  than  Reason  -  the  Spirit. 
The  Philosopher  rulers  exemplify  proper  Platonic  virtue.  After  a  lengthy  education 
they  will  necessarily  have  all  four  cardinal  virtues:  justice,  courage,  temperance  and 
wisdom.  Is  it  then  the  case  that  the  rulers  and  only  the  rulers  can  be  fully  virtuous?  It 
is  certainly  the  case  that  the  rulers  have  something  that  the  other  citizens  do  not  have; 
they  are  the  gold  in  the  city,  a  metaphor  that  shows  their  value  in  the  state.  Given  that 
the  discussion  of  the  early  education  also  involves  the  Auxiliary  class,  it  is  to  the  role 
and  education  described  in  Books  VI  and  VII  that  are  most  informative  about  the 
19  Rep.  441  e4-442a8. 
20  Rep.  580d9-10. 
21  Rep.  5816-4. 
115 unique  status  and  abilities  of  the  rulers  -  as  this  section  discusses  them  alone.  The 
simile  of  the  cave  and  the  analogy  of  the  divided  line  show  us  that  the  rulers  alone 
have  access  to  knowledge  of  what  really  is,  instead  of  belief  of  the  transitory,  sensory 
world  around  us.  As  the  other  classes  are  unable  to  grasp  the  existence  of  the  forms 
they  are  unable  to  have  knowledge  as  one  cannot  have  knowledge  of  what  is 
constantly  in  flux.  It  is  this  knowledge  that  makes  the  rulers  special  and  guarantees 
that  they  will  always  behave  virtuously: 
We  know  that  if  a  man's  desires  set  strongly  in  one  direction,  they  are 
correspondingly  less  strong  in  other  directions,  like  a  stream  whose  water  has  been 
diverted  into  another  channel..  . 
So  when  the  current  of  a  man's  desires  flows 
towards  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  and  similar  activities,  his  pleasure  will  be  in 
things  purely  of  the  mind,  and  physical  pleasures  will  pass  him  by  -  that  is  if  he  is 
a  genuine  philosopher  and  not  a  sham.  22 
The  essential  difference  between  the  Philosopher  Rulers  and  the  Auxiliaries  and 
Producers  is  thus  that  only  the  Rulers  can  have  knowledge.  This  being  the  case,  does 
it  follow  that  only  the  Rulers  can  have  virtue,  in  other  words,  is  knowledge  a 
necessary  component  of.  virtue  for  Plato  in  the  Republic?  This  question  will  have  a 
considerable  impact  on  the  virtue  of  courage  as  it  is  supposed  to  be  the  characteristic 
virtue  of  the  Auxiliary  class,  who  are  capable  of  belief  but  not  knowledge.  In  Book  IV 
Socrates  says  of  the  definition  of  courage  given  there  that  if  you  `accept  it  as  a 
definition  of  the  ordinary  citizen's  courage"'  then  you  won't  be  far  wrong.  The 
definition  of  courage  in  Book  IV  does  not  include  knowledge  so  should  we  conclude 
that  the  ordinary  citizen's  virtue  could  be  based  on  belief,  whereas  the  virtue  of  the 
Rulers  is  based  on  knowledge? 
Much  of  the  recent  work  on  virtue  in  the  Republic  has  focussed  on  the  idea  of  demotic 
virtue  -  the  virtue  of  the  lower  classes.  In  the  more  interesting  articles  that  have  been 
written  on  this  matter  -  by  David  Sachs,  Richard  Kraut  and  George  Klosko2'  -  there 
has  been  a  tendency  to  disregard  some  of  the  key  elements  of  the  Republic  and  give 
22  Rep.  485d6-e2. 
23  Rep.  430c3. 
24  Sachs,  David,  `A  Fallacy  in  Plato's  Republic';  Kraut,  Richard,  `Reason  and  Justice  in  Plato's 
Republic';  Klosko,  George,  `Demotike  Arete  in  the  Republic'. 
116 too  much  attention  to  the  modern  distinction  between  normativity  and  non- 
normativity,  which  does  not  appear  in  the  text.  Whilst  finding  intriguing  ways  of 
clarifying  the  role  of  virtue  in  the  Republic  these  three  articles  are  all  guilty  of 
insulating  their  views  from  the  influence  of  the  Platonic  belief  that  what  really 
distinguishes  the  rulers  from  the  rest  of  the  population  is  that  they  have  knowledge. 
Kraut  and  Klosko  have  approached  the  question  of  an  ordinary  kind  of  virtue  by 
thinking  directly  about  how  that  would  work  in  the  tripartite  soul.  Inspired  by  Sachs' 
article  which  claims  that  the  tripartite  soul  does  not  discount  the  possibility  of  the 
internally  virtuous  person  doing  unjust  acts  -  because  the  soul  of  the  virtuous  person 
is  ruled  by  reason  and  he  does  not  believe  that  a  rational  person  would  necessarily 
always  do  the  right  thing  -  Kraut  considers  two  different  ways  in  which  the  soul  could 
be  said  to  be  ruled.  Kraut  argued  that  the  soul  could  be  dominated  normatively  or  non- 
normatively.  Non-normative  rule  would  be  where  the  dominating  part  of  the  soul 
rules  purely  in  virtue  of  that  part  being  in  control;  in  other  words,  reason  would  rule 
over  appetite  `if  a  person  is  faced  with  a  choice  between  a  and  b,  has  an  appetite  to  do 
b,  but  decides  to  do  a,  then  reason  rules  over  appetite  if  he  does  a'25.  This  kind  of  rule 
would  be  exemplified  by  strong-willed  behaviour  -  where  you  desire  to  do  one  thing 
but  are  able  to  go  against  that  because  of  your  beliefs.  Normative  rule  is  when  the 
dominating  part  of  the  soul  rules  in  virtue  of  the  values  of  that  part  of  the  soul.  In  this 
case,  reason  would  rule  if  a  person  wanted  to  and  decided  to  do  the  morally  right 
thing,  appetite  would  rule  if  a  person  were  driven  by  their  desires,  and  spirit  would 
rule  if  driven  by  honour.  Although  this  distinction  does  generate  some  interesting 
points  we  should  be  wary  of  whatever  conclusion  are  drawn  from  this  analysis  as  the 
distinction  between  normative  and  non-normative  rule  is  not  made  explicit  in  the 
Republic.  Plato  does  not  discuss  different  ways  which  reason  could  be  said  to  rule  the 
soul  of  the  just  man,  we  are  simply  expected  to  understand  the  idea  of  a  part  of  the 
soul  ruling  the  others.  Such  a  distinction  may  be  used  to  study  the  notion  of  a  tripartite 
soul  but  it  will  not  help  us  to  understand  what  Plato  meant  in  his  theory  of  one. 
25  Kraut,  Richard,  `Reason  and  Justice  in  Plato's  Republic',  Exegesis  and  Argument  p.  208. 
117 There  is  enough  in  the  Republic  to  generate  a  reasonably  secure  understanding  of  the 
dynamics  of  the  tripartite  soul  in  relation  to  virtue.  The  thorny  issue  of  ordinary  virtue 
as  opposed  to  the  virtue  of  the  rulers  is less  in  need  of  modern  distinctions  than  one 
would  think  given  recent  research.  The  Philosopher  Rulers  have  virtue  proper,  virtue 
based  on  knowledge  and  they  can  thus  be  depended  on  to  behave  correctly  on  all 
occasions.  The  Auxiliaries,  as  Plato  says  in  Book  IV,  have  `ordinary  citizen's 
courage',  which  is  presumably  based  on  the  correct  belief  instilled  in  them  from  the 
Rulers;  they  are  able  to  `safely  keep  the  opinion  inculcated  by  the  established 
education  about  what  things  and  what  kind  of  things  are  to  be  feared"'.  When  the 
Auxiliaries  do  something  courageous  they  could  have  the  correct  organisation  of  the 
soul  -  reason  is  in  control  of  the  soul  and  spirit  is  obeying  the  dictates  of  Reason  and 
controlling  the  appetites  -  and  the  only  way  of  distinguishing  them  is  that  they  do  not 
have  knowledge.  However,  the  Auxiliaries  cannot  be  relied  upon  to  always  act 
appropriately  as  the  Rulers  can  be  as  they  are  without  the  guarantor  of  knowledge. 
Even  the  most  thoroughly  inculcated  belief  may  be  lost  under  pressure27. 
Plato  gives  support  to  two  different  definitions  of  courage  in  the  Republic,  the  first  of 
the  Auxiliary  class  and  the  second  of  the  Guardians.  The  Guardians  are  those  who  can 
always  be  relied  upon  to  do  the  right  things  as  they  have  fail-safe  knowledge  of  what 
really  should  be  feared.  The  Auxiliaries  on  the  other  hand  have  only  belief.  The 
relevant  difference  between  the  Guardians  and  the  Auxiliaries  could  then  be  that  the 
courage  that  is  based  on  knowledge  is  always  reliable,  whereas  the  courage  that  is 
based  on  belief  is  not.  However,  it  could  be  argued,  contrary  to  this  idea,  that  the 
difference  between  the  Guardians  and  the  Auxiliaries  is  not  that  the  Auxiliaries  will 
sometimes  fail  to  do  the  courageous  thing  but  simply  that  their  type  of  courage  is 
based  on  belief  rather  than  knowledge.  But,  even  though  it  is  true  that  the  essential 
difference  between  the  Guardians  and  the  Auxiliaries  is  an  epistemological  one,  given 
the  importance  laid  on  knowledge  in  the  Republic  this  difference  must  surely  amount 
to  something  significant.  If  the  difference  did  not  have  any  impact  whatsoever  on  the 
internal  experience  of  the  agent  or  their  behaviour  then  why  should  we  take 
knowledge  so  seriously?  Plato  says  that  knowledge  is  something  reliable  and  that 
26  Republic  429c8-10. 
27  See  Meno  97-98. 
118 belief  is  not,  so  perhaps  we  can  assume  from  this  that  the  courage  of  the  Guardians  is 
consistent,  whereas  the  Auxiliaries  will  not  always  be  able  to  act  on  their  belief  of 
what  is  truly  to  be  feared,  and  will  sometimes  abandon  their  beliefs  under  pressure. 
Gill  believes  that  one  way  of  understanding  the  difference  between  the  knowledge  of 
the  Guardians  and  the  beliefs  of  the  Auxiliaries  is  in  terms  of  justification: 
The  beliefs  of  the  well-trained  auxiliary  (such  as,  that  under  appropriate 
circumstances  death  is  not  to  be  feared)  are  justified  because  they  form  part  of  a 
structured  set  of  beliefs  that  she  has  been  habituated  to  regard  as  serious  and 
worthy  of  respect,  the  coherence  of  which  she  (pre-reflectively)  recognizes.  The 
philosopher  retains  these  beliefs,  but  on  the  basis  of  an  additional  justification, 
provided  by  the  systematization  and  grounding  of  such  belief  through  dialectical 
analysis,  which  converts  that  into  understanding  why  28 
It  is  precisely  this  difference  -  that  of  the  Guardians  understanding  why  -  that  turns 
the  belief  of  the  Auxiliaries  into  knowledge  for  the  Guardians  and  makes  their 
cognitive  state  so  reliable.  If  a  child  were  to  know  why  it  were  so  important  that  they 
do  not  go  out  late  on  their  own  then  they  would  I  imagine  be  not  so  keen  to  do  so. 
When  we  know  the  why  of  things  we  can  see  for  ourselves  the  true  importance  of 
certain  rules  or  explanations  and  we  are  much  more  likely  to  act  accordingly. 
Similarly,  the  Guardians  know  that  virtue  is  always  beneficial  and  therefore  will  never 
waver  in  their  resolve  to  be  virtuous. 
What  will  this  mean  for  the  structure  of  the  soul?  One  possible  explanation  is  that 
while  both  the  Guardians  and  the  Auxiliaries  are  ruled  by  Reason,  and  helped  by 
Spirit,  the  control  enforced  over  the  Appetite  is  different.  In  a  soul  where  the  rational 
part  is  in  full  control  the  mortal  appetites  are  greatly  weakened  and  so  being  virtuous 
is  no  longer  a  conflict  between  different  desires  but  a  genuine  harmony  of  the  parts  of 
the  soul.  This  picture  is  perhaps  somewhat  similar  to  the  virtuous  man  as  conceived 
by  Socrates  in  the  early  dialogues  -a  man  whose  rationality  is in  full  control  and  who 
28  Gill,  Christopher,  'Ethical  Reflection  and  the  Shaping  of  Character:  Plato's  Republic  and  Stoicism', 
p.  201. 
119 receives  no  distraction  from  the  interference  of  desires  or  emotions29.  The  Auxiliary 
will  also  have  a  soul  that  is  ruled  by  reason  in  that  the  correct  beliefs  will  have  been 
installed  by  the  system  of  education.  This  system  of  education  will  also  ensure  that 
they  will  have  a  properly  developed  thumos  which  will  enable  them  to  resist  the 
temptations  laid  down  by  the  appetitive  part  of  the  soul,  rather  than  experience  the 
quietening  of  the  Appetite  that  the  truly  virtuous  man  will  witness. 
Given  this  picture  of  the  souls  of  the  Guardian  and  the  Auxiliary  the  difference 
between  their  types  of  courage  is  evident.  The  Guardians  undergo  the  early  education 
as  a  preliminary  to  the  intellectual  training  they  will  later  go  through.  This  training 
strengthens  their  reasoning  part  to  such  an  extent  that  they  comprehend  the  reality  of 
the  forms  and  gain  knowledge  of  the  good.  This  knowledge  of  the  why  means  that 
they  achieve  true  harmony  in  their  souls  and  no  longer  need  to  struggle  with  conflict 
between  the  parts.  The  Auxiliaries,  on  the  other  hand,  have  not  developed  the  rational 
part  of  their  soul  but  instead  have  installed  the  correct  beliefs  in  it;  the  focus  in  the 
auxiliaries  is  on  their  thumos,  which  gives  it  the  strength  to  resist  the  appetite30.  The 
thumos  then  does  not  play  such  an  important  role  for  the  Guardians  as  it  does  for  the 
Auxiliaries.  These  organisations  of  the  two  kinds  of  virtuous  souls  shows  how  the 
philosopher  is  closer  to  the  ideal  that  will  be  reached  on  death,  as  they  have  succeeded 
in  controlling  and  quietening  the  mortal  desires  and  affects  of  the  appetite  and  the 
spirit  as  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter. 
The  Auxiliaries  receive  the  education  discussed  in  Section  3  above  whereas  the 
philosopher  rulers  have  both  the  education  outlined  in  Book  III  but  also  the  far  more 
extensive  version  in  Books  VI  and  VII.  Given  that  Plato  does  describe  the  courage 
defined  in  Book  IV  as  courage  we  should  take  him  at  his  word  and  assume  that  it  is. 
However,  the  courage  of  the  philosopher  rulers  is  clearly  different  from  that  of  the 
Auxiliaries.  We  are  therefore  presented  with  two,  not  necessarily  contradictory, 
29  It  may  be  the  case  that  Plato  does  include  the  emotion  of  fear  in  his  definition  of  the  virtue  of 
courage,  but  I  will  consider  in  the  next  chapter  to  what  extent  this  `fear'  can  really  be  considered  an 
emotion. 
'0  I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  the  only  difference  between  knowledge  and  true  belief  is  an 
appreciation  of  why  something  is  the  case,  but  just  that  this  is  a  difference. 
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knowledge  or  belief  of  what  should  be  feared. 
The  problems  that  beset  these  two  definitions  are  both  shared  and  unique.  A  problem 
that  both  definitions  must  face  is  the  challenge  that  maybe  not  all  courageous  actions 
need  be  good  actions  -  perhaps  bad  courage  is  possible  -  and  one  that  I  will  look  at  in 
the  next  section.  Also,  the  courage  of  the  philosopher  rulers  appears  to  be  without 
passion  or  emotion  to  such  an  extent  it  may  make  the  whole  idea  of  the  purest  kind  of 
courage  impossible.  I  will  consider  this  problem  in  the  following  chapter  on  the 
emotions  in  the  Republic  and  other  Platonic  dialogues.  Fortunately  they  may  also  be 
some  advantage  to  the  dual-definition  offered  in  the  Republic  in  that  it  may  help  us  to 
understand  the  issue  of  supererogation  with  regard  to  courage.  This  I  will  also  look  at 
in  the  next  section. 
121 6.  Courage  Continued 
Plato  evidently  believed  that  courage  cannot  be  misused.  This  poses  problems 
however,  because  it  may  seem  obvious  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  bad  courage.  The 
idea  that  the  other  three  virtues  named  in  the  Republic  -justice,  temperance  and 
wisdom  -  are  good  things  is  thus  more  acceptable  than  the  idea  that  courage  must 
always  be  good.  What  of  the  cool-headed  burglar  who  must  scale  a  dangerously  high 
wall  and  avoid  the  vicious  dogs  in  order  to  get  at  the  jewels?  If  this  man  is  not 
exhibiting  courage  then  how  are  we  to  describe  his  ability  to  overcome  such 
obstacles?  The  idea  that  an  act  cannot  count  as  courageous  unless  it  is  virtuous  seems 
like  an  arbitrary  stipulation  when  we  consider  such  examples.  Outwardly  the  only 
difference  is  that  Platonic  courage  is  a  good  state  of  the  soul  that  will  only  lead  to 
good  acts.  The  courage  of  the  burglar  may  also  come  from  the  rational  part  within  him 
overcoming  the  desire  to  run  away,  even  though  this  part  has  become  corrupted.  The 
burglar  may  also  have  a  unified  soul  if  his  desires  obey  the  orders  of  his  reason  and 
spirit,  but  to  Plato,  and  perhaps  to  most  people,  the  burglar  is  not  a  virtuous  man. 
There  is  also  the  issue  of  the  Auxiliaries  suffering  under  incorrect  belief.  It  is  a 
strange  fact  that  two  soldiers  in  Plato's  Republic  could  have  the  same  dynamic  within 
their  soul,  behave  in  the  same  manner  and  act  in  accordance  with  their  beliefs  as  to 
what  is  the  most  damaging  action  to  them  (i.  e.  by  doing  the  alternative),  but  one  could 
be  acting  courageously  and  the  other  not.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  one  of  the 
soldier's  beliefs  are  correct  and  the  other  incorrect.  If  both  soldiers  are  driven  towards 
honour  and  act  in  accordance  with  what  they  believe  to  be  right,  the  conclusion  that 
one  is  courageous  because  he  was  lucky  enough  to  be  brought  up  with  the  right  values 
whereas  the  other  was  not  seems  to  be  far  too  dependent  on  luck  rather  than  personal 
moral  fibre. 
The  Platonic  idea  that  when  one  acts  rationally  one  necessarily  acts  virtuously 
underpins  the  belief  that  courage  is  always  a  good  thing  in  the  Republic.  In  chapter  7 
on  the  Laws  I  will  show  that  this  belief  does  change,  and  a  kind  of  dual-understanding 
of  courage  comes  into  play.  Perhaps  Plato  realised  that  the  Achilles  he  so  fervently 
122 rejected  as  an  example  of  virtuous  behaviour  in  the  Republic  does  have  some  right  to 
be  called  courageous,  and  if  this  is  the  case  perhaps  courage  need  not  always  be  a 
virtue. 
Courage  has  presented  another  serious  problem  to  the  most  prevalent  ethical  view  of 
the  recent  centuries.  Courage  has  often  been  thought  to  be  something  that  we  cannot 
expect  from  the  ordinary  good  person  -  that  it  requires  something  more.  This  idea  can 
be  quite  problematic  to  an  ethical  theory  attempting  to  define  courage  as  part  of  a 
general  understanding  of  what  makes  someone  an  ethical  person.  For  the  Kantian  who 
adheres  to  the  belief  that  doing  one's  duty  is  the  right  thing  to  do  how  are  we  to 
understand  actions  that  are  so  often  considered  to  be  beyond  the  call  of  duty?  For 
Plato,  who  believes  that  the  virtues  are  internal  states  as  opposed  to  duties  or  certain 
kinds  of  behaviour,  the  problem  of  supererogation  (something  being  beyond  the  call 
of  duty)  never  appears;  courage  is  never  supererogatory,  it  is  simply  a  part  of  being  a 
good  person.  This  means  that  the  issue  of  supererogation  is  different  from  the  one 
facing  the  Kantian.  For  Plato,  and  for  Aristotle,  ethics  are  not  primarily  deontological 
-  it  is  concerned  with  goodness  and  virtue  rather  than  duty  and  rights.  This  means  that 
Plato  or  Aristotle  can't  have  a  concept  of  supererogation  as  `going  beyond  duty'.  A 
virtue  ethicist  who  sees  virtue  primarily  as  a  disposition  to  behave  or  feel  in  different 
ways  can  make  a  distinction  between  ordinary  virtue  and  superhuman  virtue  as 
Aristotle  does.  But  Plato's  account  of  the  virtues  seems  to  leave  no  room  for  such 
degrees  of  virtuousness.  In  the  Republic,  the  virtues  are  understood  as  certain  states  of 
the  soul,  and  are  all  required  for  a  virtuous  soul  and  therefore  a  virtuous  person; 
`virtue  is  a  fixed  ideal  which  can,  in  principle,  be  achieved,  but  not  surpassed"'. 
Plato  therefore  may  not  have  to  deal  with  the  problem  of  supererogation  but  his 
expectations  of  the  rulers  in  his  Republic  are  problematic  in  a  different  way.  For  Plato 
the  virtuous  person  always  does  the  virtuous  act  in  any  given  situation  because  the 
virtuous  act  is  precisely  what  the  virtuous  person  does.  So  one  cannot  go  beyond 
virtue.  Plato's  philosopher  rulers  are  expected  to  be  ideal  human  beings  who  always 
31  Ibid. 
123 do  the  right  thing  and  never  falter.  It  is  perhaps  over-demanding  to  expect  any  human 
being  to  behave  in  such  a  way  given  that  we  are  susceptible  to  emotions  and  desires. 
However,  Plato  arguably  believed  that  emotions  and  desires  do  not  affect  his  ruling 
class  -  they  are  above  such  mortal  affects.  In  the  next  chapter  I  will  look  at  Plato's 
view  of  the  emotions  and  consider  whether  such  an  ideal  is  possible  or  even  desirable. 
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As  we  have  seen  in  chapters  2  and  3,  the  early  dialogues  (particularly  the  Laches) 
focus  on  two  definitions  of  courage  -  courage  as  knowledge  and  courage  as  some 
kind  of  endurance.  In  the  Republic  Plato's  definition  includes  both  of  these  ideas. 
Courage  is  knowledge  of  what  is  truly  to  be  feared,  but  it  is  also  the  ability  to  endure 
and  stick  to  this  belief.  The  definition  given  in  the  Republic  certainly  has  a  few  things 
going  for  it.  The  common  modern  idea  that  courage  is  simply  the  overcoming  of  fear 
does  no  work  in  explaining  how  and  why  some  people  are  able  to  act  courageously.  If 
a  woman  runs  into  a  burning  building  to  save  a  child  it  is  clear  from  her  behaviour 
that  she  have  not  been  prevented  from  action  by  her  fear,  and  someone  informing  you 
of  such  does  not  help  you  to  understand  the  phenomenon.  Plato's  definition  of 
courage  on  the  other  hand  also  helps  us  appreciate  why  the  courageous  individual  acts 
as  she  does;  we  can  all  understand  how  someone  could  be  driven  by  a  greater  fear  of 
the  alternative.  The  necessary  ability  to  act  according  to  your  beliefs  about  what  is 
most  dangerous  is  less  self-explanatory,  but  the  extensive  coverage  that  Plato  gives  to 
education  in  the  Republic  tells  us  how  this  ability  will  come  about. 
The  definition  of  courage  that  appears  in  Book  IV  based  on  belief  rather  than 
knowledge  and  intended  for  the  Auxiliary  class  does  not  face  all  the  same  damaging 
problems  as  the  definition  when  applied  to  the  Rulers.  The  Auxiliary  class  is  fallible 
and  therefore  may  not  always  do  the  right  thing,  which  is  much  more  in  keeping  with 
what  we  know  of  human  behaviour,  whereas  the  Rulers  will  always  act  in  accordance 
with  their  knowledge  of  what  is  right.  The  most  critical  problem  that  both  types  of 
courage  face  is  that  they  are  restricted  to  only  good  behaviour.  Unfortunately  this 
leaves  all  the  examples  of  people  behaving  in  ways  we  would  commonly  consider 
courageous  but  that  are  excluded  from  Plato's  definition.  If  the  stipulation  that 
courage  is  always  a  good  is  simply  a  result  of  the  Greek  tradition  then  where  the 
boundary  comes  is  not  philosophically  reliable.  The  fact  that  Plato  himself  allows  the 
behaviour  of  the  mercenary  in  battle  to  be  a  type  of  courage  in  the  Laws  shows  that 
this  was  a  genuine  issue  for  him. 
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early  dialogues  -  courage  as  knowledge  and  courage  as  endurance.  By  combining 
these  two  ideas  the  Republic  does  avoid  some  of  the  problems  with  each  separate 
definition  encountered  in  previous  chapters.  The  two  types  of  courage  in  the  Republic 
-  the  Rulers'  and  the  Auxiliaries'  -  seem  to  depend  more  on  one  of  the  separate 
definitions  from  the  early  dialogues.  The  emphasis  of  the  Rulers'  courage  is  certainly 
on  knowledge  -  they  are  said  to  transcend  the  other  parts  of  the  soul  to  some  extent. 
The  Auxiliaries  on  the  other  hand  -  who  never  attain  full  knowledge  -  must  rely  on 
the  endurance  of  their  Spirit  to  enable  them  to  stick  to  the  beliefs  that  have  been 
instilled  in  them.  Although  both  endurance  and  knowledge  are  to  some  extent 
included  in  the  Rulers'  and  Auxiliaries'  courage,  the  definition  of  courage  as 
knowledge  of  what  is  right  plus  the  ability  to  stick  to  that  belief  cannot  be  properly 
appreciated  by  either  of  these  two  instantiations.  It  does  not  help  us  to  understand 
what  is  meant  by  courage  in  the  everyday  world  -a  world  that  is  not  run  like  Plato's 
Republic. 
However,  the  definition  given  in  the  Republic  is  to  some  extent  a  more  successful  one 
than  the  ones  already  considered  however  it  still  has  its  pitfalls.  It  suffers  from  the 
apparently  arbitrary  stipulation  that  bad  courage  does  not  exist  -  or  courage  put  to  bad 
ends.  This  also  unfortunately  means  that  if  the  belief  of  the  Auxiliary  is  incorrect  the 
behaviour  will  not  be  courageous,  which  seems  incongruous  to  the  modern  reader. 
The  definition  of  courage  given  in  the  Republic  is  therefore  a  positive  progression 
from  the  early  dialogues,  but  it  has  not  successfully  eradicated  all  of  the  problems 
such  a  definition  will  face. 
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127 1.  Introduction 
I  am  taking  Plato's  definition  of  courage  in  the  Republic  to  be  when  someone's  soul: 
has  a  spirit  which  holds  fast  to  the  orders  of  reason  about  what  he  ought  or  ought  not 
to  fear,  in  spite  of  pleasure  and  pain.  ' 
In  this  definition  of  courage  fear  takes  an  important  role.  This  fact  alone  is  not  necessarily 
surprising,  but  it  is  the  place  that  Plato  gives  to  fear  that  is  the  cause  for  concern.  He 
claims  that  courage  is  doing  that  which  is  not  most  to  be  feared,  by  which  he  means  the 
morally  wrong  option.  He  does  also  recognise  the  existence  of  fear  of  other  things,  but  as 
he  believes  that  damage  to  the  body  is  of  less  importance  than  damage  to  the  soul,  this  is 
the  fear  that  must  be  ignored.  This  definition  raises  important  questions  about  how  Plato 
thought  of  the  emotions.  Firstly,  did  Plato  think  that  you  actually  had  to  feel  fear  at  the 
prospect  of  the  morally  wrong  action,  or  just  believe  that  it  was  more  dangerous  to 
yourself?  Secondly,  what  can  be  learnt  from  his  conception  of  fear  about  what  Plato 
believed  constituted  the  emotions  in  general? 
Is  describing  a  situation  as  dangerous  a  different  thing  from  feeling  fear  in  that  situation? 
It  could  be  argued  that  driving  a  car  at  100  miles  per  hour  is  dangerous,  but  that  does  not 
alone  ensure  that  we  will  have  the  appropriate  fearful  response;  we  may  feel  simply 
exhilarated  or  numbed  by  such  speed.  So  perhaps  it  is  the  case  that  some  situations  we 
would  describe  as  dangerous  and  feel  fear  towards,  and  others  we  would  merely  describe 
as  dangerous.  Given  this  how  are  we  to  determine  the  connection  between  the  attribution 
of  `dangerous'  to  a  situation,  or  the  belief  that  it  is  dangerous,  and  the  emotion  of  fear? 
This  is  an  important  question  for  Plato's  theory  of  courage  as  he  expects  his  courageous 
citizens  to  know  that  the  immoral  option  should  be  feared.  This  seems  like  a  strange 
requirement  of  virtue  as  we  would  commonly  expect  the  courageous  person  to  do  the 
brave  thing  because  they  are  motivated  by  the  belief  that  it  is  the  right  thing  to  do,  rather 
than  the  belief  that  the  alternative  is  more  dangerous. 
1  Rep.  442c1-3. 
128 One  of  the  interesting  and  potentially  enlightening  questions  that  can  be  asked  of  Plato's 
theory  of  the  emotions  is  whether  he  believed  that  they  are  cognitive,  by  which  I  mean 
that  they  were  necessarily  based  on  beliefs.  Cognitivism  about  emotion  is  similar  to  what 
Peter  Goldie  refers  to  as  the  belief-desire  account2.  What  they  have  in  common  is  that  the 
emotions  can  be  explained  in  reference  to  beliefs  and  desires  alone,  and  that  no  mention 
of  the  phenomenological  experience  of  emotion  is  necessary.  This  theory  is  associated 
with  the  work  of  Donald  Davidson3.  If  we  consider  the  case  of  the  hoplite  on  his  way  to 
war,  who  is  fearful  of  the  upcoming  combat,  a  proponent  of  the  belief-desire  account 
such  as  Davidson  would  explain  the  fear  of  the  Hoplite  as  the  perceptual  belief  that  the 
situation  is  dangerous,  and  his  desire  not  to  be  put  in  danger.  This  kind  of  cognitivism, 
and  cognitivism  in  general,  provides  no  essential  place  for  the  phenomenology  of 
emotion.  In  fact,  it  could  be  said  that  these  theories  arose  in  response  to  the  flaws  of  the 
feelings-based  explanations  of  the  emotions  which  were  more  prevalent  at  the  beginning 
of  the  twentieth  century.  This  means  that  if  cognitivism  were  indeed  consistent  with  the 
essence  of  Plato's  theory  then  the  feeling  of  fear  towards  the  morally  wrong  action  would 
consist  of  an  account  of  the  beliefs  and  desires  of  the  individual.  The  `established 
education'  referred  to  in  the  above  definition  would  then  have  to  inculcate  an 
appreciation  of  what  should  be  feared,  i.  e.  the  appropriate  beliefs  and  desires,  and  an 
ability  to  avoid  such  actions  without  worrying  about  the  feeling  element  of  emotions. 
Cognitivism  would  give  Plato  the  advantage  of  not  restricting  courage  to  people  who  had 
the  feeling  element  of  fear  at  the  morally  dangerous  option.  If  one  is  to  subscribe  to  a 
cognitive  interpretation  of  Plato's  theory,  then  this  means  that  the  example  of  the  woman 
running  into  the  burning  building  to  save  the  child  would  not  have  to  be  reconciled  with 
the  idea  that  she  was  impelled  partly  by  the  feeling  element  of  fear  of  the  alternative. 
However,  as  I  shall  argue,  the  relationship  between  the  beliefs  of  the  individual  and  her 
emotions  is  not  as  simple  as  the  cognitivist  account  suggests. 
2  Goldie,  P.,  The  Emotions:  A  philosophical  Exploration. 
3  Davidson,  D.,  Essays  on  Actions  and  Events. 
129 2.  How  Early  Education  affects  the  Emotions 
At  the  beginning  of  the  discussion  of  the  first  stage  of  education  in  the  Republic  Plato 
says: 
What  kind  of  education  shall  we  give  them  then?  We  shall  find  it  difficult  to  improve 
on  the  time-honoured  distinction  between  the  physical  training  we  give  to  the  body 
and  the  education  we  give  to  the  mind  and  character.  4 
This  initial  statement  shows  that  the  education  was  not  simply  a  matter  of  imparting 
knowledge  but  was  intended  to  shape  the  soul  (or `mind  and  character')  as  well.  And  the 
importance  of  this  early  stage  cannot  be  underestimated: 
And  the  first  step,  as  you  know,  is  always  what  matters  most,  particularly  when  we  are 
dealing  with  those  who  are  young  and  tender.  That  is  the  time  when  they  are  easily 
5  moulded  and  when  any  impression  we  choose  to  make  leaves  a  permanent  marks 
As  I  have  demonstrated  in  the  previous  chapter,  this  stage  of  education  is  supposed  to 
train  the  future  Guardians  and  Auxiliaries  to  have  the  right  emotional  response  to  the 
stories  and  music  that  they  hear  and  to  respond  correctly  to  new  situations  and  stimulus. 
The  censorship  that  their  education  is  to  receive  is  to  shield  them  from  any  improper 
examples  that  might  encourage  them  to  respond  wrongly.  It  is  clear  that  this.  stage  of  the 
education  process  targets  the  emotions  of  the  students  involved,  but  what  is  less  clear  is 
whether  their  rational  capacity  is  supposed  to  be  influenced  by  this  early  process  of 
whether  the  training  of  beliefs  comes  later.  If  Plato  does  not  think  that  the  beliefs  of  the 
students  must  be  trained  along  with  their  emotions  then  their  beliefs  cannot  constitute  the 
emotions,  as  in  this  case  the  emotions  would  be  developed  before  the  beliefs  associated 
with  them. 
4  Rep.  376e2-5;  `psyche'  here  translated  as  mind  and  character. 
5  Rep.  377a11-b2. 
130 The  position  in  the  Protagoras  is  an  explicit  commitment  to  the  tenets  of  cognitivism. 
Here  Plato  claims: 
Now,  no  one  goes  willingly  towards  the  bad  or  what  he  believes  to  be  bad;  neither  is  it 
in  human  nature,  so  it  seems,  to  want  to  go  toward  what  one  believes  to  be  bad  instead 
of  the  good.  And  when  one  is  forced  to  choose  between  one  of  two  bad  things,  no  one 
will  choose  the  greater  if  he  is  able  to  choose  the  lesser...  If  what  I  have  said  up  to  now 
is  true,  then  would  anyone  be  willing  to  go  toward  what  he  dreads,  when  he  can  go 
toward  what  he  does  not?...  For  it  was  agreed  that  what  one  fears  one  holds  to  be  bad.  6 
It  is  clear  that  at  this  stage  Plato's  theory  of  emotion  is  strongly  cognitive;  he  believes 
that  fear  or  dread  has  an  evaluative  element  -  literally  `an  expectation  of  something 
bad'.  We  fear  what  we  believe  to  be  bad  for  us,  and  that  may  be  physical  harm  or 
damage  to  our  soul.  He  continues:  `Both  the  courageous  and  the  cowardly,  go  toward  that 
about  which  they  are  confident;  both  the  cowardly  and  the  courageous  go  toward  the 
same  thing's.  What  they  go  towards  is  dependent  on  whether  they  have  `wisdom  about 
what  is  and  is  not  to  be  feared'9;  if  they  do  not  they  are  cowardly  and  ignorant,  and  if  they 
do  they  are  courageous  and  wise.  So  we  fear  what  we  believe  to  be  bad  for  us,  and 
courage  is  the  wisdom  to  know  what  that  is.  In  the  Protagoras  Plato  is  saying  that  the 
cowardly  and  the  courageous  feel  fear,  and  it  is  a  cognitive  fear  for  both  types,  but  that 
the  cowardly  are  getting  the  assessment  of  what  is  worse  for  them  wrong.  Therefore 
Socrates  is  committed  to  a  cognitive  interpretation  of  the  emotions  in  the  Protagoras,  and 
Plato  is  not  supporting  the  existence  of  non-rational  emotions. 
To  return  to  the  Republic,  at  the  beginning  of  the  educational  process  it  looks  as  if  those 
selected  for  the  training  will  be  taught  to  have  the  right  emotional  response  before  they 
develop  the  appropriate  belief,  and  that  it  is  only  later  that  the  right  beliefs  will  come 
along  to  support  this  emotional  state. 
6  Prot.  358d  1-e7. 
7  Prot.  358d8-9. 
8  Prot.  359e1-3. 
9  Prot.  360d3. 
131 This  stage  of  education  is  crucial.  For  rhythm  and  harmony  penetrate  deeply  into  the 
mind  and  take  a  most  powerful  hold  on  it,  and,  if  education  is  good,  bring  and  impart 
grace  and  beauty,  if  it  is  bad,  the  reverse.  And  moreover  the  proper  training  we 
propose  to  give  will  make  a  man  quick  to  perceive  the  shortcomings  of  works  of  art  or 
nature,  whose  ugliness  he  will  rightly  dislike;  anything  beautiful  he  will  welcome 
gladly,  will  make  it  his  own  and  so  grow  in  true  goodness  of  character;  anything  ugly 
he  will  rightly  condemn  and  dislike,  even  when  he  is  still  young  and  cannot 
understand  the  reason  for  so  doing,  while  when  reason  comes  he  will  recognize  and 
welcome  her  as  a  family  friend  because  of  his  upbringing.  10 
However,  we  can  see  from  the  definition  of  courage  that  it  is  supposed  to  result  from  the 
first  stage  of  education  that  by  the  end  of  the  process  the  correct  beliefs  are  in  place.  For 
example,  Plato  claims  that  those  who  are  to  be  brave  must  have  the  right  beliefs  about 
death  and  the  after-life: 
But  what  if  they  are  to  be  brave?  Must  we  not  extend  our  range  to  include  something 
that  will  give  them  the  least  possible  fear  of  death?  Will  anyone  who  in  his  heart  fears 
death  ever  be  brave? 
...  And  will  anyone  who  believes  in  terrors  in  the  after-life  be 
without  fear  of  death,  and  prefer  death  in  battle  to  defeat  and  slavery.  '  1 
And: 
One  good  man  does  not  think  death  holds  any  terror  for  another  who  is  a  friend  of 
his...  and  so  he  would  hardly  mourn  for  him  as  if  he  had  suffered  something  terrible.  12 
In  order  to  shape  people  to  be  courageous  they  must  be  made  to  believe  that  death  is  not  a 
bad  thing,  for  themselves  or  their  loved  ones.  They  must  not  make  too  much  of  death, 
like  Achilles  does  when  he  says: 
Do  not  make  light  of  death,  illustrious  Odysseus...!  would  rather  work  the  soil  as  a 
serf  on  hire  to  some  landless  impoverished  peasant  than  be  king  of  all  these  lifeless 
dead.  13 
10  Rep.  401  d4-402a5. 
Rep.  386a4-b4. 
12  Rep.  387d5-9. 
13  Odyssey  Book  XI  487-491,  trans  E.  V.  Rieu,  Penguin,  and  partially  quoted  in  Rep.  386c6-8. 
132 This  stage  of  education  does  involve  both  the  emotions  and  the  beliefs  of  the  children 
involved,  but  this  does  not  mean  that  the  emotions  are  necessarily  based  on  the  beliefs.  In 
fact,  it  is  clear  in  the  passage  401  d4-402a5  that  inculcating  the  right  emotional  response 
is  of  primary  importance  in  the  young  and  that  the  attention  to  the  reason  for  these 
feelings  is  explained  later.  Although  this  creates  a  distinction  between  emotions  and 
beliefs  I  do  not  think  it  would  be  fair  to  conclude  from  this  that  Plato  believed  that  young 
children  were  incapable  of  beliefs  -  there  is  nothing  to  support  that  quite  extreme  thesis. 
What  I  think  can  be  learnt  from  his  discussion  of  education  in  Book  III  is  that  we  can 
influence  the  emotions  without  dealing  with  the  beliefs,  even  if  the  child  may  have 
relevant  beliefs  about  the  objects  of  emotion.  Plato  says  that  a  child  may  be  trained  to  like 
what  is  beautiful  and  condemn  what  is  ugly  -  in  other  words  have  the  right  emotional 
response  -  before  he  recognizes  the  reason.  This  does  not  exclude  the  very  likely 
possibility  that  this  child  will  already  have  a  belief  about  such  things  but  that  they  do  not 
have  the  rational  capacity  to  be  taught  to  reason  with  these  beliefs  at  this  stage  of  their 
education.  As  it  is  the  case  that  Plato  believed  that  emotions  can  be  affected  directly  and 
that  we  do  not  need  to  work  on  the  beliefs  of  the  child  in  order  to  change  their  emotions 
he  is  clearly  not  advocating  a  cognitivist  approach  to  the  emotions  in  the  same  sense  as  in 
the  Protagoras  since  the  Republic  seems  to  imply  that  feelings  may  be  prior  to 
judgements.  This  marks  a  change  from  the  position  expressed  in  the  Protagoras  which 
was  clearly  cognitivist.  I  will  continue  my  discussion  of  the  role  of  fear  in  Plato's 
definition  of  courage  with  the  understanding  that  for  Plato  the  emotions  are  not  simply 
beliefs. 
To  return  to  the  passages  above  (Rep.  386a4-b4  &  387d5-9),  what  is  suggested  by  these 
two  passages  from  the  Republic  is  that  having  no  fear  of  death  and  the  belief  that  death  is 
not  to  be  feared  are  in  some  way  separable  but  connected  and  that  the  belief  component 
of  the  courageous  person  is  essential  to  the  theory.  What  Plato  is  saying  is  that  if  we  have 
the  belief  that  the  after-life  holds  terrors  for  us  and  our  friends  and  family  then  we  will 
fear  death  and  consequently  be  unable  to  be  brave.  There  is  therefore,  as  Christopher  Gill 
133 claims,  `a  close  and  direct  connection  between  what  people  believe  and  what  they  feel'  14 
Thus  the  educational  syllabus  is  designed  to  create  a  dynamic  of  the  soul  in  which  there  is 
this  close  relationship  between  emotions  and  beliefs. 
The  emotions  are  the  first  focus  of  the  program,  as  we  can  see  from  the  opening  section 
on  early  education.  However,  it  is  perhaps  not  particularly  relevant  whether  the  emotions 
are  to  be  shaped  before  the  beliefs  become  involved  or  not.  Children's  beliefs  are 
certainly  crucial  to  their  development  into  virtuous  adults  and  are  involved  from  early  on 
in  the  process  if  not  from  the  beginning.  The  role  of  these  beliefs,  when  they  are  correct, 
is  to  reinforce  the  proper  emotional  response  that  the  children  have  been  trained  to  have 
through  the  right  literature  and  music,  but  presumably  the  ideal  model  that  Plato  is 
aiming  for  is  a  situation  where  the  correct  beliefs  and  the  correct  emotional  response  are 
mutually  reinforcing  each  other. 
The  discussion  of  the  importance  of  eradicating  the  fear  of  death  gives  us  an  example  of 
how  someone  can  become  vicious.  If  the  belief,  which  Plato  believes  is  incorrect,  that 
death  is  something  to  be  feared  and  the  after-life  is  a  bad  place  is  encouraged  and 
supported  by  the  stories  that  children  are  told  then  this  will  consequently  impact  on  the 
emotional  response  we  have  towards  situations  that  might  bring  about  our  death.  We  will 
overestimate  the  threat  of  death  and  therefore  make  the  wrong  choice  on  the  battlefield. 
In  this  case  it  is  the  beliefs  that  are  playing  the  pivotal  role  in  determining  the  state  of  the 
soul  -  if  children  can  be  taught  that  death  is  not  a  bad  thing  then  they  will  not  fear  it. 
This  can  also  work  in  the  opposite  direction,  with  the  emotions  having  a  direct  impact  on 
the  beliefs  of  the  individual.  Evidence  for  this  can  be  found  in  Book  IV;  after  arguing  for 
14  Gill,  Christopher,  'Ethical  Reflection  and  the  Shaping  of  Character:  Plato's  Republic  and  Stoicism',  p. 
206. 
134 the  division  of  the  soul  into  three  parts  Plato  describes  the  correct  alignment  of  the  soul  as 
follows: 
The  reason  ought  to  rule,  having  the  wisdom  and  foresight  to  act  for  the  whole,  and 
the  spirit  ought  to  obey  and  support  it...  and  this  concord  between  them  is  effected,  as 
we  said,  by  a  combination  of  intellectual  and  physical  training,  which  tunes  up  the 
reason  by  a  training  in  rational  argument  and  higher  studies,  and  tones  down  and 
soothes  the  element  of  "spirit"  by  harmony  and  rhythm.  '5 
If  the  spirited  part  of  the  individual  is  soft  and  undeveloped  then  the  soul  will  presumably 
be  high-strung  and  over-anxious,  whereas  if  it  is  overdeveloped,  as  in  the  timocratic  man 
in  Book  IX,  the  soul  becomes  overambitious,  angry  and  unruly.  Neither  the  over- 
developed  nor  the  under-developed  thumos  will  lead  to  courage,  as  a  courageous  person 
is  someone  who  follows  the  dictates  of  Reason  whilst  overcoming  the  influence  of 
Desire.  The  under-developed  thumos  will  not  result  in  the  person  being  courageous 
because  the  spirited  part  of  the  soul  will  not  be  able  to  control  the  appetitive  part  and  its 
desire  to  run  away  from  conflict  or  other  threatening  situations;  a  cowardly  person  is 
someone  whose  spirit  cannot  hold  `fast  to  the  orders  of  reason  about  what  he  ought  or 
ought  not  to  fear,  in  spite  of  pleasure  and  pain'.  The  cowardly  person  is  thus  ruled  by  the 
appetitive  part  of  the  soul  as  the  thumos  is  not  able  to  exert  the  control  it  needs  to  in  order 
to  keep  the  desires  in  check.  In  this  case  the  coward  could  either  be  an  akratic  personality 
-  still  retain  the  correct  beliefs  but  be  unable  to  act  on  them  -  or  it  may  be  the  case  that 
the  fear  from  the  thumos  affects  the  beliefs  of  the  rational  part  so  that  all  three  parts  are  in 
incorrect  agreement  as  to  what  they  should  do. 
To  show  that  the  beliefs  of  the  agent  can  be  affected  by  his  emotions,  Plato  explains  the 
process  of  how  we  change  our  mind  in  Book  III  of  the  Republic: 
15  Rep.  441e4-442a3. 
135 I  think  the  discarding  of  a  belief  is  either  voluntary  or  involuntary  -  voluntary  when 
one  learns  that  the  belief  is  false,  involuntary  in  the  case  of  all  true  beliefs...  people  are 
involuntarily  deprived  of  true  opinions..  . 
by  theft,  magic  spells,  and  compulsion.  16 
By  "the  victims  of  theft"  I  mean  those  who  are  persuaded  to  change  their  minds  or 
those  who  forget,  because  time,  in  the  latter  case,  and  argument,  in  the  former,  takes 
away  their  opinions  without  their  realising  it...  The  "victims  of  magic,  "  I  think  you'd 
agree,  are  those  who  change  their  mind  because  they  are  under  the  spell  of  pleasure  or 
fear.  17 
These  two  quotations  present  the  view  that  when  we  change  our  mind  from  a  false  belief 
to  a  correct  one  we  do  so  freely  and  voluntarily.  However,  when  we  change  our  mind 
from  a  correct  belief  to  a  false  one  it  happens  involuntarily  because  of  various  insidious 
means;  we  are  `victims  of  magic'  if  this  happens  as  a  result  of  fear  or  pleasure.  This  fear 
is  different  from  the  appropriate  fear  that  we  should  feel  towards  what  is  immoral,  as  that 
could  never  result  in  us  losing  hold  of  a  correct  belief.  This  fear  results  in  us  wrongly 
discarding  a  belief  and  changing  our  mind  about  a  certain  state  of  affairs  when  we  should 
have  kept  hold  of  our  original  belief. 
Beliefs  and  emotions  therefore  have  a  two-way  causal  relationship;  they  both  can  have  an 
impact  on  the  other.  Belief  and  emotions  do  not  always  have  a  causal  impact  of  course,  as 
one  of  the  aims  of  the  Republic  was  to  explain  akratic  action,  so  there  must  be  cases 
where  a  person's  beliefs  and  desires  are  in  conflict  and  it  is  not  resolved  by  either  the  loss 
of  the  belief  or  the  cessation  of  the  emotion.  The  early  stage  of  education  is  to  develop 
the  right  kind  of  beliefs  and  desires  so  that  they  are  in  consensus  rather  than  conflict,  as 
conflict  can  lead  to  the  loss  of  the  correct  belief,  which  is  the  worst  possible  outcome  for 
the  agent.  The  aim  of  this  stage  is  to  create  a  character  type  that  is  as  stable  as  it  can  be 
given  the  so  far  limited  training,  however,  as  beliefs  are  susceptible  to  the  effects  of  the 
emotions  and  desires  it  cannot  be  an  altogether  stable  character  type  that  is  created.  Given 
that  beliefs  are  not  wholly  reliable  when  it  comes  to  the  affects  of  `theft,  magic  spells, 
16  Rep.  412e9-413b1,  trans.  G.  M.  A.  Grube,  rev.  C.  D.  C.  Reeve,  Plato:  Complete  Works,  Hackett  Publishing 
Company,  Indiana,  1997. 
'7  Rep.  413b3-c  I,  trans.  G.  M.  A.  Grube,  rev.  C.  D.  C.  Reeve,  Plato:  Complete  Works,  Hackett  Publishing 
Company,  Indiana,  1997. 
136 and  compulsion',  the  Auxiliary  who  receives  this  education  but  not  the  latter  stage  cannot 
always  be  relied  upon  to  do  the  virtuous  action. 
What  can  this  tell  us  about  the  role  of  fear  in  the  courage  of  the  Suxiliaries?  The 
definition  cited  above  tells  us  that  the  Spirit  must  hold  fast  to  what  he  has  learned  about 
`what  he  ought  or  ought  not  to  fear'  18.  What  Plato  does  not  specify  is  whether  the  feelings 
that  the  Auxiliary  ought  to  have  are  the  feelings  that  they  actually  do  have  due  to  the 
education  they  have  undergone.  However,  Plato  places  much  importance  on  the  early 
educational  process  which  is  primarily  focused  on  training  the  emotions.  This  fact 
suggests  that  when  Plato  says  that  courage  is  the  ability  to  hold  fast  to  the  beliefs  about 
what  ought  and  ought  not  to  be  feared  he  means  that  the  Auxiliaries  will  be  trained  to 
have  the  right  cognitive  and  emotional  response.  In  other  words  Plato  may  expect  his 
Auxiliaries  not  only  to  have  the  correct  belief  about  what  should  be  feared  but  also 
experience  the  feeling  of  fear  of  what  should  be  feared.  Given  that  the  beliefs  of  the 
Auxiliaries  are  not  impervious  to  their  emotions  it  is  easy  to  assume  that  it  will  be 
necessary  for  the  emotions  to  be  in  agreement  with  their  beliefs.  The  alternative  to  this 
might  mean  that  the  Auxiliaries  would  in  fact  be  very  unreliable  characters  and  would 
frequently  be  influenced  by  fear  of  the  wrong  kind  of  thing  -  fear  of  physical  danger  and 
death.  The  interconnection  of  beliefs  and  emotions  seems  to  support  the  idea  that  the 
Auxiliaries  would  indeed  feel  the  appropriate  fear  that  will  both  support  and  rely  on  the 
correct  belief  that  the  immoral  action  is  the  most  dangerous. 
However,  Plato  has  said  how  he  will  deal  with  the  interconnection  of  beliefs  and 
emotions  when  it  comes  to  courage.  The  belief  and  emotional  state  that  he  clearly  thought 
were  paramount  for  a  courageous  person  are  the  belief  that  death  is  not  something  to  be 
afraid  of  and  the  state  of  not  actually  feeling  fearful  of  it.  These  are  the  responses  that 
Plato  thinks  it  is  particularly  important  to  work  on  in  his  Auxiliaries  and  Guardians.  He 
also  defines  courage  as  sticking  to  the  right  belief  of  what  should  be  feared  rather  than 
1  Rep.  442c2. 
137 describing  the  courageous  person  as  someone  who  feels  fear  of  the  right  thing  and  sticks 
to  that.  This  is  a  crucial  point  for  Plato's  theory  as  his  theory  would  be  a  lot  less  plausible 
if  it  included  the  idea  that  we  can  be  trained  to  feel  afraid  of  the  immoral  act.  The  idea 
that  we  can  be  trained  to  appreciate  the  value  of  a  piece  of  music  or  an  epic  poem  is  not  a 
controversial  claim;  those  who  have  been  brought  up  with  an  understanding  of  literature 
and  music  may  well  be  those  who  can  discern  the  difference  between  what  is  good  and 
bad  in  those  fields,  even  if  this  is  not  always  the  case.  This  may  even  be  true  of  the 
emotions  in  general  as  well  -  if  we  are  brought  up  surrounded  by  the  attitude  that  spiders 
are  cuddly,  friendly  insects  then  we  will  probably  not  develop  a  fear  of  them.  It  may  also 
be  the  case  that  we  can  be  trained  to  feel  no  fear  of  death.  If  we  are  brought  up  in  a 
culture  that  tells  you  that  the  after-life  is  a  pleasant  place  to  be  and  that  the  act  of  dying  is 
nothing  to  fear  then  the  lack  of  fear  of  death  would  be  understandable.  Even  if  we  allow 
Plato  these  points  it  is  difficult  to  support  the  idea  that  we  can  be  trained  to  actually  feel 
afraid  of  not  running  into  the  burning  building  to  save  the  child.  I  think  it  is  therefore  all 
the  more  likely  that  Plato  did  not  believe  that  the  auxiliaries  and  rulers  will  actually  feel 
afraid  of  the  immoral  action  but  they  will  believe  or  know  that  it  is  what  they  should  feel 
afraid  of  and  given  the  fear  of  death  has  been  eradicated  they  are  impelled  by  their  belief 
and  not  held  back  by  their  emotions. 
Plato's  theory  is  much  more  convincing  when  seen  in  this  light,  and  what's  more  the 
example  of  Socrates  supports  this  reading.  In  the  opening  pages  of  the  Phaedo,  Phaedo 
himself  begins  to  describe  to  Echecrates  the  scene  of  Socrates'  death.  He  says: 
I  had  no  feeling  of  pity,  for  the  man  appeared  happy  both  in  manner  and  words  as  he 
died  nobly  and  without  fear.  19 
Socrates  shows  that  he  has  the  right  emotional  response  to  the  prospect  of  dying  when  he 
says: 
19  Phaedo  58e1-3. 
138 I  should  be  wrong  not  to  resent  dying  if  I  did  not  believe  that  I  should  go  first  to  other 
wise  and  good  gods,  and  then  to  men  who  have  died  and  are  better  than  men  who  are 
here.  20 
Socrates  does  not  fear  death  and  so  he  make  his  mind  up  about  what  is  the  right  thing  to 
do  without  influence  from  his  emotions.  Without  the  impact  of  fear  on  his  decision 
process  he  is  able  to  make  his  decision  in  the  Crito  about  whether  he  should  stay  or  not 
based  only  on  the  relevant  arguments: 
The  only  valid  consideration..,  is  whether  we  should  be  acting  justly  in  giving  money 
and  gratitude  to  those  who  will  lead  me  out  of  here,  and  ourselves  helping  with  the 
escape,  or  whether  in  truth  we  shall  be  acting  unjustly  in  doing  all  this.  If  it  appears 
that  we  shall  be  acting  unjustly,  then  we  will  have  no  need  at  all  to  take  into  account 
whether  we  shall  have  to  die  if  we  stay  here  and  keep  quiet,  or suffer  in  another  way, 
rather  than  be  unjust.  21 
Socrates  is  surely  Plato's  ideal  model  of  courageous  behaviour  in  the  face  of  certain 
death.  He  behaves  rationally  and  unemotionally  -  he  feels  no  fear  of  death  or  fear  of 
running  away  -  he  simply  acts  on  the  basis  of  the  conclusions  of  rational  argument. 
20  Ibid.  63b5-8. 
21  Crito  48c7-d5. 
139 3.  How  Later  Education  affects  the  Emotions 
The  second  stage  of  education  is  much  more  thorough  and  concerned  with  producing  the 
ideally  virtuous  character.  Before  Plato  turns  to  a  description  of  this  process  of  higher 
learning  he  gives  his  interlocutors  a  general  description  of  the  Philosopher  Rulers: 
You  will  remember  that  we  said  that  they  must  love  their  country,  and  be  tested  both 
in  pleasure  and  pain,  to  ensure  that  their  loyalty  remained  unshaken  by  pain  or  fear  or 
any  other  vicissitude;  those  who  failed  the  test  were  to  be  rejected,  but  those  who 
emerged  unscathed,  like  gold  tried  in  the  fire,  were  to  be  established  as  rulers  and 
given  honours  and  rewards  both  in  life  and  after  death.  22 
Those  who  were  able  to  stick  to  their  beliefs  after  the  first  program  of  education  are  to  be 
allowed  to  continue  in  their  training  and  eventually  become  Rulers  if  they  are  successful. 
The  second  stage  of  education  is  aimed  at  producing  a  very  different  result  from  the  early 
schooling  in  literature  and  music;  the  rulers  are  to  learn  about  what  is  unchanging  -  the 
forms.  When  considering  what  men  should  `study  if  their  minds  are  to  be  drawn  from  the 
world  of  change  to  reality'23  Plato  dismisses  the  earlier  education  by  saying: 
That...  was  the  complement  of  their  physical  education.  It  gave  a  training  by 
habituation,  and  used  music  and  rhythm  to  produce  a  certain  harmony  and  balance  of 
character  and  not  knowledge;  and  its  literature,  whether  fictional  or  factual,  had 
similar  effects.  There  was  nothing  in  it  to  produce  the  effect  you  are  seeking.  24 
The  first  stage  of  education  is  designed  to  inculcate  the  right  beliefs  and  emotional 
response  in  the  Guardians  and  Auxiliaries  of  the  city.  This  latter  stage  is  designed  to 
enable  the  Rulers  to  appreciate  the  truth  of  the  beliefs  that  have  been  ingrained  in  them 
throughout  their  lives.  The  character  or  organisation  of  the  soul  that  they  will  achieve  will 
be  the  best  possible  dynamic  of  the  soul  that  is  possible  for  a  mortal  human  being.  The 
rulers  will  have  knowledge  which  will  mean  that  they  will  never  deviate  from  the  path  of 
virtue: 
22  Rep.  503a1-7. 
"  Rep.  521  d4-5. 
24  Rep.  522a5-10. 
140 Haven't  you  noticed  that  opinion  without  knowledge  is  always  a  poor  thing?  At  the 
best  it  is  blind  -  isn't  anyone  who  holds  a  true  opinion  without  understanding  like  a 
blind  man  on  the  right  road?  25 
The  knowledge  that  they  obtain  cannot  be  affected  by  emotion  or  desire,  which  makes  it 
superior  to  belief  in  terms  of  virtue.  Presumably  there  will  be  similarities  between  the 
emotional  life  of  the  Auxiliaries  and  the  Rulers,  even  if  the  emotions  are  without  the 
same  motivational  affect  that  they  can  have  on  the  actions  of  the  Auxiliaries.  The  Rulers 
as  well  as  the  Auxiliaries  are  expected  to  have  eradicated  the  fear  of  death  and  what 
might  face  them  in  the  after-life  -  they  did  after  all  experience  the  same  early  education. 
The  education  that  only  the  future  Rulers  will  undergo  will  produce  knowledge,  and  is 
the  essential  difference  between  the  Rulers  and  Auxiliaries.  As  I  have  argued  in  the 
previous  chapter,  knowledge  as  opposed  to  belief  is  impervious  to  interference  and  can  be 
relied  upon  always  to  ensure  virtuous  action. 
So  are  the  rulers  expected  to  be  completely  emotionless?  From  the  discussion  of  the 
family  structure  in  the  Republic  it  would  seem  as  if  the  rulers  will  still  be  expected  to 
have  the  right  feelings  as  well  as  knowledge.  Plato  believes  that  it  is  important  that  the 
citizens  of  his  Republic  will  experience  their  emotions  as  a  community  and  that  this  fact 
will  bind  them  together  closely  as  a  cohesive  unit.  He  says  that  the  structure  of  the 
society: 
will  prevent  the  dissension  that  starts  when  different  people  call  different  things  their 
own,  when  each  carts  off  to  his  own  private  house  anything  he  can  lay  hands  on  for 
himself,  and  when  each  has  his  own  wife  and  children,  his  own  private  joys  and 
sorrows;  for  our  citizens,  whose  interests  are  identical  and  whose  efforts  are  all 
directed  so  far  as  is  possible  towards  the  same  end,  feel  all  their  joys  and  sorrows 
together.  26 
25  Rep.  506c7-10. 
26  Rep.  464c6-d6. 
141 All  the  citizens  will  be  expected  to  feel  things  together,  which  would  support  the  idea  that 
that  the  Rulers  are  not  unemotional  rational  beings  who  have  in  some  way  cut  themselves 
off  from  the  lower  two  parts  of  the  soul  and  are  only  guided  by  Reason. 
The  ideal  courage  of  the  Rulers  is  thus  similar  to  the  courage  of  the  Auxiliaries  except  for 
the  fact  that  for  the  Rulers  it  is  based  on  knowledge  rather  than  belief  and  is  thus  more 
reliable.  Both  the  Auxiliaries  and  the  Rulers  will,  through  their  extensive  emotional 
training,  have  no  fear  of  dying  or  the  after-life,  and  will  be  able  to  correctly  identify 
which  course  of  action  is  most  damaging  to  them.  It  seems  likely  that  neither  class  will 
feel  afraid  of  the  option  they  identify  as  being  the  most  dangerous,  as  the  eradication  of 
the  fear  of  death  and  the  correct  belief  as  to  what  they  should  do  will  be  enough.  Plato 
could  quite  easily  have  phrased  his  definition  of  courage  in  a  different  way  that  would 
have  made  it  clear  that  the  fear  of  death  would  be  replaced  by  a  fear  of  doing  what  is 
immoral  but  he  did  not,  and  his  definition  states  that  courage  is  holding  on  to  the  correct 
belief  about  what  should  be  feared,  and  he  makes  no  mention  of  actually  feeling  this  fear. 
As  Plato  does  not  explicitly  state  his  position  on  this  matter  it  is  difficult  to  conclusively 
argue  for  one  particular  interpretation  of  his  theory  at  this  point.  It  is  perhaps  more  likely 
that  he  did  not  consider  this  part  of  the  theory  in  depth,  which  could  mean  that  he  did  not 
consider  whether  the  courageous  individual  would  feel  fear  of  the  immoral  action,  or  that 
he  believed  he  would  but  did  not  think  through  the  consequences  of  such  a  belief. 
142 4.  Conclusion 
The  first  and  second  stages  of  the  educational  process  in  the  Republic  are  designed  to 
create  virtuous  individuals.  The  first  stage  is  focussed  on  directing  and  altering  the 
emotions  so  that  the  top  two  classes  will  have  the  right  emotional  response  and  that  the 
correct  beliefs  are  inculcated.  The  second  stage  is  focussed  solely  on  the  intellectual 
development  of  the  Rulers  and  will  be  their  journey  to  the  acquisition  of  knowledge.  This 
knowledge  will  ensure  that  they  will  behave  virtuously,  unlike  the  beliefs  of  the 
auxiliaries  which  will  not  always  ensure  right  action27.  So  both  groups  should  feel  no  fear 
of  death  after  this  first  stage  and  will  be  able  to  identify  which  action  is  the  moral  one  and 
therefore  which  action  is  potentially  the  most  damaging.  As  I  have  said,  it  is  likely  that 
both  groups  will  also  not  be  required  to  actually  feel  afraid  of  the  option  that  they  have 
identified  as  the  most  potentially  damaging,  but  they  will  be  expected  to  make  the  logical 
connection  that  as  it  is  the  most  potentially  damaging  it  is  what  should  be  feared.  Thus 
Plato  may  not  have  had  the  unrealistic  expectation'  that  after  the  right  training  we  will  feel 
afraid  of  not  going  in  the  burning  building  to  save  the  child  but  that  by  correctly 
identifying  this  course  of  action  as  what  should  be  feared  we  are  half  way  to  being 
courageous  -  if  it  is  coupled  with  the  lack  of  fear  of  death  then  we  are  all  the  way  there. 
It  could  perhaps  be  argued  that  when  Plato  says  that  courage  is  partially  the  correct  belief 
about  what  should  be  feared,  he  would  surely  expect  his  Rulers  to  actually  feel  this  fear 
as  they  are  the  personification  of  perfect  virtue,  and  that  their  emotions  would  surely 
always  be  in  agreement  with  their  knowledge  in  every  case.  If  this  were  true  it  would 
create  a  significant  problem  for  Plato  as  it  would  seem  strange  to  say  that  actually  feeling 
afraid  of  running  away  from  battle  is  a  requirement  of  courage.  It  may  be  possible  that 
some  people  could  actually  feel  afraid  of  doing  what  is  immoral  but  is  it  a  reasonable 
requirement?  However,  even  though  the  Rulers  will  have  ideal  virtue  based  on 
knowledge  and  would  know  that  in  the  appropriate  situation  they  should  feel  this  fear 
they  will  not  ever  find  themselves  in  this  situation  due  to  the  state  of  their  soul.  Fear  is  an 
27  See  Meno  97-8,  and  Rep.  412e-413c. 
143 emotion  that  arises  in  us  when  we  feel  that  the  dreaded  thing  is  a  possibility.  I  do  not  fear 
a  tiger  charging  into  the  room  where  I  am  working  because  I  do  not  consider  it  to  be  a 
possibility.  If  I  were  wandering  alone  around  a  tiger  populated  area  of  India  on  the  other 
hand,  my  fear  would  very  likely  be  rather  pronounced.  Likewise  for  the  Rulers,  they  will 
not  feel  fearful  of  what  should  be  feared  because  the  state  of  their  souls  means  that  such 
action  is  not  a  possibility,  therefore  they  will  never  actually  experience  such  fear. 
However,  if  this  is  the  explanation  of  why  the  Philosopher  Rulers  do  not  necessarily  feel 
fearful  of  the  immoral  action,  it  does  not  include  the  Auxiliaries  as  they  might  on 
occasion  do  what  is  immoral. 
A  close  analysis  of  Plato's  detailed  discussion  of  education  in  Book  II  shows  that  a 
cognitivist  theory  of  the  emotions  is  not  a  plausible  interpretation  of  Plato's  theory  in  the 
Republic.  When  Plato  refers  to  fear  he  is  not  simply  referring  to  the  belief  that  something 
is  dangerous  to  us  but  he  is  referring  to  an  actual  feeling.  The  courageous  person  is  then 
perhaps  fearless  in  Plato's  eyes,  given  that  we  do  not  fear  death  or  physical  harm  and  we 
do  not  actually  fear  what  we  should  fear.  It  may  be  the  case  that  there  are  many  examples 
of  people  who  act  in  a  way  we  would  consider  courageous  but  who  openly  admit  to  being 
terrified  of  death.  This  does  not  act  as  evidence  against  Plato's  theory  of  courage  as  he 
does  not  include  the  lack  of  fear  of  death  in  his  definition  of  courage,  but  it  is  used  to 
explain  in  what  way  you  can  train  people  to  be  courageous.  It  is  surely  the  case  that  those 
who  do  not  fear  death  will  be  all  the  more  likely  to  risk  their  lives  in  a  courageous  deed  if 
they  also  have  the  right  beliefs.  Plato's  theory  then  is  still  in  a  sense  the  overcoming  of 
fear  -a  common  interpretation  of  courage  -  it  is  just  that  the  overcoming  happens 
separately  from  the  act  of  courage.  The  Auxiliaries  are  trained  to  overcome  their  fear  of 
death  and  physical  harm  before  they  even  come  face  to  face  with  a  situation  that  requires 
courage.  The  consequence  of  this  theory  is  the  idea  that  those  who  feel  afraid  of  death  or 
pain  at  the  moment  when  they  are  put  in  a  situation  where  they  can  potentially  show 
courage  will  not  count  as  courageous  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word  (I  am  sure  that  many 
courageous  people  would  freely  admit  to  having  such  feelings  of  fear).  This  is  surely  not 
the  case  and  it  is  a  problem  for  Plato's  theory. 
144 Chapter  7:  Courage  in  the  Laws 
Contents 
1.  Introduction  (p.  146) 
2.  The  Artisan  Class  (p.  148) 
3.  Virtue  in  the  Laws  (p.  163) 
4.  Courage  and  the  Soul  (p.  167) 
5.  The  Dependency  Thesis  (p.  178) 
6.  Courage  Continued  (p.  192) 
7.  Conclusion  (p.  195) 
145 1.  Introduction 
To  briefly  summarize  what  I  have  argued  in  previous  sections:  In  the  early  dialogues 
Plato  is interested  in  the  idea  that  courage  is  knowledge  of  the  right  thing  to  do,  but  thinks 
that  it  is  insufficient.  In  the  Republic  he  includes  the  idea  suggested  by  Laches  (in  the 
Laches)  that  another  element,  such  as  some  kind  of  endurance,  plays  a  part.  As  I  have 
argued  earlier,  the  Socratic  position  that  virtue  is  knowledge  seems  to  include  the  idea 
that  our  feelings  will  be  in  agreement  with  our  knowledge  of  what  is  best  -  so  the 
courageous  person  will  feel  afraid  of  the  morally  worse  action.  This  suggestion  in  the 
early  dialogues  that  our  emotions  will  be  in  agreement  with  what  we  know  is  not  very 
convincing  -  there  is  no  argument  why  we  feel  fear  of  running  away  from  battle.  In  the 
Republic  Plato  comes  up  with  a  psychological  explanation  of  how  we  are  to  train 
ourselves  (our  emotions)  in  order  to  have  a  well-ordered  soul  that  will  ensure  that  our 
emotions  and  beliefs  agree  -  but  is  no  longer  committed  to  a  cognitive  interpretation  of 
the  emotions.  Although  this  does  provide  a  better  explanation  of  how  our  emotions  could 
be  in  agreement  with  our  reason  I  do  not  think  it  is  a  convincing  theory. 
The  question  of  to  what  extent  Plato  changed  his  mind  between  writing  the  Republic  and 
the  Laws  has  recently  attracted  much  attention.  There  are  three  general  theories  regarding 
this  question  -  the  Consistency  Theory,  the  Weak  Consistency  Theory  and  the 
Inconsistency  theory.  Supporters  of  the  Consistency  Theory,  which  can  also  go  under  the 
name  of  the  Unitarian  position,  believe  that  there  is  no  inconsistency  between  the 
Republic  and  the  Laws,  and  that  Plato  did  not  change  his  mind  about  any  of  the  issues 
discussed  in  the  period  between  them.  We  find  evidence  of  this  position  in  Cicero,  who 
claimed  that  the  Laws  described  the  laws  of  the  Republic'.  This  position  also  has  support 
from  modern  day  readers  of  Plato  such  as  Glenn  Morrow,  who  believes  that  the  Laws  fills 
in  the  blanks  left  in  the  Republic  about  the  legal  workings  of  the  city-state.  He  claims  that 
`the  Laws...  does  not  involve  a  break  with  the  earlier  dialogues,  but  rather  a  development 
1  Cicero,  De  Legibus  2.6.14. 
146 of  what  they  imply'2.  The  Inconsistency  Theory  takes  the  opposite  position  and  claims 
that  Plato  developed  his  theories  and  changed  his  mind  in  the  time  between  writing  the 
Republic  and  the  Laws.  This  position  is  well  supported  by  Gregory  Vlastos:  `We  see 
Plato  rehabilitating  in  the  Laws  many  of  the  democratic  rights  he  had  wiped  out  in  the 
Republic.  Though  he  does  not  discuss  the  earlier  theory,  does  not  allude  to  it  in  any  way, 
we  can  be  certain  he  has  abandoned  it'3.  The  Weak  Consistency  Theory  falls  somewhere 
in  between  these  two  positions  and  proponents  of  this  theory  can  differ  as  to  what  extent 
they  think  the  two  pieces  are  consistent.  I  will  argue  for  a  version  of  the  Weak 
Consistency  Theory  in  this  chapter;  a  version  which  sees  Plato  changing  his  mind  about 
certain  aspects  of  the  Republic,  but  that  keeps  the  ideals  he  had  from  the  earlier  dialogue 
intact. 
Before  I  go  on  to  discuss  the  relevance  of  Plato's  view  of  courage  in  the  Republic  and  the 
Laws  to  the  issue  of  the  continuity  of  his  thought,  I  would  like  to  look  at  a  few  of  the  key 
areas  that  have  been  addressed  by  those  discussing  this  question.  I  hope  that  a  more 
general  discussion  of  whether  Plato  changed  his  mind  will  help  us  to  understand  his  view 
on  the  virtues  in  the  Laws,  and  help  to  explain  the  apparent  differences  in  his  comments 
on  courage. 
2  Morrow,  G.,  Plato's  Cretan  City:  a  historical  interpretation  of  the  Laws,  p.  577. 
3  Vlastos,  G.,  `The  Theory  of  Social  Justice,  in  the  Polis  in  Plato's  Republic',  pp.  36-37. 
147 2.  The  Artisan  Class 
I  would  firstly  like  to  raise  an  issue  which  has  been  surprisingly  ignored  by  most 
commentators  on  this  issue.  When  discussing  the  issue  of  continuity  most  of  the  attention 
given  has  been  focused  on  the  question  of  the  Philosopher  Kings.  Whether  Plato  has 
rejected  the  rule  of  philosophy  in  the  Laws  has  attracted  much  debate.  This  is  a  question 
that  I  will  discuss  below,  but  I  think  that  there  is  a  more  striking  difference  between  the 
Republic  and  the  Laws  that  I  will  discuss  first  -  the  disappearance  of  the  production  class 
from  the  citizenry  of  the  state.  Plato  claims  that: 
After  these  remarks,  our  law  on  the  subject  should  run  like  this,  with  Heaven's 
blessing:  God  is  now  re-establishing  and  re-founding  Magnesia,  and  no  inhabitants 
who  holds  one  of  the  5,040  hearths  must  ever,  willingly  or  otherwise,  become  a 
retailer  or  a  wholesaler,  or  perform  any  service  whatever  for  private  individuals  who 
are  not  his  equals  in  status,  with  the  exception  of  those  services  that  a  free  man  will 
naturally  render  to  his  father  and  mother  and  remoter  ancestors,  and  to  all  free  persons 
older  than  himself.  4 
Apart  from  farming,  the  citizens  of  Magnesia  are  not  allowed  to  do  any  of  the  jobs 
previously  attributed  to  the  Production  class  of  the  Republic5.  These  jobs  will  now  be 
taken  over  by  slaves  and  foreigners.  The  focus  of  the  Laws  is  then  on  the  two  remaining 
classes  of  the  Republic  -  the  Guardians  proper  and  the  Auxiliaries.  This  expulsion  of  the 
majority  of  the  lowest  class  from  full  citizenship  in  the  Laws  is  I  think  the  most 
significant  change  from  the  Republic  to  the  Laws,  and  cannot  be  explained  away  by 
saying  that  in  the  Laws  the  artisans  of  the  Republic  would  just  have  had  different  jobs. 
The  fact  is,  if  we  examine  the  state  in  the  Republic,  in  the  light  of  the  framework  of  the 
Laws,  over  a  third  of  the  population  would  no  longer  be  citizens  -a  change  in  status  that 
could  not  be  underestimated  in  the  ancient  Greek  world. 
4  Laws  919d2-e2. 
s  As  farming  was  one  of  the  most  important  occupations  previously  done  by  the  productive  class  of  the 
Republic,  its  continued  relevance  to  the  citizens  in  The  Laws  might  give  the  impression  that  a  significant 
function  of  the  lowest  class  was  retained.  However,  the  citizens  of  Magnesia  will  be  farm  managers  and 
will  not  be  heavily  involved  with  the  day  to  day  work  as  that  would  not  leave  them  sufficient  time  for  their 
political  duties. 
148 Why  did  Plato  take  the  significant  step  of  denying  citizenship  to  the  artisans  of  the 
Republic?  By  asking  such  a  question  I  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  I  consider  the  Laws  to 
be  a  revision  of  the  Republic,  a  claim  that  would  put  me  firmly  in  the  Inconsistency 
Theory  camp,  because  I  certainly  do  not.  However,  I  believe  that  the  differences  between 
the  two  dialogues  can  help  us  to  understand  each  of  them  separately,  and  appreciate  the 
importance  of  certain  elements  within  the  framework  of  each  individual  state.  The 
evidence  often  given  against  the  belief  that  the  Laws  is  a  revised  version  of  Plato's  ideal 
city  is  the  fact  that  he  appears  to  list  his  states  in  order  of  perfection,  and  is  worth  quoting 
in  full: 
Reflection  and  experience  will  soon  show  that  the  organization  of  a  state  is  almost 
bound  to  fall  short  of  the  ideal.  You  may,  perhaps  -  if  you  don't  know  what  it  means 
to  be  a  legislator  without  dictatorial  powers  -  refuse  to  countenance  such  a  state; 
nevertheless  the  right  procedure  is  to  describe  not  only  the  ideal  society  but  the  second 
and  the  third  best  too...  So  let's  follow  this  procedure  now:  let's  describe  the 
absolutely  ideal  society,  then  the  second  best,  then  the  third.  6 
The  description  of  the  ideal  state  soon  follows: 
You'll  find  the  ideal  society  and  state,  and  the  best  code  of  laws,  where  the  old  saying 
`friends'  property  is  genuinely  shared'  is  put  into  practice  as  widely  as  possible 
throughout  the  entire  state.  Now  I  don't  know  whether  in  fact  this  situation  -a 
community  of  wives,  children  and  all  property  -  exists  anywhere  today,  or  will  ever 
exist,  but  at  any  rate  in  such  a  state  the  notion  of  `private  property'  will  have  been  by 
hook  or  by  crook  completely  eliminated  from  life...  It  may  be  that  gods  or  a  number  of 
the  children  of  gods  inhabit  this  kind  of  state:  if  so,  the  life  they  live  there,  observing 
these  rules,  is  a  happy  one  indeed.  And  so  men  need  look  no  further  for  their  ideal: 
they  should  keep  this  state  in  view  and  try  to  find  the  one  that  most  nearly  resembles 
it., 
The  ideal  society  described  in  the  second  passage  is  commonly  assumed  to  be  the  society 
of  the  Republic,  the  society  of  the  Laws  the  `second  best'.  If  the  Laws  are  describing 
Plato's  second  best  society,  second  to  the  Republic,  then  there  would  be  no  reason  to 
think  that  Plato  has  changed  his  mind  about  the  organization  of  the  state  in  the  Republic  - 
6  Laws  739a3-b4. 
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149 he  would  just  be  offering  an  inferior  alternative  in  the  Laws.  I  think  it  is  a  fair  assumption 
that  Plato  is  referring  to  the  city  as  described  in  the  Laws  as  the  second  best  society.  After 
the  brief  description  of  the  best  ideal  society  the  discussion  of  the  second  best  is  clearly 
part  of  the  main  body  of  the  text  describing  Magnesia.  However,  whether  the  first  society 
is  referring  to  the  society  of  the  Republic  is  more  questionable. 
Andre  Laks  bases  his  theory  of  the  continuity  of  the  Platonic  corpus  on  his  reading  of 
these  passages.  He  believes  that  the  `ideal  society'  is  a  reference  to  the  Republic  and  that 
the  two  societies  from  the  Republic  and  the  Laws  are  both  possible  and  consistent  in  that 
the  Republic  is  a  discussion  of  a  city  of  gods  or  a  number  of  the  children  of  gods,  and  that 
the  Laws  describes  the  ideal  city  of  meng.  Although  Laks'  discussion  of  the  idea  of  what 
Plato  means  by  `possibility'  is  interesting  and  enlightening,  I  think  Laks'  main  thesis 
suffers  from  a  misreading  of  this  passage  of  the  Laws.  As  much  as  there  are  similarities 
between  the  Republic  and  the  ideal  state  described  in  the  Laws,  it  is  clearly  not  the  same. 
It  is  not  the  same  because  of  the  omission  discussed  above  -  the  ideal  society  mentioned 
in  the  Laws,  as  well  as  the  Laws  itself,  ignores  the  artisan  class. 
In  the  above  passage  in  the  Laws  Plato  undeniably  refers  to  elements  from  the  Republic; 
the  idea  of  having  `a  community  of  wives'  and  `children'  has  echoes  of  the  organization 
of  coupling  and  child  rearing  from  the  earlier  dialogue.  It  could  be  argued  that  the 
elimination  of  the  existence  of  private  property  was  one  that  occurred  in  the  Republic 
only  in  relation  to  the  ruling  and  military  classes,  and  not  the  artisan  class.  If  this  were  the 
case  then  it  would  show  that  the  description  of  the  ideal  state  in  the  Laws  was  not  a 
reference  to  the  Republic  as  it  was  but  to  some  new  conception  where  all  citizens  held 
things  in  common.  However,  the  idea  that  only  the  Rulers  and  Auxiliaries  were  intended 
to  live  communistically  was  questioned  by  Aristotle: 
8  Laks,  A.,  `Legislation  and  Derniurgy:  On  the  Relationship  Between  Plato's  Republic  and  Laws'. 
150 But  what  of  the  arrangements  of  the  constitution  as  a  whole,  and  how  do  they  affect 
participant  members?  In  the  absence  of  any  positive  statement  by  Socrates  it  is  very 
hard  to  say.  Certainly  the  bulk  of  the  other  citizens  will  make  up  almost  the  entire 
population  of  the  state;  but  no  decision  was  taken  as  to  whether  the  fanning  class  are 
to  have  communal  or  individual  private  possession,  whether  of  property  or of  wives 
and  children.  9 
If  it  were  the  case  that  Plato  was  undecided  about  whether  the  Artisan  class  was  to  share 
in  the  communistic  life-style,  he  could  very  well  have  been  referring  to  the  Republic  in 
his  description  of  the  ideal  state  in  the  Laws.  Mayhew  argues  that  Aristotle  is  right  in  his 
assessment  of  Plato  as  being  unclear  about  the  details  of  the  lowest  class: 
A  consideration  of  some  key  passages  from  the  Republic  shows  that  the  question  of 
how  the  lower  class  is  to  live  (and  particularly,  whether  the  lower  class  is  to  live 
communistically)  has  not  been  fully  or  clearly  answered  by  Plato's  Socrates  and  that 
Aristotle  is  therefore  justified  in  thinking  it  unresolved.  10 
Mayhew's  argument  for  Plato  believing  that  children  should  be  held  in  common  is  the 
,  which  is  supposed  to  most  persuasive.  After  Plato  introduces  the  Myth  of  the  Metals  ý 
provide  a  metaphysical  religious  justification  for  the  separation  of  people  into  classes,  he 
says: 
If  any  child  of  a  Guardian  is  a  poor  specimen,  it  must  be  degraded  to  the  other  classes, 
while  any  child  in  the  other  classes  who  is  worth  it  must  be  promoted  to  the  rank  of 
Guardian.  12 
For  Plato's  system  to  work,  the  Guardians  need  to  be  able  to  assess  all  the  children  of  the 
state  in  order  to  decide  which  class  they  should  be  in.  This  suggests  that  all  children  will 
be,  initially,  educated  together  away  from  their  biological  parents.  I  do  not  think  Plato's 
system  of  education  and  fluidity  between  classes  can  be  accomplished  without  children 
being  held  in  common  in  all  classes. 
9  Aristotle,  Politics  1264a1  I. 
10  Mayhew,  R., Aristotle's  criticism  of  Plato's  Republic.  For  others  who  hold  this  position  see  Mayhew 
129. 
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151 A  good  case  can  be  made  for  women  being  held  in  common  within  their  class  in  the 
Republic.  Plato  begins  his  discussion  of  women  and  the  structure  of  the  family  by  arguing 
that  although  women  will  on  the  whole  be  less  capable  than  men,  they  will  also  be  suited 
to  all  professions13.  It  is  on  the  basis  of  this  idea  that  Plato  then  concludes  that  the  family 
must  be  abolished.  If  women  are  to  fulfil  their  role  as  Guardians,  Auxiliaries  or  Artisans 
they  must  be  committed  to  that  profession,  and  cannot  therefore  be  responsible  for  the 
running  of  a  house.  Although  Plato  discusses  the  dissolution  of  the  family  in  relation  to 
the  Guardians  and  Auxiliaries  only,  this  may  be  because  his  primary  interest  is  with  those 
two  groups,  as  if  it  will  follow  for  them  that  women  having  the  same  jobs  as  men  means  a 
rejection  of  the  traditional  family  structure,  why  would  it  not  for  the  Artisans?  Plato  gives 
no  reason  why  the  same  argument  would  not  be  used  for  the  women  of  the  lowest  class, 
and  so  I  think  it  is  more  befitting  for  Plato's  utopia  to  support  the  idea  of  both  women  and 
children  being  held  in  common. 
However,  there  is  a  good  case  for  the  claim  that  Plato  does  not  support  the  idea  of 
property  being  held  in  common  by  all  classes  in  the  Republic.  This  is  not  just  because  he 
makes  claims  in  the  Republic  that  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  Artisans  not  having 
private  ownership,  but  because  it  would  contradict  the  justification  for  the  separation  into 
classes  in  the  first  place.  Mayhew  admits  that  there  are  passages  in  the  Republic  that 
make  it  difficult  for  him  to  support  the  Aristotelian  idea  that  Plato  is  undecided  about  the 
communism  of  property.  For  example  when  Plato  is  discussing  the  Guardians  (which  I 
assume  here  included  the  Auxiliaries  as  well)  he  says: 
They  must  be  told  that  they  have  no  need  of  mortal  and  material  gold  and  silver, 
because  they  have  in  their  hearts  the  heavenly  gold  and  silver  given  them  by  the  gods 
as  a  permanent  possession,  and  it  would  be  wicked  to  pollute  the  heavenly  gold  in 
their  possession  by  mixing  it  with  earthly,  for  theirs  is  without  impurity,  while  that  in 
currency  among  men  is  a  common  source  of  wickedness.  They  alone,  therefore,  of  all 
the  citizens  are  forbidden  to  touch  or  handle  silver  or  gold  ...  If  they  acquire  private 
13  Rep.  455c-e. 
152 property  in  land,  houses,  or  money,  they  will  become  farmers  and  men  of  business 
instead  of  Guardians.  14 
If  `they  alone..  .  are  forbidden  to  touch  or  handle  silver  and  gold'  then  others  in  the 
community  must  be  allowed  to;  in  other  words,  the  Artisans  are  allowed  silver  and  gold. 
The  final  statement  of  this  passage  is  also  particularly  relevant.  If  the  Guardians  were  to 
be  allowed  private  ownership,  then  they  would  not  be  Guardians,  but  farmers  or  men  of 
business.  The  lower  class  is  characterized  by  their  desires,  most  of  which  I  will  argue 
cannot  be  fulfilled  and  will  ultimately  be  the  downfall  of  the  analogy  and  of  the  Artisan 
class  itself,  but  some  will  necessarily  be  fulfilled,  as  this  is  one  of  the  ways  the  Artisans 
are  differentiated  from  the  other  classes. 
The  evidence  suggests  that  Plato  was  in  support  of  women  and  children  being  held  in 
common  for  all  classes,  but  that  some  restricted  form  of  private  ownership  was  allowed 
to  the  Artisans'5.  However  how  is  Plato  to  hold  these  two  positions?  If  people  are  not  to 
live  in  family  units  are  they  to  live  in  communal  housing  as  the  others  classes  do.  If  this 
is  the  case  then  what  use  is  private  ownership  to  them?  Perhaps  they  will  be  allowed 
certain  luxuries  that  gold  and  silver  can  buy  them  over  and  above  their  living  situations. 
If  this  is  what  Plato  intended  then  we  have  to  question  the  equality  of  the  advantages 
bestowed  on  the  Artisan  class.  Plato  claims  that  he  is  not  interested  in  only  making  one 
class  happy,  but  is  concerned  with  the  whole  state  -  if  that  is  the  case  then  he  appears  to 
have  balanced  it  somewhat  in  favour  of  the  Guardians  and  Auxiliaries.  Perhaps  Plato  did 
not  think  through  the  consequences  of  the  arguments  given  for  communism  of  wives  and 
children  in  the  higher  classes,  and  did  not  mean  that  communism  of  property  should  be 
applied  throughout  his  state.  If  it  were  the  case  that  the  Artisans  could  retain  control  over 
their  private  lives  as  well  as  private  property  then  at  least  the  Artisans  would  have  some 
significant  advantages  in  comparison  with  the  other  classes  which  would  make  their 
acceptance  of  such  of  system  more  understandable.  In  this  case  Plato  is  guilty  at  the  very 
4  Rep.  416e4-417b  1. 
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153 least  of  not  making  his  position  clear  and  not  being  aware  that  the  position  he  took  on 
communism  in  the  higher  classes  -  such  as  the  argument  given  for  having  women  in 
common  -  would  have  an  impact  on  the  lives  of  the  lowest  class.  Alternatively,  if  he  did 
believe  in  communism  throughout  the  state,  then  this  compounds  a  more  fundamental 
problem  that  already  exists  in  the  Republic  that  I  will  discuss  below  -  that  the 
characteristics  of  the  artisan  class  provided  by  the  analogy  of  soul  to  state  are  not  fully 
taken  into  account,  which  undermines  the  assertion  that  all  the  citizens  in  the  Republic 
will  be  content.  I  think  that  there  is  enough  evidence  to  conclude  that  Plato  still  intended 
the  Artisans  to  have  access  to  money,  even  if  it  is  not  possible  to  draw  a  similar 
conclusion  concerning  women  and  children.  Therefore  Aristotle  may  have  been  right 
about  Plato  not  making  his  position  clear  about  wives  and  children,  but  his  point  was  not 
right  when  applied  to  property.  This  is  because  Plato  describes  his  best  state  in  the  Laws 
as  one  where  there  would  be  a  `community  of  wives,  children  and  all  property',  which  in 
fact  cannot  happen  in  the  Republic.  Thus  there  is  enough  evidence  for  the  idea  that  the 
Republic  does  not  fulfill  the  criteria  for  the  first  society  briefly  described  in  the  Laws. 
Due  to  this  important  difference  (that  communism  is  not  widespread  in  the  Republic  but 
is  said  to  be  in  the  ideal  state  in  the  Laws)  we  cannot  safely  attribute  this  description  of  an 
ideal  state  to  the  state  of  the  Republic.  However,  that  this  is  not  a  clear  reference  to  the 
Republic  is  interesting.  The  fact  that  Plato  creates  such  a  list,  which  places  the  political 
organization  of  the  Laws  in  second  place,  second  place  to  one  very similar  to  the  one  of 
the  Republic,  does  show  that  the  Laws  is  not  an  adaptation  of  the  society  of  the  Republic. 
The  description  of  the  ideal  society  in  the  Laws  does,  on  the  other  hand,  show  that  Plato 
has  changed  his  mind  about  what  would  be  part  of  his  ideal  society.  To  return  to  the 
question  of  the  removal  of  the  Artisans  from  the  citizenry  of  the  Laws,  it  may  be  the  case 
that  Plato  describes  his  ideal  state  in  the  Laws  as  one  where  all  things  would  be  held  in 
common  because  he  is  only  referring  to  the  upper  two  classes  that  this  would  have  been 
relevant  to.  Therefore  Plato  may  have  been  committed  to  the  idea  that  the  working  class 
did  not  deserve  to  be  citizens  both  in  the  Laws  and  in  his  brief  new  formulation  of  his 
ideal  state.  Plato  is  at  no  point  explicit  as  to  why  such  a  large  part  of  the  population  from 
154 the  Republic  is  shut  out  of  the  Laws,  so  we  can  at  best  hypothesise  about  what  would 
encourage  him  to  make  such  a  move.  To  do  this  we  need  to  look  back  at  the  Republic  and 
consider  what  there  is  about  that  dialogue  that  would  have  motivated  him  to  take  such  a 
step. 
The  state  of  the  Republic  is  made  up  of  three  separate  parts  -  the  Rulers,  Auxiliaries  and 
the  Artisans.  Each  of  these  classes  have  their  own  motivations,  according  to  which  part  of 
the  soul  they  are  associated  with,  and  their  own  rewards  from  the  organization  of  the  city. 
The  Rulers  have  the  philosophical,  or  intellectual,  fulfillment  of  doing  the  good  thing  and 
do  not  need  to  concern  themselves  with  issues  of  protecting  the  city  or  providing  basic 
human  necessities  such  as  food  and  clothing;  the  Auxiliaries  receive  the  reward  of  honour 
that  the  thumos  longs  for  and  do  not  need  to  bother  with  either  intellectual  pursuits  that 
they  are  not  suited  to,  or  the  mercantile  business  of  the  Artisan  class;  and  the  Artisans  are 
allowed  the  physical  rewards  of  ownership  and  also  the  safety  of  being  protected  by  the 
other  two  classes,  and  do  not  need  to  bother  with  the  jobs  specific  to  the  two  other 
classes.  Justice  in  the  state  is  when  each  of  these  groups  is  doing  what  is  expected  of 
them  because  of  their  class. 
The  three  pieces  fit  together  and  rely  on  each  other  for  the  benefits  they  get  from  the 
organization  of  the  city.  If  any  one  class  from  this  state  were  to  be  removed  for  any 
reason  the  other  two  classes  could  not  continue  as  they  were;  they  rely  on  each  other  for 
the  benefits  they  get  from  the  arrangement.  However,  how  is  this  state  ever  to  come 
about?  At  the  beginning  of  Book  VII  of  the  Republic  Adeimantus  challenges  Socrates  to 
show  the  practicality  of  his  state: 
But  it  seems  to  me,  Socrates,  that  if  we  let  you  go  on  like  this  you  will  forget  that  you 
still  have  to  show  that  the  state  we  have  described  is  a  practical  possibility,  and  if  so 
how.  16 
16  Rep.  471  c3-5. 
155 Socrates  appears  to  change  his  mind  on  the  issue  of  how  possible  the  ideal  state  from  the 
Republic  is.  At  502,  Socrates  also  says:  `The  conclusion  seems  to  be  that  our  proposed 
legislation,  if  put  into  effect,  would  be  the  ideal,  and  that  to  put  it  into  effect,  though 
difficult,  would  not  be  impossible'  17.  However,  in  his  response  to  Adeimantus'  challenge 
he  responds  that  the  important  thing  is  getting  as  close  as  we  can  to  the  ideal,  as  if  the 
ideal  itself  were  not  possible.  And  at  the  end  of  Book  IX  Socrates'  interlocutor  says  the 
philosopher  will  enter  politics  `in  the  society  which  we  have  been  describing  and  which 
we  have  theoretically  founded;  but  I  doubt  that  it  will  ever  exist  on  earth',  to  which 
Socrates  replies:  `perhaps...  it  is  laid  up  as  a  pattern  in  heaven,  where  he  who  wishes  can 
see  it  and  found  it  in  his  own  heart.  But  it  doesn't  matter  whether  it  exists  or  ever  will 
exist'  18.  It  may  be  that  Plato's  view  of  the  possibility  of  his  ideal  state  evolved  during  the 
process  of  writing  the  Republic. 
Before  analyzing  this  issue  it  is  important  to  consider  what  Plato  could  mean  by 
`possible'  when  he  considers  whether  the  ideal  state  is  indeed  possible.  There  are  two 
ways  in  which  the  term  `possible'  can  be  understood  in  Plato,  and  much  hinges  on  an 
awareness  of  the  different  ways  in  which  Plato  could  be  using  this  term.  In  one  sense 
Plato  is  using  the  term  possible  to  mean  could  possibly  happen,  or  capable  of  existing  or 
happening.  This  is  similar  to  the  philosophical  sense  of  logical  possibility  which  we 
distinguish  from  other  modal  terms  such  as  necessary  and  contingent.  However,  it  is 
different  in  the  sense  that  Plato  is  not  appealing  to  all  things  possible  in  this  strong  sense. 
When  he  says  that  his  state  is  possible  he  means  possible  for  us,  as  we  are,  not  that  we 
could  have  developed  in  such  a  way  that  the  state  of  the  Republic  would  have  been 
possible  for  us.  I  will  refer  to  this  strong  use  of  the  word  as  literal  possibility.  The 
alternative  reading  of  the  word  possible  is  one  which  is  also  commonly  used,  which 
refers  to  things  that  are  in  some  way  likely  or  possible  given  the  actual  situation;  in  other 
words,  it  is  possible  given  the  world  as  it  is.  I  will  refer  to  this  use  of  the  term  as  common 
possibility.  To  give  an  example  to  clarify  the  difference  ways  in  which  Plato  could  be 
'7  Rep.  502c8-10. 
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156 using  the  term  possible,  imagine  the  following  situation.  When  discussing  who  will  be 
elected  Prime  Minister  in  the  next  general  election  someone  says  to  you  that  `it  is 
possible  that  David  Beckham  will  be  Prime  Minister',  and  someone  else  says  `it  is 
impossible  that  David  Beckham  will  ever  be  Prime  Minister'.  The  two  people  who  had 
made  these  claims  may  not  actually  be  disagreeing  with  one  another,  and  the  reason  they 
may  not  disagreeing  is  essentially  what  I  am  appealing  to  in  my  above  distinction.  It  is  of 
course  possible  that  David  Beckham  will  be  Prime  Minister  -  if  he  won  enough  votes  in 
an  election  then  he  would  be  elected  to  office.  However,  given  what  we  know  about 
David  Beckham  it  is  so  highly  unlikely  that  he  would  be  elected  most  people  would  be 
inclined  to  contradict  the  former  of  the  two  statements  -  that  it  is  possible  that  David 
Beckham  will  be  Prime  Minister.  I  think  Plato  uses  this  word  in  both  these  senses  when 
he  is  discussing  the  possibility  of  the  state  of  the  Republic.  It  can  therefore  appear  that  he 
says  at  different  times  that  his  ideal  state  is  both  literally  possible  and  literally 
impossible,  which  creates  the  confusion,  even  though  what  he  means  is  that  his  state  is 
literally  possible,  but  needs  the  preconditions  that  are  so  unlikely  that  it  is  commonly 
impossible.  So  when  Plato  says  that  he  doubts  `it  will  ever  exist  on  earth'  he  referring  to 
the  fact  that  his  ideal  state  is  very  unlikely,  and  therefore  practically  commonly 
impossible.  However,  when  he  claims  that  it  is  not  impossible  for  his  state  to  come  about 
he  means  that  it  is  literally  possible.  If  read  in  this  way  Plato  is  neither  contradicting 
himself,  nor  wavering19,  but  is  simply  making  two  separate  claims. 
Unfortunately,  Plato  adds  a  further  complication  to  the  way  the  word  `possible'  can  be 
used.  He  appears  to  have  a  looser  conception  of  literal  possibility  than  we  would 
commonly  have.  He  asks  Adeimantus: 
Does  practice  ever  square  with  theory?  Is  it  not  in  the  nature  of  things  that,  whatever 
people  think,  practice  should  be  less  close  to  truth  than  theory  ... 
Then  don't  insist  on 
my  showing  that  every  detail  of  our  description  can  be  realized  in  practice,  but  grant 
that  we  shall  have  met  your  demand  that  its  realization  should  be  possible  if  we  are 
able  to  find  the  conditions  under  which  a  state  can  most  closely  approximate  to  it.  20 
19  As  Julia  Annas  claims  he  is  in  An  Introduction  to  Plato's  Republic,  p.  185. 
20  Rep.  473a1-b2. 
157 Now  this  is  not  leading  us  towards  common  possibility  which  would  assess  whether  the 
ideal  state  was  possible  under  the  present  conditions,  or  the  conditions  set  by  Plato.  This 
is  a  weakening  of  literal  possibility  that  allows  Plato  to  say  that  his  state  is  literally 
possible  even  if  what  is  literally  possible  is  not  an  exact  representation  of  his  description. 
I  think  it  is  important  to  note  that  even  though  I  think  that  this  is  a  good  explanation  of 
the  apparent  inconsistencies  in  the  Republic  of  Plato's  claims  of  possibility  and 
impossibility,  I  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  this  remained  his  view  for  the  rest  of  his  life.  In 
fact,  what  I  will  argue  below  is  precisely  the  opposite  -  that  Plato  did  indeed  change  his 
view  on  the  possibility  of  such  a  subservient  class,  and  that  is  why  it  was  not  included  in 
either  the  brief  reformulation  of  the  ideal  state  in  the  Laws,  or  the  state  described  in  the 
Laws  at  length. 
After  a  reassessment  of  the  idea  of  possibility  Plato  goes  on  to  describe'  the  basic 
condition  of  the  ideal  state,  the  Philosopher-Kings: 
there  will  be  no  end  to  the  troubles  of  states,  or  indeed,  my  dear  Glaucon,  of  humanity 
itself,  till  philosophers  become  kings  in  this  world,  or  till  those  we  now  call  kings  and 
rulers  really  and  truly  become  philosophers.  21 
This  is  the  precondition  of  the  ideal  state  of  the  Republic  -  until  Rulers  are  philosophers 
this  ideal  state  without  discord  or  strife  will  not  be  possible.  The  next  two  books  of  the 
Republic  are  devoted  to  the  education  of  the  Philosopher  Ruler,  and  the  different  subjects 
of  study  they  are  to  devote  themselves  to.  We  can  now  see  a  difficulty  for  Plato.  His  ideal 
city  depends  on  the  philosophical  rule  of  the  Guardians  proper,  without  which  the 
harmony  of  the  state  cannot  be  achieved,  but  without  the  state  constructed  as  it  is  in  the 
Republic  those  with  the  potential  to  be  Philosopher  Rulers  will  not  be  given  their 
extensive  education  committed  to  making  them  into  ideal  rulers.  So,  when  it  comes  to  the 
question  of  how  to  actually  bring  such  a  state  about,  Plato  has  caught  himself  in  a  catch 
22.  Therefore,  I  think  that  Plato's  state  is  literally  possible  because  he  believes  that  it  is 
2!  Rep.  473d1-4 
158 not  contrary  to  human  nature  to  be  able  to  have  a  state  set  up  in  such  a  way,  but  that  it  is 
commonly  impossible,  because  the  conditions  necessary  for  bringing  such  a  state  about 
are  themselves  dependent  on  the  existence  of  such  a  state. 
So  if  the  possibility  of  such  a  state  actually  existing  is  dependent  on  the  interconnection 
on  the  three  parts,  which  in  turn  is  what  makes  it  impossible  to  bring  such  a  state  into 
existence,  then  Plato  needed  to  make  some  changes  to  the  construction  of  his  ideal  state  if 
it  were  to  be  more  commonly  possible.  So  given  the  above  discussion  on  the  dependence 
of  each  of  the  three  parts  on  one  another,  why  were  the  Artisans  for  the  chop  and  not  the 
other  two  parts?  Andre  Laks  answers  his  own  question  `In  what  sense  exactly  is  man  in 
the  Politeia  a  god  and  in  the  Laws  a  man?  '  with  this  insightful  passage: 
Within  man,  the  soul's  irrational  part,  that  is,  appetites  and  pleasures,  is  not  taken  into 
account  in  the  Politeia.  Now  this  assertion  is  in  a  way  obvious,  but  on  the  other  hand 
paradoxical.  It  is  obvious  because  the  return  to  private  property  in  the  Laws  gives 
satisfaction  to  the  lower  part  of  the  soul  and  because  the  subordination  of  the 
magistrates  to  the  law  is  supposed  to  prevent  the  corruption  of  supreme  power  into 
tyranny  under  the  appeal  of  pleasures.  But  it  is  also  paradoxical,  because  the  divided 
nature  of  the  soul  is  the  great  principle  of  the  Republic.  2 
Even  though  I  am  not  in  agreement  with  Laks  that  the  question  he  sets  himself  is  a 
relevant  one,  the  response  is  a  response  to  many  more  questions  than  the  one  posed.  One 
of  the  jobs  done  so  successfully  by  the  Republic  was  the  explanation  of  akrasia  that  the 
divided  soul  provides.  So  in  that  sense,  the  inclusion  of  the  lower  soul  is  paramount  in  the 
Republic.  However,  as  Laks  points  out,  the  dialogue,  famous  for  introducing  the 
appetites,  also  fails  to  take  their  full  implication  into  account,  a  position  I  will  argue  for 
below.  Plato  eradicated  the  Artisan  class  as  opposed  to  either  of  the  other  classes  from  the 
state  in  the  Laws  due  to  a  belated  acceptance  of  the  impossibility  of  them  happily 
fulfilling  their  role  in  the  Republic.  This  means  that  Plato  changed  his  mind  about  the 
literal  possibility  of  the  ideal  state  of  the  Republic  at  some  point  between  writing  it  and 
22  Laks,  A.,  `Legislation  and  Demiurgy:  On  the  Relationship  Between  Plato's  Republic  and  Laws',  p.  217. 
159 writing  the  Laws,  and  he  therefore  replaced  his  ideal  with  one  that  excluded  them  in  the 
Laws. 
What  were  the  problems  with  the  lowest  class  of  the  Republic  that  Plato  may  have 
become  aware  of  that  inspired  him  to  make  such  changes  in  the  Laws?  One  of  the 
important  features  of  the  Republic,  and  the  Laws,  is  the  significance  Plato  places  on 
harmony  within  the  soul.  Plato  even  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  right  harmony  of  notes 
can  encourage  people  to  have  a  harmony  within  their  souls23.  In  Book  IX  of  the  Republic 
Plato  memorably  describes  man  as  a  composite  of  a  man,  a  lion,  and  a  many-headed 
beast,  each  part  representing  the  different  parts  of  the  soul.  He  describes  the  just  man  as 
someone  who: 
Ought  to  say  and  do  all  we  can  to  strengthen  the  man  within  us,  so  that  he  can  look 
after  the  many-headed  beast  like  a  farmer,  nursing  and  cultivating  its  tamer  elements 
and  preventing  the  wilder  ones  growing,  while  he  makes  an  ally  of  the  lion  and  looks 
after  the  common  interests  of  all  by  reconciling  them  with  each  other  and  with 
himself.  24 
Plato  frequently  mentions  the  need  to  be  gentle  with  the  savage  part  of  ourselves;  he  is 
not  a  proponent  of  violently  suppressing  our  less  virtuous  appetites  and  desires.  Harmony 
is  also  described  as  what  someone  will  have  in  their  soul  if  they  have  the  virtue  of 
`söphrosune',  which  can  be  translated  as  `temperance',  `self-control',  or  `moderation'.  In 
the  Republic  `söphrosune'  is  described  as  `a  kind  of  order,  the  mastery  of  certain  kinds  of 
pleasures  and  desires'25.  So  `söphrosune'  is  the  ability  to  create  order,  or  harmony,  in  a 
soul.  What  I  would  like  to  discuss  is  how  this  translates  to  the  city,  and  more  specifically, 
whether  the  classes  can  be  harmonized  in  such  a  way  as  to  produce  the  society  of  the 
Republic. 
2'  The  discussion  of  the  right  kind  of  music  in  Republic  Book  II. 
24  Rep.  589a8-b5. 
25  Rep.  430e6-7. 
160 The  appetitive  part  of  the  soul,  and  the  Artisan  class  of  the  state,  are  seen  as  a  threat  to 
the  unity  of  the  soul  and  state.  The  correct  organization  of  the  soul  and  state  is  where  this 
part  is  weakened.  In  the  soul  the  lowest  part  of  the  soul  will  presumably  acquiesce 
because  of  the  improved  happiness  of  the  soul  as  a  whole,  of  which  it  is  a  part.  How  will 
this  work  in  the  state.  Are  we  to  follow  the  analogy  through  in  the  same  way  and  say  that 
the  happiness  of  the  state  as  a  whole  will  mean  the  improved  happiness  of  each  part?  The 
analogy  doesn't  appear  to  work  in  this  way,  as  the  connection  between  the  parts  of  the 
soul  is  obviously  much  stronger  than  those  of  artisan  to  Philosopher-King.  The  improved 
atmosphere  and  success  of  the  state  may  make  living  conditions  better  and  provide 
protection  from  external  threats  but  is  this  going  to  be  enough  for  the  largest  class  of  the 
Republic?  As  Andre  Laks  says: 
If  the  members  of  the  third  class  are  necessary  to  the  city  insofar  as  they  produce  the 
common  goods,  and  gladly  perform  this  function  in  exchange  for  the  advantage  of 
having  their  life  secured,  why  should  they  ever  dissent?  This  rather  idyllic  view  of  the 
Platonic  city  cannot  be  the  whole  story,  though.  For  whereas  if  it  is  true  that  the 
producers'  need  for  security  is  guaranteed,  there  will  be  no  reason  for  them  to  dissent 
on  this  ground,  it  is  also  true  that  the  producers'  needs  are  by  no  means  reducible  to 
security  alone,  at  least  if  the  analogy  between  the  city  and  the  soul  is  to  hold.  26 
The  Artisan  class  is  characterized  by  its  counterpart  in  the  soul  -  the  Appetite.  In  the  soul 
the  appetites  are  many  and  varied,  and  can  be  ones  that  are  in  need  of  weakening  or 
eradication  or  ones  that  should  be  encouraged.  These  desires  are  not  only  focused  on  a 
sense  of  security,  and  so,  if  the  analogy  is  going  to  hold,  neither  will  the  desires  of  the 
Artisan  class.  Are  we  supposed  to  believe  that  all  the  other  desires  experienced  by  the 
class  that  is  characterized  by  having  desires,  will  be  overwhelmed  by  the  need  for 
security  and  a  limited  amount  of  ownership  as  discussed  above?  If  the  state  of  the 
Republic  were  constantly  under  attack  this  might  be  a  possible  explanation,  but  Plato 
clearly  says  that  it  will  not  be.  The  incentives  given  to  the  Artisan  class  will  just  not  be 
enough  to  guarantee  their  support  for  the  state  as  a  whole. 
26  Laks,  A.,  `Legislation  and  Demiurgy:  On  the  Relationship  Between  Plato's  Republic  and  Laws',  p.  219. 
161 Perhaps  Plato  would  have  responded  to  this  problem  by  reminding  us  what  he  said  about 
the  appetites  of  the  soul: 
I  think,  then..  .  that  we  may  venture  to  conclude  that  if  our  desire  for  gain  and  our 
ambition  will  follow  the  guidance  of  knowledge  and  reason,  and  choose  and  pursue 
only  such  pleasures  as  wisdom  indicates,  the  pleasures  they  achieve  will  be  the  truest 
of  which  they  are  capable,  because  truth  is  their  guide,  and  will  also  be  those  proper  to 
them  -  for  isn't  what  is  proper  to  a  thing  what  is  best  for  it?  27 
In  other  words,  the  Artisans  will  get  the  satisfaction  of  their  desires,  desires  which  are 
best  for  them,  even  if  they  are  not  their  strongest  desires.  If  the  desires  that  are  best  for 
them,  or  `proper  to  them',  will  be  satisfied,  then  why  would  they  have  any  reason  to  rebel 
against  a  system  that  provides  that  for  them?  The  problem  with  this  response  is  the  fact 
that  the  people  of  the  Artisan  class  will  still  not  have  the  things  that  they  desire  most. 
They  may  have  what  is  best  for  them,  but  that  is  characteristically  a  different  thing  for  the 
people  of  this  class,  and  if  it  were  the  case  that  they  always  wanted  what  was  best  for 
them,  then  they  would  have  been  promoted  to  a  higher  station  in  the  life  of  Plato's  utopia. 
The  fact  is  their  subjective  desires  will  still  not  be  satisfied,  even  if  they  continually  get 
what  is  best  for  them  throughout  their  life.  They  will  not  be  content  with  the  satisfaction 
of  desires  they  are  supposed  to  feel,  but  actually  do  not,  or  do  so  slightly  that  it  would 
never  take  the  place  of  their  real  desires.  Given  that  this  is  arguably  the  main  problem 
with  the  state  in  the  Republic,  and  also  the  element  that  Plato  expels  from  Magnesia,  it  is 
fair  to  hypothesize  that  Plato  was  aware  of  this  problem  too. 
The  fact  that  Plato  changes  his  idea  of  the  ideal  state  when  he  writes  the  Laws  is 
important  not  only  for  his  political  philosophy  but  also  for  his  ethics.  If  the  Republic  is  no 
longer  the  ideal  then  we  may  expect  a  new  account  of  the  virtues  in  the  Laws.  I  have 
shown  above  that  Plato's  position  on  issues  such  as  communism  has  changed,  and  that 
the  class  division  has  also  altered.  Therefore,  we  should  not  expect  the  virtues  in  the 
Laws  to  be  the  same  as  they  were  in  the  Republic. 
27  Rep.  586d4-e2. 
162 3.  Virtue  in  the  Laws 
It  has  often  been  argued  that  Plato's  ethical  views  in  his  last  work  have  developed  from 
the  utopian  dreams  of  the  Republic  into  a  more  pragmatic  conception  of  virtue  in  his  later 
life.  This  is  a  very  plausible  interpretation  of  what  is  going  on  in  Plato's  later  philosophy. 
In  the  Laws  virtue  is  accessible  to  those  people  without  knowledge  of  what  is  truly  to  be 
valued,  but  with  true  belief  gained  through  right  instruction  from  law  and  the  inclination 
to  act  in  accordance  with  this  true  belief.  Plato  says: 
His  survey  completed,  the  author  of  the  legal  code  will  appoint  guardians  (some  of 
whom  will  have  rational  grounds  for  their  actions,  while  others  rely  on  "true 
opinion"),  so  that  all  these  regulations  may  be  welded  together  into  a  rational  whole, 
demonstrably  inspired  by  considerations  of  justice  and  self-restraint,  not  of  wealth  and 
ambition.  28 
This  means  that  the  Guardians  do  not  need  knowledge  to  rule  because  they  no  longer 
need  knowledge  for  virtue  -  true  belief  is  now  sufficient.  Virtue  is  then  not  dependent  on 
knowledge  but  instead  requires  a  balance  between  judgement  and  desire.  As  Stalley  puts 
it,  `In  the  Laws.. 
.  the  suggestion  seems  to  be  that  the  citizens  can  become  virtuous  if  only 
their  desires  and  passions  are  disciplined  in  such  a  way  that  they  obey  the  law  as  a  matter 
of  habit'29.  This  view  is  supported  by  passages  such  as: 
When  a  man  thinks  something  is  fine  and  good,  but  loathes  it  instead  of  liking  it,  and 
conversely  when  he  likes  and  welcomes  what  he  believes  is  wicked  and  unjust.  I 
maintain  that  this  disaccord  between  his  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  and  his  rational 
judgement  constitutes  the  very  lowest  depth  of  ignorance...  So  when  the  soul  quarrels 
with  knowledge  or  opinion  or  reason,  its  natural  ruling  principles,  you  have  there  what 
I  call  `folly'.  This  applies  both  to  the  state  in  which  people  disobey  their  rulers  and 
laws,  and  to  the  individual,  when  the  fine  principles  in  which  he  really  believes  prove 
not  only  ineffective  but  actually  harmful.. 
. 
You  see,  my  friends,  without  concord,  how 
could  you  ever  get  even  a  glimmer  of  sound  judgement?  30 
And  also: 
28  Laws  632c4-d  I. 
29  Stalley,  R.,  An  Introduction  to  Plato's  Laws,  p.  9. 
30  Laws  689a5-d6. 
163 I  maintain  that  the  earliest  sensations  that  a  child  feels  in  infancy  are  of  pleasure  and 
pain,  and  this  is  the  route  by  which  virtue  and  vice  first  enter  the  soul.  (But  for  a  man 
to  acquire  good  judgement,  and  unshakable  correct  opinions,  however  late  in  life,  is  a 
matter  of  good  luck:  a  man  who  possesses  them,  and  all  the  benefits  they  entail,  is 
perfect.  )  I  call  `education'  the  initial  acquisition  of  virtue  by  the  child,  when  the 
feelings  of  pleasure  and  affection,  pain  and  hatred,  that  well  up  in  his  soul  are 
channelled  in  the  right  courses  before  he  can  understand  the  reason  why.  Then  when 
he  does  understand,  his  reason  and  his  emotions  agree  in  telling  him  that  he  has  been 
properly  trained  by  inculcation  of  appropriate  habits.  Virtue  is  this  general  concord  of 
reason  and  emotion.  31 
If  Plato  did  indeed  lower  the  necessary  requirements  for  virtue  in  the  Laws  to  the  right 
emotion  accompanied  by  the  right  response  guided  by  law  then  it  seems  right  to  infer  as 
Bobonich  does  that: 
At  least  some  non-philosophers  are  capable  of  valuing  virtue  for  its  own  sake,  that  is, 
are  capable  of  believing  that  virtue  is  good  for  its  own  sake  and  of  desiring  virtue  for 
its  own  sake.  32 
This  is  a  claim  that  clearly  illuminates  the  difference  between  the  Republic  and  the  Laws. 
In  the  Republic  it  is  the  philosopher  ruler  who  embodies  virtue,  his  soul  being  ruled  by 
Reason,  which  is  supported  by  a  well-trained  Spirit  and  obeyed  by  the  Desires.  The 
inherent  problems  in  the  design  of  virtue  and  the  state  in  the  Republic  (discussed  in  the 
previous  section)  must  have  been  visible  to  Plato  as  the  alterations  he  makes  in  the  Laws 
respond  directly  to  those  incurable  maladies.  We  can  assume  that  he  was  aware  at  some 
later  point  that  his  assurances  that  the  state  was  designed  for  the  happiness  of  all  three 
classes  were  unfounded,  as  the  lowest  class  could  not  possibly  have  been  satisfied  with 
the  arrangement.  To  follow  the  analogy  Plato  makes  in  the  Republic  between  state  and 
soul,  it  can  also  be  assumed  that  he  realized  that  the  soul  does  not  function  in  the  way 
depicted  in  that  dialogue;  more  specifically,  that  the  desires  cannot  be  so  easily  dealt 
with. 
31  Laws  653a5-b8. 
32  Bobonich,  C.,  Plato's  Utopia  Recast,  p.  90. 
164 Plato  did  change  his  mind  about  virtue  between  writing  the  Republic  and  the  Laws:  he 
changed  his  mind  about  the  possibility  of  controlling  the  worst  element  within  us.  He  also 
appears  to  have  changed  his  mind  about  the  best  elements  within  us  as  well,  and  the  lack 
of  ability  of  most  people  to  actually  obtain  such  qualities.  Therefore  I  think  Plato  changes 
his  mind  about  the  possibility  of  a  content  and  supportive  Artisan  class  and  about  the 
possibility  of  attaining  the  virtue  of  the  philosopher  rulers  (I  will  give  support  for  this 
assertion  in  the  following  section).  However,  I  do  not  think  that  Plato  has  altogether 
changed  his  mind  about  his  ideals  of  state.  He  may  have  become  more  pessimistic  about 
the  Philosopher  Rulers,  but  that  doesn't  mean  that  he  is  no  longer  a  supporter  of  a  more 
aristocratic  ideal,  he  does,  it  must  not  be  forgotten,  refer  to  the  Laws  as  the  second  best 
type  of  city.  I  am  in  agreement  with  Stalley  when  he  says: 
Wherever  Plato  addresses  himself  to  matters  of  practical  politics  he  advocates  the 
supremacy  of  law,  a  doctrine  worked  out  in  great  detail  in  the  Laws.  This  is  entirely 
compatible  with  his  doctrines  at  the  theoretical  level.  If,  as  the  Statesmen  suggests,  law 
embodies  decisions  of  the  community  taken  after  careful  consideration,  the  rule  of  law 
may  be  the  closest  ordinary  men  can  come  to  the  rule  of  knowledge.  So  the  Republic 
and  the  Laws  can  be  seen  as  complementary  to  one  another.  33 
Before  I  move  on  to  discuss  the  implications  of  the  changes  Plato  has  made  to  the  virtue 
of  courage,  I  would  like  to  consider  a  further  significant  difference  between  the  early  and 
middle  dialogues  and  the  Laws.  In  the  early  dialogues  Socrates  is  seen  as  the  role  model 
for  those  aspiring  to  virtue.  He  is  to  some  extent  the  inspiration  for  the  ideas  embodied  in 
the  early/middle  dialogues,  and  also  the  spokesman  for  Plato's  own  philosophical  ideas. 
However,  when  we  come  to  the  Laws,  not  only  is  Socrates  no  longer  the  mouthpiece 
through  which  Plato  wishes  to  communicate,  he  is  no  longer  the  role  model  set  up  for  his 
readers  to  follow.  In  Book  IV,  when  Plato  is  discussing  the  difficulty  of  bringing  about  a 
situation  where  such  a  state  as  the  one  they  are  discussing  could  happen  he  says  that  what 
they  need  is: 
33  Stalley,  R.,  An  Introduction  to  Plato's  Laws,  p.  21. 
165 A  situation  in  which  an  inspired  passion  for  the  paths  of  restraint  and  justice  guides 
those  who  wield  great  power.  The  passion  may  seize  a  single  supreme  ruler,  or 
perhaps  men  who  owe  their  power  to  exceptional  wealth  or  high  birth;  or  you  may  get 
a  reincarnation  of  Nestor,  who,  superior  as  he  was  to  all  mankind  for  the  vigour  of  his 
speech,  is  said  to  have  put  them  in  the  shade  even  more  by  his  qualities  of  restraint.  In 
Trojan  times,  they  say,  such  a  paragon  did  exist,  but  he  is  certainly  unheard  of  today. 
Still,  granted  someone  like  that  did  in  fact  exist  in  the  past  or  is  going  to  in  the  future, 
or  is  alive  among  us  now,  blessed  is  the  life  of  this  man  of  moderation,  and  blessed 
they  who  listen  to  the  words  that  fall  from  his  lips.  And  whatever  the  form  of 
government,  the  same  doctrine  holds  true:  where  supreme  power  in  a  man  holds  hands 
with  wise  judgement  and  self-restraint,  there  you  have  the  birth  of  the  best  political 
system,  with  laws  to  match34 
Nestor  is  an  understandable  choice  as  a  role  model  for  Plato.  He  clearly  exhibits  the  four 
cardinal  virtues;  he  is  wise  and  just  in  his  advice  to  Agamemnon  and  Achilles;  shows  his 
support  for  temperance  by  advising  others  to  be  so;  and  shows  courage  on  the  battle  field. 
However,  I  do  not  think  he  was  Plato's  choice  in  the  Laws  for  this  reason  only.  Nestor  is 
an  example  of  a  virtuous  man  who  also  involves  himself  with  politics.  Unlike  Socrates, 
Nestor  contributes  to  the  discussions  of  the  powerful  when  they  are  working  out  what 
should  be  done.  In  the  Laws  Plato  makes  the  virtues  accessible  to  those  other  than 
philosophers,  and  Nestor  provides  an  extraordinary  example  of  the  common  man.  He 
may  not  be  a  philosopher,  but  that  is  not  now  necessary.  What  Plato  is  concerned  with  in 
the  Laws  is  the  kind  of  person  who  will  get  involved,  but  not  let  power  or  influence  go  to 
his  head.  Socrates  is  famous  for  challenging  those  in  power  by  questioning  them  and  their 
ideals,  but  not  for  challenging  them  in  a  way  that  would  actually  affect  legislation  or  the 
structures  of  power.  Plato  is  here  interested  in  a  man  who  is  prepared  to  risk  sullying 
himself  with  politics  as  well  as  being  a  man  of  words. 
34  Laws  711d7-712a3. 
166 4.  Courage  and  the  Soul 
The  striking  difference  between  the  Republic  and  the  Laws  is  that  in  the  Laws  Plato 
seems  to  be  more  interested  in  the  kind  of  virtue  that  is  obtainable  by  the  population  at 
large.  In  the  Republic  the  divine  virtues  are  inaccessible  to  the  majority,  if  not  all  of  the 
population,  whereas  the  Auxiliaries  are  capable  of  more  human  virtues.  The  fact  that  only 
the  Philosopher  Kings  can  be  genuinely  virtuous  does  limit  the  possibility  of  people 
capable  of  genuine  virtue  existing  in  an  ordinary  state  significantly.  The  fact  that  such  a 
theory  means  that  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  anyone  will  be  virtuous  does  not  necessarily 
mean  that  the  theory  is  wrong  but,  as  discussed  above,  to  limit  the  meanings  of  such 
words  so  that  they  no  longer  designate  any  actual  person  is  problematic.  I  will  argue  that 
the  Laws  changes  the  picture  of  virtue  from  the  one  of  the  Republic  in  two  ways.  Firstly, 
genuine  virtue  appears  to  be  no  longer  dependent  on  knowledge,  but  is  now  also  open  to 
those  with  only  true  belief.  Secondly,  Plato  accepts  a  further  type  of  `lesser'  courage 
which  explains  certain  types  of  behaviour  previously  not  covered  by  the  two  kinds  of 
virtue  in  the  Republic.  Thus,  in  the  Republic  we  have  two  kinds  of  virtue,  the  divine  and 
the  human,  whereas  in  the  Laws  we  lose  the  higher  demands  of  the  virtue  of  the 
Philosopher  Rulers,  but  a  new  one  is  added  -  that  of  the  mercenary  soldier  in  the  case  of 
courage. 
The  Laws,  being  a  practical  work,  focuses  more  on  how  courage  is  to  be  obtained.  Plato's 
final  work  follows  the  general  trend  I  have  outlined  from  the  view  of  courage  as  simply 
knowledge  of  what  should  be  feared  in  the  early  dialogues,  to  the  later  addition  of  a  non- 
cognitive  element  such  as  habituation  through  education  in  the  Republic.  In  the  Laws, 
knowledge  is  no  longer  necessary  for  virtue,  as  true  belief  is  sufficient,  and  the  emphasis 
on  education  is  still  an  important  theme  in  the  process  of  becoming  courageous.  I  will 
argue  that  Plato  made  courage  accessible  to  those  of  the  populace  who  are  not  virtuous. 
There  are  still  elements  left  from  the  utopian  Republic,  but  the  more  demanding 
commitments  of  that  dialogue  have  been  replaced  with  more  pragmatic  compromises 
167 with  the  real  world.  Also,  Plato  has  appeared  to  accept  in  the  Laws  that  other  kinds  of 
fearlessness,  like  that  of  the  mercenary,  may  also  be  considered  to  be  a  kind  of  courage. 
As  the  Laws  is  a  more  practical  work,  questions  of  how  the  soul  is  constituted  and  the 
psychological  underpinning  of  our  actions  are  not  explicitly  answered.  This  has 
commonly  been  assumed  to  mean  that  Plato  has  either  rejected  the  tripartite  soul  of  the 
Republic  or  is  just  no  longer  as  interested  in  such  issues.  However,  just  because  this  issue 
is  not  addressed  as  explicitly  as  in  the  Republic  does  not  mean  it  was  not  in  Plato's  mind 
when  he  wrote  the  Laws.  In  fact,  I  think  the  discussion  in  Book  1  shows  that  Plato  was 
aware  that  his  ideas  about  the  soul  could  not  be  left  behind  even  though  the  Laws  is  more 
directly  relevant  to  political  and  legal  issues.  The  Laws  begins  with  the  introduction  of 
the  question  of  the  proper  aim  of  the  law.  Both  Cleinias  and  Megillus  believe  that  the 
laws  of  the  state  should  be  focused  on  warfare.  Cleinias  says: 
All  these  Cretan  practices  have  been  developed  for  fighting  wars,  and  that's  precisely 
the  purpose  I  think  the  legislator  intended  them  to  serve  when  he  instituted  them...  In 
this,  I  think,  he  censured  the  stupidity  of  ordinary  men,  who  do  not  understand  that 
they  are  all  engaged  in  a  never-ending  lifelong  war  against  all  other  states.  35 
What  role  does  Cleinias's  approach  play  in  establishing  Plato's  current  position  on  the 
metaphysics  of  the  soul?  He  goes  on  to  agree  that  this  could  also  be  said  of  towns  and 
individual  people  as  well  as  cities:  `not  only  is  everyone  an  enemy  of  everyone  else  in  the 
public  sphere,  but  each  man  fights  a  private  war  against  himself  36.  The  Athenian 
disagrees,  and  shows  in  the  following  discussion  that  he  believes  that  the  law  should  not 
aim  at  `victory'  over  other  states,  villages  or  parts  of  the  self,  but  at  finding  a  compromise 
between  these  conflicting  parts37.  As  he  was  in  the  Republic,  Plato  is  still  concerned  with 
the  idea  of  creating  a  harmony  between  groups  -  bringing  them  to  some  kind  of 
agreement  -  rather  than  the  destruction  of  one  part  for  the  sake  of  another.  So  whether 
Plato  has  sacrificed  the  tripartite  model  for  a  different  one,  which  is  perhaps  suggested  by 
35  Laws  625d7-e8. 
36  Laws  626d9-1  1. 
37  Laws  627-9. 
168 the  illustration  of  man  as  a  puppet  of  the  gods38,  the  ideal  state  of  the  soul  is  still  one  of 
persuasion  -  but  how  this  is  achieved  has  changed.  Given  the  problems  that  came  out  of 
the  depiction  of  the  Artisan  class  in  the  Republic,  by  the  time  of  the  Laws  Plato  is  not 
using  the  analogy  of  soul  to  state.  He  has  not  shifted  his  view  of  the  soul  so  as  not  to 
include  the  desires,  but  he  has  expelled  the  part  of  the  state  that  represented  the  appetitive 
part  of  the  soul.  As  he  is  not  relying  on  the  analogy  of  state  to  soul,  we  cannot  necessarily 
infer  anything  about  Plato's  later  metaphysical  ideas  about  the  soul  from  the  structure  of 
the  state  in  this  dialogue. 
The  lack  of  a  specific  metaphysical  model  of  the  soul  in  the  Laws  may  be  why  the 
descriptions  given  of  courage39  appear  to  have  become  more  vague  than  those  of  the 
Republic.  In  the  Republic,  courage  was  said  to  reside  in  the  thumos,  even  though  it  was 
also  the  case  that  only  the  true  philosopher  was  able  to  be  genuinely  courageous,  because 
genuine  virtue  required  wisdom.  Will  the  picture  change  because  of  the  absence  of  the 
tripartite  model  and  a  greater  awareness  of  the  influence  of  the  desires? 
The  closest  Plato  gets  to  giving  a  definition  of  courage  in  the  Laws  is  in  Book  I.  He  says: 
[Athenian]  But  what  is  to  be  our  definition  of  courage?  Are  we  to  define  it  simply  in 
terms  of  a  fight  against  fears  and  pains  only,  or  do  we  include  desires  and  pleasures, 
which  cajole  and  seduce  us  so  effectively...  [Megillus]Yes,  I  think  so  -  the  fight  is 
against  all  these  feelings.  40 
This  doesn't  at  first  glance  appear  to  be  a  complete  definition.  I  assume  that  Plato  means 
that  courage  is  not  simply  the  fact  that  there  is  conflict  between  on  the  one  hand  fear,  pain 
and  pleasure  and  some  other  element  of  the  individual  on  the  other.  The  definition 
implies  that  Plato  thought  that  courage  is  the  ability  to  overcome  these  fears,  pains  and 
pleasures.  What  must  also  strike  the  reader  as  strange  is  the  reference  to  courage  having 
38  Laws  644d+. 
39  In  will  argue  that  temperance  also  suffers  for  the  same  reason. 
40  Laws  633c8-d7. 
169 to  overcome  pleasures  as  well  as  fears  and  pains.  Is  it  not  temperance  that  must  deal  with 
the  irrational  desires  and  find  some  way  of  assuaging  them?  Trevor  Saunders  appears  to 
think  that  we  should  not  interpret  this  passage  as  a  sign  of  confusion  between  courage 
and  temperance.  In  the  summary  of  his  translation  he  says: 
Spartan  and  Cretan  laws,  then,  excel  in  making  a  man  resist  fear,  but  they  fail  when  it 
comes  to  resisting  the  temptations  of  pleasure;  they  give  a  man  courage,  but  not  self- 
control.  4' 
But  can  this  really  be  an  accurate  summary  of  the  above  statement?  Let  us  look  at  the 
context  in  which  the  definition  of  courage  is  given.  The  Athenian  is  trying  to  convince 
Megillus  and  Cleinias  that  the  laws  should  not  only  aim  at  strengthening  the  city  and 
preparing  it  for  war.  He  wants  his  two  interlocutors  to  explain  how  the  laws  of  their 
respective  cities  aim  at  all  the  virtues42,  given  that  they  have  said  that  the  proper  aim  of 
the  law  is  to  instill  the  whole  of  virtue,  and  not  just  courage.  Once  he  has  asked  them  to 
explain  this  he  refers  the  discussion  back  to  courage  and  asks  in  what  way  the  cities  are 
able  to  encourage  the  development  of  this  virtue.  Once  they  have  given  a  few  examples 
of  the  institutions  set  up  to  this  end  the  Athenian  suggests  the  definition  we  get  at  633c8- 
d7.  This  definition  appears  to  include  the  fight  against  pleasures  as  well  as  fears  and 
pains,  which  are  said  to  pose  the  greater  threat  to  character  and  reputation  than 
succumbing  to  fears.  Given  that  pleasures  do  pose  a  greater  threat  the  Athenian  wonders 
why  the  laws  of  the  cities  they  are  discussing  do  not  have  methods  set  in  place  to  enable 
the  citizens  to  strengthen  their  resolve  against  such  temptations.  Then  the  Athenian  says: 
Well  then,  Cleinias  and  our  friend  from  Sparta,  let's  turn  to  the  next  item  we  put  on 
the  agenda:  after  courage,  let's  discuss  self-control.  We  found,  in  the  case  of  war,  that 
your  two  political  systems  were  superior  to  those  of  states  with  a  more  haphazard 
mode  of  government.  Where's  the  superiority  in  the  case  of  self-control?...  when  men 
investigate  legislation,  they  investigate  almost  exclusively  pleasures  and  pains  as  they 
affect  society  and  the  character  of  the  individual.  Pleasure  and  pain,  you  see,  flow  like 
two  springs  released  by  nature.  If  a  man  draws  the  right  amount  from  the  right  one  at 
the  right  time,  he  lives  a  happy  life.  43 
41  Saunders,  T.,  in  his  notes  to  The  Laws,  p.  20. 
42  Laws  632d1-5. 
43  Laws  635e4-636e1. 
170 What  appears  to  be  Saunders'  interpretation  of  this  section  of  the  Laws  may  be  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  discussion  moves  from  what  the  Cretan  and  Spartan  states  do  in  order  to 
instil  courage  to  what  they  don't  do  to  encourage  temperance,  and  that  the  discussion 
appears  to  conflate  them  in  the  middle.  The  Athenian  might  have  been  including  what 
one  would  normally  think  of  as  temperance  -  the  ability  to  withstand  the  allures  of 
pleasure  -  within  the  discussion  of  courage  in  order  to  lead  his  companions  on  to  a 
discussion  of  another  virtue  which  is  just  as  important  (if  not  more  so)  than  courage  and 
one  they  have  excluded  as  an  aim  of  their  administration.  The  idea  that  this  section  of  the 
Laws  is  discussing  courage  and  self-control  and  not  conflating  the  two  can  also  find 
support  from  the  later  discussion  of  courage  and  the  explanation  of  the  role  that  pleasure 
can  play  in  that  virtue. 
To  do  this,  let  us  first  look  at  what  Plato  says  about  the  cultivation  of  courage  through  the 
use  of  drinking  parties: 
Tell  me:  can  we  conceive  of  two  roughly  opposite  kinds  of  fears?...  when  we  expect 
evils  to  occur,  we  are  in  fear  of  them,  I  suppose?...  And  we  often  fear  for  our 
reputation,  when  we  imagine  we  are  going  to  get  a  bad  name  for  doing  or  saying 
something  disgraceful.  This  is  the  fear  which  we,  and  I  fancy  everyone  else,  calls 
`shame'...  These  are  the  two  fears  I  meant.  The  second  resists  pains  and  the  other 
things  we  dread,  as  well  as  our  keenest  and  most  frequent  pleasures  ... 
The  legislator, 
then,  and  anybody  of  the  slightest  merit,  values  this  fear  very  highly,  and  gives  it  the 
name  `modesty'.  The  feeling  of  confidence  that  is  its  opposite  he  calls  `insolence',  and 
reckons  it  to  be  the  biggest  curse  anyone  could  suffer,  whether  in  his  private  or  public 
life.  44 
And  also: 
So  this  fear  not  only  safeguards  us  in  a  lot  of  other  crucial  areas  of  conduct  but 
contributes  more  than  anything  else,  if  we  take  one  thing  with  another,  to  the  security 
that  follows  victory  on  war.  Two  things,  then,  contribute  to  victory:  fearlessness  in  the 
face  of  the  enemy,  and  fear  of  ill-repute  among  one's  friends...  Every  individual 
44  Laws  646e4-647b1. 
171 should  therefore  become  both  afraid  and  unafraid,  for  the  reasons  we  have 
distinguished  in  each  case  45 
This  conception  of  courage  is  clearly  very  different  from  the  definition  of  courage  in  the 
Republic;  Plato  now  has  two  kinds  of  fear  as  motivational  sources  to  explain  courageous 
behaviour.  Whereas  in  the  Republic  there  was  only  the  knowledge  of  what  should  be 
feared  (the  fear  of  pain  or  death  was  supposed  to  be  eradicated  in  both  the  courage  of  the 
auxiliaries  and  the  rulers),  in  the  Laws  Plato  has  included  the  normal  fear  of  pain,  and  the 
second  is  the  fear  of  disgrace46  -a  less  cerebral  explanation  of  why  the  courageous 
person  is  not  tempted  to  flee.  Plato  now  has  a  new  explanation  to  give  us  about  why  some 
people  are  courageous  and  others  not.  The  courageous  person  is  educated  in  such  a  way 
as  to  be  able  to  resist  the  fear  of  pain  and  death,  presumably  by  becoming  accustomed  to 
dangerous  situations  like  in  the  Spartan  system,  which  explains  why  he  stands  and  fights 
the  enemy.  The  second  strand  of  the  explanation  -  why  he  is  not  tempted  away  -  is  the 
fear  of  disgrace,  and  the  ability  to  withstand  such  fear  Plato  calls  modesty.  The  `great 
advantages  this  kind  of  fear  secures'  are  presumably  that  the  citizens  of  Magnesia  will 
fear  doing  what  in  this  state  as  decided  by  law  will  cause  disgrace;  thus  it  is  this  kind  of 
fear  that  the  law  relies  on  to  keep  people  in  line. 
Pleasure  then  does  have  a  specific  role  to  play  in  the  virtue  of  courage,  but  it  is  not  the 
same  as  the  role  it  fulfils  in  temperance.  A  temperate  person  is  able  to  overcome  the  lure 
of  the  pleasures  or  to  have  such  an  ordered  soul  that  such  things  are  no  longer  desired. 
The  courageous  person  must  identify  what  pleasures  must  be  resisted  by  having  the 
appropriate  knowledge  or  belief  of  what  pleasures  would  bring  disgrace  if  indulged  in. 
Having  identified  those  pleasures  they  must  then  have  the  appropriate  fear  of  disgrace 
which  drives  them  to  do  the  right  thing  according  to  law.  If  we  put  together  what  the 
original  definition  says  about  fear  and  what  the  inclusion  of  pleasure  in  that  definition 
really  means,  the  conception  of  courage  that  is  produced  is  one  that  requires  two  kinds  of 
45  Laws  647b3-c2. 
46  It  could  be  argued  that  this  is  present  in  the  Republic  as  well.  It  may  be  true  that  it  is  not  necessarily 
absent  but  it  is  also  not  explicitly  included. 
172 fear.  Plato  appears  to  acknowledge  that  the  courageous  person  will  need  to  be  able  to 
overcome  fears  of  pain  and  death,  but  that  they  will  also  fear  the  disgrace  of  not  acting 
courageously. 
So  the  difference  in  this  conception  of  courage  from  the  one  given  in  the  Republic  is  the 
role  of  fear.  As  I  have  shown,  the  aim  in  both  the  Republic  and  the  Laws  is  to  create  a 
harmony  between  knowledge  or  judgement  and  the  desires.  In  the  Republic  the 
unrealistic  psychological  model  underestimates  the  influence  of  these  desires  and  the 
position  taken  in  that  dialogue  is  consequently  undermined.  For  example,  courage  in  the 
Republic  is  an  appropriate  ascription  of  dangerousness  to  the  immoral  option,  in  other 
words,  knowledge  of  what  should  be  feared.  There  is  no  special  role  given  to  a  natural 
fear  of  pain  or  death  within  the  virtuous  individual  in  that  dialogue47.  In  the  Laws  the 
definition  given  at  633  shows  that  Plato  accepts  that  it  is  likely  that  these  fears  will  be 
present  in  a  courageous  person,  and  thus  part  of  courage  is  the  ability  to  overcome  them. 
However,  Plato  is  still  concerned  with  the  harmony  between  judgement  and  desire  in  the 
Laws  -  the  virtuous  individual  is  after  all  supposed  to  love  what  he  thinks  is  `fine  and 
good  i48.  We  will  see  in  section  6  that  the  harmony  model  of  virtue  is  not  consistent  with 
the  idea  of  courage  being  partly  the  ability  to  ignore  certain  feelings. 
Another  interesting  change  from  the  definition  in  the  Republic  is  that  there  is  no  mention 
of  knowledge  in  this  definition.  In  the  previous  dialogues  I  have  looked  at  knowledge 
plays  either  a  singular  or  important  role  in  the  definition  of  courage.  As  stated  above, 
Plato  has  decided  that  knowledge  is  unnecessary  for  virtue  at  the  end  of  his  philosophical 
career,  and  that  true  belief  will  be  sufficient  for  the  kind  of  courage  he  is  here  discussing. 
There  is  significant  evidence  for  the  view  that  knowledge  is  no  longer  necessary  for 
virtue  in  the  discussions  about  courage  in  this  dialogue.  The  Athenian  claims  that  the 
communities  of  his  interlocutors,  Sparta  and  Crete,  expose  their  young  citizens  to  fearful 
47  See  the  discussion  on  courage  in  the  Republic  in  chapter  5. 
48  Laws  689a6. 
173 and  painful  situations  in  order  to  make  them  brave,  as  they  believe  that  if  this  is  not  done 
it  would  be  the  case  that  `when  it  came  to  pains  and  fears,  your  legislator  reckoned  that  if 
a  man  ran  away  from  them  on  every  occasion  from  his  earliest  years  and  was  then  faced 
with  hardships,  pains  and  fears  he  could  not  avoid,  he  would  likewise  run  away  from  any 
enemy  who  had  received  such  training,  and  become  their  slaves'49.  The  fact  that  the 
Athenian  claims  that  the  Spartan  system  can  instill  courage  in  a  person,  a  system  that  did 
not  accompany  this  rigorous  physical  endurance  with  intellectual  training,  also 
contributes  to  the  idea  that  Plato  has  changed  his  mind  about  courage  requiring  such  a 
stringent  intellectual  element  as  knowledge.  This  suggests  that  Plato  no  longer  believed 
in  the  ideal  of  the  philosopher's  virtue,  and  now  accepts  that  the  Republic  set  unrealistic 
standards  for  people. 
If  knowledge  is  no  longer  necessary  for  virtue  then  the  virtue  of  the  philosopher  rulers  - 
which  required  knowledge  -  is  presumably  not  included  in  the  Laws.  However,  it  could 
be  argued  that  the  virtue  of  the  philosophers  has  not  been  weakened  for  the  Laws,  but  still 
exists  alongside  the  more  human  virtue.  It  does  not  take  centre  stage,  as  it  does  in  the 
Republic,  because  it  is  not  the  focus  of  the  dialogue.  What  has  been  called  the 
Dependency  Thesis  by  Christopher  Bobonich  could  be  called  on  to  support  this  viewso 
The  Dependency  Thesis  says  that  we  can  only  benefit  from  `human'  goods,  such  as 
wealth,  health,  and  attractiveness,  if  we  have  the  `divine'  goods,  the  virtues  wisdom, 
courage  etc.  The  use  of  the  word  `divine'  in  this  description  is  what  causes  the  difficulty 
for  the  idea  that  the  virtue  of  the  philosopher  rulers  has  been  left  behind.  The  divine 
virtues  are  so  called  because  of  their  affinity  with  what  is  godlike.  Could  the  more 
accessible  virtues  of  the  Laws  possibly  be  described  as  god-like?  I  argued  above  that 
when  Plato  refers  to  the  best  city  in  the  Laws  he  is  not  describing  the  actual  city  of  the 
Republic,  but  something  very  similar  to  it.  Thus,  the  elements  described  as  playing  a  part 
in  this  state  were  parts  of  the  Republic,  but  not  all  of  those  have  been  included.  He  says: 
49  Laws  635c1-6. 
50  Laws  631  b-e. 
174 It  may  be  that  gods  or  a  number  of  the  children  of  gods  inhabit  this  kind  of  state:  if  so, 
the  life  they  live  there,  observing  these  rules,  is  a  happy  one  indeed.  51 
Here  he  is  referring  to  the  philosopher  kings  of  the  Republic  as  being  the  `children  of 
gods'.  So  those  who  are  capable  of  genuine  virtue  -  virtue  based  on  knowledge  -  are 
semi-divine  because  they  have  an  element  of  what  is  divine  in  them.  So  when  Plato  refers 
to  the  divine  virtues  in  the  Laws,  could  it  be  that  he  is  still  committed  to  the  idea  that  for 
genuine  virtue  you  need  the  knowledge  of  the  Philosopher  King? 
The  problem  for  this  view  comes  about  if  we  take  the  reference  to  `divine'  virtue  to  mean 
the  higher  virtue  of  the  Republic  in  the  context  of  the  Dependency  Thesis.  Firstly,  Plato 
does  not  include  the  humanly  accessible  virtues  of  the  Laws  in  the  category  of  the  lesser 
goods.  He  lists  the  lesser  goods  as  what  would  have  commonly  been  thought  to  be  goods 
by  the  Greeks  at  that  time  -  health,  wealth,  attractiveness  and  strength.  If  he  were 
claiming  that  the  benefit  of  the  human  virtues  such  as  courage  and  temperance  were 
dependent  on  the  divine  virtues  he  surely  would  have  listed  them  as  being  more  important 
than  health  and  attractiveness.  Secondly,  if  it  were  the  case  that  Plato  was  positing  (at 
least)  two  kinds  of  virtue  in  the  Laws,  one  divine  and  one  human,  and  including  them  in 
the  Dependency  Thesis,  it  would  be  claiming  that  one  would  only  benefit  from  the  human 
virtues  if  one  had  the  divine  virtues.  This  would  mean  that  Plato  wrote  his  longest 
dialogue  mainly  about  the  kind  of  virtue  he  didn't  believe  would  benefit  people  without 
the  higher  virtue.  I  do  not  find  this  a  plausible  explanation.  The  Laws  is  written  about  a 
real  type  of  virtue  that  is  accessible  to  the  populace  of  Magnesia  -  why  would  he  commit 
so  much  time  to  it  if  he  didn't  believe  it  to  be  beneficial? 
A  further  alteration  in  Plato's  conception  of  courage  is  made  explicit  at  the  end  of  the 
Laws  when  Plato  states  his  new  position  on  the  possibility  of  children  and  animals  being 
courageous: 
51  Laws  739d6-8. 
175 Here's  the  question  for  you  to  put  to  me:  "why  is  it  that  after  calling  both  by  the  single 
term  `virtue',  in  the  next  breath  we  speak  of  two  `virtues',  courage  and  wisdom?  "  I'll 
tell  you  why.  One  of  them,  courage,  copes  with  fear,  and  is  found  in  wild  animals  as 
well  as  human  beings,  notably  in  the  characters  of  very  young  children.  The  soul,  you 
see,  becomes  courageous  by  a  purely  natural  process,  without  the  aid  of  reason.  By 
contrast,  in  this  absence  of  reason  a  wise  and  sensible  soul  is  out  of  the  question.  That 
is  true  now,  has  always  been  true,  and  always  will  be  true;  the  two  processes  are 
fundamentally  different.  52 
This  reference  to  animals  and  children  is  an  interesting  point  of  comparison  between  the 
early  and  middle  dialogues  and  the  Laws.  In  the  Laches  Nicias  takes  the  position  of 
Socrates  that  virtue  is  knowledge  and  claims  that  children  and  animals  cannot  be 
courageous53,  therefore  there  appears  to  be  a  considerable  difference  between  the  Laches 
and  the  Laws  on  this  subject.  In  the  Republic  Socrates  takes  the  position  that  animals,  and 
in  that  case  slaves  as  well,  cannot  be  brave.  After  explaining  that  the  `nature  and 
upbringing'  of  the  military  class  would  enable  them  to  `preserve  through  everything  the 
correct  and  law-inculcated  belief  about  what  is  to  be  feared  and  what  isn't',  Plato  says: 
I  imagine  that  you  would  not  regard  mere  uninstructed  judgement,  such  as  an  animal 
or  slave  might  have  on  these  matters,  as  being  in  accordance  with  law,  even  if  right, 
and  that  you  would  use  some  other  name  for  it.  54 
The  animals  and  slaves  can  have  correct  beliefs  about  what  should  be  feared,  but  it  only 
contributes  to  courage  if  they  have  had  the  proper  upbringing  and  know  why  these  things 
are  genuinely  to  be  feared.  However,  in  the  Laws  courage  can  be  instilled  by  a  natural 
process  and  the  right  education  is  not  a  necessary  component. 
The  inclusion  of  the  behaviour  of  animals  and  children  into  the  cases  covered  by  the  term 
`courage'  has  a  considerable  impact  on  the  meaning  of  this  virtue  for  Plato.  Children  and 
animals  can  behave  in  a  way  he  previously  categorized  as  simply  fearless  or  rash,  as  they 
do  not  have  the  right  knowledge  about  what  is  the  right  thing  to  do.  In  the  Laws  their 
52  Laws  963e1-11. 
53  Laches  197a-b. 
34  Rep.  430b5-8. 
176 behaviour  is  considered  to  be  courageous  but  they  do  not  have  a  `wise  and  sensible  soul' 
as  they  have  not  yet,  or  will  never  have  the  right  influences.  Does  this  then  mean  that 
Plato  now  thinks  that  one  can  be  courageous  whilst  doing  some  thing  immoral?  When 
discussing  the  work  of  Tyrtaeus  they  refer  to  his  position  on  the: 
hordes  of  mercenaries  who  are  ready  to  dig  their  heels  in  and  die  fighting,  most  of 
whom,  apart  from  a  very  small  minority,  are  reckless  and  insolent  rogues,  and  just 
ss  about  the  most  witless  people  you  could  find. 
The  Athenian  says  he  could  not  deny  `the  courage  of  those  soldiers'56,  so  it  appears  that 
Plato  now  believes  that  these  mercenaries  can  display  courage  regardless  of  what  or  who 
they  are  fighting  for.  Like  children  and  animals,  mercenary  soldiers  can  be  courageous 
`by  a  purely  natural  process'  which  does  not  rely  on  any  particular  cognitive  state.  If  this 
kind  of  courage  is  completely  divorced  from  reason  then  in  what  way  can  it  be 
considered  a  virtue? 
Plato's  position  has  clearly  changed  significantly  from  the  Republic.  Courage  can  not 
only  be  exhibited  by  animals,  children  -  those  without  developed  rationality  -  but  also  by 
mercenaries  -  who  will  by  no  means  be  necessarily  doing  the  right  thing.  I  do  not  think 
that  it  can  be  the  case  that  Plato  was  simply  vacillating  about  the  necessary  conditions  for 
virtue.  Given  the  description  of  the  mercenaries  as  `witless'  it  would  be  hard  to  accept 
that  Plato  believed  witless  mercenaries  were  capable  of  a  virtue.  What  can  be  concluded 
from  the  comments  made  about  courage  in  the  Laws  is  that  the  only  essential  element  in 
all  cases  of  courage  is  the  ability  to  overcome  the  conflict  with  fear,  pain  and  pleasure  - 
which  reflects  the  definition  given  at  633c8-d5.  What  distinguishes  the  courage  of  the 
mercenary  and  the  courage  of  the  virtuous  citizen  is  that  the  virtuous  citizen  will  be 
courageous  in  conjunction  with  having  true  belief  or  knowledge.  It  is  only  by  having  this 
true  belief  or  knowledge  that  the  tendency  towards  courageous  behaviour  can  be 
considered  a  virtue. 
ss  Laws  630b4-8. 
56  Laws  629e9-10. 
177 5.  The  Denendencv  Thesis 
So  how  is  the  relationship  between  virtuous  and  non-virtuous  courage  to  be  understood? 
If  we  are  to  consider  courage  as  including  acts  that  we  would  commonly  describe  as 
fearlessness,  or  the  ability  to  withstand  frightening  situations,  and  not  only  those  which 
are  governed  by  knowledge  or  true  belief,  is  there  anything  in  the  Laws  to  help  us 
understand  how  these  two  types  of  behaviour  both  referred  to  by  Plato  as  courage  relate 
to  one  another?  Fortunately,  Plato  does  comment  on  the  issue  of  how  `human'  goods  are 
related  to  `divine'  goods  in  the  Laws  -a  distinction  that  I  think  will  be  helpful  in 
understanding  how  the  apparently  disparate  nature  of  the  witless  mercenary,  children  and 
animals  and  the  noble  soldier  can  both  be  described  as  courageous. 
In  the  Laws  Plato  says: 
Benefits  fall  into  two  classes,  "human"  and  "divine".  The  former  depend  on  the  latter, 
and  if  a  city  receives  the  one  sort,  it  wins  the  other  too  -  the  greater  include  the  lesser; 
if  not,  it  goes  without  both.  Health  heads  the  list  of  the  lesser  benefits,  followed  by 
beauty;  third  comes  strength,  for  racing  and  other  physical  exercises.  Wealth  is  fourth 
-  not  "blind"  wealth,  but  the  clear-sighted  kind  whose  companion  is  good  judgement  - 
and  good  judgement  itself  is  the  leading  "divine"  benefit;  second  comes  the  habitual 
self-control  of  a  soul  that  uses  reason.  If  you  combine  these  two  with  courage,  you  get 
(thirdly)  justice;  courage  itself  lies  in  fourth  place.  All  these  take  a  natural  precedence 
over  the  others,  and  the  lawgiver  must  of  course  rank  them  in  the  same  order.  Then  he 
must  inform  the  citizens  that  the  other  instructions  they  receive  have  these  benefits  in 
view:  the  "human"  benefits  have  the  "divine"  in  view,  and  all  these  in  turn  look 
towards  reason,  which  is  supreme.  57 
This  passage  raises  a  general  problem  about  why  the  so-called  human  goods  lack  value  in 
the  absence  of  the  virtues.  It  also  implies  that  courage  as  well  as  the  other  virtues  is  a 
necessary  condition  of  our  deriving  any  benefit  from  the  human  goods.  However,  the  fact 
that  Plato  lists  courage  as  the  fourth  divine  virtue  may  suggest  that  he  had  some 
reservations  about  it.  Christopher  Bobonich  sees  this  passage  as  embodying  the 
57  Laws  631  b7-d5. 
178 `Dependency  Thesis'58,  a  doctrine  which  in  his  view  Plato  held  throughout  his  life.  An 
understanding  of  this  thesis  is  therefore  essential  to  our  understanding  of  the  role  of 
courage  in  the  Laws. 
So,  the  `Dependency  Thesis'  is  the  idea  in  the  Laws  that  the  commonly  held  good  things 
in  life  are  dependent  on  being  virtuous.  What  isn't  made  clear  here  is  in  what  way  health, 
beauty,  strength  and  wealth  are  dependent  on  the  virtues.  Plato  clearly  cannot  mean  that 
something  as  common  as  physical  health  cannot  exist  in  a  state  that  is  lacking  in  virtue; 
surely  a  person  can  have  physical  health  or  wealth  and  be  unjust.  It  would  be  an 
obviously  erroneous  claim,  if  that  were  the  claim  that  Plato  was  making.  However,  Plato 
is  making  a  more  complicated  and  challenging  claim.  The  idea  is  that  these  commonly 
held  good  things  would  only  benefit  a  person  if  he  was  also  virtuous.  The  clarification 
however,  does  not  make  clear  in  what  way,  and  why  a  person  will  only  be  benefited  by 
health  if  they  are  virtuous.  I  would  firstly  like  to  look  at  Vlastos'  and  Bobonich's 
interpretation  of  this  theory  before  turning  to  my  own  interpretation  of  how  this  theory 
should  be  understood. 
i.  Vlastos'  Interpretation 
Firstly,  it  is  important  to  note  that  when  Vlastos  discusses  what  he  calls  the  Sufficiency 
Thesis,  he  is  talking  about  the  views  of  Socrates  in  the  early  dialogues.  Even  though  his 
interpretation  is  of  a  different  period  of  Plato's  work  it  can  still  contribute  to  the 
understanding  of  this  idea  in  the  Laws.  To  what  extent  Plato's  views  have  changed  is  also 
of  course  an  interesting  issue.  The  primary  importance  of  virtue  in  the  life  of  the  happy 
man  is  prevalent  throughout  Plato's  work.  That  the  rational  man  will  at  the  same  time 
know  what  is  in  his  best  interests  and  realise  that  the  right  thing  to  do  is  the  morally right 
thing  to  do  is  an  idea  Plato  never  relinquishes.  It  forms  a  connection  between  what  is  in  a 
person's  self-interest  and  what  is  moral  that  he  assumes  or  argues  for  in  most  of  the 
dialogues.  The  idea  in  the  Laws  that  the  human  goods  depend  on  the  divine  goods  for 
58  Bobonich,  Christopher,  Plato's  Utopia  Recast. 
179 their  value  -  an  idea  that  appears  in  many  of  the  other  dialogues  -  attempts  to  explain  to 
us  how  the  virtues  relate  to  the  other  things  in  life  commonly  conceived  of  as  good. 
Vlastos  defines  the  three  possible  positions  that  people  could  be  taking  in  regard  to  the 
relationship  between  virtue  and  happiness.  The  second  and  third  position  he  discusses  as 
ones  that  Plato  might  be  taking  on  this  issue.  They  are: 
(1)  `the  relation  is  constitutive,  but  only  partly  so;  they  hold  that  virtue  is  a  principal,  but 
not  the  only,  thing  desirable  for  its  own  sake.  '59 
(2)  `the  relationship  is  constitutive  in  toto;  for  them  virtue  is  happiness  -  the  only  thing 
that  makes  life  good  and  satisfying.  160 
Even  though  there  is  some  apparent  evidence  in  the  early  dialogues  that  Plato's  position 
was  closer  to  (2),  a  position  Vlastos  calls  the  Identity  Thesis  because  virtue  is  identified 
with  happiness,  Vlastos  states  that  not  only  is  there  evidence  that  Plato  does  not  hold  this 
position  but  the  fact  that  he  would  be  facing  serious  problems  with  the  theory  if  he  did 
weighs  against  it.  The  Identity  Thesis  does  not  explain  why  non-moral  choices  could  be 
genuinely  meaningful  to  us.  Vlastos'  example  of  the  vomit-covered  bed  illustrates  this 
point  perfectly.  He  asks  you  to  imagine  that  you  are  staying  the  night  in  a  room  with  two 
beds,  one  clean  and  fresh  and  the  other  covered  in  vomit.  If  the  Identity  Thesis  were  the 
case  and  that  happiness  is  only  a  matter  of  doing  what  is  moral  and  so  choices  which  do 
not  have  a  moral  component  cannot  be  said  to  effect  our  happiness  in  any  way,  then  we 
would  be  equally  happy  sleeping  in  either  bed.  This  is  a  conclusion  that  is  intuitively  very 
hard  to  accept.  Due  to  this  consequence  of  the  Identity  Thesis  it  is  clear  that  any 
interpretation  of  the  idea  of  human  virtues  depending  on  divine  virtues  would  have  to 
find  a  way  of  making  non-moral  choices  as  meaningful  as  they  clearly  are  to  us. 
59  Vlastos,  G.,  Socrates:  Ironist  and  Moral  Philosopher,  p.  204. 
60  Vlastos,  G.,  Socrates:  Ironist  and  Moral  Philosopher,  p.  204. 
180 Vlastos  concludes  that  the  position  described  in  (1)  is  what  Plato  actually  thought  about 
this  issue.  Vlastos  believes  that  the  non-moral  goods  can  still  be  goods,  but  that  they  are 
significantly  inferior  to  moral  goods: 
Keeping  virtue  in  its  place  as  the  sovereign  good,  both  necessary  and  sufficient  for 
happiness,  let  us  allow  happiness  a  multitude  of  lesser  constituents  in  addition  to 
virtue.  Everything  on  Socrates'  list  of  non-moral  goods  would  come  in  under  this 
head.  In  disjunction  from  virtue  each  would  be  worthless.  But  when  conjoined  with 
virtue  (i.  e.  when  used  virtuously)  they  would  enhance  happiness  in  some  small 
degree.. 
.  all  of  those  non-moral  mini-components  of  happiness  would  be  incremental 
in  some  small  way  if  conjoined  with  virtue.  61 
A  problem  with  Vlastos'  interpretation  is  that  he  doesn't  explain  why  it  is  the  case  that 
regarding  non-moral  goods  `in  disjunction  from  virtue  each  would  be  worthless'.  I  think 
it  is  a  good  point  that  non-moral  goods  can  have  a  greatly  reduced  effect  on  a  person's 
happiness,  but  he  does  not  explain  why  these  much  less  significant  goods  could  not  make 
a  tiny  difference  when  not  accompanied  by  virtue.  Bobonich  fills  in  this  blank  in  Vlastos' 
theory  by  claiming  that  what  Vlastos  means  by  moral  virtue  is  moral  knowledge.  So  the 
explanation  for  why  non-moral  goods  cannot  be  good  in  disjunction  from  virtue  is  that  it 
is  moral  knowledge  that  makes  them  good  for  someone: 
What  Vlastos  seems  to  mean  by  `moral  virtue'  is  `moral  knowledge,  '  i.  e.  knowledge 
of  the  moral  values  at  stake  in  the  circumstances  of  choice..  .  Given  this  identification 
of  moral  virtue  with  moral  knowledge,  the  claim  that  moral  virtue  is  what  makes  all 
goods  good  for  their  possessor  is  equivalent  to  the  claim  that  moral  knowledge  is  what 
makes  all  the  Dependent  Goods  valuable.  62 
Bobonich  describes  two  problems  with  Vlastos'  interpretation.  The  first  is  a  point  about 
moral  knowledge.  Bobonich  claims  that  `in  the  Euthydemus  and  the  Meno,  Plato  claims 
that  Dependent  Goods  are  dependent  on  people's  knowledge  of  the  good,  i.  e.  on  their 
knowledge  of  what  is  good  or  bad  for  themselves  all  things  considered'63.  His  reading  of 
Vlastos  would  mean  that  Vlastos  was  misreading  this  knowledge  as  only  moral 
knowledge  and  not  a  more  general  kind  of  knowledge  of  moral  and  non-moral  options. 
61  Vlastos,  G.,  Socrates:  Ironist  and  Moral  Philosopher,  p.  216. 
62  Bobonich,  C.,  Plato's  Utopia  Recast,  p.  138. 
63  Ibid. 
181 The  second  problem  concerns  the  immoral  man.  If  it  were  the  case  that  moral  knowledge 
determined  the  value  of  non-moral  goods  then  those  without  moral  knowledge  would 
have  no  reason  to  distinguish  between  non-moral  alternatives  such  as  the  clean  or  dirty 
bed. 
The  fact  that  Bobonich  describes  his  reading  of  Vlastos  as  what  Vlastos  `seems  to  mean' 
show  that  it  is  not  taken  directly  from  his  work.  It  is  understandable  that  Bobonich  has 
assumed  that  by  `moral  virtue'  Vlastos  really  means  `moral  knowledge'  as  Vlastos  was 
writing  about  the  early  dialogues  where  virtue  is  said  to  be  knowledge.  He  has  simply 
replaced  virtue  with  what  it  is  said  to  be  in  the  early  works  of  Plato.  However,  Vlastos 
does  not  explicitly  say  this  himself,  and  it  is  an  assumption  that  this  is  what  he  really 
means.  The  thrust  of  Vlastos'  argument  in  Socrates:  Ironist  and  Moral  Philosopher  is 
that  he  does  not  think  that  the  Identity  Thesis  is  an  accurate  representation  of  Plato's 
thought  and  that  non-moral  goods  can  affect,  although  only  slightly,  a  person's  quality  of 
life.  That  he  doesn't  fully  explain  the  connection  between  moral  and  non-moral  goods  is 
perhaps  an  omission  but  I  do  not  think  we  are  entitled  to  read  into  the  work  a  conclusion 
that  he  doesn't  himself  argue  for.  Also,  the  main  problem  with  this  assumption  is  I  do  not 
believe  that  it  is  the  only  way  of  filling  in  the  gap  left  by  Vlastos.  I  will  discuss  an 
alternative  below  after  I  have  looked  at  Bobonich's  attempt  to  explain  the  Dependency 
Thesis. 
ii.  Bobonich's  Interpretation 
Firstly  Bobonich  classes  the  greater  and  lesser  goods  from  631b-d  as  Independent  and 
Dependent  Goods,  where  Independent  Goods  are  the  virtues,  and  Dependent  goods  are 
the  lesser  goods  -  health,  wealth  etc.  The  virtues  are  good  independently  of  any  other 
factor,  whereas  for  the  lesser  goods  to  benefit  a  person  they  must  necessarily  have  the 
greater  goods.  Bobonich  roots  his  interpretation  of  this  issue  in  the  importance  Plato 
places  on  knowledge.  Bobonich  claims  that  a  good  explanation  of  the  Dependency  Thesis 
must  fulfil  the  following  four  conditions: 
182 (1)Virtue  must  be  necessary  for  benefiting  from  any  Dependent  Good,  not  only  those 
Dependent  Goods  that  are  instances  of  `moral  value'. 
(2)  Virtue  must  be  genuinely  necessary  for  benefiting  from  any  Dependent  Good  and  a 
good  explanation  must  make  clear  why  it  is  necessary. 
(3)Virtue  must  be  an  Independent  Good. 
(4)  The  feature  of  virtue  that  makes  it  an  Independent  Good  is  essential  to  explaining 
why  virtue  is  a  source  of  value  for  the  Dependent  Goods.  64 
By  focusing  on  (2)  he  thinks  `we  can  make  knowledge  a  genuinely  necessary  condition  of 
benefit  by  making  the  agents'  knowledge  itself  partially  constitutive  of  their  benefiting'65 
The  idea  is  that  in  order  for  us  to  benefit  from  Human,  or  Dependent,  Goods  we  must  be 
aware  that  we  have  them  and  have  `a  positive  attitude  towards  them'66.  He  then  continues 
that: 
The  idea  that  such  an  awareness  of  a  Dependent  Good  and  a  belief  about  its  goodness 
are  partially  constitutive  of  benefiting  from  the  Dependent  Good  is  very  plausible. 
How  could  a  Dependent  Good  benefit  me,  if  I  am  unaware  that  I  have  it  or  I  perceive 
it  as  a  great  evil?  67 
Bobonich  also  acknowledges  the  importance  of  including  the  idea  that  what  is 
appreciated  about  the  Dependent  Good  is  what  is  genuinely  good  about  it  (this  is  in  order 
to  exclude  such  cases  as  someone  who  appreciates  their  intelligence  because  it  enables 
them  to  make  others  feel  inferior). 
64  Bobonich,  C.,  Plato's  Utopia  Recast,  pp.  145-6. 
65  Ibid. 
66  Ibid 
67  Ibid. 
183 Bobonich  himself  brings  up  a  possible  problem  for  his  theory,  and  I  think  rejects  it  too 
quickly.  He  says: 
We  might  be  concerned  that  we  are  attributing  to  Plato  a  far  too  subjective  account  of 
the  good.  Specifically,  this  interpretation  makes  the  benefit  people  receive,  that  is, 
what  is  good  for  them,  depend  on  their  attitudes  or  beliefs.  Thus  on  one  prominent 
contemporary  account  of  what  is  objectively  good  for  a  person,  Plato  is  not  an 
objectivist  about  the  goodness  of  Dependent  Goods.  On  an  `Objective  List'  conception 
of  well-being,  things  are  good  or  bad  for  people,  independently  of  their  attitude 
towards  them.  But  we  cannot  avoid  denying  that  Plato  is  an  objectivist  in  this  sense. 
Simply  by  making  the  goodness  of  Dependent  Goods  depend  on  the  agent's  virtue, 
Plato  makes  their  goodness  depend  on  the  agent's  beliefs  about  and  desires  for  the 
good.  The  Dependency  Thesis  is  just  inconsistent  with  making  the  benefit  of 
Dependent  Goods  independent  of  the  agent's  attitude  towards  them.  68 
I  think  Bobonich's  interpretation  fails  on  two  counts.  Firstly,  he  misunderstands  the 
nature  of  the  Dependent  Goods.  They  are  not  subjectively,  but  conditionally  good,  and 
under  certain  circumstances,  objectively  good,  by  which  I  mean,  when  they  are  good  they 
are  objectively  good.  Secondly,  he  fails  to  recognise  the  role  that  Dependent  Goods  play 
in  Plato's  moral  theory  -  Dependent  Goods  are  not  only  conditionally  good,  but  also 
instrumentally  good;  they  are  good  or  bad  because  of  the  effect  they  may  have  on  the 
individual.  I  will  be  referring  to  some  important  distinctions  in  this  discussion.  They  are: 
subjective  and  objective  goods,  ends  and  means,  and  conditional  and  unconditional 
goods.  I  am  taking  subjective  goods  as  goods  which  are  `relative  to  the  person'  and  as 
`varying  among  individuals'69,  objective  goods  will  therefore  be  those  which  are  not 
relative  to  the  person.  I  am  taking  goods  which  are  good  as  ends  as  ones  that  are  valuable 
as  things  in  themselves,  whereas  things  which  are  good  as  means  are  valuable  for  their 
instrumental  effect70.  Unconditional  goods  are  goods  which  do  not  rely  on  any  other 
condition  for  their  goodness,  whereas  conditional  goods  require  some  further  condition 
be  met  in  order  for  them  to  be  good.  These  distinctions  can  easily  be  conflated,  and  this 
68  Ibid. 
69  Korsgaard,  C.,  `Two  distinctions  in  Goodness'. 
70  I  am  not  here  committing  the  mistake  that  Korsgaard  discusses  in  her  paper,  although  I  do  think  that  for 
Plato  things  which  are  good  as  an  end  will  also  be  intrinsically  good.  However,  Korsgaard  takes  things 
good  as  means  and  ends  as  things  that  we  value  as  means  or  ends.  Plato  believes  that  things  can  be  valuable 
as  means  and  as  ends  but  not  necessarily  because  we  value  them  in  that  way. 
184 can  unfortunately  lead  to  a  misunderstanding  of  the  problems  in  some  theories  of  the 
good. 
Bobonich's  account  relies  on  the  idea  that  for  Plato  human  goods  are  dependent  on  the 
attitudes  and  beliefs  of  the  individual.  As  he  points  out,  this  means  that  Plato  thought  that 
the  goodness  of  health,  wealth  etc.,  relies  on  how  the  individual  feels  about  such  things, 
which  also  means  that  this  goodness  is  subjective  -  depending  on  the  attitude  of  an 
individual  person.  Bobonich  accepts  that  this  may  seem  like  an  unlikely  interpretation  of 
a  philosopher  known  for  his  belief  in  objective  value.  He  attempts  to  dissolve  this 
problem  for  his  interpretation  by  claiming  that  Plato  clearly  is  a  subjectivist  about  the 
goodness  of  human  goods,  as  they  are  conditional  on  the  moral  status  of  the  individual.  I 
think  this  is  a  mistake  on  Bobonich's  part.  Plato  says  that  human  goods  are  in  some  way 
dependent  on  virtue,  and  that  we  cannot  benefit  from  human  goods  without  first  being 
virtuous.  What  he  does  not  claim,  and  I  think  it  would  have  been  surprising  if  he  had,  is 
that  human  goods  are  dependent  on  the  subjective  personal  appreciation  of  the 
appropriate  quality  of  the  Dependent  Good  by  a  virtuous  person.  I  think  Bobonich  is here 
assuming  that  all  conditional  goods  are  necessarily  subjective  goods.  It  may  be  true  that 
all  things  we  think  of  as  subjectively  good  are  also  conditionally  good,  as  to  say  that 
something  is  subjectively  good  we  mean  that  its  goodness  relies  on  whether  the  condition 
of  a  person's  positive  attitude  to  it  is  fulfilled.  However,  the  conditions  under  which 
something  can  be  conditionally  good  do  not  just  make  reference  to  a  person's  attitudes  to 
it. 
Let's  consider  an  example  in  order  to  make  this  distinction  clearer.  Imagine  someone 
who  is  committed  to  his  or  her  exercise  regime.  They  get  up  a  7a.  m.  every  morning  in 
order  run  around  the  park.  The  fact  that  this  person  is  running  is  a  conditionally  good 
thing  -  if  they  are  exercising  sensibly  and  improving  their  overall  standard  of  health,  and 
not  pushing  themselves  so  hard  that  they  injure  themselves,  then  it  is  a  good  thing.  It  is 
conditional  on  doing  it  in  such  a  way  that  will  benefit  the  person  and  not  injure  them.  If 
185 in  fact  it  is  not  being  done  sensibly  then  it  is  not  a  good  thing.  Whether  it  is  a  good  thing 
or  not  is  conditional  on  the  way  in  which  it  is  done  and  the  effect  it  is  having  on  the  body 
of  the  person  concerned.  I  lowever,  whether  this  exercise  regime  is  good  or  not  is  not  in 
any  way  dependent  on  whether  the  individual  believes  it  to  be  or  has  a  certain  attitude  to 
it.  Thus  we  can  sec  that  there  is  a  legitimate  difference  between  the  issue  of  whether  Plato 
is  being  a  subjectivist  or  objectivist  about  human  goods,  or  whether  he  believes  they  are 
conditionally  or  unconditionally  good. 
It  is  clear  that  with  regard  to  the  conditional  -unconditional  distinction  Plato  believes  that 
human  goods  are  conditional,  and  conditional  on  being  virtuous.  The  goodness  of 
conditional  goods  is  dependent  on  certain  conditions  being  satisfied,  which  in  Plato's 
case  would  be  having  the  virtues.  We  can  see  from  the  example  above  that  just  because 
Plato  is  committed  to  the  idea  that  human  goods  are  conditional  does  not  mean  that  he 
also  believes  them  to  be  subjectively  good.  Therefore  it  is  clear  that  Bobonich  is  wrong 
when  he  denies  that  `Plato  is  an  objectivist  in  this  sense',  and  goes  on,  `simply  by  making 
the  goodness  of  Dependent  Goods  depend  on  the  agent's  virtue,  Plato  makes  their 
goodness  depend  on  the  agent's  beliefs  about  and  desires  for  the  good.  The  Dependency 
Thesis  is  just  inconsistent  with  making  the  benefit  of  Dependent  Goods  independent  of 
the  agent's  attitude  towards  them'.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  simply  the  case  that  Plato  can 
make  human  goods  dependent  on  the  virtues  without  also  making  them  dependent  on  the 
agent's  belief  about  what  is  good  for  them. 
I  think  I3obonich's  interpretation  would  also  entail  an  unfortunate  consequence  for  Plato 
if  this  were  indeed  what  he  meant.  Consider  two  people,  one  moral  and  the  other  immoral 
who  arc  both  healthy,  something  Plato  considers  to  be  the  primary  human  good  in  his 
description  of  the  Dependency  Thesis.  I  assume  that  when  Plato  says  that  when  a  city 
'accepts  the  greater  goods'  it  'acquires  the  lesser  along  with  them,  but  one  which  refuses 
them,  misses  both',  he  does  not  mean  that  a  person  who  is  not  virtuous  cannot  be  healthy, 
but  they  cannot  benefit  from  being  healthy,  therefore  they  are  not  benefiting  from  a 
186 `good'.  So  the  virtuous  person  is  healthy  and  benefits  from  it,  whilst  the  non-virtuous 
person  is  healthy  but  doesn't  benefit  from  it.  What  Bobonich  is  proposing  is  that  the 
reason  the  non-virtuous  person  does  not  benefit  from  being  healthy  is  that  they  do  not 
appreciate  what  is  genuinely  good  about  health.  Can  it  be  true  that  a  virtuous  and  non- 
virtuous  person  appreciates  health  for  essentially  different  reasons? 
There  is,  however,  something  plausible  about  the  idea  that  you  need  to  appreciate  what  is 
genuinely  valuable  about  something  in  order  to  benefit  from  it.  Perhaps  it  could  be 
argued  that  if  the  moderately  well-off,  healthy,  attractive,  strong  person  cannot  appreciate 
what  is  genuinely  valuable  about  such  qualities  and  how  much  better  their  life  is  than  the 
poverty-stricken,  ill,  ugly  weakling  then  they  will  not  really  benefit  from  such 
advantages.  If  we  are  not  aware  of  the  goods  things  that  we  have,  or  what  is  really  what  is 
good  about  them  how  can  we  benefit  from  them?  However,  the  case  of  health  is  still 
problematic.  It  may  be  possible  that  a  person  of  perfect  health  might  not  appreciate  and 
benefit  from  their  health  because  they  do  not  understand  why  it  is  valuable  -  i.  e.  that  it 
allows  you  to  involve  yourself  actively  in  worthwhile  pursuits.  But  what  would  happen  if 
this  person  became  ill  and  therefore  lost  the  standard  of  health  they  were  so  used  to? 
They  would  probably  think  that  in  retrospect  they  did  not  fully  appreciate  what  was  so 
wonderful  about  being  healthy.  However,  I  also  imagine  it  would  be  common  to  think 
that  it  had  been  something  valuable  that  had  been  taken  away  and  that  now  they  were  at  a 
disadvantage,  even  though  it  may  be  that  in  illness  that  they  can  really  appreciate  what 
was  valuable  about  health.  So  benefiting  from  health  does  not  necessarily  go  hand  in 
hand  with  having  an  appreciation  of  what  is  genuinely  valuable  about  health. 
iii.  An  alternative  interpretation 
I  think  it  is  important  to  state  what  a  good  interpretation  of  this  theory  should  be  able  to 
do.  Firstly  it  should  be  able  to  explain  why  there  is  a  relationship  between  the  virtues  and 
the  commonly  held  human  goods,  such  that  a  person  and  a  state  can  only  have  the  latter  if 
they  have  the  former.  Secondly,  it  should  be  able  to  take  into  account  the  fact  that  it  is 
187 possible  for  non-moral  goods  to  impact  on  a  person's  life  whether  they  are  a  moral 
person  or  not,  such  that  it  is  legitimate  within  the  theory  to  prefer  the  clean  to  the  dirty 
bed. 
An  alternative  way  of  understanding  the  idea  of  dependency  in  the  Laws  is  by 
considering  the  role  that  the  human  goods  can  play  in  making  a  person  virtuous  or  not.  It 
is  clear  that  Plato  thinks  that  the  human  goods  are  significantly  less  important  for 
happiness  than  virtue.  He  frequently  claims  that  the  only  consideration  we  should  have 
when  making  a  decision  is  whether  it  is  the  right  thing  to  do.  However,  as  stated  above, 
this  theory  also  must  be  able  to  make  sense  of  making  choices  between  two  non-moral 
options.  I  think  the  subjectivity  of  Dependent  Goods  is  dependent  on  the  effect  they  can 
have  on  the  individual,  and  that  is  why  they  are  sometimes  good  and  sometimes  bad.  A 
human  good  such  as  wealth  is  bad  for  the  immoral  person  not  because  they  appreciate  it 
for  the  wrong  reason  (even  though  they  might),  but  that  it  contributes  to  their  belief  that 
the  immoral  life  is  the  superior  one,  and  will  therefore  not  wish  to  change.  Wealth  is  a 
good  for  a  moral  person  because  it  also  contributes,  although  much  less  than  virtue,  to 
their  standard  of  living.  Commonly  held  good  things  will  make  the  life  someone  is  living 
more  comfortable  and  therefore  the  person  is  less  likely  to  wish  to  change  it.  This 
interpretation  makes  sense  of  the  claim  that  Dependent  Goods  really  are  bad  for  unjust 
people,  and  Dependent  Bads  really  are  good.  Otherwise  this  claim  is  quite  difficult  to 
support.  Bobonich  claims  that: 
Plato  need  not  (and  I  think  does  not)  hold  that  every  Dependent  Good  is  bad  for  an 
unjust  person;  what  he  should  hold  is  that  no  Dependent  Good  benefits  a  person  apart 
from  virtue.  This  is  true  if  either  the  Dependent  Good  is bad  for  the  unjust  person  or  if 
it  is  simply  not  good  for  them.  Nor  should  Plato  hold  that  a  Dependent  Bad  is  actually 
good  for  an  unjust  person;  nothing  is  good  for  an  unjust  person.  7' 
But  Plato  quite  explicitly  says  that: 
71  Bobonich,  C.,  Plato's  Utopia  Recast,  pp.  126-7. 
188 Look  here,  now:  my  position  is  quite  clear.  Although  so-called  evils  are  in  fact  evil  for 
the  just,  they  are  good  for  the  unjust;  and  so-called  `goods',  while  genuinely  good  for 
the  good,  are  evils  for  the  wicked.  72 
I  do  not  think  we  can  ignore  such  an  explicit  claim,  and  I  think  it  is  to  the  detriment  of 
Bobonich's  theory  that  it  cannot  explain  it  and  therefore  must  reject  it. 
The  role  of  punishment  in  the  Gorgias  can  also  lend  support  to  this  interpretation. 
Punishment  is  something  that  is  commonly  held  to  be  a  bad  thing  for  the  individual, 
whether  they  are  guilty  of  the  crime  they  are  being  punished  for  or  not.  In  the  Gorgias 
Plato  argues  with  Polus  not  only  that  it  is  better  to  suffer  wrong  than  to  do  wrong,  but 
also  that  those  who  do  wrong  would  be  benefited  by  being  punished: 
You  claim  that  nothing  could  be  worse  for  a  criminal  than  paying  the  penalty  for  his 
crimes,  whereas  I  claim  that  he's  worse  off  if  he  doesn't  pay  the  penalty.  73 
Plato  draws  an  analogy  between  physical  health  and  injustice;  he  says  that  we  take  people 
to  doctors  when  they  are  unwell  and  judges  when  they  commit  a  wrongdoing.  He  then 
makes  the  unacceptable  jump  to  the  claim  that:  `Medicine  relieves  us  of  illness,  and  the 
administration  of  justice  relieves  us  of  self-indulgence  and  injustice'74.  Punishment,  like 
medical  treatment,  is  there  to  help  us  with  different  problems,  some  curable  and  others 
not.  The  fact  that  punishment  can  have  such  an  effect  on  the  soul  of  the  individual 
suggests  that  Plato  believed  that  we  could  be  changed  by  things  that  happen  to  us  as  well 
as  things  that  we  do. 
Punishment  is  something  which  is  considered  to  be  a  human  `bad';  it  is  something  that 
most  people  would  commonly  wish  to  avoid  regardless  of  whether  they  have  committed 
some  kind  of  crime  or  not.  Plato  argues  that  this  commonly  held  view  is  actually  an 
72  Laws  661  d  1-4. 
73  Gorgias  476a6-8. 
74  Gorgias  478a17-b2. 
189 erroneous  one,  and  that  a  guilty  person  would  be  benefited  by  being  punished,  and 
therefore  should  seek  it  out.  At  the  end  of  the  dialogue  when  discussing  the  judgment 
after  death,  he  claims  that  the  `promiscuity,  sensuality,  brutality  and  self-indulgence'  of 
the  unjust  man  would  have 
Distorted  the  harmony  and  beauty  of  his  soul.  When  he  sees  a  soul  in  this  state,  he 
immediately  dispatched  it  to  prison,  where  it  will  undergo  the  appropriate  treatment. 
What  is  appropriate?  As  long  as  the  person  inflicting  the  punishment  is  justified  in 
doing  so,  then  every  instance  of  punishment  should  either  help  its  recipient  by  making 
him  a  better  person  or  should  act  as  an  example  for  others..  . 
Those  who  are  benefited 
by  being  punished  (whether  the  agents  of  punishment  are  divine  or  human)  are  those 
whose  faults  are  curable.  75 
So  punishment  is  something  that  is  good  for  you  if  you  are  immoral  because  it  helps  you 
to  escape  that  immorality  that  is  bad  for  you.  Although  Plato  is  arguing  for  the  beneficial 
nature  of  punishment  from  a  more  psychological  perspective  in  the  Gorgias  the  similarity 
of  the  idea  to  the  dependency  thesis  in  the  Laws  is  clear.  Punishment,  like  ill  health  and 
poverty,  is  seen  by  Plato  as  an  opportunity  to  change  what  the  person  considers  to  be  a 
good  way  of  life.  In  the  Gorgias  punishment  is  supposed  to  help  the  unjust  individual 
realize  the  genuine  error  of  his  ways. 
We  can  see  the  same  attitude  to  punishment  coming  through  in  the  Laws  as  well.  In  Book 
IX  Plato  says: 
If  a  man  is  caught  thieving  from  a  temple  and  is  a  foreigner  or  slave,  a  brand  of  his 
misfortune  shall  be  made  on  his  face  and  hands,  and  he  shall  be  whipped,  the  number 
of  lashes  to  be  decided  by  his  judges.  Then  he  shall  be  thrown  out  beyond  the 
boundaries  of  the  land,  naked.  (Perhaps  paying  this  penalty  will  teach  him  restraint 
and  make  him  a  better  man:  after  all,  no  penalty  imposed  by  law  has  an  evil  purpose, 
but  generally  achieves  one  of  two  effects:  it  makes  the  person  who  pays  the  penalty 
either  more  virtuous  or  less  wicked.  )76 
73  Gorgias  525a6-b10. 
76  Laws  854d  1-e2. 
190 He  goes  on  to  say  that  if  a  citizen  were  convicted  of  a  crime  as  serious  as  sacrilege 
against  `gods,  parents,  or  society'  he  would  have  to  be  killed  as  his  `case  is  already 
desperate'.  At  862c8-e4  Plato  says  that  death  must  be  the  punishment  for  those  who 
cannot  be  cured.  This  is  same  conception  of  punishment  that  we  find  in  the  Gorgias  - 
those  who  can  be  cured  will  be  appropriately  punished;  those  who  cannot  be  cured  will 
be  sentenced  to  death  or  held  up  as  an  example  for  others. 
It  is  clear  from  this  discussion  of  punishment  that  Plato  believed  in  the  efficacy  of  human 
goods  on  the  more  important  beliefs  and  commitments  of  people.  People  can  be  changed 
by  the  things  that  happen  to  them,  as  punishment  can  change  a  person  from  believing  that 
wrongdoing  is  beneficial  to  seeing  the  error  of  his  ways.  Therefore  the  human  goods 
referred  to  in  the  Laws  are  dependent  on  the  divine  virtues  because  without  the  virtues 
they  can  be  positively  hurtful.  The  bad  man  who  grows  rich  will  be  confined  in  his 
wickedness;  if  on  the  other  hand  he  becomes  poor  he  may  see  the  error  of  his  ways.  What 
comes  out  of  this  discussion  is  the  issue  of  whether  Plato  was  right  in  listing  courage  as 
one  of  the  divine  virtues,  since  it  can  be  bad  for  us  when  not  directed  by  reason.  In  this 
way  courage  appears  to  have  more  in  common  with  health  and  wealth  rather  than  justice 
and  wisdom. 
191 6.  Courage  continued 
This  discussion  of  the  Dependency  Thesis  can  possibly  help  us  to  understand  Plato's 
conception  of  courage  in  the  Laws.  Abilities,  such  as  being  able  to  stand  up  for  yourself 
and  fight  your  enemies  or  in  situations  of  battle  where  you  are  in  danger,  are  positive 
traits.  So,  we  can  understand  why  such  a  quality  is  a  human  good;  it  is  a  characteristic 
one  would  prefer  to  have  than  not  to  have.  However,  in  Plato's  ethical  scheme,  such  a 
characteristic  would  only  be  beneficial  to  someone  if  they  also  possessed  knowledge  or 
true  belief  of  what  things  were  worth  fighting  for.  If  they  did  indeed  possess  this 
knowledge  or  true  belief  then  their  courage  would  be  a  good  thing  for  them  and  be 
described  as  a  `divine'  virtue.  However,  if  the  individual  in  question  was  ignorant  of  the 
good  then  having  such  a  character  trait  would  not  be  beneficial  for  them,  for  it  would 
encourage  them  to  believe  that  the  life  of  the  fighter,  whoever  or  whatever  they  were 
fighting  for  was  a  positive  thing,  with  rewards  of  the  lifestyle  to  support  this  view. 
The  problem  with  interpreting  Plato's  view  of  courage  in  the  Laws  in  this  way  is  that  he 
at  no  point  says  that  courage  can  be  both  a  Dependent  and  an  Independent  Good,  so  we 
are  left  with  the  conclusion  that  it  is  a  Dependent  Good.  Considering  this  is  quite  a 
considerable  change  of  view  we  would  imagine  that  Plato  would  discuss  it  in  greater 
depth,  or  at  least  make  some  explicit  reference  to  it.  Is  the  explanation  that  the  Laws  is  a 
practical  work  and  not  so  directly  concerned  with  discussing  ethics  a  plausible  solution  to 
this  problem?  I  am  not  so  sure.  Even  though  it  is  true  that  Plato  is  not  as  concerned  with 
defining  and  discussing  the  virtues  in  the  same  depth  as  he  was  in  the  Republic,  it  does 
not  seem  probable  that  he  would  allow  such  an  about  face  to  go  uncommented  on.  A 
further  consequent  of  this  apparent  separation  of  courage  into  the  virtuous  and  the  non- 
virtuous  is  the  status  of  virtuous  courage.  Plato  has  stated  that  courage  as  a  virtue  is,  like 
the  other  virtues,  independent  -  it  requires  nothing  further  to  value  it  as  good.  The  human 
goods,  on  the  other  hand,  rely  on  the  virtues  in  order  to  determine  whether  they  are  good 
or  bad  for  the  individual.  However,  it  appears  that  even  courage  as  a  virtue  is  not  an 
192 Independent  Good  because  it  relies  on  also  having  the  virtue  of  wisdom.  It  is  becoming 
clear  that  Plato's  conception  of  courage  is  a  particularly  troubling  one. 
There  is  another,  perhaps  more  serious  consequence  of  Plato's  concept  of  courage  as  a 
virtue.  As  stated  above,  virtue  in  the  Laws  can  be  seen  as  an  agreement  between  what  one 
values  and  what  gives  one  pleasure: 
When  a  man  thinks  something  is  fine  and  good,  but  loathes  it  instead  of  liking  it,  and 
conversely  when  he  likes  and  welcomes  what  he  believes  is  wicked  and  unjust.  I 
maintain  that  this  disaccord  between  his  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  and  his  rational 
judgement  constitutes  the  very  lowest  depth  of  ignorance.  77 
The  idea  in  the  Laws  that  virtue  is  an  agreement  between  our  judgement  and  our  desires 
does  not  fit  well  with  courage  as  a  virtue.  If  courage  is  an  overcoming  of  fear  then  how 
can  it  also  be  some  kind  of  concord  with  them?  If  I  am  right  to  assume  that  virtue  is  when 
`reasoned  judgement'  and  what  one  `loves  and  enjoys'  find  some  harmony,  then  how  is 
Plato's  version  of  courage  to  fit  into  this  conception?  The  person  with  the  virtue  of 
courage  would  then  have  to  be  someone  who,  for  example,  judges  that  it  is  right  to  go 
into  battle,  and  that  the  idea  of  battle  also  gives  him  pleasure.  That  seems  more  akin  to 
bloodthirstiness  than  virtue.  Even  if  this  ethical  theory  of  virtue  being  found  in  a  harmony 
between  judgement  and  desire  does  not  lead  to  courage  being  bloodthirstiness  -  for 
example  if  this  harmony  could  be  created  by  someone  simply  not  having  fear  or  feeling 
happy  about  the  gore  of  battle  -  it  still  relies  on  the  idea  that  virtue  is  not  the  overcoming 
of  the  desires  but  some  kind  of  agreement  with  them.  What  about  the  man  who  hates 
fighting,  but  overcomes  his  fears  and  charges  in  for  the  sake  of  his  family  and  state 
driven  by  the  knowledge  that  his  is  a  worthy  cause?  He  would  have  courage  as  a  virtue 
according  to  the  definitions  of  courage  given  in  the  Laws  but  according  to  the  overall 
ethical  position  he  has  the  same  human  courage  as  the  witless  mercenary  or  animals  78.  it 
is  not  possible  to  interpret  the  Laws  in  such  a  way  that  this  confusion  does  not  occur. 
"Laws  689a5-10. 
78  See  Laws  630b4-8  &  963e1-11. 
193 Plato's  concern  with  harmony  in  the  Laws  has  created  a  particular  problem  with  his  new 
concept  of  courage. 
194 7.  Conclusion 
As  I  stated  above,  Plato  has  not  pursued  the  Socratic  search  for  definitions  and  essential 
qualities.  This  is  perhaps  a  shame,  as  given  the  diversity  of  the  behaviour  now 
encompassed  by  the  term  courage,  we  are  left  to  ask  what  it  is  that  makes  all  types  of 
courageous  behaviour  fall  under  the  same  term.  We  now  know  that  the  courageous 
person  can  be  both  knowledgeable  (or  at  least  have  true  belief),  and  `witless'  or  pre- 
rational  like  children,  and  is  an  appropriate  term  to  describe  both  people  and  animals  79 
Let  us  return  to  the  definition  of  courage  Plato  gives  us  in  the  Laws: 
[Athenian]  But  what  is  to  be  our  definition  of  courage?  Are  we  to  define  it  simply  in 
terms  of  a  fight  against  fears  and  pains  only,  or  do  we  include  desires  and  pleasures, 
which  cajole  and  seduce  us  so  effectively?  They  mould  the  heart  like  wax  -  even  the 
hearts  of  those  who  loftily  believe  themselves  superior  to  such  influences...  [Megillus] 
Yes,  I  think  so  -  the  fight  is  against  all  these  feelings.  80 
Courage  is  therefore  the  conflict  with  -  and  presumably  the  ability  to  overcome  -  fear, 
pain,  pleasure  and  seduction.  Plato  no  longer  explains  this  ability  in  terms  of  the  Socratic 
belief  that  it  is  what  someone  knows  that  counts;  it  is  not  necessarily  a  quality  that 
someone  can  only  have  if  they  have  the  right  kind  of  education  or  upbringing.  Human 
courage,  as  separate  from  courage  as  a  virtue,  is  a  character  trait  that  can  be  found  in 
those  who  don't  have  knowledge  or  true  belief;  as  Plato  says  `the  soul..  . 
becomes 
courageous  by  a  purely  natural  process'81.  There  is  no  reason  to  think  that  for  those  who 
have  developed  courage  by  a  `purely  natural  process'  that  some  form  of  relevant 
education  was  needed  in  order  to  instil  such  a  temperament,  as  I  doubt  Plato  believed  that 
the  witless  mercenary,  or  indeed  an  animal,  had  the  right  kind  of  education  to  instill 
courage.  Courage  then  appears  to  be  a  character  trait  that  can  be  found  in  either  the 
virtuous  or  the  non-virtuous,  and  it  is  exhibited  through  the  kind  of  actions  that  overcome 
fear,  pain  and  pleasures,  and  it  is  not  necessarily  of  benefit  to  the  individual.  However,  a 
difficulty  arises  when  we  try  to  incorporate  this  definition  of  courage  within  Plato's 
79  Laws  963e,  630b. 
8°  Laws  633c8-d7. 
e1  Laws  963e6-7. 
195 general  ethical  scheme  in  the  Laws.  As  I  have  argued  above82,  in  the  Laws  Plato  thinks 
the  virtues  are  a  harmony  in  the  soul,  but  he  also  says  that  courage  is  a  struggle  between 
two  things.  Regardless  of  what  two  things  they  may  be,  this  definition  of  justice  does  not 
sit  comfortably  with  the  idea  that  the  virtues  are  a  kind  of  harmony. 
It  is  difficult  to  determine  how  successful  Plato's  conception  of  courage  is  in  the  Laws 
due  to  the  confusion  surrounding  it.  It  is  clearly  a  problematic  virtue  for  Plato.  It  does  in 
some  respects  seem  like  a  development  from  the  view  in  the  Republic  as  it  no  longer 
excludes  the  behaviour  of  children  and  animals  that  we  would  intuitively  think  of  as 
courageous.  The  removal  of  the  necessity  of  knowledge  for  virtue  also  seems  like  a 
positive  development,  as  the  fact  that  virtue  now  depends  on  either  knowledge  or  belief 
makes  it  a  far  more  accessible  virtue  and  again  seems  to  respond  to  what  our  intuitions 
tell  us  about  it.  However,  the  confusion  created  by  the  contrast  between  Plato's  general 
ethical  theory  of  harmony  and  the  specific  definition  he  gives  us  of  courage  cannot  be 
explained  away.  The  change  in  Plato's  approach  to  courage  should  have  been  taken  into 
account  when  writing  about  the  general  ethical  theory  he  puts  forward  in  the  Laws.  In 
order  to  write  a  coherent  dialogue  he  would  have  to  have  reconsidered  his  position  on  the 
virtues  as  a  whole  so  that  courage  could  have  been  included  in  the  overall  picture  created. 
However,  maybe  it  simply  was  not  possible  to  change  his  definition  of  courage  in  such  a 
way  and  still  retain  his  ethical  theory  in  a  recognizable  form.  By  allowing  courage  to  be  a 
description  of  behaviour  which  was  not  for  the  good  he  loses  the  special  relationship 
between  the  virtues  and  the  force  of  his  ethical  theory.  At  the  end  of  the  Laws  Plato  again 
struggles  with  the  unity  of  the  virtues  and  the  specific  difficulty  facing  him  is  instructive. 
He  says: 
When  we  said  there  were  four  species  of  virtue,  obviously  the  very  fact  that  there  were 
four  meant  that  each  had  to  be  thought  of  as  somehow  distinct  from  the  others..  .  yet  in 
fact  we  call  them  all  by  a  single  name.  We  say  courage  is  virtue,  wisdom  is  virtue,  and 
82  See  section  6,  and  the  Laws  689a+. 
196 the  other  two  similarly,  on  the  ground  that  really  they  are  not  several  things  but  just 
one  -  virtue...  It's  not  hard  to  explain  how  these  two  `virtues'  and  the  rest  differ  from 
each  other  and  how  each  has  acquired  a  different  name.  The  real  problem  is  this:  why, 
precisely,  have  we  described  both  of  them  (as  well  as  the  others)  by  this  common  term 
`virtue'  ?  83 
The  challenge  Plato  believes  now  faces  him  is  not  how  to  explain  that  the  virtues  are 
four,  but  in  what  way  they  can  be  one.  How  indeed,  can  the  virtues  be  one  if  one  of  the 
individual  virtues  can  describe  the  irrational  behaviour  of  the  mercenary?  The  struggle  to 
incorporate  a  more  reasonable  conception  of  courage  in  his  overall  ethical  theory  has 
created  serious  problems  for  Plato.  I  do  not  think  that  he  uses  wisdom  and  courage  by 
accident  in  the  above  section,  for  it  is  courage  with  the  absence  of  wisdom  that  has 
created  so  many  difficulties  for  Plato. 
93  Laws  963c9-d8. 
197 Chapter  8:  Conclusion 
A  common  and  straightforward  way  to  define  courage  is  as  the  capacity  to  overcome 
fears  in  order  to  carry  out  one's  chosen  aims.  As  argued  in  Adkins,  this  would  obviously 
be  vital  in  a  warrior  society  such  as  the  one  described  in  the  Homeric  poems.  However,  it 
is  a  characteristic  that  is  also  essential  to  any  form  of  morality.  Without  the  courage  to  act 
in  accordance  with  your  beliefs,  you  would  not  be  able  to  act  morally  in  situations  where 
there  is  something  to  fear.  In  which  case  the  timid  person  would  not  have  a  clearly 
defined  personality  as  what  they  believe  and  what  they  do  would  not  be  consistent.  A 
problem  with  an  account  of  courage  that  sees  it  as  always  being  a  good  is  that  although 
courage  may  be  a  necessary  condition  of  moral  goodness  it  is  not  necessarily  a  good  in 
itself.  After  all,  a  wicked  man  may  also  need  courage  in  order  to  carry  out  his  aims.  So 
although  courage  is  regarded  by  the  Greeks  and  by  most  other  societies  as  a  very 
important  virtue,  it  is  not  a  good  in  itself.  Kant  expounded  this  point  in  the  Groundwork 
of  the  Metaphysics  of  Morals  when  he  identified  courage  as  a  conditional  good: 
Intelligence,  wit,  judgement,  and  the  other  talents  of  the  mind,  however  they  may  be 
named,  or  courage,  resolution,  perseverance,  as  qualities  of  temperament,  are 
undoubtedly  good  and  desirable  in  many  respects;  but  these  gifts  of  nature  may  also 
become  extremely  bad  and  mischievous  if  the  will  which  is  to  make  use  of  them,  and 
which,  therefore,  constitutes  what  is  called  character,  is  not  good.  .  . 
There  are  even 
some  qualities  which  are  of  service  to  this  good  will  itself  and  may  facilitate  its  action, 
yet  which  have  no  intrinsic  unconditional  value,  but  always  presuppose  a  good  will, 
and  this  qualifies  the  esteem  that  we  justly  have  for  them  and  does  not  permit  us  to 
regard  them  as  absolutely  good. 
Kant  correctly  identified  the  fact  that  courage  may  be  used  for  good  or  for  ill,  depending 
on  the  character  of  the  individual  -a  point  that  was  picked  up  by  Plato  at  the  end  of  his 
life. 
1  Kant,  1.,  Groundwork  of  the  Metaphysics  of  Morals,  p.  138. 
198 The  main  point  to  come  out  of  this  concentrated  study  of  courage  in  Plato  has  been  how 
problematic  this  virtue  was  to  Plato,  partially  due  to  the  fact  that  he  persisted  in  seeing  it 
necessarily  as  a  good  until  The  Laws.  The  difficulties  in  assuming  that  courage  is 
necessarily  a  good  thing  are  apparent  in  the  Laches  and  Protagoras.  Laches'  account  of 
courage  as  endurance  is  on  the  right  lines  but  the  problem  for  Plato  is  that  endurance  is 
not  always  a  good  thing.  In  the  Protagoras  and  the  Laches,  Plato  explores  the  cogency  of 
the  Socratic  idea  that  the  virtues  are  simply  knowledge.  That  not  all  kinds  of  knowledge 
could  fulfil  this  role  is  missed  or  omitted  in  the  Protagoras,  and  this  leaves  the  reader 
dissatisfied  with  the  discussion;  how  could  Plato  expect  us  to  agree  with  the  idea  that 
those  who  do  dangerous  activities  with  knowledge  of  the  practicalities  are  necessarily 
braver  than  those  who  attempt  such  deeds  untrained?  This  omission  is  rectified  in  the 
Laches,  but  even  though  the  Socratic  position  is  considered  with  more  sophistication  than 
in  the  Protagoras,  courage  still  eludes  the  writer's  attempts  to  explain  it  as  part  of  a 
unified  ethical  theory.  From  the  discussion  in  the  Laches  it  becomes  clear  that  Plato 
requires  some  kind  of  moral  knowledge  for  the  identification  of  virtue  with  knowledge 
but  the  theory  is  still  flawed  because  how  knowledge  of  the  good  will  help  to  overcome 
fear  is  not  explained. 
As  I  argued  in  Chapter  3,  the  evidence  suggests  that  Plato  did  not  think  any  feeling 
element  of  fear  was  necessary  for  his  definition  of  courage  at  that  point,  in  fact  as 
Socrates  exemplified  the  ideal  courageous  individual  it  seems  that  rational  emotionless 
decision  making  is  what  is  required.  Such  a  cognitive  based  theory  dismisses  the 
possibility  of.  firstly,  pre-rational  children,  and  non-rational  animals  acting  courageously; 
secondly,  those  with  mistaken  beliefs  (and  therefore  without  knowledge)  of  the  right 
thing  to  do;  and  thirdly  -  and  perhaps  most  importantly  -  those  who  do  experience  the 
feeling  of  fear  but  act  courageously  anyway.  People  who  are  able  to  feel  the  fear  and  do  it 
anyway  would  certainly  have  a  case  for  arguing  that  their  courage  is  even  more  praise- 
worthy  as  they  have  more  to  contend  with  but  still  do  what  they  think  is  the  right  thing. 
And  even  if  it  is  not  more  praise-worthy,  it  surely  still  counts  as  courageous  behaviour. 
Plato  could  perhaps  have  responded  to  such  criticisms  by  simply  accepting  that  children, 
199 animals,  those  with  mistaken  views  and  people  who  feel  fear  are  not  courageous, 
regardless  of  what  our  intuitions  may  be  -  intuitions  can  be  wrong.  However,  the  problem 
with  the  cognitive  theory  in  the  early  dialogues  is  not  just  that  it  dismisses  such 
candidates  for  the  description  of  `courageous',  but  that  the  theories  offered  in  the 
dialogues  I  have  looked  at  are  flawed.  The  Protagoras  is  based  on  a  version  of  hedonism 
that  does  not  work,  and  implies  that  courageous  people  must  take  pleasure  in  doing  brave 
deeds  (which  is  surely  an  unfair  requirement),  does  not  clarify  what  kind  of  knowledge 
that  is  required  and  ultimately  ends  with  both  Protagoras  and  Socrates  appearing  to  be 
committed  to  ideas  that  contradict  their  previous  statements.  The  Laches,  on  the  other 
hand,  may  clarify  certain  unclear  issues  left  over  from  the  Protagoras  but  still  concludes 
with  the  problem  that  if  virtue  is  knowledge  then  we  have  no  good  way  to  distinguish 
them  from  one  another. 
The  Republic  makes  some  changes  to  the  picture.  In  Chapter  6I  demonstrated  the 
importance  of  courage  for  Plato's  new  psychological  model.  As  courage  is  the  defining 
characteristic  of  the  spirited  part  of  the  soul,  and  the  allegiance  of  the  spirited  part 
determines  the  health  of  the  tripartite  soul,  it  holds  a  pivotal  role  in  the  Republic.  In  the 
following  two  chapters  I  look  at  courage  and  the  emotions.  Although  Plato  does  still 
believe  that  the  courageous  individual  will  be  in  some  way  emotionless  -  particularly  in 
this  case  being  without  fear,  particularly  of  death  -  he  does  acknowledge  the  role  that  the 
emotions  can  play  in  making  us  the  kind  of  people  that  we  are,  and  thus  leaves  the 
cognitivism  of  the  early  dialogues  behind.  The  emphasis  he  places  on  the  emotional 
development  of  children  is  perceptive  and  a  considerable  intellectual  step  forward  in  the 
study  of  human  psychology.  The  fact  that  the  Republic  states  that  the  training  of  emotion 
is  important  could  be  said  to  not  sit  happily  with  the  idea  that  courageous  people  were  to 
Plato  fearless  -  after  all  he  does  not  say  that  the  early  emotional  education  is  intended  to 
eradicate  the  emotions.  I  have  shown  that  it  is  likely  that  the  Philosopher  Rulers  were 
expected  to  be  fearless,  and  only  have  an  understanding  of  what  should  be  feared  without 
experiencing  this  fear.  This  interpretation  is  the  most  plausible  open  to  us  as  the 
Philosopher  Rulers  will  not  contemplate  doing  what  should  be  feared,  and  it  is  a  truism 
200 that  we  do  not  fear  the  dangerous  options  we  know  we  have  no  intention  of  taking.  The 
courage  of  the  Auxiliaries  however  is  harder  to  interpret.  They  will  only  have  the  early 
stage  of  the  education  process,  and  will  not  develop  knowledge  and  therefore  appreciate 
the  real  reasons  for  their  beliefs.  Their  emotions  will  surely  have  a  greater  role  to  play  in 
their  behaviour  because  of  this  and  this  may  mean  that  Plato  intended  the  Auxiliaries  to 
be  trained  to  actually  experience  fear  at  the  immoral  action.  If  this  is  indeed  what  Plato 
intended  it  would  unfortunately  make  his  theory  far  less  convincing.  We  simply  do  not 
experience  fear  in  such  a  way. 
Thus  we  learn  from  the  Republic  that  Plato  believes  that  for  the  Philosopher  Rulers  not 
only  must  the  fear  of  death  be  eradicated  but  also  that  no  other  fear  will  be  experienced  as 
part  of  their  courage.  However,  the  ideal  Philosopher  Rulers  may  always  be  courageous 
but  given  that  they  will  in  all  likelihood  never  be  instantiated  by  any  actual  human  being 
is  it  really  a  relevant  depiction  of  a  kind  of  courage?  The  Auxiliaries  are  perhaps 
expected  to  not  be  completely  fearless,  but  it  is  not  fear  of  the  danger  they  are  going 
towards  that  is  supposed  to  frighten  them.  The  fear  that  Plato  may  think  they  experience 
is  fear  of  doing  what  is  immoral  instead  of  physically  dangerous.  The  idea  that  people  can 
be  trained  to  experience  fear  in  this  way  does  not  conform  to  our  attitudes  about  human 
psychology.  If  the  Auxiliaries,  like  the  Rulers,  are  actually  intended  to  be  fearless  then 
they  face  the  same  difficulty.  It  is  also  probable  that  Plato  was  at  this  point  or  soon  after 
beginning  to  realise  that  the  traditional  idea  that  courage  was  necessarily  a  good  thing 
was  actually  not  set  in  stone.  If  courage  was  a  good  thing,  and  by  this  Plato  meant  good 
for  the  individual,  then  what  of  those  who  die  in  their  first  battle?  Plato's  tripartite  soul 
can  explain  why  courage  is  beneficial  internally  but  why  would  this  entail  a  good  life2? 
Courage  is  not  the  kind  of  virtue  that  is  always  good  for  the  agent,  even  if  it  might  always 
have  some  kind  of  utilitarian  benefit  to  the  society  of  which  you  are  part.  The  main 
problem  with  the  two  accounts  Plato  gives  of  courage  in  the  Republic  -  the  courage  of  the 
Rulers  and  the  courage  of  the  Auxiliaries  -  is  that  in  real  life  we  do  not  have  the  political 
framework  of  the  Republic.  So  without  Philosopher  Rulers  or  Auxiliaries  in  the  Platonic 
2  Plato  does  not  use  the  promise  of  the  afterlife  as  a  necessary  reason  for  behaving  morally. 
201 sense  no  one  is  really  courageous.  On  a  more  positive  note,  Plato's  theory  does  not  have 
to  deal  with  the  issue  of  supererogation  when  defining  courage  -  he  simply  sees 
courageous  behaviour  as  necessary  in  the  same  way  as  being  just  or  temperate.  This 
solution  however,  seems  to  disregard  the  fact  that  courageous  behaviour  should  perhaps 
not  always  be  expected  by  the  virtuous  person. 
In  the  Laws  Plato  changes  his  mind  about  courage.  Perhaps  due  to  the  difficulty  of  how  to 
define  the  apparently  courageous  behaviour  of  those  not  primarily  driven  by  Reason  or 
Spirit,  in  the  Laws  Plato  accepts  the  actions  of  the  mercenary  soldier,  children  and 
animals  as  brave.  However,  he  unfortunately  does  not  take  the  step  of  recognising  that 
courage  is  only  good  on  condition  that  it  is  used  for  the  right  ends.  The  division  of  goods 
into  divine  and  human  -  the  latter  being  of  no  value  without  the  former  -  gives  us  an 
insight  into  Plato's  ethical  theory  but  does  not  help  to  understand  courage.  It  might  seem 
that  courage  ought  to  be  classified  as  a  human  good  (a  quality  which  is  of  great  value 
when  accompanied  by  wisdom  but  is  of  no  value  or  is  even  harmful  without  it)  but  Plato 
persists  in  treating  it  as  a  divine  good.  Thus  Plato's  final  work  follows  the  general  trend  I 
have  outlined  from  the  view  of  courage  as  simply  knowledge  of  what  should  be  feared  in 
the  early  dialogues,  to  the  later  addition  of  a  non-cognitive  element  such  as  habituation 
through  education  in  the  Republic.  In  the  Laws,  knowledge  is  no  longer  necessary  for  the 
central  kind  of  virtue,  as  true  belief  is  sufficient,  and  the  emphasis  on  education  is  still  an 
important  theme  in  the  process  of  becoming  courageous.  This  widening  of  the  scope  of 
courage  seems  to  fit  in  with  our  intuitions  about  the  ability  of  those  not  driven  by  good 
intentions  to  be  brave.  However,  the  fact  that  courage  is  something  special  -a  quality  not 
necessarily  found  in  the  ordinarily  virtuous  individual  -  is  never  acknowledged  in  Plato's 
work,  and  is  an  oversight  on  his  part. 
In  the  Laws  Plato  accepts  that  fear  of  danger,  physical  damage  or  death  may  be  present  in 
the  courageous  individual.  The  definition  given  at  Laws  633  shows  that  Plato  accepts  that 
it  is  likely  that  these  fears  will  be  present  in  a  courageous  person,  and  thus  part  of  courage 
202 is  the  ability  to  overcome  them.  However,  as  Plato's  general  ethical  theory  in  the  Laws  is 
concerned  with  the  harmony  between  judgement  and  desire  how  is  this  to  be  squared  with 
the  idea  of  courage  as  the  overcoming  of  fear?  Plato's  ideas  about  courage  have  changed, 
but  not  in  the  same  way  as  his  overall  theory,  and  so  they  are  at  variance  with  one 
another.  At  the  end  of  Plato's  final  work  he  is  still  concerned  with  how  the  unity  of  the 
virtues  is  to  be  understood,  as  he  is  at  a  loss  as  to  how  courage  and  knowledge  could  be 
one.  Indeed,  as  courage  is  no  longer  always  a  virtue  that  question  would  present  serious 
problems  for  Plato.  Thus  Plato  does  not  succeed  at  any  point  in  providing  a  wholly 
adequate  account  of  courage. 
203 Bibliography 
Adkins,  A.  W.  H.,  Merit  and  Responsibility,  Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  1960. 
Aeschylus,  The  Suppliants,  trans.  Philip  Vellacott,  Penguin,  Harmondsworth,  1961. 
Annas,  Julia,  An  Introduction  to  Plato's  Republic,  Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  1981. 
Annas,  Julia,  Platonic  Ethics,  Old  and  New,  Cornell  University  Press,  Ithaca  and  London, 
1999. 
Aristotle,  Politics,  trans.  Ernest  Barker,  Oxford  University  Press,  Oxford,  1995. 
Bobonich,  C.,  Plato's  Utopia  Recast,  Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  2002. 
Bobonich,  C.,  `Akrasia  and  Agency  in  Plato's  Laws  and  Republic',  AGPH.,  Vol.  76, 
1994,  pp.  1-36. 
Davidson,  D.,  Essays  on  Actions  and  Events,  Oxford  University  Press,  Oxford,  1980. 
Devereux,  Daniel  T.,  `Courage  and  Wisdom  in  Plato's  Laches',  Journal  of  the  History  of 
Philosophy,  Vol.  15,1977,  pp.  129-141. 
Dummett,  Michael,  `Realism',  Synthese  52,1982,  pp.  55-112. 
Foot,  Philippa,  Moral  Dilemmas,  Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  2002. 
Gill,  Christopher,  `Ethical  Reflection  and  the  Shaping  of  Character:  Plato's  Republic  and 
Stoicism',  Proceedings  of  the  Boston  Area  Colloquium  in  Ancient  Philosophy,  Vol.  XII, 
1996,  Ed.  Cleary  &  Wians,  ppl93-225. 
Gill,  Christopher,  `Plato  and  the  Education  of  Character',  Archiv  für  Geschichte  der 
Philosophie,  Vol.  67,1985,  pp.  1-26. 
Goldie,  Peter,  The  Emotions,  A  Philosophical  Exploration,  Oxford  University  Press, 
Oxford,  2000. 
Gosling,  J.  C.  B.,  Pleasure  and  Desire:  the  case  for  hedonism  reviewed,  Clarendon  Press, 
Oxford,  1969. 
Gosling  &  Taylor,  The  Greeks  on  Pleasure,  Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  1982. 
Griffin,  James,  `Are  there  incommensurable  values?  ',  Philosophy  and  Public  affairs, 
1977,  pp.  39-59. 
Guthrie,  W.  K.  C.,  A  History  of  Greek  Philosophy,  Vol.  IV,  Cambridge  University  Press, 
Cambridge,  1975. 
Heyd,  David,  Supererogation,  Cambridge  University  Press,  Cambridge,  1982. 
Ilobbs,  Angela,  Plato  and  the  Hero,  Cambridge  University  Press,  Cambridge,  2000. 
Isomer,  The  Iliad,  trans.  E.  V.  Rieu,  Penguin,  Harmondsworth,  1950. 
Irwin,  T.,  Plato's  Moral  Theory,  Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  1977. 
Kahn,  C.,  Plato  and  the  Socratic  dialogue,  Cambridge  University  Press,  Cambridge, 
1996. 
Kahn,  Charles,  `Did  Plato  Write  Socratic  Dialogues?  ',  Essays  on  the  Philosophy  of 
Socrates,  Ed.  Ilugh  H.  Benson,  Oxford  University  Press,  Oxford,  1992,  pp.  35-51. 
Kant,  Immanuel,  Groundwork  of  the  Metaphysics  of  Morals,  Cambridge  University 
Press,  Cambridge,  1998. 
Kiosko,  George,  `Demotike  Arete  in  the  Republic',  History  of  Political  Thought,  (3), 
1982,  pp.  363-381. 
Korsgaard,  C.,  `Two  distinctions  in  Goodness',  The  Philosophical  Review,  April,  1983, 
pp.  169-195. 
204 Kraut,  Richard,  `Reason  and  Justice  in  Plato's  Republic',  Exegesis  and  Argument,  ed. 
E.  N.  Lee  et  al,  1973,  pp.  207-224. 
Laks,  A.,  `Legislation  and  Demiurgy:  On  the  Relationship  Between  Plato's  Republic  and 
Laws',  Classical  Antiquity,  Vol.  9,  (2)  Oct.  1990,  pp.  219-229. 
Lorenz,  Hendrik,  `Desire  and  Reason  in  Plato's  Republic',  Oxford  Studies  in  Ancient 
Philosophy,  Vol.  27,2004,  pp.  83-116. 
Mayhew,  R.,  Aristotle's  criticism  of  Plato's  Republic,  Rowman  and  Littlefield,  Lanham, 
Oxford,  1997. 
Morrow,  G.,  Plato's  Cretan  City:  a  historical  interpretation  of  the  Laws,  Princeton 
University  Press,  Princeton,  N.  J,  1993. 
O'Brien,  Michael,  `The  Unity  of  the  Laches',  Essays  in  Ancient  Philosophy,  Ed.  John  P. 
Anton  &  George  L.  Kustas,  State  University  of  New  York  Press,  Albany,  1971,  pp.  303- 
315. 
Penner,  T.,  `The  Unity  of  Virtue',  Plato  2:  Ethics,  Politics,  Religion  and  the  Soul,  Oxford 
Readings  in  Philosophy,  Ed.  Gail  Fine,  Oxford  University  Press,  Oxford,  1999,  pp.  78- 
104. 
Penner,  Terry,  `Socrates  and  the  early  dialogues',  The  Cambridge  Companion  to  Plato, 
Ed.  Richard  Kraut,  Cambridge  University  Press,  Cambridge,  1992,  pp.  121-169. 
Price,  A.  W.,  Mental  Conflict,  Routledge,  London,  1995. 
Raz,  Joseph,  The  Morality  of  Freedom,  Oxford  University  Press,  Oxford,  1986. 
Reeve,  C.  D.  C.,  Philosopher-Kings:  The  Argument  of  Plato's  Republic,  Princeton 
University  Press,  Princeton,  1988. 
Robinson,  T.  M.,  `Soul  and  Immortality  in  Republic  X',  Phronesis  12,1967,  pp.  147-151. 
Rudebusch,  George,  Socrates,  Pleasure,  and  Value,  Oxford  University  Press,  Oxford, 
1999. 
Sachs,  David,  `A  Fallacy  in  Plato's  Republic',  The  Philosophical  Review,  1963,  pp.  141- 
158. 
Santas,  G.,  `Socrates  at  Work  on  Virtue  and  Knowledge  in  Plato's  Laches',  The 
Philosophy  of  Socrates:  A  Collection  of  Critical  Essays,  ed.  Gregory  Vlastos,  Anchor 
Books,  Garden  City,  New  York,  1971,  pp.  177-208. 
Santas,  G.,  `Plato's  Protagoras  and  Explanations  of  Weakness',  The  Philosophy  of 
Socrates:  A  Collection  of  Critical  Essays,  ed.  Gregory  Vlastos,  Anchor  Books,  Garden 
City,  New  York,  1971,  pp.  264-298. 
Santas,  G.,  Goodness  and  Justice,  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  the  Moderns,  Blackwell, 
Massachusetts  and  Oxford,  2001. 
Seung,  T.  K.,  &  Bonevac,  D.,  `Plural  Values  and  Indeterminate  Rankings',  Ethics, 
Vol.  102,  No.  4,  pp.  799-813. 
Shorey,  Paul,  Republic,  trans.  Shorey,  The  Loeb  Classical  Library,  William  Heinemann 
Ltd.,  London,  1930. 
Sorabji,  Richard,  Emotion  and  Peace  of  Mind,  Oxford  University  Press,  Oxford,  2000. 
Stalley,  R.,  An  Introduction  to  Plato's  Laws,  Basil  Blackwell,  Oxford,  1983. 
Stalley,  Richard,  `Plato's  Argument  for  the  Division  of  the  Reasoning  and  Appetitive 
Elements  within  the  Soul',  Phronesis,  Vol.  20,  no.  2,1975,  pp.  110-128. 
Stalley,  Richard,  `Punishment  and  Plato's  Ideal  State',  Polis,  Vol.  16,  Issues  I  and  2, 
1999,  pp.  51-72. 
205 Stalley,  Richard,  `Justice  in  Plato's  Laws,  Plato's  Laws:  From  Theory  into  Practice', 
Proceedings  of  the  VI  Symposium  Platonicum,  Ed.  Samuel  Scolnicov  &  Luc  Brisson, 
Vol.  15,2003,  pp.  174-185. 
Stocker,  Michael,  Plural  and  Conflicting  Values,  Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  1990. 
Szasz,  Thomas  S.,  The  Myth  of  Mental  Illness,  Paladin,  St.  Albans,  1962. 
Vlastos,  G.,  Socratic  Studies,  Cambridge  University  Press,  Cambridge,  1994. 
Vlastos,  G.,  Socrates:  Ironist  and  Moral  Philosopher,  Cambridge  University  Press, 
Cambridge,  1991. 
Vlastos,  G.,  `The  Theory  of  Social  Justice  in  the  Polis  in  Plato's  Republic',  in 
Interpretations  of  Plato:  a  Swarthmore  symposium,  ed.  Helen  North,  Lugduni 
Batavorum,  Brill,  1977,  pp.  1-40. 
Von  Wright,  Georg  Henrik,  The  Varieties  of  Goodness,  Routledge  &  Kegan  Paul, 
London,  1963. 
Walton,  Douglas  N.,  Courage:  A  Philosophical  Investigation,  University  of  California 
Press,  Berkeley,  Los  Angeles,  London,  1986. 
Wiggins,  David,  `Truth,  Invention  and  The  Meaning  of  Life',  Proceedings  of  the  British 
Academy,  Vol.  LXII,  1976. 
Zeckhauser  &  Schaefer,  `Public  policy  and  normative  economic  theory',  The  Study  of 
Policy  Formation,  ed.  Raymond  Bauer  &  Kenneth  J.  Gergen,  New  York,  The  Free  Press, 
London,  Collier  Macmillan,  pp.  27-101. 
.  'tý 
C(JA  -ZS(,, 
fat. 
ý`ý  ý'Zi  206 